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ABSTRACT 
 
The US Democrats, Australian Labor Party and British Labour Party adopted the issue of 
childcare assistance for middle-income families as both a campaign and as a legislative issue 
decades apart from one and other, despite similar rates of female employment. The varied timing 
of parties’ policy adoption is also uncorrelated with labour shortages, union density and female 
trade union membership. However, it is correlated with two politically-charged factors: first, 
each party adopted childcare policy as their rate of ‘organised female labour mobilisation’ (union 
density interacted with female trade union membership) reached its country-level peak; second, 
each party adopted the issue within the broader context of post-industrial electoral change, when 
shifts in both class and gender-based party-voter linkages dictated that the centre-left could no 
longer win elections by focusing largely on a male, blue-collar base. Were these parties driven to 
promote childcare in response to the changing needs of their traditional affiliates (unions), or 
was policy adoption an outcome of autonomous party elites in search of a new electoral 
constituency? 
 
Using both qualitative and quantitative techniques, this research analyses the correlates of policy 
adoption and the specific mechanisms through which party position change on the issue took 
place (e.g. legislator conversion versus legislator turnover). It finds that parties largely adopted 
the issue as a means to make strategic electoral appeals to higher-educated, post-materialist and 
in particular, female voters. However, the speed in which they were able to make these appeals 
(and hence, the time at which they adopted the issue) was contingent on the speed in which elites 
were able to reform their party’s internal organisation and specifically, wrest power away from 
both the unions and rank-and-file members in order to centralise decision making power on 
election campaigns, executive appointments and candidate selection processes into the hands of 
the leadership.  
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Chapter One: Introduction  
 
1.1 Background and Research Question  
Less than twenty years ago the post-war social policy framework, in which income-related social 
insurance protected breadwinners and their dependent families from the trials of old age, illness 
and disability was deemed a “frozen welfare state landscape” too electorally perilous to retrench 
(Esping-Andersen 1996, 24). Yet as welfare state analysts recognised that, across the OECD, 
several types of benefits that catered to “old social risks” were being re-indexed and in de-facto 
terms, scaled back (Korpi and Palme 2003, Bonoli 2005), scholars began to pay attention to one 
sector of the welfare state experiencing a period of growth: work/family reconciliation policies.  
Governments in the OECD have responded to the exigencies of a post-industrial economy, 
whereby deindustrialisation and tertiarisation have prompted a significant increase in not only 
female labour force participation but also the proportion of part-time and temporary employment 
(Bonoli 2005, Häusermann 2010, Fleckenstein & Seeleib-Kaiser 2011) by developing social 
policies that address such “new social risks.” Examples include pensions that cover employees 
with discontinuous work patterns and paid parental leave following childbirth, etc. (Bonoli 2005, 
Jenson and St-Martin 2006, Huber and Stephens 2006). Affordable childcare is a central 
component of work/family reconciliation since it is argued to fulfil a number of functions: it 
boosts income tax receipts by supporting dual-earner families and allowing lone-parents to enter 
the labour market, it ensures employers are supplied with a large pool of labour, fosters child 
development and according to some, promotes social mobility (Esping-Andersen 1996).  
 
Yet access to affordable childcare varies from country to country, as governments have 
responded to increased demand for childcare both at different times and in different ways, often 
out of sync with their designated “worlds of welfare” or “variety of capitalism” (Esping-
Andersen 1990, Hall and Soskice 2001). For example, Figures 1.1 and 1.2 display a great deal of 
variation in spending on family benefits and on childcare expenditure across the OECD.
1
 
Countries within the ‘liberal welfare regime’ are highlighted in Figure 1.2  
                                                     
1
 Excluding lone-parent benefits. 
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Figure 1.1 Family benefits as % GDP, 2008  (Source: author calculation based on OECD 2011) 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Childcare expenditure as % GDP, 2007 (Source: author calculation based on OECD 2011) 
 
However, the value of total childcare spending can be a poor indicator of the actual costs parents 
face.
2
 Figure 1.3 displays the total childcare assistance awarded to an average earning, dual-
income family via services, cash benefits and tax breaks across the OECD. These are offset 
against each country’s average childcare fees in order to calculate the net costs to parents.  
 
 
                                                     
2
 Reasons for this include OECD accounting standards (which, for example, count the UK’s Working Tax Credit as 
a childcare expenditure despite the fact it benefits parents with children of all ages), inflationary effects of demand-
led subsidies on childcare fees, a fragmented childcare market and high overhead costs, etc. 
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Figure 1. 3 Childcare benefits, fees and costs, 2008 (Source: author calculation based on OECD 2011) 
Looking at the ‘liberal market economies’ of interest to this research, one can see that a dual-
earner, average income family in Australia would pay 14% of their net family income towards 
childcare, relative to 23% in the US and 27% in the UK.
 3
 Yet, variation within this regime type 
extends beyond spending levels and policy outputs: countries in the liberal welfare regime 
display greater variation in the time at which their political parties adopted the issue of childcare 
than they do on overall spending and net-cost patterns. Specifically, centre-left parties in 
Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States – countries that are all classified as ‘liberal 
market economies’ (Hall and Soskice 2001) and ‘liberal welfare regimes’ (Esping-Andersen 
1990)
4
  – illustrate this schism quite well. Despite having similar levels of female employment 
since the 1960s, each of these parties placed the issue of childcare assistance for middle-income 
families
5
 on their agenda at quite different times: in the US, Democrats first placed universal 
childcare on their party platform and passed legislation to provide universal access to subsidised 
childcare places during the late 1960s and early 1970s, legislating heavily on the issue between 
                                                     
3
 Dual earning family earning their country’s average wage with two children, aged two and three, in full-time 
childcare. 
4
 Frank Castles argued in 1985 that the Australian welfare state occupied what should be a fourth category of 
Esping-Andersen’s  “three worlds”: the “wage earners’ welfare state.” Castles based his assertion on Australia’s 
high-level minimum wage policies, a strong degree of corporatism (through the Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission, its powers weakened from the 1990s before being abolished in 2010), and the fact that Australia’s 
means-tested social insurance policies benefited a wider range of incomes than did those in the US and the UK. 
Notwithstanding, Esping-Andersen reports that Australia as of the 1980s had a comparatively low level of social 
expenditure, above-average levels of private social expenditure (i.e. on health and pensions) and a system dominated 
by means-tested benefits (1990, 70-75). This suggests that an expensive, centrally funded, universal childcare 
system would not seem as natural a fit for the Australian welfare state as it would, for example, the Danish. In other 
words, this research suggests that when comparing the Australian welfare state to its counterparts in Britain and the 
US, there are more similarities than differences relevant to our question.  
5
 As opposed to “welfare to work” childcare policy, wherein childcare provision/fee assistance is strictly means-
tested so as to shift low-income parents into the labour market. Definitions under Section 1.4 will elaborate on this 
point. 
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1971 and 1972.
6
  Over ten years later, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) turned childcare 
assistance into a popular campaign issue when it ran the 1983 federal election on the promise of 
an “Accord” with the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) that would define childcare 
as part of the “national social wage.” During the 1984 federal election, the ALP pledged to 
nearly double the number of childcare places in the country in what was, according to Brennan, 
the “biggest promise made by the Government during the campaign” (Brennan 1998, 165, 176). 
Yet it would be another 14 years before childcare access and affordability became a widely 
discussed and politically contested issue in the UK, during Labour’s 1997 general election 
campaign.  
 
In light of this temporal variation, the question guiding this research asks, ‘Why did centre-left 
parties in Australia, the UK and the US adopt childcare assistance for middle-income families at 
different times, given their similar female employment rates and similar welfare state regime 
types?’ In analysing the causes of such variation, it attempts to identify the determinants that lay 
behind each party’s decision to adopt the issue, estimating the extent to which parties did so in 
the aim of appealing to new electoral constituencies and the extent to which they were coaxed by 
party-linked interest groups (namely trade unions). While this work addresses these issues 
largely from a ‘party politics’ lens, and specifically locates itself in the party change and party 
position change literature, it also adopts into its framework components that are shared with the 
welfare state development body of literature, in particular power resources. Its findings bear 
relevance to the discussion surrounding left party change in the post-industrial era or, as 
Kitschelt (1994) described it, a ‘transformation’ of social democratic parties.  It does not attempt 
to provide a comprehensive model explaining childcare policy adoption but instead, within the 
context of social democratic party change, addresses the relative importance of interest group 
pressure and electoral imperative. 
 
1.2 Case Selection 
This research takes a ‘most similar systems design’; there are certainly differences between the 
three countries at hand and perhaps the most obvious of these are institutional: the US is federal 
country, operating under a presidential system and a bicameral legislature, Australia is a federal, 
parliamentary system with a bicameral legislature and the UK is a unitary Parliamentary system 
with a de-facto unicameral legislature
7
.  Yet their similarities are clear: for most of the post-war 
era, party systems in all three countries have been dominated by two major political parties or 
                                                     
6
 After initially welcoming a landmark childcare bill, The Child Development Act, President Nixon took issue with 
an administrative change made to the bill in Conference Committee. He vetoed the final version in December 1971.  
This will be elaborated on in Chapter Three (Morgan 2001). 
7
 To the extent that the House of Lords does not typically introduce legislation as do the Australian and US Senates, 
particularly when said legislation requires spending and/or raising tax. 
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permanent coalitions,
8
 each of the three countries are characterised as welfare state spending 
‘laggards’ (Wilensky 2002, Castles 2009) and as ‘liberal market economies’ (LMEs) (Hall and 
Soskice 2001). Moreover, the institutional differences between the US and the British/Australian 
legislatures may not prove to be a crucial barrier to comparison, given that this thesis asks why 
parties adopted childcare in both legislative and electoral terms
9
 at different times from each 
other, rather than whether or not a particular childcare bill was passed through the legislature and 
signed into law. This limits the potential risks that could arise from comparing systems with 
different numbers of veto points or executive-legislative relations. 
 
a. United States 
Parties’ attention to childcare can be measured in legislative or electoral terms, for example by 
the number of words, sentences and specific policy commitments relating to non means-tested 
childcare in party platforms (Figure 1.4).  
 
 
Figure 1. 4 Childcare related words and policy commitments in Democratic Party Platforms, 1960-1988 (Source: Woolley 
and Peters 2013) 
The number of childcare related bills introduced into the legislature is another measure: Patsy T. 
Mink (D-HI) introduced the country’s first universal pre-school and childcare bills in 1967 and 
1969 (Cohen 2001, 32). Subsequent interest in the issue arose in the House Education and Labor 
Committee, with leading Democrats in both legislative chambers working alongside an array of 
                                                     
8
 In Australia, the Liberal Party holds a permanent coalition with the National Party (formerly the Country Party), 
though the Coalition   is often referred to simply as ‘the Liberals.’ UK Labour did face a formidable challenge 
during the 1983 and 1987 general elections when a group of breakaway Labour Party members formed the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP) and ran both elections in an ‘Alliance’ with the (then) Liberal Party, winning nearly 25% of 
the vote in 1983 (relative to 27 and 42% for Labour and the Conservatives, respectively), and 23% in 1987, relative 
to 31 and 42% for Labour and the Tories. The Alliance was disbanded in 1988 (House of Commons 1984, 1987).  
9
 By either campaigning on the issue or co-sponsoring/debating childcare legislation. 
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interest groups to develop a universal childcare policy (the Child Development Act) throughout 
1969 to 1972; separate bills followed up through the mid 1970s. A related measure is the number 
of times House Democrats co-sponsored a middle-income related childcare bill in a given 
Congress (Figure 1.5). Here, the increase in attention to childcare between the late 1960s to mid 
1970s becomes apparent. 
 
 
Figure 1.5 House Democrats co-sponsoring childcare legislation, 87th-97th Congresses (Source: Congressional Record 
1965-74, Thomas 2014) 
 
The first spate of attention to the issue, in terms of both manifesto words and policy proposals 
occurred in the late 1960s/early 1970s. Childcare again became a Democratic-party focus during 
the mid and late 1980s (particularly in manifesto terms), somewhat outstripping the attention it 
received during the early 1970s though as Chapter Three will outline, these proposals for the 
most part advocated means-tested rather than universal benefits and services  (Cohen 2001, 
Karch 2013).
10
 Moreover, the point of interest is why such a sudden increase in attention first 
happened in the 1970s and on a comparative level, predated those spates of attention in Australia 
and the UK by roughly ten and 25 years, respectively. 
 
b. Australia 
During 1972, Australia’s Liberal-Country governing Coalition passed the Commonwealth Child 
Care Act (CCA), the first federal-level intervention into the Australian childcare market. 
However neither the Act’s funding mechanism nor its intended beneficiaries were clearly 
identified and throughout the 1970s, federal outlays remained stagnant (going mainly to pre-
                                                     
10
 Of interest is the 1984 platform, which as Figure 1.4 shows, displayed the highest level of attention childcare 
since 1972. This was the year that Walter Mondale, Senate sponsor of the 1971 Child Development Act, ran for 
President. 
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schools rather than day care centres) (Brennan 1994, 115, 203). The issue largely stayed out of 
the ALP and the Coalition’s legislative agendas, as well as their party platforms. It was not until 
the late 1970s/early 1980s and specifically the 1983 and 1984 federal elections that the ALP 
campaigned on the issue of childcare access and funding in particular.
11
 In the run up to the 1983 
election they also signed a ‘Prices and Incomes Accord’ with the Australian Council of Trade 
Unions (ACTU),
12
 which formalised an agreement for wage restraint in return for an increase in 
the “social wage” – childcare being denoted as key component of said wage – and the Accord 
being a central element of the ALP’s campaign. During the 1984 campaign the ALP promised to 
expand by 50% the number of subsidised places available to children from families of all 
incomes, at a total cost of AU $100 million; at the time this was the largest childcare campaign 
pledge of any Australian political party in history (Brennan 1998, 176). Returning to power in 
1984, the ALP extended fee relief for families earning up to $30,000 (it had been $20,000 under 
the Coalition Government) and increased the number of universally available Commonwealth-
funded childcare places by over 60% in their first two years of government.  
 
The increase in ALP attention to the issue can be seen via the number of words referring to 
childcare in their national party platforms and also, the number of sentences and specific 
commitments made on the issue in ALP Federal Leaders speeches (see Figures 1.6 and 1.7).   
 
Figure 1.6 Childcare mentions, commitments in ALP federal leader speeches, 1969-1987  (Source: Australian Politics, 
2014) 
                                                     
11
 The 1983 and 1984 elections were deliberately held in close proximity: the double dissolution that ended the 
Coalition’s Fraser Government in 1983 disturbed the typically similar schedule of House and Senate elections; as 
such the 1984 election was held 18 months early, in order to bring the House and Senate election schedule back into 
line (Nethercote 2001, 330). 
12
 Largest peak-level trade union confederation in Australia. 
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Figure 1.7 Number of childcare-related words in ALP National Platform, 1967-1988 (Source: Australian Politics, 2014) 
Whilst there was a spate of attention (measured by words and sentences devoted to the issue) 
following the 1972 Child Care Act, this mostly levelled off, as did any policy commitments, 
until the early 1980s. Party position change on the issue can also be measured by the number of 
times ALP legislators raised the issue during Parliamentary debates. Figure 1.8 depicts the 
increase in childcare discussion that occurred amongst ALP legislators in the House of 
Representatives from the 26
th
 to 34
th
 Parliament (1969-1987), with a peak of attention to the 
issue in the early-mid 1980s.
13
   
 
Figure 1.8 ALP debates on childcare: proportion of ALP MPs who debated and total number of mentions, 1966-1987 
(Source: Commonwealth of Australia Hansard, 2013) 
 
 
                                                     
13
 Whilst there was a noticeable drop during the 33
rd
 federal parliament (1983-84), this can largely be attributed to 
the fact that 10 weeks out of the parliamentary year were spent campaigning for the 1984 election, which occurred 
only 1.5 years after the March 1983 federal election. 
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c. Britain 
For nearly all of the post-war era, British childcare was a highly decentralised and poorly funded 
policy, with a scarce amount of places in either the publicly run or the private sectors (Randall 
2000). By the early 1990s there was only one childcare place per every nine children under the 
age of eight in England (Waldfogel and Garnham 2008), leaving 94% of mothers who required 
childcare to have to rely on their family for help (Hakim et al, 2008). Party competition over 
childcare policy was so minimal that in 1984, the Thatcher Government were able to classify 
workplace nurseries as a ‘perk’ and institute a tax on parents whose children utilised them 
(Randall 1996, 183, Policy Studies Institute, 1989, 57). The Labour Party, in opposition since 
1979 and undergoing a period of modernisation under Neil Kinnock from the mid-to-late 1980s, 
began to increase their attention to childcare in their party programmes and platforms; there was 
a heightened focus on childcare during the 1992 election that continued under John Smith’s 
leadership and after his death in 1994, rose again under Tony Blair. In 1997, Labour's campaign 
manifesto touted a “National Childcare Strategy” which included universal provision “to match 
the requirements of the modern labour market” (Labour Party 1997).  
 
Figures 1.9-1.11 depict the increase in Labour Party attention to the issue as measured in three 
different ways: 1) the number of words referring to childcare in Labour Party manifestos, 2) the 
number of sentences related to and specific policy commitments on childcare in Labour Party 
Leader’s speeches at the annual conference and 3) the number of times Labour Party MPs 
mentioned childcare during parliamentary debates. There was a sharp increase in words about 
childcare in Labour Party manifestos from 1992, as well as an increase in childcare spending 
commitments from the mid 1990s. Figure 1.11 displays increased attention to the issue as 
measured by mentions in parliamentary debate. Here, attention to the issue seemed to occur 
sooner (i.e. from the 50th Parliament, 1987-1992) than it appears when policy adoption is 
measured by manifesto words or leader commitments. By the 52
nd
 Parliament (1997-2001), the 
proportion of Labour MPs debating the issue had more than doubled since the 49
th 
Parliament 
(1983-87).  
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Figure 1.9 Number of childcare-related words in Labour Party manifestos, 1966-2001 (Source: Labour Party, 1966-2001) 
  
 
Figure 1.10 Childcare related sentences, spending commitments in Labour Leader conference speeches, 1975-2000 
(Source: Labour Party, 1966-2000) 
 
Figure 1.11 Labour MPs’ debates on childcare, proportion of Labour MPs debating childcare, 1970-1991 (Source: House 
of Commons Hansard, 2013) 
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1.3 Theoretical Framework 
a.  Structural foundations 
Whilst this research anchors itself in the party change and party position change literature, it 
attempts to link these works to the body of literature on welfare state development. In terms of 
party position change, it identifies a puzzle of temporal variation (parties adopted childcare at 
different times) and employs David Karol’s (2009) models of party position change in order to 
disentangle two hypothesised drivers of childcare policy adoption: electoral imperative and 
interest group pressure. Its findings are situated in the discussion surrounding both the 
transformation of social democratic parties’ electoral bases and internal organisational structures 
during the post-industrial era. The following section intends to guide the reader through the 
structural foundation of the research question and then introduce the theoretical framework from 
which it attempts to answer the question. 
 
A structural-functionalist approach to explaining why the US Democrats, Australian Labour 
Party and British Labour Party adopted childcare three decades apart from one and other (US in 
the early 1970s, Australia in the early 1980s and the UK in the mid-to-late 1990s) would first 
look toward underlying demand for childcare provision, perhaps best indicated by female labour 
force participation rates. However, these countries experienced a similar trajectory of female 
employment from the early 1960s to the 2000s: Figure 1.12 below displays similar levels of 
absolute and relative growth in female employment across all three countries, despite parties 
having adopted the issue at such different times. General unemployment trends also display little 
correlation: where we might expect childcare to be adopted during periods of below average 
unemployment (i.e. during a stark labour shortage) the Democrats began advancing childcare 
policy during the early 1970s, when total unemployment ranged between 5 and 5.6% against a 
35-year average (1965-2000) of six per cent (BLS). The average unemployment rate in Australia 
between 1972 and 2000 was roughly six per cent; when the ALP promoted childcare during the 
mid 1980s it was higher – at roughly eight per cent (ABS). Between 1970 and 1999, the UK’s 
average unemployment rate was 7.5%; in the three years surrounding the 1997 election (1996-
1998) it averaged 6.4% (Denman 1996, ILO). The inference being that, across the board, these 
parties did not adopt childcare policy during times of significant labour shortages. 
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Figure 1.12 Females as per cent of total civilian employment, 1960-2008 (Source: OECD Stat, 2013)14 
 
Taking a cue from Korpi’s (1983) Democratic Class Struggle, a power-resources approach 
would suggest that parties and left-power (i.e. trade union strength) ‘matter.’ In all three 
countries under scrutiny it was centre-left parties that first adopted the issue of childcare. Yet the 
‘parties matter’ thesis is not entirely conclusive: whilst Democrats led on the childcare issue, 
they were not without support from leading Congressional Republicans; just as Australia’s 
Liberal-National (centre-right) Coalition promised federal childcare assistance during campaigns 
in the early 1980s, albeit on a lower scale than the ALP.
15
 Nor does trade union strength, another 
key component of the power resources approach, clearly explain why the three parties at hand 
adopted the childcare issue at such different periods in time; as Figure 1.13 shows, US trade 
unions underwent a decline in membership approximately 20 years before their counterparts in 
the UK and Australia, yet relative levels of decline do not seem to correlate with childcare policy 
introduction.  
 
                                                     
14
 Measures of maternal employment display similar trends to female employment in that the countries experienced 
similar absolute and relative levels of it. Maternal employment according to age of child would also prove helpful 
however reliable data for each country is not available earlier than the 1980s.  
15
 Promises included tax expenditures such as making childcare tax deductible but not serviced-based increases in 
provision (Brennan 1998, 176-177). 
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Figure 1.13 Union density, 1960-2010 (Source: Visser 2011) 
In all three countries the union movement also saw a significant shift in its membership 
demographics, with females joining at a faster rate than males. As with female labour force 
participation, female trade union membership (women as a per cent of total trade union 
membership) remained at fairly similar levels in both absolute and relative growth terms from 
1960 to the mid 1990s across all three countries (see Figure 1.14). Although one might argue that 
an increase in female trade union membership would persuade union leaders to address feminist 
issues and childcare in particular, the largely similar level of female unionisation rates across all 
three countries displays little association with the timing of childcare policy introduction. 
 
Figure 1.14 Female trade union membership, 1960-2010 (Source: Visser 2011) 
However, one could also measure the aggregate strength of organised female labour by 
interacting trade union density with female trade union membership, thereby providing a rough 
indicator of the overall strength and density of organised female labour. Figure 1.15 indicates 
that when the product of trade union density and female trade union membership reached its 
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peak in a given country, that country’s centre-left party adopted childcare assistance policies. 
One could argue that this simply reflects a correlation with broader patterns of labour market 
change, yet some qualitative evidence (Perrigo 1996, Bashevkin 2000, Brennan 1998, Cohen 
2001) suggests that left-party politicians were influenced by the increasing feminisation of 
unions, a core constituency. This is despite the fact that in each country, females have held few 
trade union leadership roles relative to men, even in predominantly female unions (Kirton and 
Healy 2010, 2013). 
 
Figure 1.15 Organised female labour mobilisation, 1960-2010 (Source: author calculation from Visser 2011) 
 
But whilst there is a temporal correlation between organised female labour mobilisation and the 
adoption of childcare policy, the body of literature surrounding party competition and social 
policy development would suggest that one also consider a second correlate: parties’ electoral 
aims (Häusermann 2006, Fleckenstein 2010, Fleckenstein and Lee 2014, Morgan 2013). Was 
their adoption of childcare at that particular point in time also correlated with a shift in class and 
party-voter linkages? Each of the three centre-left parties did adopt the issue of childcare in the 
midst of electoral flux, chiefly characterised by 1) a decline in traditional party-voter alliances 
such as class and 2) the erosion of the traditional ‘gender vote gap,’ wherein women as an 
aggregate voting bloc tended to favour conservative, as opposed to left or indeed centre-left, 
parties (Randall 1987, Norris 1996, Inglehart and Norris 2000, Manza and Brooks 1998). 
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Figure 1.16-1.17 Alford and Thomsen indices, 1945-1990 (Source: Nieuwbeerta 2001, 125 & 128) 
Figures 1.16 and 1.17 show the evolution of both the Alford and Thomsen indices, two measures 
of class voting across each country, which display a loosening of traditional class-party alliances 
between the 1960s and the 1990s.
16
 Each party also adopted childcare policy in the midst of a 
weakening of the traditional gender vote/identification gap,
17
 the extent to which women vote for 
or identify with a particular party in greater/lesser proportion than men.
18
  Figures 1.18-1.20 
display the weakening of the traditional gender identification gap (wherein a higher proportion 
of women than men identified with conservative parties) as measured in two ways: the margin in 
which women are more likely than men to identify with conservatives and the margin in which 
men are more likely than women to identify with left-leaning parties: here it is apparent that as 
the centre-right’s advantage with female voters (relative to male voters) declined from the 1960s, 
the left’s disadvantage with women (relative to men) began to decelerate and eventually, reverse. 
This is not to suggest that ‘women voters’ are in actuality a monolithic bloc19 but instead point to 
the broad or indeed superficial fundamentals that the three parties – before the onset of 
professional pollsters and sophisticated analyses – may have absorbed at the time.   
 
                                                     
16
 Whereas the Alford index is the traditional, absolute measure of class voting (proportion of working class voting 
left minus the proportion of middle class voting left), the Thomsen index is the log-odds ratio of the Alford. This has 
become preferred to the Alford as it is not sensitive to overall popularity of political parties (Nieuwbeerta and De 
Graaf 2001, 27). 
17
 Most studies (see for example Norris 1996, 1999) refer to the gender-vote gap, however the data analysed here 
looks at gaps in party identification as it looks for longer-term shifts in party allegiance. 
18
 The ‘traditional’ gender vote gap refers to the observed cross-country pattern in which women tended to identify 
with conservative parties at a higher rate than did men (see for example Norris 1999, Inglehart and Norris 2000). 
19
 Several studies have pointed out the extent to this is untrue: for example Seltzer et. al. argue that in the US, race 
and income cross-cut gender just as Iversen and Rosenbluth (2010) argue that class cross-cuts gender. 
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Figure 1.18: Gender identification gaps, Australia, 1967-1987 (Source: Australian National Political Attitudes Study, 
1967-1979; Australian Election Study, 1987) 
 
 
Figure 1.19 Gender identification gaps, UK, 1964-2001 (Source: British Election Study, 1964-2001) 
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Figure 1.20 Gender identification gaps, US, 1952-1996 (Source: ANES, 1952-1996) 
 
The shifts outlined above offered both threats and opportunities for centre-left parties: they were 
at risk/in the process of losing their male, ‘blue-collar’ base but at the same time stood to gain 
from the middle class and female voters whose allegiance to centre-right parties was also 
beginning to wear away. Yet although such electoral change clearly displays the incentive for 
parties to develop particular social policies that would attract new voting blocs into their 
(shifting) electoral constituencies,
20
 these shifts do not correlate as neatly with each party’s 
childcare policy adoption as we might expect them to do, if electoral change were the sole 
determining mechanism behind the timing of childcare policy adoption. For example, the 
traditional gender identification gap (wherein women disproportionately identify with 
conservative parties) dropped earlier and steeper in the UK than it did in Australia, and until the 
late 1970s it did so at a steadier rate than even in the US. This does not match the order of 
childcare policy adoption, wherein the Democrats moved first in the late 1960s/early 1970s, the 
ALP in the late 1970s/early 1980s and the Labour Party not until the mid-to-late 1990s. Figures 
1.16 and 1.17 indicate that the drop in class-party linkages which occurred in the UK between 
1970 and 1980 was far steeper than that which occurred in either the US or Australia, suggesting 
that by 1980 UK Labour would have had as much electoral incentive to develop a universal 
childcare policy as did the Democrats and ALP at that same point in time – and yet Labour did 
not act on that incentive until the 1990s. 
 
The party competition literature also draws attention to a third factor: the role of internal party 
organisation, suggesting that parties endowed with ‘strategic capacity’21 have an easier and 
                                                     
20
 See for example Morgan (2013), Huber and Stephens (2000). 
21
 See Kitschelt (1994 and1999). This will also be elaborated upon in Chapter Two. 
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indeed quicker time changing or developing policies in order to cater to newly desired electoral 
constituencies. Kitschelt (1993, 1994) states that either an autonomous leadership or a diverse 
and dynamic membership base can foster strategic capacity. Schumacher et. al. suggest that such 
capacity is higher in ‘leadership-dominated’ parties, where the party elite are not beholden to 
party-linked interest groups and/or staid, entrenched activists (Schumacher, Vries and Vis 2013; 
Marx and Schumacher 2013; Schumacher 2013). In fact, near to the time that each party adopted 
childcare policy they each underwent a process of internal reorganisation that included 1) the 
introduction of gender-based reforms, like quotas on internal party decision making bodies, such 
as platform committees and executive bodies (US, Aus, UK), as well as gender-based quotas on 
candidate selection, such as ‘one woman on a shortlist’ (OWOS) and ‘all-women shortlists 
(AWS) (UK) and 2) reforms that were largely framed as ‘democratising’ but which essentially 
diminished the power of party-affiliated interest groups (namely trade unions) and centralised 
power into the hands of party elites. Examples include reducing the power of the union vote at 
party conferences as well as reducing the strength of the union vote in candidate selections (Aus, 
UK) and leadership elections (UK), and democratising candidate selection so as to reduce the 
unions’ ability to act as powerbrokers at conventions (US). The reduction of union dominance 
helped empower higher-educated, non-trade unionist party members who once might have been 
assumed to be constituents of the centre-right, but who now allied with social democratic parties 
on non-redistributive issues (often referred to here as ‘post-materialists’).22 
 
As will be discussed throughout Chapters Three through Seven, these internal reorganisations 
occurred fastest in the Democratic Party, which had fewer veto points to prevent reform than did 
Labour and a stronger leadership than the ALP. Reform occurred next in the ALP, where the 
federal party was able to take advantage of the party’s decentralised structure and a series of 
exogenous circumstances in order to intervene in state-level parties and stipulate particular 
conference delegation/candidate selection requirements.
23
 It took the longest in UK Labour, 
where any reforms had to make their way through 1) a battling contingent of factions within the 
party and 2) a decision making structure with multiple veto points, wherein any rule changes 
needed to pass through at least three forums
24
 including the conference floor, where voting was 
heavily dominated by trade unions and for a time, the hard-left.
25
 The approximate amount of 
time that elapsed between the initial decline in either the Alford or Thomsen indices and 
enactment of a party-centralising reform was six years in the US, relative to five in Australia and 
                                                     
22
 This will be discussed further in Chapter Two, with specific reference to Inglehart (1977) and Inglehart and 
Rabier (1986). 
23
 In 1970 and 1980 the federal branch of the Australian Labour Party directly intervened into its state branches, 
citing corruption (Jupp 1982). This will be detailed in Chapter Four. 
24
 These include the National Executive Committee (NEC) policy/rules committee (depending on the type of 
reform) the NEC itself and the Party Conference. 
25
 Unions comprised 90% of conference votes before the conference voting reform of 1990 (Russell 2005, 40). 
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twelve in the UK; the amount of time between the initial decline in the traditional gender vote 
gap and the enactment of gender-based reforms was five years in the US, 12 years in Australia 
and 20 in the UK (see Table 6.4).  
 
b.  Explaining party position change 
The three correlates of childcare policy introduction as outlined above – organised female labour 
mobilisation, electoral incentives and party reform - display varying levels of consistency with 
each other. On the one hand, it seems viable to hypothesise that when party-linked interest 
groups, such as trade unions, change their policy stance on a particular issue, their affiliated 
political party will respond by changing their policy stance in the same direction. Thus, one 
might hypothesise that when organised female labour mobilisation (female trade union 
membership interacted with trade union density) neared its peak, trade unions would have placed 
increased pressure on their affiliated parties to advance the childcare issue, and the parties would 
have responded accordingly. But what about electoral incentives? Figures 1.16-1.20 suggest 
centre-left parties stood to benefit by promoting policies, such as childcare, that appealed to 
disaffected centre-right voters, such as middle-income and female voters. How can we 
disentangle the driving forces of interest group influence versus electoral strategy? Was one 
more influential than the other in persuading parties to adopt the issue?  
 
Moreover, the first and third variables appear to be in direct odds with one and other: as 
discussed above, just as peak-level organised female labour mobilisation occurred in each 
country, political parties were undergoing a process of internal reorganisation, which in each 
case presented here, resulted in a significant reduction of trade unions’ power and influence 
within political parties. In other words, if parties can be organised along a spectrum from 
activist-dominated to leadership-dominated, these parties were undergoing a transition in which 
they moved towards the leadership end of the scale. How could trade union pressure have driven 
parties to adopt childcare when parties were at the same time reducing union power and 
influence within internal party decision making structures?  
 
David Karol’s (2009) models of party position change may be able to reconcile this apparent 
inconsistency by providing a theoretical framework that allows a researcher to both understand 
and disaggregate the proportion of party position change that was driven by interest groups and 
the proportion driven by party elites’ electoral imperatives. Much of the literature related 
to/stemming from Carmines and Stimson’s (1981) seminal work on issue evolution suggests that 
party position change is driven by autonomous party elites in search of a new constituency.
26
 The 
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 Carmines and Stimson (1981) also focus on replacement amongst voters. 
 30 
mechanism through which position change occurs is elite replacement: the gradual replacement 
of older party elites with younger party elites allows room for these new elites to both develop 
ties to, and develop policies that cater to, a new electoral constituency. As a result, the process of 
party position change is gradual. However, from the early 2000’s a small body of research began 
to question whether all party position change was driven by strategic elites and occurred via elite 
turnover. They also questioned whether these new positions were always stable (see for example 
Wolbrecht 2000, Wolbrecht 2002, Karol 2009).  
 
In particular, David Karol (2009) analysed roll call votes on six different US public policies and 
found that on several issues the Republican and Democratic parties changed their positions in 
response to the shifting demands of their key party-linked interest groups. Moreover, these 
position changes did not all occur gradually and via elite replacement, but quite abruptly and via 
legislator ‘conversion.’ Karol formalises his analyses into three ideal-type party position change 
models (two of which may help the theoretical puzzle displayed above)
27
: he identifies the 
impetus for change (either party politicians in search of votes or party-linked interest groups 
pushing for a new policy) which is associated with the autonomy of party-elites in the position 
change process, the speed of party position change, the dominant mechanism through which it 
occurs (legislator replacement or conversion) and the stability of the party’s new position (Karol 
2009, 19).  
 
The first model, “coalition maintenance,” is in stark contrast to Carmines and Stimson’s ‘issue 
evolution’ model: it states that party position change occurs when parties respond to new and/or 
changing demands “by groups already ensconced within their party coalition” (Karol 2009, 18). 
Here, party elites have little autonomy in the position change process: their actions are driven by 
policy demanders (i.e. party-linked interest groups) who are able to ‘convert’ party-elites to their 
newfound position. Thus the turnover of party elites plays a non-existent to minor role in 
mechanising party position change due to the fact that party elites will already be tied to the 
policy demander at hand - party elites will simply be ‘converted’ to a new position. The speed of 
policy change is quite quick – “because it does not require politicians to foster new ties to new 
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 Only two of Karol’s three models are relevant and as such discussed here. The third model, “coalition expansion,” 
states that “party leaders adopt a new position to improve their standing with the public generally.” In that sense, 
this model is more akin to coalition group incorporation as party elites are autonomous throughout the process and 
do not require replacement to embrace the issue. However, these are typically “groupless” issues, in Karol’s words 
“because the shift is promoted by neither the demands of a party’s current or prospective organized constituency.” 
Party leaders will have the freedom to make the change occur at quite a rapid pace (because whilst the issue may not 
have any supporters, it has neither organised detractors). Yet the fact that the issue is groupless suggests that their 
newfound position has little to keep it stable as parties leaders are not motivated by specific constituencies, existent 
or prospective, unlike in the first two models (Karol 2009, 20). 
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groups, or voters to alter their loyalties” – and the new position should remain relatively stable, 
so long as the policy demander’s preferences remain so (Karol 2009, 18-19).   
 
The second model, “coalition group incorporation,” seems to have more resonance with 
Carmines and Stimson: here party elites design policy positions so as to attract a specific bloc of 
voters. Party elites will have a great deal of autonomy whilst targeting voters with new positions 
on a popular political issue,
28
 although the longer these new groups are incorporated into a 
specific party’s electoral coalitions, the more said groups become powerful policy demanders in 
their right. The gradual nature of change and the requisite wooing of new groups suggests that 
elite turnover plays a significant role in this model, since party incumbents would be unlikely to 
break with old alliances and reformulate relationships with quite different types of electoral 
constituencies (e.g. new middle classes and post-materialists)
29
 (Karol 2009, 19). Coalition 
group incorporation, applied to this research, would feature a linear relationship between the 
functional and political incentives for childcare (female employment and electoral coalitional 
change). Yet adoption of the issue requires the party to make appeals to non-traditional electoral 
constituencies with whom longstanding party-elites have had little contact. As such, we would 
expect childcare policy adoption to be a slow process, fostered by the arrival of younger, higher-
educated and perhaps indeed more female legislators, who tend to both identify and form 
relationships with post-materialists and new middle classes more so than they do the party’s 
traditional constituencies, who mobilise along the materialist (as opposed to post-materialist) 
axis of party competition (Kitschelt 1994).  
  
This study hypothesises that the process that produced position change amongst each of these 
parties is one that resembles coalition group incorporation, however it suggests that policy 
adoption is mediated by the speed of each party’s internal organisational reform. In an era of 
shifting electoral coalitions, centre-left party elites responded to the potential gains that could be 
made amongst previously unreachable electoral constituencies (middle-income, educated and 
female voters, i.e. new middle classes) by developing work/family balance policies that would 
appeal to them, such as childcare. This process would naturally be slow: older party elites and 
members would have few ties to the aforementioned voting blocs and their related interests, and 
thus the party as a whole would need to experience turnover in its ranks in order to form ties 
with these new groups. These new party elites would resemble the constituencies they seek to 
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 Karol points out that the longer these new groups are incorporated into a specific party’s electoral coalitions, the 
more said groups become powerful policy demanders that “gain leverage over the party’s elected officials, leading 
them to increasingly reflect the group’s preferences rather than overall sentiment in a state or district” (Karol 2009, 
19). 
29
 See for example Inglehart (1977) and Knutsen (2008). 
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attract more so than they would reflect their predecessors (i.e. party elite replacement would 
mechanise childcare policy adoption in this case).  
 
However the process, gradual as it is, is contingent upon ‘strategic flexibility’ (Kitschelt 1994). 
Organisational barriers (either stemming from the leadership or the rank-and-file) that prevent 
the party from both recruiting a different set of elites and developing left-libertarian/progressive 
social policies that would appeal to a new electoral constituency limit said flexibility. Once 
internal organisational reforms are produced (and thus barriers to new policies and appeals to 
new voters are eradicated), party elites and the rising intake of the party’s post-materialist 
members and legislators will be able to reach out to new groups by legislating and making 
electoral appeals on socially progressive policies such as childcare. As such, this hypothesises a 
linear model, akin to coalition group incorporation wherein electoral coalitional change and 
female employment form the functional and political incentives for childcare policy adoption, 
however party reform serves as an intervening variable, mediating the speed at which parties are 
able to adopt the issue. A summary of Karol’s two competing models and this study’s hypothesis 
appear in Table 1.1 below: 
 
 
Structural 
preconditions 
Independent 
variable 
Intervening 
variable 
Mechanism 
Dependent 
variable 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
Coalition 
group 
maintenance 
(Karol 2009) 
 
1. Rise in 
female 
employment 
 
Trade union 
pressure 
None 
Legislator 
conversion 
(fast) 
Childcare 
policy 
adoption 
Coalition 
group 
incorporation 
(Karol 2009) 
1. Rise in 
female 
employment 
 
2. Electoral 
change 
Electoral 
imperative 
(distinct 
opportunity to 
capture new 
voting blocs) 
 
None 
Legislator 
replacement 
(slow) 
Childcare 
policy 
adoption 
Hypothesis 
1. Rise in 
female 
employment 
 
2. Electoral 
change 
Electoral 
imperative 
(distinct 
opportunity to 
capture new 
voting blocs) 
Party reform: 
public 
relations and 
internal 
organisational 
Legislator 
replacement 
(slow but 
speed 
contingent on 
party reform 
process) 
Childcare 
policy 
adoption 
Table 1.1 Model comparison (Source: Karol, 2009) 
  
This hypothesis does not deny that there was any influence from trade unions; in fact the case 
studies will show that union confederations in both Australia and the US were involved in 
promoting childcare issues and drafting legislation. However, it suggests that union influence, 
relative to that of electoral imperative, is weak. Moreover, it implies that by the time each 
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country’s union movement reached peak-level organised female labour mobilisation (when one 
would expect them to lobby for childcare), their power within the three political parties at hand 
had already been reduced. 
  
In order to determine what actually drove party-elites to adopt childcare as an electoral issue 
(and why this occurred over three different decades) it is necessary to try and disentangle the 
impact of interest groups (i.e. trade unions) from that of strategic party elites as well as to 
identify the possible intervening role of party organisational reform. Just how autonomous were 
party elites in this process; how influential were trade unions; and how easy was it for the party 
to develop legislation and platforms that would appeal to new blocs of voters?  
 
1.4 Methodology and Methods 
a.  Methodological approach 
This is a most similar systems design that tests whether the temporal variance of parties’ 
childcare policy adoption can be attributed to variables frequently cited to be behind party 
position change (electoral imperative, interest group influence), and in so doing tests whether or 
not these parties’ policy adoption processes fit into either Karol’s (2009) coalition group 
maintenance or incorporation models, or into the hypothesis outlined above. It does so by 
employing a comparative historical analysis and supplementary quantitative analyses that are 
designed to produce what George and Bennett term a "structured focused comparison." George 
and Bennett characterise a "structured focused compassion" as one in which: 
 
“The method is ‘structured’ in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect 
the research objective and that these questions are asked of each case under study to 
guide and standardize data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and 
cumulating of the findings of the cases possible. The method is ‘focused’ in that it deals 
only with certain aspects of the historical cases examined. The requirements for 
structure and focus apply equally to individual cases since they may later be joined by 
additional cases” (George and Bennett 2005, 67). 
 
This research attempts to meet those requirements in the sense that it has “asked general 
questions that reflect the research question" (George and Bennett 2005, 67). Specifically, the 
research objective asks: “Why did these parties adopt childcare at different times, given similar 
levels of female employment?” The general sub-questions, asked in each case, that reflect the 
research objective include: 
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1. ‘What role can we attribute to electoral change?’ 
2. ‘What role can we attribute to interest group (i.e. trade union) influence?’ 
3. ‘What role can we attribute to party-elite replacement?’ 
4.  ‘Did party-elite replacement produce intra-party demographic change?’ 
5.  ‘Is there an intervening effect between electoral change and childcare policy adoption 
that can be attributed to internal party reorganisation?’ 
 
This analysis is focused in that it limits itself to a specific set of independent variables (electoral 
change, elite replacement/conversion, trade union pressure and party reorganisation and/or 
modernisation) and examines these in each of the three cases. It does not attempt to find a single, 
overarching causal mechanism that lies behind childcare policy adoption, nor explain current 
policy in each country, but rather, it seeks to measure the relative impact that a set of limited but 
theoretically relevant variables have had on the three parties’ childcare policy timing. 
 
The use of one of Mill’s methods (i.e. the most similar systems design) does offer potential 
pitfalls. For example, Hopkin (2002) notes that, “there will almost always be enough differences 
between cases to ‘over determine’ the dependent variable, making it difficult to establish which 
differences are key and which are not” (Hopkin 2002, 254). Additional concerns related to the 
use of a most similar systems design include, as Gering points out, the fact that “one must code 
cases dichotomously (high/low, present/absent)” when using this design. This is problematic in 
the sense that whilst electoral change can be roughly dichotomised as ‘high/low’ or indeed 
‘present/absent,’ it is not as simple to try and dichotomise the extent to which trade unions 
pressured political parties on childcare or even the extent to which political parties’ internal 
organisation can be characterised as shifting from activist to leadership dominated, or vice-versa. 
As Gering notes, “Unfortunately, the empirical universe does not always oblige the requirements 
of Millean-style analysis” (Gering 2006, 133). 
 
Attempts are made to mitigate this first risk (‘over determination’) by employing within each 
case study a form of process tracing that George and Bennett term an ‘analytical explanation.’ 
This method of process tracing “converts a historical narrative into an analytical causal 
explanation couched in explicit theoretical forms” (George and Bennett 2005, 211). In particular, 
this analytical type of process tracing allows one to “point out variables that were otherwise left 
out in the initial comparison of cases, check for spuriousness and permit causal inference on the 
basis of a few cases or even a single case” (George and Bennett 2005, 215). In other words, the 
use of process tracing in this comparative historical analysis allowed the researcher, at the 
beginning, to identify any potentially spurious variables and then led the researcher to focus on 
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the specific set of factors discussed here (and employ a structured focused comparison), thus 
reducing the risk of over determination. 
 
This research has tried to address the second concern – dichotomisation – through structuring my 
case studies into two broadly different types of components: first, it (qualitatively) traces the 
history of childcare policy in each country and then places the issue of childcare into each 
country’s larger electoral context (i.e. class and gender dealignment); it then analyses each of the 
specific variables under consideration: electoral change in both class and gender party 
alignments (which is a largely quantitative analysis as it tracks change in both those alignments 
over time),
30
 trade union pressure on parties over childcare (a qualitative description and 
analysis) and party reorganisation/modernisation (a qualitative description and analysis).  
 
Although the qualitative approach leaves little room for dichotomisation, it is then supplemented 
by the second component of each study, which analyses co-sponsorship of childcare legislation 
and parliamentary debates on childcare in order to (quantitatively) measure proxies for the 
relative influence of trade union pressure (the ‘conversion’ effect) versus legislator turnover (the 
‘replacement’ effect) on childcare policy adoption. Where there is little conversion effect we 
might find minimal to absent trade union influence on childcare policy adoption, and where there 
is a conversion effect we would find presence/high union influence. OLS regressions test for an 
association between a legislator speaking on childcare/co-sponsoring legislation and having 
characteristics associated with either unionism or post-materialism. Results are dichotomised in 
the sense that they provide information on the presence/absence of a statistically significant 
relationship between the variables. The study is able to dichotomise party reform by pinpointing 
the years in which 1) gender-based and 2) party centralising reforms were first enacted, and then 
comparing when these variables were present/absent in each country. So for example, in 1972, 
when the US Democrats were in the midst of adopting childcare as an electoral issue, the party 
had already undergone both gender-based and party centralising reforms. At this same time, the 
ALP had already enacted a party-centralising reform but not a gender-based reform; the 
enactment of either type of reform was, as yet, absent in the British Labour Party.  
 
b.  Mixed methods design 
This thesis relies on mixed methods in that both qualitative and quantitative approaches are 
employed to illustrate and corroborate findings on party position change, electoral change, shifts 
in party elite characteristics, trade union influence, electoral strategy and internal organisational 
reform. Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) describe mixed methods research as “[s]tudies that are 
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 And thus is comparable with other countries as it can be roughly dichotomised into high-low level change. 
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products of the pragmatist paradigm and that combine the qualitative and quantitative 
approaches within different phases of the research process” (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998, 19). 
The specific mixed-method applied to this research is a modified ‘exploratory sequential’ design 
in that it “starts by qualitatively exploring a topic before building to a second, quantitative 
phase” (Creswell and Plano-Clark 2011, 86). There is an interactive relationship between the 
qualitative and quantitative strands of research in that for example the qualitative findings that 
question the role of trade unions as a driver of party position change are instrumentalised into the 
OLS regressions, which test for an the association between union background (UK and Aus) or 
union rating (US) with either debating or co-sponsoring childcare legislation.  
 
However, the variant on this exploratory sequential analysis is the fact that it is multi-stage or in 
other words, ‘iterative,’ in that there are multiple phases of qualitative and quantitative research 
(Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009, 278). Specifically, the qualitative analysis finds temporal 
variation in the three parties’ adoption of childcare policy, whilst a subsequent quantitative 
comparison attempts to find correlations between various social-structural variables and said 
policy adoption, such as employment rates, union density, organised female labour mobilisation, 
left-party power and electoral change. The positive correlations found between organised female 
labour mobilisation and electoral change are further explored in a qualitative analysis, in which 
each case points to mixed evidence on the impact of unions, positive evidence on the impact of 
party-elite turnover and electoral strategy, and beyond that, positive evidence on the impact of 
party organisational reform as a mediating variable. In order to corroborate the qualitative 
findings, a further quantitative stage uses both Rapoport and Stone (1994) and OLS regressions 
to disaggregate between the relative importance of trade union influence and legislator turnover 
(i.e. replacement of materialist ‘left-right’ oriented party elite with post-materialist party-elite), 
whilst a simple matrix comparing organisational reform within the three parties attempts to test 
whether the duration and intensity of reform does indeed mediate the impact of legislator 
replacement on childcare policy adoption.  
 
Although the qualitative and quantitative strands are interactive with one and other, their mutual 
usage allows for a degree of ‘triangulation,’ wherein “the results of an investigation employing a 
method associated with one research strategy are cross-checked against the results of using a 
method associated with the other research strategy” (Bryman 2006, 611). The “incompatibility 
thesis” would suggest that qualitative and quantitative strands are epistemologically divergent 
and thus incompatible (see for example Guba 1987, Smith 1983), however a defence of mixed-
methods research would argue, in Tarrow’s words, “[w]ithin a single research project, the 
combination of qualitative and quantitative data increases inferential leverage” (Tarrorw 2010, 
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104). Indeed, he notes that the sort of triangulation allowed via mixed-methods “is particularly 
appropriate in cases in which quantitative data is partial and qualitative investigation is 
obstructed by political conditions”  (Tarrow 2010, 108). In this research, solely employing 
quantitative analyses would be too parsimonious (and the three cases would likely not allow 
enough data points) to identify the impact of changing electoral behaviour on parties’ electoral 
strategies and the complex relationship between trade unions and the advocacy of work-family 
policies. Its qualitative analysis, although pointing to the importance of electoral strategy and 
party organisational reform, does feature a degree of conflicting evidence on the importance of 
unions. As such quantitative methods are a helpful instrument with which to corroborate 
qualitative findings, and a pragmatic mixed-methods design in general increases the ‘inferential 
leverage’ that would have been yielded by employing either quantitative or qualitative strands in 
isolation.  
 
c.  Hypotheses and variables 
As discussed above, this study’s guiding question is, “Why did the US Democrats, Australian 
Labor Party and British Labour Party” adopt childcare policy as an electoral and as a legislative 
issue decades apart from one and other,
31
 given similar rates of female labour force 
participation?” 
 
It explores the extent to which parties’ adoption of childcare was driven by their main party-
linked interest group (trade unions) and the extent to which it was driven by electoral strategy. In 
other words, it tests whether the adoption process fits into Karol’s (2009) coalition group 
maintenance model,
32
 coalition group incorporation model,
33
 or a model of coalition group 
incorporation mediated by party organisational reform. 
 
It hypothesises that parties adopted childcare policy in a process that most closely resembles 
coalition group incorporation mediated by party organisational reform: this suggests that both 
rising female employment and electoral change are necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for 
childcare policy adoption, as they respectively provide party elites with the “functional 
underpinnings” (Fleckenstein and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011, 146) and political incentive for childcare 
policy adoption. However, the modernising goals of enterprising party elites would come into 
conflict with both a) older guard incumbents and b) affiliated organisations such as industrial 
unions, both of whom were reticent to campaign on or approve a new, socially progressive issue 
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 Democrats: late 1960s/early 1970s US; Australian Labor Party: late 1970s/early 1980s; UK Labour: mid-to-late 
1990s. 
32
 Which would attribute causality to trade union pressure. 
33
 Which would attribute causality to electoral imperative (i.e. autonomous party elites who develop policies in 
search of a new constituency). 
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that encourages female employment or attracts the party’s attention away from its traditional 
constituency.  The ease in which party modernisers could advance work/family balance issues
34
 
such as childcare would be contingent on the speed in which they could push through party 
reforms that 1) increased female representation in several levels of the party and 2) centralised 
power in the hands of leadership and away from affiliated interests, such as trade unions. 
 
This study hypothesises that organised female labour mobilisation and, more specifically, the 
impact of trade unions will be neither necessary nor sufficient for a party to adopt childcare as an 
electoral or a legislative issue because, despite the correlation between organised female labour 
mobilisation and policy adoption, 1) their power with parties will have already have been 
diminishing; 2) fractionalisation between the male-dominated industrial and rising number of 
female-dominated service unions will have prevented a unified lobby that actively pushed their 
affiliated party to pass a universal childcare policy; 3) even in cases where unions did pressure 
parties to act on childcare, their goals would have been in line with the party modernisers (and 
their new constituents) anyway. 
  
-The dependent variable is the time at which a party adopts childcare policy as an electoral or 
as a legislative issue.  
Measurement: This thesis identifies three time points at which centre-left parties first ‘embraced’ 
or ‘adopted’ (both terms used interchangeably throughout) childcare policy: 1972 (US), 1983 
(Australia) and 1997 (UK). These focal years are selected because they were the federal/general 
election years in which the party first advocated the need for universal childcare and promised a 
specific policy for doing so; moreover each of the parties were also legislating on the issue either 
immediately before (US) or after (UK and Australia) the election. It is also necessary to adopt 
specific points in time in order to operationalise the Rapoport and Stone model and the OLS 
regressions. Although the specific years are convenient time points for measurement, it can be 
said and indeed Figures 1.4-1.11 display, that the Democrats’ attention to the issue was raised 
during the broader time period between the late 1960s and early 1970s, whereas the ALP through 
the early 1980s and the UK from the early-to-mid 1990s. A fine-pointed date in time helps with 
the quantitative analyses but qualitatively it is more reasonable to suggest that parties ‘adopted’ 
the issue over a period of a few years surrounding the specific years identified above. 
 
Policy adoption or party position change (used interchangeably) can be measured in two 
different ways: legislative or electoral. Although as shown in Figures 1.4-1.11, the two occur 
broadly in tandem with one and other across all three countries; in the UK legislative attention to 
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 In terms of highlighting it during an election campaign and/or debating/co-sponsoring it in the legislature.  
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childcare predated electoral attention to the issue by approximately five to ten years.
35
 When 
relevant, this research will make specific reference to childcare policy adoption/position change 
in the ‘legislative’ or ‘electoral sense.’  
 
i)  Legislative 
The legislative measurement identifies when legislators increased their attention to the issue by 
either discussing it in parliamentary debate (UK and Australia) or co-sponsoring childcare 
legislation (US). The US case measures party position change according to the proportion of 
House Democratic legislators who co-sponsored childcare bills at points Time 1 (T1) and Time 2 
(T2),
36
 whereas the UK and Australia cases focus on the number of Labo(u)r MPs who raised the 
issue of childcare during parliamentary debates at T1 and T2. Any debate mention that is 
negative in terms of childcare as a concept or state subsidies for childcare are excluded.
37
      
 
There are two main reasons why party position change in the US is measured by House 
Democratic co-sponsorship of childcare bills whereas in Australia and the UK, it is measured by 
parliamentary debate mentions. They include: 1) parliamentary systems, where the opposition do 
not introduce bills as in the US, offer far less room for gathering data because for example, 
Labour would not have been able to introduce a single bill between 1979 and 1997.
38
 By 
contrast, they could bring up the issue in debates as often as they desired; 2) a digital record of 
US House debates is not available until the year 1973, however the policies of interest, such as 
the CDA, predate that. Finally, whereas authors such as Karol (2009) employ US Congressional 
roll call votes to measure party position change, this research measures co-sponsorship rates, 
given that several of the childcare bills included in the study were never put to the floor for a full 
vote. Roll-call votes would, as such, further restrict the amount of data available for analysis.  
More broadly, the advantage of the legislative measure of childcare policy adoption (relative to 
the electoral measure) is that it allows the researcher to analyse a specific sample of people (all 
House Democrats/Labo(u)r MPs at a given time) and associate each individual with their 
proclivity to co-sponsor/debate childcare in quantitative analyses such as linear regressions.  
 
ii)  Electoral 
Electorally, childcare policy adoption/party position change can be measured by the number of 
words appropriated to the issue on party manifestos/platforms, in leaders speeches and specific 
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 Whereas manifesto attention to childcare increased in 1992 and strong manifesto policy commitments 
commenced from 1997 (which will be outlined in Chapter Five), MPs increased their attention to the issue, as 
measured by parliamentary debate, from the 49
th 
Parliament (1987-1992). 
36
 Time periods of analysis will be elaborated further in Chapters Three through Six but they are, roughly: 1969-
1991 in the US; 1970-2001 in the UK and 1968-1987 in Australia. 
37
 This will be elaborated on further in Chapters Four and Five.    
38 Excluding the rare instance of a private member’s bill. 
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policy commitments in speeches/manifestos. This measurement is helpful because election 
statements are perhaps the most direct way of appealing to new voters, and this research 
hypothesises that electoral appeals drove childcare policy adoption. Whilst the party’s manifesto 
is a good indicator of a party’s general stance on an issue, data on each and every person who 
produced said manifesto, the way every party member voted on it and the extent to which each 
of the policies were welcomed by the party at large is unclear in all three parties.
39
  Given that 
there is no information on the demographics/background of every single party member, their role 
in various campaign functions and their overall power at a given time, it is impossible to 
quantitatively find the mechanism that produced childcare policy adoption (in electoral terms) 
within these three political parties. However, throughout this research qualitative links will be 
drawn between childcare policy attention in the electoral sense (e.g. in manifestos and leader’s 
speeches) and organisational reforms: for example, the correlation between a 1972 Democratic 
Party mandate that women should hold 40% of the seats on party platform committees and the 
rather steep incline in the number of words dedicated to childcare that appeared in that same 
year’s election manifesto (see Chapter Three).  
 
-The independent variables are:  
1. Electoral imperative 
Measurement: Electoral strategy or electoral imperative (used interchangeably) implies that 
parties adopted childcare policy as a means of appealing to a new constituency and thus, winning 
either votes, seats or office. This assumes that they had viable gains to be made from doing so. It 
cannot be directly measured but is indicated by proxy in a number of ways throughout the case 
studies. These include: 
 
i) An analysis of electoral coalitional change in the era surrounding each party’s adoption 
of childcare policy. These analyse the extent to which declines in traditional gender and 
class-based party-voter linkages offered opportunities and constraints for the three parties 
at hand. Based upon Kriesi’s (1999) discussion of the primacy of access to higher 
education for explaining shifts in party-voter linkages (which will be discussed in the 
next chapter) education, rather than class, is considered alongside gender. This research 
will interchangeably refer to the group of post-war, higher-educated voters who align 
with left parties not on the traditional left-right economic axis but on a 
libertarian/authoritarian axis,
40
 as the ‘new middle class,’ ‘new politics’ or ‘post-
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 The US-based Convention Delegate Surveys would be helpful to the extent that they provide background data and 
policy preferences for delegates to the Democratic and Republican conventions. However, these surveys only began 
in 1972 and as such will not show how change in delegates fostered the adoption of childcare policy that this study 
argues to have occurred in and around 1968-1972. 
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 Also referred to as the materialist/post-materialist axis. 
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materialist’ voters41 (see for example Knutsen 2008, Inglehart 1977, Hout, Brooks and 
Manza 1995). 
 
ii) Qualitative evidence (i.e. secondary source material) that notes specific strategies to 
attract new voters. 
 
iii) Rapoport and Stone’s (1994) analysis: where replacement effects dominate the model 
it is clear that party position change is mechanised by legislator replacement rather than 
conversion. This is linked to the idea that a party’s motivation for adopting childcare is 
driven by their desire for new voters. However the mechanism that actually produces this 
is legislator turnover, as the party will need to court members/legislators who bear similar 
traits to those electoral groups that they are seeking to attract, rather than rely on long-
term incumbents who would need to revise their alliances with more traditional blue-
collar constituencies and form new ties to post-modernist, ‘new politics’ voters. 
 
iv) OLS regressions: these test for an association between a legislator debating/co-
sponsoring childcare legislation and several characteristics.
42
 Where the association 
between debating/co-sponsoring and having a university education or being female is 
positive and statistically significant (and having a trade unionist background is either not 
significant and/or is negative) we can infer that the replacement of older legislators with 
post-materialist oriented legislators might have helped drive forward childcare policy 
adoption. The strength and direction of these associations would either corroborate or 
dampen the replacement effect as found by Rapoport and Stone. 
 
2. Trade union pressure 
Trade union pressure is also measured by proxy in several different ways.  
i) This research tests whether the correlation of organised female labour mobilisation 
(trade union density x female trade union membership rates) suggests that feminisation of 
unions and their attendant power on centre-left parties pushed these parties to adopt 
childcare policy. 
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 This concept will be elaborated on in Chapter Two. 
42
 These include gender, education (i.e. university) and trade union background. In the UK and Australia, trade 
union background signifies that an MP had in fact previously worked for a union whilst, in the US, where 
Congressional biographies in Sharp (2000) indicate that this is quite rare, the AFL-CIO’s COPE score, a 
measurement of pro-labour voting as measured by that interest group, is employed.     
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ii) Trade union pressure can also be evaluated via qualitative (largely secondary source) 
evidence, which points to the pressure (or lack thereof) that trade unions placed on 
parties to act on the particular ‘new social risks’ that correlated with increased female 
labour force participation. 
 
iii) As with electoral strategy, trade union pressure is also proxied by the ‘conversion’ 
results from the Rapoport and Stone model. If the results show that childcare policy 
adoption (party position change) was largely driven by conversion then we may expect 
that a group with close ties to the party (i.e. trade unions) was able to convince legislators 
to change their position of either ambivalence and/or opposition to the issue and go out of 
their way to either co-sponsor legislation or debate the issue. However, OLS regressions 
would be needed to corroborate this.  
 
iv) Whilst the Rapoport and Stone results may point to evidence of conversion, the OLS 
regression results will indicate whether that conversion is indeed associated with 
legislators who have a unionist background.
43
 A positive and significant association 
between debating/ co-sponsoring childcare legislation would indicate that union interests 
might have helped drive legislators’ newfound attention to the issue.  
 
-My (hypothesised) intervening variable is: 
1. Internal party reorganisation/party organisational reform 
Measurement: In this research, party modernisation refers to a comprehensive process that 
includes both change in public relations strategies and a change in internal organisational 
structure. Party organisational reform refers specifically to micro-level changes, such as 
instituting gender-based quotas and reducing union power in party decision making structures, 
which can de facto increase the relative strength of new politics/post-materialist party 
members/legislators. These changes will be detailed in each of the case study chapters as well as 
in the comparative analysis, Chapter Six. Because the parties all have had different 
organisational structures and are thus coming from different starting points, it is difficult to 
devise a single measurement for such organisational reforms: as such both the case studies and 
the comparative analysis chapter will highlight reforms in a broader sense, i.e. the length of time 
reforms took and the extent to which reforms a) brought in and indeed promoted minority 
members (for example gender-based quotas) and b) the extent to which they centralised power at 
the expense of either the rank-and-file membership or affiliates such as trade unions. 
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 Or, in the US, a high COPE score. 
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-My control variables include 
 1. Rates of female employment in both absolute and relative terms (similar) 
 2. Welfare state regime type/variety of capitalism (similar) 
 
In testing which of three models (Karol’s two models and this research’s hypothesis) fits parties’ 
childcare policy processes, the research runs through a series of analyses within each case study 
chapter.  
 
1. As outlined above, this study will first provide a brief historical analysis of childcare policy 
and the politics surrounding it in each country.  
 
2. It will then analyse the amount of electoral change that both preceded and surrounded parties’ 
adoption of childcare as an electoral issue, focusing specifically on shifts in class and gender 
based party allegiance.  
 
3. It next analyses parties’ response to such electoral change: 1) their attempts to target particular 
voters and 2) their attempts at internal party reorganisation, i.e. securing both gender-based 
representation and party-centralising reforms (i.e. reducing the power of traditional blue-collar 
male groups).  
 
4. Next it analyses the extent to which each country’s trade union movement prioritised childcare 
or indeed pressured political parties to develop childcare policies that would be of assistance to 
middle-income families, taking into account fractionalisation within the union movement and in 
particular, discord between female and male-dominated unions within the same confederation. 
 
5. It then supplements those largely qualitative analyses by employing tests that attempt to 
account for party position change by disaggregating between the effects of a) legislator 
conversion, which is a proxy for interest group (in this case, trade union) pressure and b) 
legislator replacement, which is a proxy for electoral imperative (i.e. party elites adopting the 
issue and the rest of the party gradually warming to it by the intake of new/replacement of old 
legislators). 
 
It uses two main tests to try and disaggregate the relative impact of conversion and replacement 
on party position change, Rapoport and Stone’s 1994 model of political change44 and multiple 
linear regressions. Whereas the Rapoport and Stone model indicates the total amount of party 
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 See Rapoport and Stone description in Chapter Three. 
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position changed accounted for by conversion, replacement and mobilisation, the OLS 
regressions tests for associations between legislators who positively debated/co-sponsored 
middle-income childcare policies and age, gender, education and trade union background. These 
latter tests indicate whether legislators advocating the issue were of a traditional socialist-
capitalist politics or of a more post-materialist, ‘new politics’ background.  
 
The OLS regressions supplement the Rapoport and Stone findings in two ways: while Rapoport 
and Stone identify the causal mechanism behind change (i.e. they will inform whether the 
adoption of childcare policy in the legislature was mechanised by either conversion, replacement 
or mobilisation), the OLS regressions can help shed light on which of these variables of interest 
helped drive that mechanism. For example, if the Rapoport and Stone models find that legislator 
conversion was the dominant mechanism behind change, we may assume that party-linked 
interest groups such as trade unions were the forces that ‘converted’ said legislators, although 
this would be no more than educated conjecture. If however, the OLS regressions find a positive 
and significant association between having a trade union background and frequently debating/co-
sponsoring childcare then we may be more confident that legislators were driven to adopt the 
issue because of pressure from their longstanding interest groups.
45
  Second, the structure of the 
Rapoport and Stone model treats a legislator’s co-sponsorship/debate mentions as a binary 
variable (i.e. they either did or did not do so). This is helpful for explaining broad party change 
but less so when assessing the gradations of legislator attention to the issue (Rapoport and Stone 
would treat a legislator who mentioned childcare ten times in a single parliament the same as 
they would a legislator who mentioned it once). The OLS regressions, however, treat the number 
of bills co-sponsored/number of debate mentions in a particular Congress/Parliament on a 
continuous scale. 
 
However, as will be discussed in Chapter 3.4, there are strong reasons for the use of binary 
logistic regressions, under which the dependent variable is not the number of times that a 
legislator co-sponsored a childcare bill or debated childcare, but simply whether or not they did 
so. The need for a binary dependent variable is driven by the fact that there is a non-normal 
distribution of the number of times that legislators did debate/co-sponsor during a given 
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 The reverse is also true: if replacement appears to be the dominant mechanism, we may assume that the new 
legislators who frequently spoke on/co-sponsored childcare issues were associated with characteristics of post-
materialist political actors (such as university education, being female, having alliances with socially progressive 
interests, etc.), however we could not be sure that they in fact had different backgrounds from their predecessors. If 
the OLS regressions find a significant and positive association between childcare co-sponsorship/debate mentions 
and characteristics typically associated with post-materialist, new politics groups, then we can be more confident 
that the influx of left-liberal/post-materialist party members, legislators and voters was the driving force behind 
childcare policy adoption. 
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legislative session.
46
 Moreover, there can be as many as 90% of legislators who, in a given 
parliament, never co-sponsored/debated at all.
47
 As such, logistic regressions are run using the 
same independent variables as in the OLS regressions however the dependent variable is binary: 
whether or not a legislator debated/co-sponsored.  The results of these models will be noted in 
each of the case studies and the tables themselves are located in Appendix D. 
 
6. In order to test whether the replacement effects discussed above do in fact correlate with 
socio-demographic change amongst each party’s legislators, it provides overtime demographics 
on House Democrats, ALP, Labour MPs. This will display the extent to which there was/was not 
a replacement of male, unionist oriented legislators with higher-educated and often female 
legislators.  
 
7. It then summarises the qualitative/quantitative findings and reaches a broad conclusion about 
the main forces that drove the party to adopt childcare as an electoral or legislative issue (i.e. 
electoral imperative versus interest group pressure) and conclude on the extent to which internal 
party reorganisation played an intervening role in allowing parties to be able to do adopt the 
issue. 
 
Each case study chapter (3-5) follows the same structure, in order to yield greater comparative 
leverage. Chapter Six then provides a conclusive analysis: identifying variation in the processes 
(i.e. strength and weaknesses of each variable) that occurred across all three parties and largely 
confirming this study’s hypothesis.  
 
The structured-focused comparison described above allows testing for each of the below sub-
hypotheses: 
 
H1: Electoral change should precede childcare policy adoption and it should contain 
shifts in both class and gender based party alliances. 
 
H2: There should be qualitative evidence of parties attempting to target middle 
class/female voters. 
 
                                                     
46 For example, during the UK’s 52nd Parliament 42% of Labour MPs debated childcare and the average number of 
mentions was 1.19. Yet, in an OLS regression particular outliers (for example one Labour MP who raised the 
issue 34 times) may skew results.  
47 This is the case during the UK’s 48th Parliament. The minimum percentage of co-sponsors/debaters in the US and 
Australian cases was 20%. 
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H3: Rapoport and Stone tests should indicate that party elite replacement accounted for a 
greater proportion of party position change than legislator conversion. 
 
H4: OLS regressions should indicate that each party’s childcare supporters were of a 
more ‘new politics’ than traditional socialist-capitalist/left right background (i.e. being 
female and/or higher education should have positive and higher correlation with 
advancing childcare policy than should being male and/or having a trade union 
background). 
 
H5: There should be limited or at least mixed qualitative evidence of trade unions 
lobbying political parties for action on childcare. 
 
H6: Party organisational reform should precede childcare policy adoption; the timing 
should differ across each country in accordance with the order in which each country’s 
centre-left party adopted childcare policy and should predate or at least be correlated with 
shifts in the dominant characteristics of a party’s legislators. 
 
d.  Sources 
This study relies on primary documents, including party manifestos, leaders’ speeches and party 
strategy documents (e.g. Fabian Society paper written by Labour MPs such as “Winning 
Women’s Votes”48). For historical context it also relies on primary and secondary accounts of 
childcare policy formation, party politics and indeed party reform and modernisation strategies. 
Finally, it uses electoral and legislative databases (the American National Election Study, 
Australian Election Study, Australian National Political Attitude Study, British Election Study, 
US Congressional Record, Hansard – Parliament of Australia and Hansard – UK Parliament) in 
order to 1) gather electoral data 2) gather information about childcare legislation co-sponsorship 
and voting, and 3) analyse the discussion of childcare in parliamentary debates. Interviews were 
employed during the inductive phase of this research. Whilst they were helpful in building a 
narrative, the responses from respondents on either side of the framework (i.e. party or union) 
were biased in terms of attributing causation to their own side. As such, this thesis follows 
Karol’s framework and analyses party position change through a mix of qualitative, corroborated 
by more quantitative material. 
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 Hewitt and Mattinson (1989). 
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e. Definitions 
 
1. Childcare assistance for middle-income families: the dependent variable of this research is the 
time at which the parties under examination (US Democrats, Australian Labor Party, British 
Labour Party) adopted childcare policy as a legislative or an electoral issue. However, as noted 
at the beginning of this chapter, it refers specifically to childcare policy that assists ‘middle-
income’ families. The Child Development Act fits this, as it was a universal programme with 
income-sliding fees; Australia’s federally funded childcare programme was of the same 
structure. Childcare policies both promoted and implemented under UK’s New Labour included 
many means-tested programmes but they also subsidised capital costs for new start-ups and 
offered all parents 12 free hours of care per week, amongst other benefits. Therefore, ‘childcare 
assistance for middle income families’ refers to any service or benefit that is not 1) limited to 
lone parents and/or 2) premised upon a welfare to work scheme.
49
 This distinction is important 
because this thesis tests whether parties adopted childcare policies so as to attract new middle 
class/post-materialist voters and the new middle classes would not benefit from a narrowly 
means-tested policy. Thus references to this are not included in parliamentary debate counts, nor 
are such bills considered in the analysis of House Democrat co-sponsorship rates. Throughout 
this work, unless noted, the term ‘childcare’ refers to programmes that benefit all families. Any 
references to means-tested childcare will be denoted as such. 
 
2. Childcare or ‘early education’? Many national systems of ‘early childhood education and care’ 
integrate pre-school and ‘care.’ For example the Danish government, like its fellow 
Scandinavian counterparts, offers a system of childcare in which children are provided full day 
care (in line with their parents’ working hours), but also engage in pre-school lessons. By 
contrast, childcare has not consistently been seen as an ‘integrated’ concept in Australia, the US 
and the UK (Penn 2000, 37). Whilst the distinction is not clear cut (i.e. it could be drawn 
according to any number of metrics, such as the number of qualified teachers or the ages of 
children) the key concept here is provision length: pre-school/early education operates on a 
sessional basis and, in in these countries, does not typically involve a full day’s provision, 
whereas childcare or ‘daycare’ does. There are political ramifications attached to this distinction 
as legislators and voters of a socially conservative view might oppose the family-implications of 
subsidising full-day childcare, as it encourages female employment or indeed subsidies parents’ 
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 For example, any bills in which childcare is provided only on a welfare to work basis are excluded, as well as any 
debate mentions of the like. However, a bill or debate mention would be included if, in addition to a welfare to 
work, or lone-parent only provision, it advocated expenditure and/or programmes that benefit families of all income 
types. An example of this 1983’s HR 1603 in the US, which had provisions for free care for low income families but 
also expanded funds for the Child Care Development Block Grant, which could be used to subsidise capital costs for 
new childcare centres and thus increase provision overall (Congressional Record, 1983). 
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‘choice’ to work, but they would not be opposed to early childhood education50 (Randall 2000, 
65; Brennan 1994, 77-78). Therefore this thesis includes any debates and/or pieces of legislation 
that subsidises childcare alongside pre-school,
51
 but it excludes any debates or legislation 
focused exclusively on part-time pre-school.  
 
3. Party position change: this term is used interchangeably with childcare policy adoption as it 
indicates the point at which a party changed their official stance and adopted the issue either in 
the legislative or in the electoral sense. Electorally, it is measured by the strength of particular 
commitments (i.e. promising to double the number of places) or quantitatively (words in a 
manifesto), where legislatively it can be measured qualitatively (i.e. depth of childcare 
legislation) but is largely measured quantitatively: the proportion of MPs/House Democrats who 
debated/co-sponsored childcare at T2 minus the proportion who did so at T1. 
 
1.5 Main findings 
This study will find that parties introduced childcare policy in response to electoral change (i.e. 
electoral imperative), but that the speed of their response was conditioned by the speed of their 
internal party reform processes, i.e. the ease in which they were able to achieve reforms that a) 
adopted gender-based quotas and b) allowed party leaders to centralise power and thus diminish 
the internal-party power of affiliated interest groups, namely trade unions, which by extension 
increased the relative power of post-materialist/new politics legislators and party members.  
 
This is not to suggest, however, that the parties under consideration are purely leadership-
dominated institutions, free from the dictates of organised interests and powerful constituencies 
– far from it. This rather points to the difficulty in organising political coalitions around social 
policies that are essential to a large swathe of middle-income voters but have a diffuse, 
unorganised array of beneficiaries. It also speaks to the Janus-faced nature of affiliating powerful 
interests, such as unions, into a political party: before reorganisation processes altered the 
operating structure of the Democrats, ALP and Labour Party, trade unions would have had far 
more influence in pushing parties to campaign for – and attempt to legislate on – long-term, 
universal childcare funding. However their claims today will not be heard as loudly.  
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 For example Margaret Thatcher, as education minister, proposed a system of publicly funded pre-school but 
opposed such a scheme offering care (Randall 2000, 65). Brennan notes that in the early 1970s ALP education 
minister and “devout Christian” Kim Beazley Snr. was “very sympathetic” to the pre-school movement but not full 
day childcare (Brennan 1994, 77-78). 
51
 For example, the ‘free entitlement’ of 12.5 hours early education offered by New Labour allow parents to spend 
their hours (now 15) at any approved early childhood education and care centre. While parents can claim their free 
hours at centres that exclusively run part-time pre-school programmes, they can also claim them at childcare centres 
that offer full day care. 
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1.6 Contributions/importance 
This study provides a contribution to welfare state research by attempting to take factors 
commonly associated social policy development, such as power resources, and integrating them 
into the broader body of political party literature, specifically using concepts related to party 
competition and internal party politics. By blending the welfare state development and party 
competition bodies of literature, it is able to explain outcome variation amongst cases that most 
welfare state development theories would predict to have similar outcomes. This thesis also 
attempts to provide a contribution to the subfield of party position change by taking two 
competing models of party position change (Carmines and Stimson vs. Karol), both of which 
have been predominantly located in the context of US politics, and applying those models to a 
cross-country analysis.  
 
The actual findings lend itself to the body of literature surrounding change and transformation in 
social democratic parties: on the one hand it provides an additional empirical account of centre-
left parties shifting from a mass party towards a more electoral-professional structure as 
discussed in Katz and Mair (1995) and Panebianco (1988). On the other hand, it also provides an 
empirical account quite closely linked to Herbert Kitschelt’s 1994 work, The Transformation of 
European Social Democracy, which emphasises the importance of internal party organisation in 
determining the likelihood of a party undertaking a strategic appeal such as the ones discussed in 
this thesis. Here we see that, as Kitschelt discussed, large-scale social change brought with it a 
change in traditional partisan alignments that required left parties to develop new forms of 
programmatic appeals in order to attract new social constituencies. However, the likelihood of a 
party making such a strategic adjustment is in part contingent upon their intra-party political 
organisation. The study’s emphasis on party organisational reform as an intervening variable 
determining the speed of childcare policy adoption is in keeping with Kitschelt’s (1994) 
assertion that “[e]xternal political-economic constraints imposed on social democratic parties are 
less decisive than the internal constraints and opportunities for strategic adjustment and renewal 
generated by changing competitive situations within a party system and the dynamic of political 
choice inside party organizations” (Kitschelt 1994, 4). 
    
Its findings point to the need for coalitions in favour of childcare policies to couch their demands 
in a strong electoral case. Yet, the fact that parties have not consistently continued to prioritise 
childcare following their initial embrace of the issue suggests that when parties adopt an issue 
due to electoral imperative (rather than interest group pressure) they may not continue to 
prioritise it on a long-term basis. This will be discussed further in the study’s concluding chapter. 
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1.7 Thesis structure  
A theory and literature review appears in Chapter Two, highlighting the relevant bodies of 
literature that guided this research’s framework. Chapters Three through Five are the case study 
chapters, ordered in accordance with childcare policy timing: the US Democrats, the Australian 
Labor Party and lastly, the British Labour Party.  
 
The case study chapters are structured so as to include a qualitative description of the political 
history of childcare in each country, followed by an analysis of electoral change and another two 
sections on party response to that change (1. the extent to which parties targeted female and 
middle-income voters, and 2. the depth and timing of their internal reform processes). The next 
section critically analyses qualitative evidence on the extent to which trade unions embraced 
childcare policy, prioritised it and indeed lobbied their affiliated political parties on it.  
 
Next, an analysis of both co-sponsorship rates and debates on childcare supplements the 
qualitative analyses by attempting to disaggregate whether a party’s shift towards childcare 
policy was mechanised by legislators who were converted to the issue (thus lending credence to 
trade union power thesis) or by legislator replacement (thus lending credence to electoral 
imperative thesis). This is done in three ways: 1) examining legislator demographic shifts in the 
three decades surrounding childcare policy adoption, which highlights the extent of change 
produced by legislator turnover 2) operationalising a model put forth by Rapoport and Stone 
(1994) that disaggregates the proportion of party position change driven by legislator conversion, 
replacement and mobilisation,
52
 and 3) employing a series of multiple linear regressions that 
estimate the strength of association between a legislator’s demographic background, union 
history and higher-education, and the number of times they either co-sponsored a bill related to 
or entered a debate on childcare.
53
   
 
Chapter Six provides a comparative analysis of the case study results, bringing them together in 
order to address the hypotheses set out in this chapter. Chapter Seven concludes and discusses 
possible avenues for further research.   
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 ‘Change’ in this sense is measured the proportion of legislators who co-sponsored /debated childcare at the 
beginning of our time period of interest as compared to the number who co-sponsored/debated at the end of that 
time period. 
53 Binary logistic regressions are also run. These are referenced in each case study and their results are included in 
Appendix D. 
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Chapter Two: Theory and Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction  
The research question that guides this study asks why the US Democrats, Australian Labor Party 
and British Labour Party adopted childcare policy decades apart from each other, given their 
similar rates of female employment. The following chapter will review the two larger bodies of 
literature that have informed this study’s theoretical framework, first focusing on the ‘welfare 
state development’ approach and second, the ‘party politics’ approach. Throughout, it will note 
where particular subsets of literature, and specific works, are helpful or unhelpful in addressing 
the research question. It will summarise by drawing these contributions into an outline of the 
theoretical framework as described in Chapter One. 
 
2.2 Welfare state growth approaches to social policy development 
The broad body of literature loosely grouped under the comparative welfare state development 
tag provides a wide array of theories with which to test this research’s guiding question. Yet, 
despite the ease in which some of these theories can be tested, they do not necessarily produce 
helpful findings. For example, basic tests stemming from the functionalist approach (e.g. female 
employment, labour shortages) fail to explain the temporal variation of policy adoption across 
our cases. Differences in macro-political institutions such as executive-legislative relations and 
veto points would help explain cross-country variation in childcare provision if this research was 
focused on said legislation actually being signed into law, which it is not. They are not as helpful 
when this study’s point of interest is party policy adoption. However, a handful of the works 
which will be reviewed below do point to variables that this analysis should take into account: 
contradicting theories over the extent to which unions might help/hinder childcare policy 
development and to a lesser extent, whether a ‘critical mass’ of female legislators is correlated 
with the timing of a party’s childcare policy adoption. The following sections will outline the 
relevant streams of welfare state development literature, indicating both where it contributes to 
the theoretical framework used to answer the research question, as well where it lacks specific 
relevance to the question or cases at hand.    
a.  Structural-functionalist approach to social policy development 
A glance at female employment rates would seem a natural starting point for this study; such a 
functionalist approach to social policy development analyses the underlying socio-economic 
factors that would drive demand for childcare provision. Building upon Wilensky’s (1975) ‘logic 
of industrialism’ framework, functional explanations have suggested that ‘new social policies’ 
are an apolitical response to the increasing number of citizens no longer protected by the 
traditional, male breadwinner-dominated welfare state (i.e. single parents, unskilled labour) (see 
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for example Bonoli 2005). Each political party studied in this thesis did adopt the childcare issue 
within the broader context of rising female employment rates. However, as discussed in Chapter 
One, there is no correlation between female employment and childcare policy adoption: each of 
the three parties adopted childcare during different decades despite the fact that female 
employment rates were (in both absolute and in relative growth terms) quite similar across all 
three countries between the early 1970s, when the US Democrats placed childcare on their party 
programme and on their legislative agenda, just as they were similar in 1997, when New Labour 
became the first British party to campaign and comprehensively legislate on childcare.
54
 
Although the social and economic change that occurred over the past four decades has 
transformed risk structures, and hence the demand for new social policies, the functionalist 
argument appears to gloss over the potentially obstructive mediation of variables ranging from 
political institutions and interests, to patterns of party competition and internal party 
organisation. 
 
b.  Welfare state /political economy typologies 
i.  Three Worlds of Welfare 
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) “three worlds of welfare” provides a helpful lens through which to 
understand the impediments that stand before parties who attempt to develop universal social 
policy within a liberal welfare state, a category to which the US, UK and Australia all qualify.
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His welfare regime consists of three ideal-type welfare state models: liberal, conservative-
corporatist and social democratic, premised upon the way in which each ideal-type 
decommodifies labour, stratifies citizens and provides public/private goods. Esping-Andersen’s 
liberal welfare state is one in which “means-tested assistance, modest universal transfers, or 
modest social-insurance plans predominate.” He further notes that “[b]enefits cater mainly to a 
clientele of low-income, usually working-class, state dependents” (Esping-Andersen 1990, 26). 
So while this typology allows us to understand the typical character of the welfare states relevant 
to this thesis and by extension, some of the barriers that may stand in front of social policy 
development, the cross-country temporal differences in childcare policy adoption are unlikely to 
be explained by Esping-Andersen’s (1990) three “words of welfare,” given that all three parties 
under examination operated in states that have typically been classified under the same regime-
type.  
Lewis’s seminal 1992 article criticised Esping-Andersen’s typology for ignoring the gendered 
implications of labour decommodification. Lewis’s response typologises welfare states 
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 Nor, as set out in Chapter One, is there a correlation between policy adoption and unemployment rates. 
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 See Footnote 4 in Chapter One for Castle’s (1985) description of Australia as “wage earners’ welfare state” and 
why this classification does not necessarily impede within-type comparison for our research.  
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according to their capacity for fostering women’s labour force participation. For example, Lewis 
classified Britain in 1992 as a “strong male-breadwinner state” characterised by a social security 
system that provided first tier pension and unemployment benefits to men – who were meant to 
be active in the labour market - and second tier benefits to women, whose work was in the 
private sphere. Thus, “social policies were not permitted to undermine the man’s responsibility 
to provide for dependents” (Lewis 1992, 163). The implications of such systems included lower 
levels of female employment than those seen in ‘moderate’ (France) and ‘weak’ (Sweden) male 
breadwinner regimes, alongside lower rates of childcare provision and other work/family balance 
policies (Lewis 1992, 162-63).   
Additional scholars have also classified states according to their ‘strong,’ ‘weak’ or ‘modified’ 
male breadwinner/female carer regimes (see for example Sainsbury 1999, O’Connor 1993), 
whilst political scientists and social policy analysts have taken great strides towards quantifying 
state support for female employment (Bradshaw and Finch 2002, Gornick et. al. 1997, Gornick 
and Meyers 2004). These works are critical to understanding the historical and institutional 
barriers that stand before the development and implementation of universal childcare policies. 
However like the ‘three words’ typology, they do not seem to provide many clues as to why 
there was such a temporal difference in childcare policy adoption between the Democrats, 
Labour and the ALP, given the fact they operated in similar welfare states and male breadwinner 
systems. Moreover, the male breadwinner typologies do not help us identify the specific drivers 
behind change in each welfare state, specifically the shift from a male breadwinner model to 
what Orloff (2006), Lewis and Campbell (2007) and Lewis (2009) would eventually deem an 
‘adult-worker’ model, wherein state policy provides assistance to keep two-parent families in 
work.
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ii.  Varieties of Capitalism  
Whereas Esping-Andersen’s ‘three worlds’ focuses its lens on labour decommodification, Hall 
and Soskice’s Varieties of Capitalism (2001) typologises broad systems of capitalism according 
to 1) labour market regulations (i.e. centralised/decentralised wage bargaining, union strength, 
compressed/flexible wages, ease of hiring/firing) 2) product market regulation 3) finance 
regulations (i.e. access to short term vs. patient capital) and 4) income inequality. The approach 
contrasts coordinated market economies (CMEs) – characterised by high levels of industry-
specific training, long tenure at firms, capital-labour bargaining and, in general, a high level of 
investment in employees – against liberal market economies (LMEs), wherein general skills, 
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 Lewis identified Britain as an adult-worker model in 2009, stating “[i]n line with the core policy goal of 
increasing women’s employment rates, there has been a shift away from policy assumptions based on the existence 
of a male breadwinner/female carer model towards the promotion of an adult worker model family” (Lewis 2009, 
120). 
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lower levels of job protection and lower levels of firm-level investment in employees and short-
term capital dominate (Hall and Soskice 2001). Whilst the framework at first glance may seem 
of little relevance to the research question, Estevez-Abe (2009) explains that there are gendered 
implications stemming from these two ideal-types: in CMEs like Germany, political actors such 
as trade unions and social democratic parties may be unlikely to promote policies that foster 
female labour participation because women’s employment is often characterised by temporary 
breaks for care work and/or flexible hours; as such, women’s occupations would likely be less-
skill intensive and hence lower paid, all of which run the risk of wage depression. By contrast, 
employees in liberal market economies (LMEs) would in theory be quite neutral, if not 
welcoming, towards female labour force participation due to flexible labour markets and higher 
wage dispersion. In other words, political actors would have little impetus to develop costly 
childcare policies and would instead be likely to leave work/family solutions to the exigencies of 
the market, wherein very low-paid carers can provide solutions for middle and high-earning 
families (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2009, Morgan 2005). As Fleckenstein argues with respect to 
Germany and the UK, both systems had fostered a male-breadwinner system, but whilst 
Germany, a CME, “‘produced’ this outcome with a pro-active ‘general family support’ 
approach,” England, an LME, did so “largely indirectly with a ‘market-oriented’ model of family 
policy” (Fleckenstein 2010, 791).  
 
Morgan (2005) nicely illustrates this argument in a comparison of childcare provision across 
Sweden, France and the US. Morgan’s VoC account emphasises cross-country variation of 
institutions that affect wage dispersion; pointing out that where wage-setting institutions are 
weak (LMEs), the resultant inequality fosters an affordable childcare market for higher earners, 
versus CMEs, where labour regulations (and consequent lower wage dispersion) bar carers from 
being as poorly paid as they would be in LMEs and thus so costly that they would be out of most 
middle-income families’ reach. Such high cost care would require substantial government 
investment. 57  The lack of specific skills training associated with LMEs (and the fact that one 
cannot increase productivity in care services— in other words, ‘the Baumol effect’) ensures that 
low-paid, untrained labourers will “cycle in and out of child care employment as needed.” 
Morgan states: “the low wages and poor conditions of the workers who staff these services 
provide an essential subsidy to the child care industry, allowing these services to exist” (Morgan 
2005, 249-250).  Torben Iversen and Frances Rosenbluth (2010), like Morgan, also pick up on 
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 There is however, a great deal of variance in public childcare provision amongst CMEs, with countries such as 
Sweden having high levels of female employment and publicly provided childcare compared to other CMEs such as 
Germany and the Netherlands. Morgan explains that the high cost of childcare provision in CMEs is a result of 
labour market regulation, which makes the private services developed in LMEs “more difficult to sustain and thus 
force the issue onto the [CME’s] political stage,” adding “[to] the outcome of those debates reflects forces beyond 
those identified by the varieties of capitalism,” including “[p]olitical ideology, the pressures of interest 
organizations, and fiscal motivations” (Morgan 2005, 259). 
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the character of inequality amongst females within LMEs and argue that it may inhibit cross-
class coalition building amongst women who would otherwise coalesce in favour of better 
governmental childcare assistance. The authors note that in the “fluid labor markets” where 
female labour force participation is already high: “women at the top of the income ladder may 
feel that they have more in common with the men above them than with the women below them. 
Class politics crosscuts gender politics more in the United States than in Europe, and this makes 
majority coalitions in favour of new initiatives for gender equality hard to assemble” (Iversen 
and Rosenbluth 2010, XIV, XV). 
 
These Varieties of Capitalism-based approaches do not provide a single framework with which 
to answer the research question but they do provide us with a few important points to consider. 
For example, given that it is supposedly difficult to form a broad interest coalition around 
universal childcare policy in countries with such wide wage bands (i.e. high levels of income 
inequality), one should analyse the types of voters that the Democrats, ALP and Labour sought 
to appeal to when they adopted childcare policy: were they appealing to a broad coalition, or in 
fact targeting higher or lower income voters? Also, Estevez-Abe (2009) suggests that trade 
unions would be opposed to work-family policies such as childcare in CMEs, given its potential 
impact on wages, but how might trade unions react to childcare policy proposals in LMEs such 
as the US, UK and Australia? Was union influence a key driver? Or was it so low at the time of 
policy adoption that their stance on childcare did not have a political consequence?  
 
c.  Institutionalism 
The institutionalist approach, which emphasises how the ‘rules of the game’ (Steinmo et. al. 
1992) structure policy preferences, bargaining, coalition choice, etc. finds itself much at home in 
the welfare state development literature. Indeed, a host of rational-choice institutionalist studies 
have highlighted the impact of institutional variables (type of executive system, number and 
placement of veto points, rules of electoral competition, state centralisation, etc.) upon welfare 
effort (Hicks and Swank 1992; Lijphart and Crepaz 1991; Huber, Ragin and Stephens 1993).  
The rational-choice subsection of institutionalism tends to focus on economic factors such as 
trade dependency (Cameron 1978), GDP (Rodrik 1998) and formal political institutions, such as 
veto points (Immergut 1990, Huber et. al. 1993; Huber and Stephens 2000; Pierson 1994; 
Tsebelis 2002), electoral systems (Lijphart 1991, Iversen and Soskice 2006, Lijphart 1999) and 
strength of the left, as measured by left party power and/or trade union density rates (Pampel and 
Williamson 1988; Hicks and Misra 1993; Bradley et. al. 2003). These variables, such as veto 
points, are useful in models that attempt to predict the likelihood of childcare bills passing 
through a legislature, though they do not necessarily determine the likelihood of a political party 
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adopting childcare as an election issue.
58
 Whereas the relevance of ‘left party power’ for our 
research question will be elaborated upon under the party politics sector of this chapter, the 
institutional and socioeconomic factors listed above come short of explaining party policy 
change and cross-country variation in policy adoption, given that none of the three political 
parties under examination experienced significant economic change and/or change in their 
formal political institutions that correlate or even closely predate their adoption of childcare 
policy. However, certain institutions, such as wage bargaining systems (including their attendant 
political opportunity structures) may be relevant to the extent that they mediate public debate and 
consultation between employers, labour and political elites on issues ranging from wage restraint 
to childcare.
59
  
 
Historical institutionalist approaches take account of how formal institutions structure politics 
and analyse how feedback effects and path dependence of particular policies shape the 
possibilities for future institutional change itself (see for example Thelen 1999, Pierson 1994). 
Paul Pierson states, “[i]f Interest groups shape policies, policies also shape interest groups,” 
since “[t]he organizational structure and political goals of groups may change in response to the 
nature of the programs that they confront and hope to sustain or modify” (Pierson 1994, 40). 
Karch’s (2013) analysis of pre-school politics in the United States is an excellent example of 
this: Karch explains that after Nixon’s veto of the CDA, which would have operationally funded 
universal non-profit childcare from the federal level, child development advocates saw states as a 
more amenable venue for passing early childhood legislation. State leaders such as governors 
and state-level legislators, who felt they were wrongly bypassed in the CDA legislation, worked 
with child development advocates to set up state-level childcare offices and assistance 
programmes, thus becoming powerful stakeholders in the country’s childcare system. Proposals 
for federal-level programmes were thereafter hindered in the sense that they often risked 
reproducing efforts already underway in some states and also, met resistance from state leaders 
who were no longer willing to be circumvented (Karch 2013, 86-105). Karch’s work, which 
traces change in US pre-school policy from the immediate post World War II era to the current 
US administration, illustrates the key mechanisms that have driven policy shape over time (splits 
among interest coalitions, venue shopping and the role of states as childcare stakeholders). 
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 Electoral systems/number of parties in a legislature are relevant to the extent that they shape patterns of party 
competition and, as a consequence, electoral strategy – this will be touched upon under the party politics section of 
this chapter. However, as set out in Chapter One, this study suggests that the US, UK and Australia have similar 
electoral systems in the sense that all of the countries under examination have non-proportional representation and 
single member district systems (in both the US and UK federal and central government elections are run on first past 
the post, Australia has runoff preferential voting for the Senate and single transferable vote for the House). 
Moreover, the US has two main parties, the UK has mostly been dominated by two, with 1983 and 2010 being an 
exception and Australian politics feature three main parties though the two of these three (Liberal and National) 
have a permanent coalition, opposing the ALP.  
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 See the ALP case study on this point. 
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However, it offers less insight into the cross-country comparison at hand: why parties operating 
in countries with similar fundamentals adopted the issue at different times. 
 
By contrast, Morgan (2006) provides a comparative historical analysis of work-family policies in 
the US, France, Sweden and the Netherlands, arguing that the different forms of organised 
religion that dominated each country in the 19
th
 century went on to shape different patterns of 
political competition, and following from that, different ideologies and different norms/popular 
preferences towards working women, the effects of which still were felt into the 20
th
 century 
(Morgan 2006). Morgan’s book is essential to identifying the extent to which, in the US, 
religious-based path dependency effects provided a stumbling block to the type of work-family 
policies seen in France or Sweden and it helps one contextualise the forces that so fanatically 
implored Nixon to veto the Child Development Act in 1971. It offers less insight into the 
specific variables that portended policy change, as childcare quickly moved to the top of the US 
legislative agenda and gained an increasingly large role in the Democrats’ manifestos in the early 
1970s. This is, in part, because Morgan’s account explains the roots of cross-national variation 
amongst states with three different types of breadwinner models (US, Netherlands, 
France/Sweden) rather than explain late 20
th
 century policy proposals from parties that operated 
in quite similar male breadwinner models, such as the US, UK and Australia. 
 
Historical institutionalist approaches, like the VoC and ‘three worlds’ works, offer several 
important sub-questions to consider, though they do not provide a clear framework through 
which the research question can be answered. For example, the historically driven opposition to 
full-time female employment in the US may have augured the CDA’s failure but it is unclear 
how it affected the timing of the Democrats’ childcare policy proposal and why that proposal 
happened first in the US. The feedback effects of previous policies and the impact of venue 
shopping could have, in theory, prevented the ALP and British Labour from adopting childcare 
policy as early as the Democrats did. However, at that time there would have been few existing 
stakeholders
60
 in Britain to push back against central government childcare plans; and in 
Australia, the ALP’s embrace of childcare as identified in this research consisted of increasing 
funds to a pre-existing, minimally-financed programme. As such, they did not run the risk of 
angering the states/early childhood stakeholders because they were not constructing or 
overlaying a new, competing childcare policy but rather, increasing expenditure on a minimally 
funded albeit, pre-existing, policy.   
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 In terms of organised interests that would object to publicly funded or provided childcare provision, such as 
private, for-profit childcare interest groups. 
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2.3 Party politics approach to social policy development 
There are several theoretical strands emerging from the party politics approach to welfare state 
development that are of relevance to the research question at hand. For example, the traditional 
power resources (‘parties matter’) thesis assumes a linear relationship between left party power 
and social policy output
61
 whereas a subsequent strand of literature questions whether the 
traditional party-linkages of the industrial era remain relevant in the post-industrialist age 
(Kitschelt 1994, 1999; Häusermann 2006, 2010; Kriesi 1998, 1999; Oesch 2006), thus 
suggesting that the link between left power and generous welfare effort may not be as linear or 
robust as imagined. Shifting electoral constituencies may require left parties to make strategic 
appeals to different types of voters in order to remain electorally viable: these strategic appeals 
often call for parties to change or develop new policy positions.
62
 A third strand of party politics 
literature, issue evolution and party position change (Carmines and Stimson 1981, 1986, 1989; 
Wolbrecht 2000, 2002; Karol 2009), discusses the drivers behind such adjustment and examine 
the specific mechanisms through which it occurs (party elite turnover or party elite conversion).  
 
Yet as Kitschelt (1994) so convincingly demonstrates, the strategic appeals that a party should 
make in order to win seats or office is often the opposite of the appeals that it actually does 
make. A party’s internal political climate and organisational structure often hinder its strategic 
flexibility to make the ‘correct’ appeal to particular voters, and in so doing propose policies that 
are attractive to these voters (Schumacher, Vries and Vis 2013; Schumacher 2013, Schumacher 
and Marx 2013). However, this research suggests that parties’ organisational structures do not 
always remain idle and that changes in organisational structure provided the Democrats, ALP 
and Labour with the strategic flexibility needed to make appeals to new constituencies, such as 
on childcare policy. The following section will elaborate on the relevant strands of party and 
party competition literature as outlined above, noting how they relate to this study’s research 
question and contribute to its analytical framework. 
 
a.  Power resources
63
  
The ‘power resources’ approach posits a linear relationship between the strength of the left and 
positive social policy output. It contends that the welfare state evolved through a series of 
distributive conflicts and that cross-country variation in social spending reflects, to a large 
extent, historical conflict between capital and labour. According to this approach, ‘party 
matters’: the strength of left parties and/or trade unions, relative to business organisations and 
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 For more on this see Häusermann, Picot and Geering (2012). 
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  See for example Fleckenstein (2010), Fleckenstein and Lee (2014), Morgan (2013). 
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 The power resources approach is also employed in the welfare state development literature, however it is here 
classified under the party competition approach, given the prominence with which the ‘parties matter’ thesis exists 
in the party competition approach.  
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centre-right parties can explain both cross-time and cross-country variation in welfare state 
development. This is essentially a ‘bottom-up’ argument: a party’s policy is designed to serve 
the needs of its constituency. This partisan-based thesis has engendered wide support through 
several of the large-N quantitative analyses noted above, which are located in the rational choice 
institutionalism approach to welfare state development (Pampel and Williamson 1988; Hicks and 
Misra 1993; Bradley et. al. 2003). How would a traditional ‘parties matter’ thesis fit into the 
research question at hand? It was the centre-left in each of the three countries that first embraced 
childcare policy as an electoral issue, yet this correlation bears little relevance to the fact that 
they did so at such different times. Moreover, the assertion would be unlikely to hold up in a 
larger-N comparison: Fleckenstein (2010), for example notes that from the early 2000s 
Germany’s Christian Democrats (CDU), a centre-right party, not only followed up but greatly 
expanded upon the Social Democrats’ commitment to public childcare expansion, a policy 
reversal well at odds with the CDU’s longstanding tradition of social conservatism. Other 
variables employed in the power resources approach, such as trade union density and female 
trade union membership, also display little correlation with parties’ adoption of childcare policy, 
as noted in the introductory chapter. 
 
Whereas the power-resources oriented works cited above identify either left party strength or 
trade union density as a predictor of social policy output, several studies that have sought to 
explain the development of work-family balance policies have ‘gendered’ the ‘strength of the 
left’ variable, analysing instead the strength of the female union movement, the women’s rights 
movement and the number of women in parliament (the third is often dubbed the ‘critical mass’ 
theory
64
). For example, Bonoli and Reber (2010) analyse cross-country variation in childcare 
expenditure and find a positive, significant association between expenditure and the number of 
women in parliament.
65
 Flipping that logic on its head, several works have also concluded with 
the seemingly logical point that where women’s organisations are fragmented, policy 
development is often staggered, if not scant (Marchbank 1996, Randall 2000, Williams 2009). 
However, Lewis (1992) warns against the assumption that work-family policies arise directly 
from female political mobilisation: “in both France and Sweden women played little part in 
securing such advantages as accrued to them from the respective welfare regimes.” In Sweden, 
she argues, female gains were not so much the result of female political mobilisation but the 
consequence “of the desire to increase the size of the labour force” (Lewis 1992, 171). This is in 
keeping with Morgan’s assertion that in 1960s and 70s Sweden and Denmark, both the social 
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 For a review see Childs and Krook (2008). 
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 They also attribute causality to spending on old-age policies, finding that when they control for total social 
spending there is a negative association between old age and childcare spending, thus a ‘crowding out’ effect exists 
(Bonoli and Reber 2010, 115). 
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democratic parties and the unions were more pragmatic than gender-altruistic in that they 
developed policies that encouraged female employment in response to labour shortages: “Both 
labor unions and employers viewed such policies as important for promoting economic growth, a 
position that helped build a consensus across the political spectrum” (Morgan 2003, 287). 
 
Rather than looking at the strength of the women’s movement and the strength of the left in 
isolation from one and other, Huber and Stephens (2000) provide a gender-based approach to the 
power resources model that analyses the combined forces of working women and potential 
political allies, such as trade unions or left parties. The authors suggest a mutually reinforcing 
relationship between social-structural change and power resources:  
 
“Increasing women's labor force participation is expected to generate demands for a 
greater public role in caregiving and thus pressures for an expansion of welfare state 
services. Where such demands and pressures are supported by powerful political allies, 
they tend to result in policies that facilitate the combination of paid work and family-care 
obligations, such as the provision of public day care and elderly care and parental leave 
insurance” (Huber and Stephens 2000, 327). 
 
This finding has some resonance with the correlation displayed in Chapter One, which points to 
an association between the timing of a party’s childcare policy adoption and the peak of their 
organised female labour mobilisation rates (the product of female trade union membership and 
trade union density). But while Huber and Stephens (2000) assert that high rates of female labour 
participation, when coupled with a powerful political ally, will result in the development of 
work/family reconciliation policies, it is somewhat unclear whether and/or when powerful 
political allies (i.e. parties or unions) have a compelling incentive to partner themselves with the 
interests of the female labour force. This is particularly the case if doing so would risk alienating 
another core element of their electoral coalition – a factor that will be elaborated on in the 
following sections. For example, Rosenbluth, Salmond and Thies point out that “both social 
democratic and liberal parties are somewhat constrained by their core constituencies from 
issuing pure policy-based appeals to working women” (Rosenbluth et. al. 2006, 167). According 
to the authors, social democratic parties are limited to the extent that male-dominated labour 
unions fear that the entrance of female labour (which often implies temporary career breaks) will 
cause employers to lower wage and benefit packages. Liberal party supporters, on the other 
hand, would reject increased public expenditure and/or the prospect of additional taxes and 
mandates on employers that would be required to fund work/family reconciliation policies 
(Rosenbluth et. al  2006, 168).   
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Rosenbluth et. al. (2006) yet again bring up the issue of organised labour placing a constraint on 
a social democratic party’s ability push forward work-family policies that encourage female 
employment. They note:  
“The problem for social democratic parties is partial incompatibility with the interests of 
their core voters, the predominantly male union membership. Unions succeed for their 
members, in part, by creating barriers to entry into the labor force. Incumbent male workers 
might fear that the extension of union membership and benefits to women, who require 
flexibility and compensation for time spent with children, might lead employers to respond 
by reducing the average male wage and benefit package” (Rosenbluth, et. al., 167-68). 
This is similar to the argument set out in the gendered-VOC account discussed in the previous 
section, which suggests that at least in CMEs, unions were unlikely proponents of work-family 
policies (Estevez-Abe 2009). Lewis (1992) notes that British unions served to ‘enforce’ the male 
breadwinner model, stating that “it became part of the badge of working class male respectability 
to keep a wife, enforced by a strong trade union movement as well as by the discourse of social 
reform” (Lewis 1992, 166), whereas Fleckenstein and Seeleib-Kaiser (2011) find that the impact 
of trade unions in workplace negotiations for occupational-based workplace families was 
“limited” in Germany and “negligible” in Britain.66  Arguments such as Rosenbluth et. al. (2006) 
that suggest unions oppose positive female employment policies belie the data showing a rise in 
female union membership across advanced industrial democracies, and in the three countries 
under examination in this thesis.
67
 In Britain for example, women’s trade union membership 
underwent a substantial climb from the 1960s, with female union membership increasing by 
111% between 1961 and 1980, versus just 17.5% for men (Gelb 1989, 69). By 2012 female trade 
union membership was 29% versus 23% for men, the difference being statistically significant 
(ONS 2012). By the late 1980s, women in the US also had higher rates of trade union 
membership than men (Gelb 1989, 76). Even during the 1990s and 2000s union membership was 
higher amongst Australian women than men (ABS 2011).  
 
On the other hand, increases in female union membership have not moved in tandem with 
increases in female union leadership, suggesting perhaps a lack of female agency in unions: 
Ledwith states that as of 1999, “[w]orldwide, women account for less than a third of members in 
                                                     
66
 Fleckenstein and Seeleib-Kaiser also point to larger a body of literature discussing the impact of unions in 
workplace negotiations for work-family policies, analysing whether highly unionised companies have stronger 
work-family policies (for example Morgan and Milliken 1992, Budd and Mumford 2004, Dex and Smith 2001). The 
insight into unions’ role at the workplace negotiation level is helpful for generating a picture of how highly work-
family policies place on different unions’ workplace negotiation agendas however this study is focused upon unions’ 
lobbying efforts with political parties.  
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 Despite declines in union membership as a whole. 
 62 
the highest [union] decision making bodies,” noting that a 2011 survey of 55 European trade 
union confederations from 30 countries showed of 43 presidents only four were women, of 74 
vice presidents 28 were women, of 40 secretary generals 10 were women, and of 18 deputy 
secretary generals only six were women” (Ledwith 2012, 191). Of the top ten largest unions in 
Britain, women made up roughly 50% of their total membership in 2008, yet comprised 33% of 
National Executive members, 41% of Trades Union Congress (TUC) delegates and 32% of paid 
staff members. The picture is similar in the US: women made up approximately 55% of union 
membership during 2011 but held just 30% of officer and executive board positions (Kirton and 
Healy 2013, 39-41).  
 
The case study chapters explain the complex relationship between unions, female workers and 
parties in greater detail, however the inconsistencies above suggest that an alliance between 
unions and women, which perhaps should be strong given that women’s membership is key to 
union survival,
68
 is not guaranteed. This factor could be driven by institutional stickiness within 
unions’ own organisational structures: for example Ebbinghaus argues that unions “do indeed lag 
behind structural changes,” noting that in Western European countries apart from the Nordics 
and Belgium, “blue-collar workers still represent a large share of membership while they are a in 
a clear minority position in post-industrial labour forces” (Ebbinghaus, 2006, 127). Or as the US 
and British case studies will show, a high degree of variance in gender balance across unions, 
with some unions actively promoting gender-based quotas within their own structures and their 
affiliated party structures (as in the UK) as well as lobbying for universal childcare (as in the 
US), but a level of decentralisation amongst unions such that these demands never reached 
confederation level leadership. Ledwith notes, “So we can conclude that women are represented 
as members, but not recognized as leaders” (Ledwith 2012, 191). These examples speak to a key 
question underlying this research: can we reasonably expect trade union movements to have 
made a concerted effort to push parties on childcare? And if parties decided to ally with working 
women and propose childcare policies without trade union encouragement, did they risk 
alienating their traditional, male blue-collar base?   
 
A key implication of the traditional ‘parties matter’ thesis is that it often assumes that parties 
within the same ‘family’ (e.g. social democratic, Christian democratic, conservative) are likely to 
compete for their associated constituencies using similar appeals. Lynch (2006) however notes 
that there are historically-derived, cross-country variations amongst parties within the same 
‘family,’ with some operating on particularistic (i.e. developing policies that reward a limited 
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albeit crucial base of voters) and others, programmatic modes of competition (which results in 
more inclusive social policies). Lynch explains that current cross-country variation on the age 
orientation of welfare state spending is driven by an interaction between the way social policies 
were historically structured and the aforementioned modes of party competition over these 
policies. In countries where benefits have been occupationally based, parties tend to compete in a 
more particularistic manner and expenditure patterns are likely biased towards the elderly. In 
countries where benefits have traditionally been universally oriented, parties tend to have a more 
programmatic mode of competition and thus have an easier time implementing social insurance 
policies for the citizenry at large. Whereas the US is categorised as an occupationally based 
welfare state with particularistic modes of party competition, both Australia and the UK have 
more universal welfare state systems, operating on more programmatic modes of party 
competition (Lynch 2006, 10-11). As Chapter Three will show, this makes the Democrats’ 1971 
childcare legislation that was essentially universal (a federally funded programme available to all 
children under five with fees on an income sliding scale) even more noteworthy and indeed, 
somewhat of anomaly as none of their subsequent childcare programmes were as universally 
oriented as the Child Development Act.    
 
The following section will address shifting party-voter linkages in the post-industrial era and as a 
consequence, the rise of a new, communitarian dimension over which left parties need to 
compete in order to remain electorally viable (Kitschelt 1994). In doing so, it discusses the need 
for parties to make strategic appeals that attract a more educated middle class electorate without 
deterring their traditional base. It then goes on to explain how the likelihood of a party making 
these appeals is conditioned by the party’s own internal politics and organisational structure.  
 
b.  Social structural change and partisan alignments in the post-industrial era 
Political competition, it has traditionally been theorised, operates around a limited number 
cleavages: for example Lipset and Rokkan (1967) traced four lines of party competition across 
Western Europe and North America (centre vs. periphery, church vs. state, land vs. industry and 
capital vs. labour). But the partisan stability implied by such historically rooted cleavages 
eroded, Dalton notes, just around the time that partisan stability in and of itself became 
“conventional wisdom” (Dalton 2002, 133). In fact, Inglehart’s 1977 study of political attitudes 
in Western Europe found that as countries became wealthier, younger, higher-educated, citizens 
were “socialized during an unprecedentedly long period of unprecedentedly high affluence,” 
hypothesising that, “[f]or them, economic security may be taken for granted, as the supply of 
water or the air we breathe once could.” Whereas their parents and grandparents may have been 
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focused upon materialist concerns, this group tended to mobilise on “post-bourgeois” issues, 
“relating to the need for belonging and to aesthetic and intellectual needs.” This change in 
political values, Inglehart predicted in 1977, “may have a long-term tendency to alter existing 
patterns of political partisanship” (Inglehart 1997, 991-992). By the 1980s and early 1990s, both 
Inglehart and Rabier (1986) and Franklin, Mackie and Valen’s (1992) cross-country analysis of 
partisan alignment highlighted a weakening in the link between social cleavage and partisan 
alignment, with Inglehart and Rabier finding electoral importance in “New Politics issues 
concerning the quality of life, the role of women, and the implications of recent technological 
developments concerning the environment and the nature of modern warfare” (Inglehart and 
Rabier 1986, 479), and Franklin et. al. identifying higher levels of partisan volatility (at both the 
individual and aggregate levels), correlated with, in Dalton’s words, a “common set of new post 
materialist issues that emerged on the stage in these nations” (Dalton 2002, 133).  
Inglehart and Norris’s (2000) developmental theory of the gender gap argues that “structural and 
cultural trends common to post-industrial societies” also had an impact on gender-based party-
voter linkages and “realigned women towards parties of the left” (Inglehart and Norris 2000, 
447).  The authors map shifts in gender-vote linkages across Western Europe alongside social-
structural change, hypothesising that the ‘traditional gender vote gap,’ wherein women identified 
with conservative parties in greater proportion than men, has eroded as women’s employment 
and take-up of higher education has increased: 
 
“Virtually all preindustrial societies emphasized childbearing and child-rearing as the 
central goal for women, and their most important function in life; careers in the paid 
workforce were predominantly male. In post-industrial societies gender roles have 
increasingly converged due to a structural revolution in the paid labor force, in 
educational opportunities for women, and in the characteristics of modern families. These 
major changes in sex roles can be expected to influence women's and men's political 
behavior. Studies suggest that female participation in the paid labor force has had a 
significant impact on female voting behavior, for example, in terms of political 
participation” (Inglehart and Norris 2000, 446).  
Although their theory relates to the broader implications of post-materialism on political values 
for both men and women as set out in Inglehart (1977), the authors imply that there is also a 
materialist driver behind the gendered realignment: “[w]omen’s support for parties of the left 
may be encouraged by pervasive patterns of horizontal and vertical occupational segregation. 
Working women are often overrepresented in low-paid jobs and as public sector professionals 
and service providers in education, health care, and welfare services” (Inglehart and Norris 2000, 
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446). Brooks and Manza (1998) analyse the reversal of gender party alignment in the US and 
argue that the development of the ‘modern gender vote gap,’ wherein women vote left in greater 
proportion than men, is attributable to the increase in female employment that has occurred since 
the 1950s and 1960s, controlling for women’s views towards both social provision and the 
women’s movement. Whilst the authors do not dismiss arguments suggesting that shifts towards 
the left on behalf of both men and women are in some part driven by post-materialist attitudes, 
they argue that for US women voters in particular, the driver may be somewhat materialistic:  
 
“More women are dependent on an activist public sector for access to jobs, public social 
provision for help with childcare and other parental responsibilities, and (especially as 
actual or potential single mothers with lower-paid employment prospects) income 
maintenance programs such as the Earned Income Tax Credit. As the party that has been 
more receptive to building or maintaining such social programs, the Democrats have thus 
benefited from the increasing proportion of women in the workforce since the 1950s” 
(Manza and Brooks 1998, 1259). 
 
So what is the actual evidence surrounding stability and change in party-voter linkages? Several 
studies point to a strong shift in gender-based linkages within advanced industrial democracies: 
women began to vote for left parties in greater proportion than men. The trend is argued to have 
happened first in the US, before occurring in advanced democracies in Western Europe (Norris 
1996, Giger 2009, Inglehart and Norris 2000). Whereas US women tended to identify with 
Republicans in greater proportion than men, this pattern began to erode from the late 1960s and 
was reversed by the 1980s, with for example 54% of women voting Democrat in the 1996 
presidential election, as compared to 43% of men (see Manza and Brooks, 1998; Trevor 1999, 
Inglehart and Norris 2000 on the US gender vote gap). In 1996 Pippa Norris identified a ‘gender 
generation gap’ across Western Europe; using Eurobarometer data she noted that, at the time, 
“women were more left wing than men” in Germany, Spain, Portugal and the US, as measured 
by the gender vote gap.
69
 Whilst British women as a whole were still more right-wing than men, 
this trend was on the decline amongst younger women, who, like their American and Western 
European counterparts were increasingly more left-wing. For example, the gender vote gap 
declined from 17 percentage points in 1959 to just one in 1987 (and six in 1992). Whereas in 
1992 the gender vote gap for women aged 30-64 and 65+ was 8 and 18 percentage points, 
respectively, it was -14 for women under the age of 30 (Norris 1996, 333-336). By 2000, 
Inglehart and Norris found a continuing erosion of the traditional gender vote gap in Britain and 
an increasing left-lean on the part of women across Western Europe. Using a slightly different 
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 Calculated as the difference in the proportion of women and men who support conservative/right parties. A 
positive number indicates conservative lean whilst a negative number denotes a left-lean. 
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scale
70
 the authors found the proportion of women who identified with the left increased in the 
Netherlands, Belgium, France, W. Germany, Britain, Canada, Ireland and the US between 1981 
and 1990, even though women as a whole remained more conservative in absolute terms in 
Belgium, France, Britain and Ireland  (Inglehart and Norris 2000, 448). The gender identification 
gap in Australia steadily declined from 9.5 to 2.5 between 1967 and 1987 (ANOP 1967, 1969; 
AES 1979, 1987).  
 
The strength of class voting has also varied over time and across countries: in 1996 the Alford 
Index, a measure of class voting that ranges from 0-1 found Australia with the lowest level (.06), 
the US with a medium level (.10) and Britain with the highest of our case studies (.18). Yet these 
figures provide just a snapshot in time: Dalton shows that Alford index scores were halved in 
Germany and the UK between 1960 and 2000, and nearly halved in the US
71
 over that same time 
period (Dalton 2002, 153).
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 Between 1945 and 1990 Australia’s Alford index dropped 41% 
(Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf 2001, 27). While the traditional class voting approach would link 
vote choice to a binary variable measuring occupation (manual or non-manual), the demise of 
industry, coupled with the rise of largely white-collar and civil sector employment is argued to 
have generated a ‘new middle class,’ who, in Daltons words “does not own capital as the old 
middle class did but also differs in lifestyle from the blue-collar workers of the traditional 
proletariat” (Dalton 2002, 148).  In fact, several authors have discussed the manner by which 
deindustrialisation has shifted traditional class-cleavage voter alignments throughout the OECD, 
weakening the ties between blue-collar workers and left political parties (Oesch 2006, Kitschelt 
1994, Häusermann 2006). Häusermann (2010) explains that three trends, deindustrialisation 
(including the rise of service sector dominance), the expansion of new middle classes via the 
“educational revolution” (Kriesi 1998), and the “feminization of the labour force” have “deeply 
transformed the class structure of the labour market, by creating new classes of privileged or 
precarious workers” thereby generating “horizontal differentiations of the middle classes” 
(Häusermann 2010, 13).    
 
Kriesi in particular argues that increased access to higher education has transformed political 
value structures and created groups of ‘haves’ and ‘have-not’s.’ According to Kriesi “one of the 
main forces of contemporary societal change” is the new “educational revolution.” Said 
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 Measured by a 10-point ideology scale from the World Values Survey. 
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 Congressional elections surveyed. 
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 While Dalton finds that “historical class alignments persist” in the US, UK and Germany, with the working and 
‘old middle’ classes giving “disproportionate” support to parties on the left and right respectively, “the new middle 
class now constitutes the majority of voters,” and it “holds ambiguous partisan preferences…normally located 
between the working class and the old middle class in its left/right voting preferences” (Dalton 2002, 148). 
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revolution is based upon the expansion of higher education and is linked to welfare state 
expansion, and broad economic changes (“tertiarization and reorganization of the production 
process”). Kriesi states: 
 
 “To some extent, the expansion of higher education constitutes a functional perquisite 
for the modernization of the state and the economy: it provides the personnel to fit the 
newly created positions, to implement the new production regimes and to handle the 
newly developing technology. That is, education has become a crucial factor in the 
reproduction of the social structure” (Kriesi 1999, 400).  
 
According to Kriesi, the “expansion of higher education has a ‘liberalizing effect’” in that it 
shifts political value orientations towards anti-authoritarianism and emancipatory goals
73
; 
whereas those who have not benefited from the expansion of higher education (i.e. low-skilled 
workers) “will be excluded from access to the new middle class” and “end up in poorly paid, 
often unstable job positions with no or only limited prospects for occupational mobility.” Their 
newfound precarious position
74
 lends itself to threats from immigration and globalisation, and in 
Kriesi’s words, “not having undergone the ‘liberalizing’ effect of education” they “tend to have a 
rather parochial and authoritarian political orientation,” leading towards social conservatism 
(Kriesi 1999, 403). Häusermann, noting the impact of deindustrialisation, tertiarisation and the 
educational revolution, goes on to articulate a more complex class schema and notes that left 
parties today draw mostly on a combination of “blue-collar workers (BC), low-skilled service 
sector workers (LSF) and high-skilled socio-cultural professionals (SCP, the new middle 
classes),” leaving Social Democratic parties “torn between two poles”: “their ‘old’ industrial 
constituency” (BC) but also, since the 1970s, a “new left” constituency of higher-skilled middle 
classes, women, and public sector workers (Häusermann 2010, 14). Kitschelt also points to 
relevant social-structural differences: 
  
“The work and market experiences of blue collar workers and white collar workers are 
often not significantly different. Instead, divisions in the workforce based on education, 
occupation, gender and employment sector are likely to shape citizens’ political 
consciousness and their availability for political appeals in more powerful ways than 
class” (Kitschelt 1994, 6).  
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 However, he also points out that this effect is conditioned on their specific occupational placement and that there 
is indeed a cleavage within the ‘new middle classes,’ with professionals defending their work autonomy leaning 
more social democratic than do the more organisationally-tied managers and technocrats (who prefer the status quo 
and middle ground, respectively) (Kriesi 1999, 402). 
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 In contrast to the ‘golden age’ of the welfare state when they were, according to Kriesi, “among the chief 
beneficiaries” of the production system (Kriesi 1999, 402). 
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Indeed, Huber and Stephens (2001) large-N quantitative analysis of welfare state growth, found 
that the explanatory value of left party power became increasingly weak after 1970. This is often 
interpreted to mean that parties' representative functions have ‘hollowed,’ in that they no longer 
represent the interests of their traditional core cleavages.
75
 So how does one explain the 
purported “hollowing” out (Mair2013) of parties' representative functions? A ‘bottom-up’ 
approach to party politics would simply update the ‘parties matter’ thesis with left parties’ new 
middle class constituents, theorising a linear relationship between ‘left’ power and social policy 
output, whilst stating that the post-industrial ‘left’ represents a different set of constituents than it 
did in the industrial age. The implication being that studies which found that parties no longer 
represented their constituents’ interests (e.g. Huber and Stephens 2000, Mair 2006) were simply 
attempting to match left parties with the wrong type of constituents. Alternatively, the party-
competition strand of the literature would, according to Häusermann et. al., contextualise party 
preferences by taking account of existing welfare state institutions, secondary political cleavages 
(e.g. libertarian-authoritarian, agrarian-urban, etc.) and a party system’s spatial configurations 
(Häusermann et. al. 2012, 228-230). This approach ascribes parties far more autonomy than does 
the traditional ‘parties matter’ thesis: 
 
“[W]hile the traditional approach sees party politics as driven by social constituencies and 
their interests, party competition approaches focus on the relative autonomy of parties as 
organizations and the independent logic of the interaction between parties” (Häusermann 
et. al. 2012, 236). 
For example, Picot (2009) argues that the German Social Democrats (SPD) took the unlikely 
policy of abolishing unemployment allowance and reducing unemployment insurance because 
there had been a slight rightward shift in public opinion on the Hartz Reforms
76
 and the SPD 
calculated that there was no party on their left to which their constituents, unhappy with reforms, 
could escape. However, there are gradations of strength in this approach: whilst a pure party 
competition approach would ignore traditional party-voter links altogether and assume that 
parties have ultimate autonomy to develop new policies in order to capture any type of voter that 
would win them seats (treating party competition as an independent variable); a modified 
approach would still assume that a party needs to maintain some linkages with a set of voters 
and/or balance linkages between types of voters, but that the development of secondary 
dimensions of party competition (i.e. different cleavages), spatial positioning of parties, 
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 A series of reforms to the German labour market made between 2002-2005. 
 69 
institutional barriers, etc. structures the policy decisions they make (treating party competition as 
an intervening variable): 
 
“[T]he orientation of a party can be determined by its social constituency (in line with the 
traditional or updated assumption), but the extent to which this goal is actively pursued, i.e. 
the policy choice, is limited by party competition” (Häusermann et. al. 2012, 237). 
Additional works have discussed the impact of social-structural driven change on class schema 
and how its attendant effects on political alliances have increased the dimensionality of party 
competition and social policy development (Oesch 2006, Kitschelt 1994, Häusermann 2006). For 
example, Kitschelt states that “the transformation of the economic structure that expanded the 
proportion of labor market participants who are highly educated, work with clients, and are 
female, has shifted the main axis of voter distribution from a simple alternative between socialist 
(left) and capitalist (right) politics to a more complex configuration opposing left-libertarian and 
right-authoritarian alternatives” (Kitschelt 1994, 31). If the traditional left (socialist) to right 
(capitalist) spectrum is depicted as a horizontal line, then left-libertarian to right-authoritarian 
dimension can be depicted as a vertical line cutting through the middle of the socialist-capitalist 
axis. According to Kitschelt, this leaves social democratic parties with two separate dilemmas: 
on the one hand, their position on the new vertical dimension requires them to decide “whether 
they will rely more on traditional, less educated blue collar, working-class voters or more on 
highly educated white collar employees.” On the other hand, “[i]f they move to the socialist left, 
they will lose the growing pool of highly educated, predominantly male workers in 
internationally competitive manufacturing and service industries who no longer support further 
growth of the public sector they also face trade-offs within the working class.” However, moving 
towards the socialist left, according to Kitschelt, is “likely to preserve support among less 
educated workers in industries that are protected from international competition” (Kitschelt 
1994, 33). Thus Kitschelt concludes, class is no longer a viable dimension for social democratic 
parties to compete on: 
 
“On the socialist-capitalist axis, then, social democrats choose not between a pure class 
and cross-class strategy, but between mobilizing different segments of the working class. 
As a consequence, class politics is no longer the foundation of a broadly successful social 
democratic coalition” (Kitschelt 1994, 33). 
 
In fact, Kitschelt states, “where socialist or bourgeois governments lost when presiding over a 
weak economy in the 1980s, the main winners were not in the opposite political camp, but 
parties running primarily on noneconomic platforms” (Kitschelt 1994, 68). Policies of interest 
 70 
may include the “environment, urban planning, health care, and women’s role in society” 
(Kitschelt 1994, 4). In line with this secondary value axis, Häusermann (2006, 2011) suggests 
that conflict over welfare state reform in general – and work/family policies in particular – is 
bidimensional in the sense that voters and political actors not only disagree with each other over 
the socioeconomic ‘distributional’ conflict’ but also the ‘libertarian-traditionalist’ value 
dimension (Häusermann 2006, 8). As such, the political feasibility of childcare policy adoption 
may well be contingent upon both the incentives and risks a party runs by placing itself within a 
particular quadrant of this bidimensional sphere of conflict.  
 
Fleckenstein (2010) analyses the adoption of work-family balance policies by the British Labour 
Party and the German Christian Democrats, both of whom operated in male-breadwinner and in 
Britain, service-lean welfare states. He attributes the change in policy to electoral competition 
for female votes and by extension, the party modernisation required to appeal to such voters: 
“the Labour Party, after continuous electoral defeats, engaged in party modernisation, which not 
only involved greater female representation but also revised family and childcare policies” 
(Fleckenstein 2010, 802). Fleckenstein also demonstrates that strategic appeals for women’s 
votes are not limited to left parties: the German Christian Democrats, suffering during the late 
1990s and early 2000s at the expense of the modern gender vote gap, pursued a programme of 
party modernisation in order “to widen the electoral appeal of the party, for which ‘women-
friendly’ policies were considered imperative” (Fleckenstein 2010, 802). Fleckenstein and Lee 
(2014) analyse the development and subsequent distributional shape of work-family balance 
policies in Britain, Germany, Sweden and Korea, and note “the critical importance of party and 
electoral competition for the emerging new political equilibrium for employment-oriented family 
policies, which are viewed as a means to attract young and especially female voters” 
(Fleckenstein and Lee 2014, 623). Similarly, Morgan (2013) analyses the development of work-
family policies in Britain, Germany and the Netherlands, attributing causality to electoral 
competition and party modernisation: “in each country, party officials confronted with declining 
traditional constituencies turned their attention to women, an increasingly dealigned electorate 
that had not developed solid ties to other parties…[t]o reach out to these voters, party officials 
increased the role of women within their party organizations and changed their electoral 
platforms, with the former development reinforcing the latter” (Morgan 2013, 74).  
Fleckenstein (2010) highlights the Labour Party’s “modernisation agenda,” stating that after the 
1987 election, its Shadow Communications Agency called for the party to be re-branded as 
“more woman-friendly” as the Labour-linked Fabian Society released a pamphlet deeming 
female voters crucial for Labour’s electoral success. Morgan (2013) similarly highlights the 
party modernisation process that occurred within Labour: 
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“Each [lost election between 1979 and 1992] reinforced a modernization drive in party 
ideology and internal functioning, including growing professionalization of campaigns and 
more sophisticated electoral targeting. The party leadership centralized power in its own 
hands while traditional core organizations, such as labor unions, were marginalized. 
Acutely aware’ of the decline of their working-class constituency, Labour leaders began 
casting about for ways to reel in new voters” (Morgan 2013, 86).  
 
These accounts suggest that there are at least two separate but related components of 
modernisation: 1) the use of sophisticated polling to identify strategic electoral targets and the 
development of public relations campaigns that make the party’s image more appealing to said 
targets and 2) specific internal organisational reforms that may either diversify rank-and-file 
party members (by applying quotas for particular demographics, etc.), which would both change 
the party’s image and perhaps encourage a push for new types of social policies, or apportion 
more power to the party leadership, thus giving them more autonomy to direct the tone of 
election campaigns and make strategic appeals (including developing appropriate policies) to a 
desired set of voters (Kitschelt 1994, 1999). It would be difficult to achieve a modernised image 
without having undergone internal organisational reforms that allowed the leadership to control 
elections and manage candidate selection processes, so as to ensure a viable crop of modern 
candidates run under the party’s banner. 
The following section elaborates on the specific mechanisms through which strategic appeals 
and their attendant policy proposals are developed: are they the result of autonomous party elites 
or perhaps interest group pressure? Does a party’s embrace of these strategies occur gradually 
via legislator turnover or quickly, as legislators and party elite become ‘converted’ to the idea of 
developing new policy proposals so as to appeal to different types of constituencies? It will first 
discuss Carmines and Stimson’s (1981) influential work on issue-evolution before going on to 
discuss subsequent works on the mechanics of party position change, such as Wolbrecht (2000, 
2002); Karol (2009) and Schumacher (2013). 
 
c.  Party responses to electoral change: 
We can see how party-voter linkages become eroded and how parties often need to compete on 
two different axes competition, but what does this tell us about issues? What are the driving 
forces behind a party’s decision to adopt or change position – is it always in the aim of a 
strategic electoral appeal or can it be induced by pressure from party-linked interest groups? And 
what is the actual mechanism that produces party position change? 
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i.  Issue evolution 
Carmines and Stimson’s issue evolution model sees change as being driven by a new issue that 
“cuts across” existing patterns of party competition (Carmines and Stimson 1989, 11). However, 
unlike realignment theory,
77
 the large-scale partisan shifts caused by this evolution do not occur 
within a singular ‘critical election,’ but instead are slow and continuous, more akin to V.O. 
Key’s  (1959) concept of a ‘secular realignment’ (Carmines and Stimson 1981, 108). As such, 
the mechanism behind partisan change is not the conversion of party identifiers or party elites 
occurring in an abrupt manner, but instead is argued to occur via replacement: in order for issues 
to change the party system, “parties must take up visibly different positions on the issue.” This 
partisan change is likely to be quite gradual, given the politicians’ fear of ‘flip-flopping’ (Karol 
2009, 13) and the “limited turnover of party elites”; as such the party will need to “recruit new 
identifiers with distinctive issue positions” which of course takes time (Carmines and Stimson 
1981, 109).  
 
Strategic elites are another implication of the model: in order to capitalise on a new issue that 
cuts across the existing pattern of party competition, elites must select newly arising issues that 
they believe will win them votes: by targeting issues with the enough resonance and staking out 
differentiating positions on them in order to win votes (Carmines and Stimson 1989, 6). The 
implications of this are two-fold as 1) party elites are autonomous in their ability to develop 
differentiating positions on issues that they believe will eventually earn them votes and 2) party 
elites lead the mass public: by staking out different issue positions they set the stage for the 
electorate to follow and amend their partisan identification within the context of parties’ new 
stances on the issue. This, as a corollary, implies a strong office-seeking view to Carmine and 
Stimson’s model. The theory attributes far less power to party activists,78 who instead of driving 
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 Realignment, first raised by V.O. Key (1955), suggests that change in the party system occurs abruptly and with 
permanent consequences. Its driver is the emergence of an issue that produces intense reactions and, crucially, in 
Carmines and Stimson’s words, “cut[s] across rather than reinforce the existing bases of support for political 
parties” (Carmines and Stimson 1981, 107). The dominant strand of realignment literature suggests that these issues 
led to such a disruption in the party system that, within the course of a single ‘critical election’ the majority party 
loses electoral dominance and is overtaken by a minority party, who thus benefits from realignment. Later iterations 
of realignment theorised that the shift in the distribution of partisan alignments occurs in a periodised manner  
(Burnham 1970). Realignment theory came under attack from the 1980s: Carmines and Stimson (1989) famously 
disagreed with the concept of dichotomising elections into being ‘realigning’ (i.e. critical) or not), just as they 
argued that there is little empirical evidence supporting the occurrence of “large-scale partisan conversions, since all 
realignments occurred before we began seriously to study individual party identification” (Carmines and Stimson 
1981, 107). The notion of realignment implies a permanent, coherent shift in partisan identification, yet additional 
arguments claim there has been no real realignment since the New Deal realignment of 1932 (Mayhew 2002). The 
supposed onset of dealignment (Beck 1977) suggested that there was little scope for subsequent partisan 
realignment. 
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 Defined by Carmines and Wagner as “heterogeneous set of overlapping groups that include delegates to national 
and state nominating conventions, major financial contributors to parties and candidates, and the thousands of state 
and local officeholders and party officials” (Carmines and Wagner 2006, 70). 
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party elites’ to select a particular policy, “reinforce the issue cues of party elites and provide an 
additional mechanism through which the mass public can become aware of the policy 
preferences of the political parties” (Carmines and Wagner 2006, 71).  
 
ii.  Party position change 
From the early 2000s a body of literature began to question whether all party position change 
was driven by strategic elites and occurred via elite turnover, with little scope for legislators to 
reverse themselves on particular issues. David Karol (2009) analyses Congressional roll-call 
votes on six key issues in the US and finds that in contrast to Carmines and Stimson’s (1989) 
conclusions about racial politics, the Republican and Democratic parties changed their relative 
positions on several issues in response to the shifting demands of their key party-linked interest 
groups. Moreover, these position changes did not all occur gradually and via elite turnover, but 
quite abruptly and via legislator ‘conversion.’ Simply put, legislators had “flip-flopped” (Karol 
2009, 24). As outlined in Chapter One, Karol (2009) places party position change into three 
different models
79
: the first model, dubbed ‘coalition group maintenance,’ posits a linear 
relationship between the demands of party linked interest groups and party policy. Once a group 
“already ensconced within [the party’s] coalition” changes its position, the party follows suit. 
The implications of this are that party leaders have little autonomy: we would see legislators 
convert positions in order to meet with the party-linked group’s new stance. As such, the 
gradual, over time (legislator) replacement process, as described by Carmines and Stimson is 
unnecessary. Party position change happens quickly in this case, given the party does not need to 
form ties to a new group but simply maintain old ones. In this case the driver of change is 
interest group and/or activist pressure whereas the mechanism is legislator conversion (Karol 
2009, 18-19). 
 
An example of coalition maintenance is trade policy: until the 1960s Republicans generally held 
a high-tariff and Democrats a low-tariff policy stance which even survived the incorporation of 
trade unions into the Democratic fold during the 1930s. Yet unions became increasingly worried 
about job losses, a partial outcome of President Kennedy’s 1962 Trade Expansion Act. As they 
moved towards a protectionist stance their traditional allies in Congress, Democrats, followed 
suit: “Forced to choose between old friends and old positions they chose the former…The same 
year the AFL-CIO [the largest US trade union confederation] reversed itself the [Democratic-
led] House passed a bill imposing import quotas on textiles, shoes and several other products” 
(Karol 2009, 41).  
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‘Coalition group incorporation,’ Karol’s second model, is the inverse of coalition group 
maintenance and very much reflects Carmines and Stimson’s issue evolution. Party elites in this 
model are not constrained actors at the hands of party-linked interest groups and activists but 
instead, autonomous strategic agents who design particular policy positions so as to appeal to 
specific sets of voters. Given that the party as a whole will need to reflect any newfound position 
(i.e. any appeal to a new electoral constituency), the speed of overall position change will be 
gradual: party elites (and in particular legislators) will need to be replaced with new elites who 
can form ties with these new constituencies and indeed whose demographics are more reflective 
of the constituencies that they aim to add to their party’s electoral coalition. In this model the 
driver of change is electoral strategy whilst the mechanism is legislator replacement (Karol 2009, 
28-30). 
 
Karol’s (2009) example of coalition group incorporation is abortion and the US Republicans: 
whilst Democratic voters had for the most part held strong anti-abortion views, Republicans, 
comprised of a fair amount of wealthy, educated Protestants maintained a more liberal stance 
until the late 1970s/early 80s. Yet President Richard Nixon’s small margin election victory in 
1968 prompted his quest to expand the Republican coalition, and in doing so he targeted white 
southerners and in particular the “Silent Majority,” a grouping of white middle/working class 
Northern Democrats – typically Catholic – who had long voted Democratic. By the 1972 
election he advanced an increasingly anti-abortion position – antithetical to the position of most 
Republican identifiers as they remained in Karol’s words, “at least slightly more pro-choice than 
Democrats” until the mid 1980s. Nixon adviser and speechwriter Pat Buchanan suggested he 
make a strategic overture to the “working class Catholic mother” (Karol 2009, 62-64). And 
indeed Nixon’s 1972 landslide victory included an increased number of Catholic voters. Nixon’s 
initial policy revision set off a slow process of party polarisation on the issue, with Republicans 
and Democrats – both in Congress and the White House, increasingly differentiating themselves 
on the issue to the point where decades later, Republican Party Platforms became quite solidly 
anti-abortion (Karol 2009, 62-84).  
 
Karol’s primary quantitative method for disaggregating the impact that legislator turnover and 
legislator conversion have on party position change is Rapoport and Stone’s (1994) model. The 
model, which measures a party’s position at T1 and T2, takes account of the average position of 
‘stayers,’ who lasted throughout the time period under examination as well as ‘dropouts,’ and 
‘newcomers,’ and indicates the proportion of change attributable to replacement, conversion and 
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mobilisation.
80
 Whereas Karol’s (2009) party positions are calculated by roll call votes amongst 
US Congressional Representatives, Wolbrecht (2002), discussed below, also employed Rapoport 
and Stone and calculated party position change using US Convention Delegate Surveys that 
included feeling thermometers on several key social and economic issues. 
 
Wolbrecht’s (2002) analysis of party policy reversal on the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) 
attributes causality to elements of both coalition maintenance and coalition group incorporation: 
whilst the Democrats were gradually embracing increased social liberalism, trade unions, a key 
Democratic constituency, dropped their opposition to the ERA after a Supreme Court ruling 
struck down certain provisions of protective employment legislation. The party – which had 
previously been ambivalent if not averse to adopting a pro-ERA policy stance – quickly reversed 
its position and embraced the ERA. The mechanisms producing change are both replacement 
(Congressional Democrats were increasingly post-materialist) and conversion (the party’s move 
towards the ERA was hastened by the changed demands of the party’s traditional policy 
demander, the unions). At the same time, Wolbrecht finds that with the Republicans, elite 
replacement (a slower process), seems to have been behind the party’s increased, long-term 
resistance (if not hostility) towards the ERA and several women’s rights issues as new, 
increasingly conservative politicians made their way into the party (Wolbrecht 2002, 254-273). 
The application of Karol’s framework to this study’s research question is indeed quite helpful in 
determining both the drivers behind and the actual mechanisms that produced childcare policy 
adoption within each party; whereas Carmines and Stimson focus largely on policy change via 
autonomous elites, Karol’s framework allows us to try and disentangle the impact of trade 
unions (bearing in mind the correlation between organised female labour mobilisation and 
childcare policy adoption) from that of electoral strategy.  
 
iii.  Party position change: cross-country comparisons 
Carmines and Stimson (1981), Wolbrecht (2002) and Karol (2009) each developed and tested 
their theories in the context of US political institutions and amongst US political parties – the 
question remains how much relevance these models have in other advanced democracies’ party 
systems. There is a body of literature that has examined the factors that induce parties to respond 
to exogenous shocks and compete with each other in quite different ways, finding that parties are 
more likely to change their positions after electoral loss (Somer-Topcu 2009; Budge et. al 2010), 
that parties change their position in response to environmental factors such as globalisation, 
unemployment etc. (Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009) and that parties are likely to change their 
position in line with median voter shifts (Adams, Haupt and Stoll 2009; Adams at el. 2004). 
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 Mobilisation is the entry of newcomers in excess of the number of dropouts. It indicates the proportion of change 
that goes beyond replacement. 
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However, it is unclear why parties may exhibit different responses to largely similar exogenous 
and environmental factors, as the US Democrats, ALP and British Labour did. 
 
Three recent papers (Schumacher, Vries and Vis 2013; Marx and Schumacher 2013; 
Schumacher 2013) aim to do this by, like Karol, focusing on parties’ internal politics and 
drawing a distinction between parties who are elite-led or activist-led, based on Laver and 
Hunt’s 1992 party organisation surveys.81 Schumacher, Vries and Vis (2013) place 55 parties 
(from 10 European countries) on a scale from activist-dominated to leadership-dominated and 
use the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) (Budge et. al. 2001) data to analyse a host of their 
policy positions between 1977 and 2003, finding that leadership dominated parties “respond to 
shifts in the mean voter position and to office exclusion, while activist-dominated parties 
respond to party voter changes,” thus suggesting that the success of party leaders in activist-
dominated parties is contingent on appealing to activists whilst party leaders in leadership-
dominated parties “aim to reap electoral gains and obtain political office in order to safeguard 
their power within the party…as well as enjoy the material benefits of office” (Schumacher, 
Vries and Vis 2013, 474). Schumacher (2013) similarly uses CMP and the Laver and Hunt party 
organisation data to analyse why historically “pro-welfare” Social Democratic, Socialist and 
Christian Democratic parties (33 parties across 14 countries between 1977 and 2003) adopted 
policies that sought a leaner/higher conditionality welfare state. He finds that activist oriented 
parties will tend to adopt positions which are in accordance with their party voter’s median 
policy stance; leadership oriented parties will adopt the position of the median voter in the larger 
electorate and finally, parties which are neither clearly activist or leadership dominated – if/when 
they are rejected from office, will shift their position in the opposite direction of their previous 
stance (Schumacher 2013).  
 
Finally, Marx and Schumacher (2013) also identify the intraparty balance of power between 
party leaders and party activists as the intervening variable that determines whether or not Social 
Democratic parties will embrace neoliberal labour market policies. Here, however, the authors 
focus on three case studies of European Social Democratic parties (in Spain, the Netherlands and 
Germany) and rather than rely on the Laver and Hunt (1992) survey data, they adopt a 
qualitative approach to measuring the activist/leader dominance in a party’s organisational 
structure, tracing parties’ changes with regard to several informal and formal balance of power 
measures, in particular, candidate selection procedures, the number of MP’s allowed on a party’s 
executive board, eligibility for voting in party conferences, and funding from/ decision making 
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 Laver and Hunt’s (1992) expert surveys ask party members if party leaders are influential in setting party policy 
and also whether activists are influential in setting party policy. Schumacher et. al (2013) construct a scale running 
from zero to 30 by subtracting the values of the first question from the second question (Schumacher et. al 2013, 4). 
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of affiliates (i.e. trade unions). However Marx and Schumacher (2013) are unique to the above 
studies as they note that parties – and in particular the British Labour Party – may change their 
organisational structure over time, becoming more leadership than activist-led or vice-versa.  
 
This is a challenge to studies that assign static organisational descriptions to parties. In fact, the 
idea that party organisations shift over time has been overlooked so much so that in their latest 
update to the Laver and Hunt 1992 data (Benoit and Laver 2006) did not ask the 1992 survey 
questions on activist and leadership policy-setting influence, stating that the questions “were also 
never used in subsequent research using the Laver-Hunt data” (Benoit and Laver 2006, 133). Yet 
party internal organisation, and more specifically change in said organisation, is quite 
fundamental to this research: it hypothesises that parties were able to make strategic appeals to 
new electoral coalitions, and in so doing develop appealing policies, such as middle-income 
childcare assistance because they underwent a process of internal organisational reform, 
reducing barriers to what Kitschelt (1994) dubs ‘strategic flexibility.’ This idea that as party-
voter linkages change, party type and internal organisational structure subsequently change, has 
been a popular strand of the party politics literature since the 1990s. The following section will 
first address broader evidence of party change, and in particular the work of Katz and Mair 
(1995) before going on to discuss Kitschelt’s (1994, 1999) argument that a party’s ability to 
make strategic appeals is conditioned by their micro-level organisational structure, and the extent 
to which the balance between rank-and-file activist, party leadership and legislative leadership 
allow room for making strategic electoral appeals.  
 
d.  Party change and internal organisational reform 
i.  Macro-changes in party type 
The political party and party change literature have produced a host of ideal-type party 
categories, with Katz and Mair (1995) suggesting, broadly, a continual occurrence of party 
change over time: from the elite-led ‘cadre party’ (Duverger 1954) of the 18th and 19th 
centuries
82
 to the industrialised era’s ‘mass party’ (Neumann 1956), the ‘catch-all’ party of the 
post-war era and finally, the ‘cartel party,’ wherein parties are entrenched in the state and collude 
to prevent the development of competitive parties.  The transition from the ‘mass’ to the ‘catch-
all’ or indeed ‘electoral-professional’ (Panebianco 1988) is of relevance here as it seems to 
coincide with the rise of new politics issues and indeed the political popularity of childcare in the 
US, UK and Australia.  
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 Elite-led parties were, in Katz and Mair’s (1995) words, “the people who made up the politically relevant 
elements of civil society and the people who occupied the positions of power in the state were so closely by ties of 
family and interest that even when the two groups were not simply coterminous, they were heavily interpenetrating” 
(Katz and Mair 1995, 9). 
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The ‘mass party’ ideal type arose with industrialisation and the expansion of suffrage; it is a 
formal, bottom-up organisation wherein, as Katz and Mair argue, “the fundamental units of 
political life are pre-defined and well-defined social groups” (Katz and Mair 1995, 7). Because 
the party programme is “not just a bundle of policies…but a coherent and logically connected 
whole,” party unity and party discipline are, Katz and Mair argue, “not only practically 
advantageous, but also normatively legitimate.” On the same token, the party’s legitimacy to act 
on behalf of a particular social group requires an organisational structure capable of transmitting 
“mass input into the party’s policy-making process,” just as it requires the “supremacy of the 
extra-parliamentary party” (Katz and Mair 1995, 7). Since, under this ideal-type, parties compete 
on the basis of social groupings, they win elections not by converting members of other social 
groups to join but rather, by mobilising from within their own group. Key characteristics, as set 
out by Katz and Mair, include party work and party campaigning that is “labour intensive”; party 
finance contingent on members’ fees/contributions; a relationship between rank-and-file 
members and the elite which is characterised by bottom-up accountability; and a membership 
base that is “large and homogenous,” where “membership [is] a logical consequence of identity” 
(Katz and Mair 1995, 18).  
 
The stability of mass parties began to erode, Katz and Mair argue, after the conclusion of the 
“big battles for political and social rights that had united the emerging constituencies of mass 
parties in a way that could not be maintained once these rights were won” adding that the “need 
for solidarity was further reduced when the state began to provide on a universal basis the 
welfare and educational services that before had been the responsibility of the party” (Katz and 
Mair 1995, 12). Indeed, Kircheimer’s (1966) identification of the “catch-all party” disrupted this 
notion of stable parties built on pre-existing social groupings: instead he argued parties from 
both the left and the right began to converge on a party model characterised by “de-
ideologisation, weak electoral links, and centralisation of power around the party leadership” 
(Hopkin and Paolucci 1999, 308). The ideal-type ‘catch-all’ party, according to Katz and Mair 
(1995), required not the mobilisation of specific social groups but instead the conversion of – 
and competition for – individuals from heterogeneous backgrounds; the party would be financed 
by a variety of sources, campaigns would be both labour and capital intensive, party-elite/rank-
and-file relations would be of a top-down variant and membership would be open and 
encouraged and, in contrast to mass parties, “marginal to [an] individual’s identity” (Katz and 
Mair 1995, 18). Panebianco (1988) took this idea further, arguing that there was an “increasing 
professionalization of party organizations,” wherein ‘experts’ become “more useful to the 
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[party’s] organization than the traditional party bureaucrats, as the party’s gravitational centre 
shifts from the members to the electorate” (Panebianco 1988, 264).  
 
In fact, whilst cautioning that “no party completely fits” these ideal types, Panebianco ascribes 
five key organisational dimensions to Kircheimer’s ‘catch-all’ model that were often 
“overshadowed” in light of the sociological implications that Kircheimer’s model implied. They 
include “de-ideololgisation,” or indeed “the reduction the party’s ‘ideological baggage'”; a 
heightened dependence on interest groups but not interest groups as they have typically been 
envisaged: there will occur “the transformation of collateral, religious, trade union organizations 
into interest groups with weaker and less regular party ties”; “members loss in political weight,” 
coupled with a decline in the number of rank-and-file members; increasing power of party 
leaders and their heightened reliance on external interests for both finance and “keeping in touch 
with the electorate” and “weaker and more discontinuous party-electorate relations” (Panebianco 
1988, 263). The shifting weight of interest groups appears an important factor: Mair, Mueller 
and Plasser (2004) note that as parties begin the transition towards becoming a catch-all party, 
there will be a decrease in ties to traditional interest groups, (Mair, Mueller and Plasser 2004, 
13). So for example, parties on the left may seek to decrease their ties to traditional interest 
groups, such as trade unions, whilst simultaneously appealing to other groups, such as those 
aligned to post-materialist values. 
 
ii.  Internal organisational reform 
Kitschelt asserts that party organisation, as discussed above, affects both the direction and the 
stability/volatility of a party’s electoral appeals (Kitschelt 1994, 207). His models of party 
organisation are more complex than the leadership vs. activist oriented framework as outlined by 
Schumacher et al, and retreat to a more micro-level than the party type models outlined above: 
Kitschelt develops four ideal type party-organisational models: in 1)“centralist clubs,” both 
leaders and activists have “strategic capacity,” and there is a “stratified internal conflict system” 
that incorporates “heterogeneous constituencies but permit[s] party leaders to manage the 
internal plurality of political voices are argued.” Kitschelt argues this party type is the most 
amenable to responding to left-libertarian and “liberal market” challenges because rank-and-file 
members are able to develop new policy positions and place them before the leader but 
apportions the leader enough power that they “are not forced to match [the rank-and-file’s 
positions] one by one.” 2) “Decentralised clubs,” which apportion greater strategic capacity to 
the rank-and-file party members, at the expense of the highly accountable party leader. Whereas 
new political inputs come “from below” leaders have “little opportunity to express a unified 
stance in interparty competition.” 3) a Leninist cadre party allocates nearly all strategic power to 
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leaders, at the expense of the rank-and-file. Kitschelt asserts that the model “may be efficient as 
long as a socialist party can be reliable on a homogenous and stable electoral following that does 
not generate new demands.” Finally, the 4) “decentralized mass party” is one in which neither 
the leadership nor the rank-and-file have strategic capacity. These parties are characterised by a 
large “bureaucratic apparatus” with “strict rules of leadership accountability”; it creates a 
strategic inertia that according to Kitschelt “is not necessarily counterproductive electorally, as 
long as electoral demands remain stable and a party is insufficiently competitive to capture the 
pivot of the electoral system” (Kitschelt 1994, 215-216). 
 
For example, Kitschelt in 1994 characterised British Labour as a “decentralised club” style of 
party, given that, in the early 1980s its central party apparatus had little control over leader 
selection, the leadership had little control over the party conference, the party’s legislative and 
executive wings were poorly integrated, and the union-party link was indeed very tight. Whilst 
Labour could have, according to Kitschelt, reaped electoral rewards had they sharply pivoted to 
the materialist right, the leadership’s minimal autonomy meant that the party continually drifted 
to the left (Kitschelt 1994, 228-229). As Kitschelt explains, its “loose cadre organization made it 
overly responsive to radical leftist stirrings promoted by activists who proceeded to dismantle 
leadership autonomy and prevent the party from choosing a vote or office-seeking strategy 
against its major conservative antagonist, which emphasized the agenda of market efficiency” 
(Kitschelt 1994, 244-245). The impact of such party organisation is, Kitschelt explains, critical 
to a party’s electoral success because it structures the type of appeals a party is able to make:  
 
“A party faces greater adjustment problems of its organization structure to new 
competitive conditions the more entrenched the historically grown structures of mass 
party organization that resist debureaucratization (path dependent learning). Often only 
momentous electoral crises enable party activists to mobilize around new political visions 
and leaders, who then refashion a party’s formal statutes and actual power distribution” 
(Kitschelt 1994, 36).   
 
But what determines when and to what extent a political party may embark on the 
‘transformation’ from a mass party to a catch-all/electoral professional one? Panebianco 
identifies two “two main variables which most influence speed and intensity of transformation.” 
First, the level of party institutionalisation prior to the beginning of transformation: a party with 
a long period of prior existence and strong institutional structures for both internal and 
parliamentary practice is better equipped to “resist transformatory pressures.” The second 
variable, also identified by Kirchheimer, is party system fragmentation: as larger parties are 
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likely to face more transformatory power than “the less fragmented the party system, the more it 
is controlled by few large organizations; change will thus begin sooner and take place more 
quickly” (Panebianco 1988, 265).  
 
As we know from the Chapter One, all three parties under consideration underwent a process of 
party modernisation preceding childcare policy adoption. As the case studies will discuss, some 
processes were easier and swifter than others, as the degree of change that occurred in both the 
public relations and especially, internal organisational components of modernisation varied. The 
effects of such micro-level party reform are of critical importance to this study and as such, party 
organisation cannot be treated as a static variable. Although parties may have had an incentive to 
court new voters by issuing strategic appeals and developing particular policies, and even if there 
was a degree of demographic shifting amongst a party’s legislators (i.e. arrival of new politics 
MPs), its ability to run campaigns of a different tone, appeal to new interest groups and recruit 
candidates who if elected, would develop social policies not in keeping with the traditional left 
socialist – right capitalist dimension of party competition is contingent upon them having an 
organisational structure that fosters what Kitschelt calls ‘strategic flexibility.’ In other words, it 
is those micro-level internal organisational reforms that allowed electoral imperative to finally 
translate into strategic policy proposals. As such the next questions might ask: did each party 
under consideration transition towards a single model of organisation (e.g. centralised club)? 
Why did some parties transition quicker than others? To what extent can one argue that 
institutionalisation and party system fragmentation explains the different speeds in which the 
Democrats, ALP and Labour reorganised their internal structures?  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
The bodies of work considered in this chapter have informed the theoretical framework outlined 
in Chapter One. Whereas much of the literature grouped under ‘welfare state development’ 
might explain cross-country variation in childcare policy passage or indeed expenditure, it 
struggles to explain the research question at hand, given that the countries operated in the same 
welfare state/breadwinner typologies at the time of childcare policy adoption. Moreover, this 
research is not focused upon the factors that increase the likelihood of a childcare policy being 
passed and signed into law but rather, the factors that caused a party to campaign on, debate and 
promote the issue – even if it was never to be signed into law. However, Estevez-Abe’s (2009) 
gendered account of the Varieties of Capitalism framework does bring with it a question of 
relevance to this thesis: what was the role of trade unions in pushing these parties to adopt 
childcare? This question is relevant because, as discussed under the power resources strand of 
the party politics literature, the time at which each of three parties adopted childcare as an 
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electoral and legislative issue correlates with the time at which their level of organised female 
labour mobilisation peaked. Is this correlation causal, or perhaps spurious? Literature and data 
surrounding women and unions suggest the evidence is mixed: whilst on the one hand growth in 
female union membership had begun to outstrip that of men’s across the three countries by the 
time each party adopted childcare as an electoral and a legislative issue, Ledwith (2012) notes 
that females have still not made proportionate inroads into union leadership structures.  Lewis 
(1992) argues that unions historically served to reinforce the (British) male breadwinner model. 
Karol (2009) suggests that on the one hand, parties could have been driven to adopt childcare in 
line with the trade union demands (coalition maintenance) but also notes that electoral strategy 
and in particular the search for new types of voters (coalition group incorporation) often drives 
forth new policy stances. 
 
And indeed, each country adopted childcare policy within the much broader context of large-
scale social-structural change (Kitschelt 1994, Häusermann 2006, 2010; Kriesi 1998, 1999; 
Oesch 2006) and party-voter alignments that increasingly differed from those of the post-war, 
industrial age. Summarising crudely, studies such as Inglehart (1977), Inglehart and Rabier 
(1986) and Kitschelt (1994) indicated a decline in ‘class voting’ and a rise in voters who 
identified more with ‘post-materialist’ or ‘new politics’ issues such as environment, women’s 
rights, etc., than they did traditional economic distributional issues. Knutsen (2008) explains that 
these “new middle class” voters would traditionally have identified with centre-right parties but 
began to mobilise on issues beyond left-right materialism and they, alongside the “better-
educated strata, are most likely to support the ‘post-materialist left’” (Knutsen 2008, 5).  
Inglehart and Norris (2000) Manza and Brooks (1998) also found shifts in gender-based party-
voter linkages across advanced industrial democracies, wherein women – led by the young – 
increasingly supported left parties in greater proportion than did men. Kitschelt (1994) pointed 
out that the declining salience of class as a vote-winning issue and noted that left parties who 
were successful during the 1980s based their strategic appeals on noneconomic issues, seeking 
voters who may identify on the left of the socialist-capitalist dimension of party competition but 
also anchor themselves far more towards the libertarian end of the libertarian-authoritarian axis 
of party competition (Kitschelt 1994, 33). And indeed, Fleckenstein (2010) and Morgan (2013) 
argue that electoral imperative drove both the German Christian Democrats and British Labour 
Party to adopt the childcare policy issue. 
 
But what explains the temporal variation of childcare policy adoption between the Democrats, 
ALP and Labour? Why, after they each began to experience volatility in the electoral coalitions 
(on both class and gender terms) did they take different amounts of time to make strategic 
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appeals to post-materialist (and in particular female) voters by placing childcare on their agenda? 
The attention to internal party organisation, highlighted in particular by Kitschelt (1994, 1999), 
Schumacher, Vries and Vis (2013) and Schumacher (2013) suggests that parties are often 
obstructed from making vote-winning strategic appeals by their internal organisational 
structures, or to put it crudely, having too much power vested in either the rank-and-file 
members at the expense of the leadership, or too much power vested in the leadership who 
presides over a staid, membership base. Yet party organisation is not always static: several 
centre-left parties in the post-industrial era have changed their broad ‘type,’ transforming from a 
mass party towards a more leadership oriented, less union-driven ‘cartel’ (Katz and Mair 1995) 
or ‘‘electoral professional’ party (Panebianco 1988), as clearly explained in Dalton (2002) and 
Mair, Mueller and Plasser (2004). Perhaps then, the varying amount of time between electoral 
change and party policy adoption that occurred amongst the Democrats, ALP and Labour can be 
explained by the time needed to make their party a) more diverse at the membership level and/or 
b) more powerful and autonomous at the leadership level. 
 
The following three case study chapters will outline the general history of childcare in each 
country and the partisan political context in which it was developed. Bearing in mind the two 
competing sub-questions of this study (‘was policy adoption a response to interest group - trade 
union – pressure or to strategic electoral imperative?’), it will qualitatively analyse the trade 
unions’ history with childcare policy promotion alongside their general treatment of female 
members. It will then explore the extent of change in the party’s electoral coalition, noting where 
gaps needed to be filled and where the opportunities to attract new types of voters presented 
themselves. Employing the Rapoport and Stone (1994) model, it will attempt to quantitatively 
disaggregate the proportions of party position change on childcare that were mechanised by 
conversion (which suggests parties changed position in direct response to interest group 
demands) and legislator replacement (which suggests that parties adopted the issue as their 
legislators turned over and new types joined the fold). Multiple linear regressions are also 
employed to test whether the legislators who either debated or co-sponsored childcare legislation 
had a traditional left background (i.e. male and having a trade union background) or indeed a 
background more akin to members of the post-materialist, new-left generation (i.e. an increase in 
females on the left, university education, high scores from left-liberal interest groups, etc.). But 
even if it finds that the effects of elite replacement outweighed those of conversion (i.e. electoral 
imperative drove parties to adopt childcare policy more so than trade unions did), what explains 
the variation in timing between the three parties? The chapters will also outline the difficulty and 
speed of internal organisational reform that occurred within the three parties, whilst the analysis 
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in Chapter Six will compare all of these processes and elaborate upon the mediating effect of 
party reform on the timing of each party’s adoption of childcare policy.           
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Chapter Three: Ever tried. Ever failed. US Democrats and universal childcare policy 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the US Democrats’ adoption of childcare policy, which occurred in both 
electoral and legislative terms during the late 1960s and early 1970s, with a particular spate of 
attention surrounding the Child Development Act in 1970 and 1971. The chapter attempts to 
identify the driving force behind the party’s position change (i.e. their adoption of childcare 
policy), with a specific focus on the extent to which it was driven by party elites who sought to 
add new middle class and women voters to their electoral coalition
83
 and the extent to which 
change was driven by party-linked interest groups and activists, notably trade unions, whose 
membership was becoming increasingly female during the late 1960s and early 1970s.
84
 It will 
first trace childcare policy as it developed in the US between the 1930s and 1970s and then 
analyse the issue in the context of two separate, yet related events: 1) US parties’ shifting 
electoral coalitions and their consequent efforts to attract new voters and 2) the Democratic 
Party’s modernisation process, which was centred upon internal organisational reforms that 
sought to reduce union influence, democratise candidate selection and empower women, 
minority and youth participants. It will then qualitatively assess the trade unions’ efforts to 
promote childcare policy. In an attempt to build upon the qualitative analyses, it employs two 
quantitative tools: 1) Rapoport and Stone’s (1994) model for disaggregating political change, 
which will show whether the Democrats’ adoption of childcare policy can be attributed more to 
legislator replacement or to legislator conversion and 2) OLS regressions that test for an 
association between a legislator co-sponsoring childcare legislation and their gender, education, 
and rankings from two think tanks, the socially liberal advocacy group, Americans for 
Democratic Action and the AFL-CIO’s political arm, the Committee on Political Education 
(COPE). It will then combine the findings of the qualitative and quantitative analyses in order to 
discuss the relative importance of electoral imperative and trade union pressure on the party’s 
adoption of childcare policy, and note the extent to which this adoption was mediated by the 
party’s internal organisational reforms.   
 
3.2 Breaking new ground: childcare policy from the Great Depression to the 1990s 
Although the US has long been considered a ‘welfare state laggard,’ typically characterised by 
low levels of direct social expenditure and meagre means-tested benefits, the Democratic-led 
Congress in 1971 passed legislation to develop a multi-billion dollar, federally funded network 
of non-profit childcare centres. Childcare would be universal – free for children from families 
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with an annual income below $6,970
85
 and available on an income-contingent sliding scale fee 
for families above that income level.  The initiative, sponsored by Democrats Walter Mondale 
(MN) in the Senate and John Brademas (IN) in the House, garnered not only wide bipartisan 
support but also attracted several Republican co-sponsors in each legislative chamber, both of 
which easily passed the bill – The Comprehensive Child Development Act (CDA) – before being 
vetoed by President Richard Nixon. The CDA has been identified as a “critical juncture” for 
childcare in the United States
86
 and indeed, it marked a newfound attention to the issue that 
whilst included some moderate Republicans,
87
 would be largely dominated by Democrats. 
Shortly after Nixon’s veto, the Democratic Party’s 1972 platform, written for the 1972 
McGovern-Nixon Presidential campaign, pledged for the first time a commitment to universal 
childcare and also for the first time, it included a section wholly dedicated to the “Rights of 
Women.” Childcare would remain, at least on the Party Platform a Democratic commitment, 
with every Party Platform between then and 1988 including a promise to develop affordable 
childcare for all (Woolley and Peters 2013).  
 
However, the CDA’s Congressional success and its particular popularity amongst Democrats 
may not have seemed a given, at least to someone familiar with the Democratic Party of the 
1950s and 1960s: both political parties have been characterised as holding a somewhat 
ambivalent stance towards women’s rights during that era, in particular the Democrats when it 
came to their positions on equal rights for women and female employment issues (Wolbrecht 
2000, 2002). The Democrats’ lack of support for these issues was partially rooted in conflict 
over equality versus protection: while the Republican Party endorsed the Equal Rights 
Amendment in 1940, the Democrats were long quiet on the matter, in part because their trade 
union base wanted to maintain protective employment rights for women, which in effect 
hindered their ability to take up full-time work on an equal basis to men. Wolbrecht notes, “the 
few Congressional votes on the issue during the 1950s confirm[ed] this alignment” (Wolbrecht 
2002, 239). Upon passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act both the courts and the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) began to interpret Title VII, which prohibits 
discrimination in employment, as a provision that applied to sexual, in addition to racial (and 
other types of) discrimination. With the trade unions’ case against women’s equality largely 
evaporated, the Democratic Party began to take on a more progressive approach to women’s 
rights, moving beyond the traditional ‘equality’ issues long supported by the Republican Party, 
and tackling some of the compensatory second wave feminist issues that the GOP would 
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 See for example Karch (2013, p. 7). 
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 Including Sen. Jacob Javits (NY), Rep. Ogden Reid (NY), Rep. John Dellenback (OR), Rep. Albert Quie (MN), 
Sen. Robert Taft Jr (OH) (Karch 2013, 107). 
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eventually come to find uncomfortable, such as childcare, protection from violence, abortion, 
and reproductive rights (Wolbrecht 2000, 152-157).  
 
Long before this partisan realignment on women’s rights both political parties had already 
touched upon the childcare issue, albeit in a targeted and emergency-based context: during the 
Great Depression publicly funded ‘emergency’ nursery schools were developed and sponsored 
by the Works Progress Administration (WPA) as a way to provide temporary employment for 
out of work teachers (Karch 2013, 36).  Funding was mostly withdrawn after the war’s end and 
the issue remained off the immediate post-war national political agenda apart from 1954, when 
the tax code was revised to allow a deduction for employment-related dependent care expenses. 
This allowed working adults who earned up to $4,500 to deduct adult or child care costs worth 
up to US $600 a year (Karch 2013, 44). In 1962, the National Day Care Committee was 
successful in lobbying Congress to resume operational funding for some targeted child care 
programmes, a policy they had not undertaken since the end of World War II. Norgren states that 
Congress “tentatively recommitted funds” under the Public Welfare Amendments to the Social 
Security Act. The coalition behind the amendments were, according to Norgren, “disparate,” as 
they reflected “traditional day care advocates with a social welfare, child focused viewpoint and 
a new congressional ‘workfare’ caucus that considered day care a necessary adjutant to welfare 
reform and job training programs”(Norgren 1981, 131). 
 
This ‘workfare caucus’ passed legislation again in 1967 - this time an amendment to the Social 
Security Act that unintentionally established a childcare programme that fostered greater demand 
for such services. Norgren states the intention of the amendment “appeared clear - the equation 
of expanded daycare with a reduction in welfare dependence.” And indeed, the legislation 
covered up to 75% of the costs of childcare for any parent participating in the government’s 
Work Incentives Program (WIN) or any parent receiving benefits on the Aid for Dependent 
Children (AFDC) programme. However as Norgren points out, the liberal eligibility 
requirements helped create a working to middle class childcare constituency:  
 
“Ironically, the impact of the 1967 legislation was not on welfare rolls. The funding 
authorization and liberal eligibility guidelines did encourage substantial growth in the 
number of day care centers. Enrolment in New York City’s day care program, for 
example, rose dramatically from 8,000 children in 1970 to 15,000 in 1971. The children 
enrolled, however, were primarily the offspring of the already employed mothers of 
working and occasionally middle class, professional background” (Norgren 1981, 132). 
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In 1967, during the 90
th
 Congress, Rep. Patsy T. Mink (D-HI) introduced the first childcare and 
early years education bill with universal benefits: the Pre-school Centers Supplementary 
Education Act (H.R. 10572), which aimed to improve the quality of childcare in non-profit 
centres through a $300 million increase in federal funding to states for educational services and 
equipment that would be allocated according to the proportion working mothers in each state. 
Mink intended for the bill to benefit all working mothers, as opposed to providing a targeted 
service
88
 (Cohen 2001, 32). While Mink’s bill never moved beyond committee, it drew 
Congressional attention beyond targeted childcare or compensatory pre-school programmes such 
as Head Start, and pointed to the fact that childcare supply was in no way meeting demand: a 
March 1969 Library of Congress report stated that only a small proportion of needs would be 
met, largely because the existing government assistance programmes were limited to low-income 
families: “As far as the non-needy general public is concerned, there are at present no federal 
programmes or proposals which would be expected to provide it with day care facilities and 
services on any significant scale” (Karch 2013, 62).  
 
At the time, contextual conditions for a non-means tested childcare policy seemed ripe. Karch 
states that three forces helped drive childcare and pre-school onto the national political agenda 
during the late 1960s and early 1970s: a rising rate of maternal employment, research in 
cognitive psychology that emphasised the importance of early years for child development and a 
political backdrop that “was conducive to major expansions of government activity,” in which 
Karch is referring to the socially progressive ‘Great Society’ policies advanced by the Johnson 
administration between 1964-1968 (Karch 2013, 7). Moreover, public opinion was increasingly 
favourable to state assistance for childcare, as Morgan states: 
 
“A 1943 Gallup poll showed that 56 percent of mothers would not use government day-
care centers even if they were free, and other anecdotal evidence showed that parents 
associated day care with poor families, and were unwilling to put their children in such 
services. By the 1960s, this mood began to change. Head Start and other early child 
education programs established for low-income children reported middle class parents 
trying to secure a place for their children in these services. A 1970 Harris poll found that 
64 percent of women and 51 percent of men favored the idea of setting up ‘many more 
day care centers.’ A 1969 survey showed 68 percent of women and 59 percent of men 
explicitly in favor of the federal government providing these centers” (Morgan 2001, 
222-223). 
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 When explaining her reasoning behind the bill she stated: “I was a young attorney working full-time and needed 
care for my children, more than just custodial care. I saw what a tremendous problem it was in my community, and 
realized that if it was a problem for me, then it must be a problem for others” (Cohen 2001, 32). 
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The shortage of childcare places was a concern to labour organisations, which in 1969 lobbied to 
amend the Taft-Hartley Act by allowing trade unions and employees to set up trust funds in 
order to provide childcare services for their members/employees. Cohen claims that “Labor 
organizations were strong supporters of child care in the late 1960s,” noting that “[u]nion leaders 
testified before Congress that initiatives sponsored by employees and unions were insufficient to 
meet the needs of their members,” as at the time members such as the International Ladies 
Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers were nearly 80% 
female (Cohen 2001, 28). The bill passed the House 354-1. By the 91
st
 Congress, Democrats, 
beyond Mink, had picked up on the issue and promised in their 1968 Party Platform to  
“finance… services necessary to enable people to undertake training and accept jobs—including 
improved recruitment and placement services, day-care centers, and transportation between work 
and home” (Woolley and Peters, 2013). In 1969, Mink reintroduced the Pre-school Centers 
Supplementary Act, whilst Reps. John Brademas (D-IN) and Ogden Reid (R-NY) introduced the 
Comprehensive Pre-school Education and Child Day Care Act of 1969 – the precursor to the 
Child Development Act that eventually passed Congress – and Sen. Walter Mondale (D-MN), 
who, alongside 21 Democratic co-sponsors introduced the Headstart Child Development Act of 
1969 (Congressional Record 90
th
 Congress). 
During 1969, Mondale had sent a letter asking Marian Wright Edelman of the Washington 
Research Project to help coordinate a coalition that would provide input on the shape of his and 
Brademas’ prospective childcare legislation. Edelman went on to form a diverse coalition that 
included labour, women’s and civil rights groups that would debate, design and lobby the bill. 
The bill, as drawn up by Edelman’s ‘ad hoc coalition,’ envisioned a childcare programme that 
was meant to encourage child development rather than simply provide a custodial function; it 
would be universally available – free for low-income families with wealthier families paying 
fees on an income sliding scale, encourage parental involvement, require a “substantial 
investment” and be based upon “local flexibility and control” – perhaps the most controversial 
element. This last requirement, that the federal government directly fund not-for-profit 
sponsoring bodies, as opposed to channelling money through state governments, was largely 
driven by civil rights leaders such as Edelman, whose experience with Office of Economic 
Opportunity (OEO) programmes in the US South led them to believe that state governments 
could not be trusted to act as non-discriminatory sponsors, and that smaller entities such as 
municipalities and community groups should be able to set up childcare centres directly (Karch 
2013, 69-70).  
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There were political actors on both sides of the left-right spectrum who offered a warm reception 
to the concept of federal childcare support. In fact, at various points in the CDA’s development 
Republicans strengthened and co-sponsored the bill, even at one point offering counter-
legislation that would offer further benefits to children from middle-income, dual earner families 
(Morgan 2001, Cohen 2001, Roth 1976).  The Nixon administration’s final specifications for 
their preferred childcare legislation were quite similar to the original bill put forth by Brademas 
in the House (Cohen 2001, 47), though the main sticking point was the issue of prime 
sponsorship. Whereas Edelman, Mondale and the civil rights groups favoured a low prime 
sponsorship number, so as to allow community action groups, small municipalities and trade 
unions to run their own childcare programmes, Brademas and many of his Democratic 
colleagues in the House were less concerned with designing legislation specifically to empower 
community groups. Congressional Republicans and the Nixon administration, supportive of this 
latter goal, were very much unsympathetic to the former (Morgan 2001, 229-231). Brademas, 
who stated that the prime sponsorship issue was “without question” the most difficult component 
of the legislation debated in committee, worked with John Dellenback (R-OR) to develop a 
compromise position with the Nixon administration, at 100,000 (Steiner 1975, 109). However, 
Carl Perkins (D-KY), chair of the full House Education and Labor Committee, first in committee 
offered an amendment to lower the bill’s prime sponsorship population to 10,000, which was 
rejected by Republicans and “a few Democrats.” Perkins’ amendment was eventually successful 
on the House floor and resulted in the evaporation of most Republican support for the bill, 
aggravating both the Nixon administration and state officials who felt they would be bypassed 
(Karch 2013, 79).  
 
The CDA passed through the Senate by a 49-12 roll call vote, just as the House passed it on 
September 30, 1971 by a margin of 251-115. However, the differences on prime sponsorship 
levels forced the bill into Conference Committee, where Perkins took the highly unusual step of 
excluding the bill’s author, Brademas, from the group. Perkins’ leadership in further reducing the 
prime sponsorship requirement – to 5,000 – is said to have left Republicans incensed, with five 
out of six of the House Republicans thereafter refusing to sign the conference report (Karch 
2013, 80-81). Still, on December 2nd the Senate adopted the Conference Report 63017 and the 
House approved the measure by a margin of 211-187 (Govtrack 2013). The end result appeared 
to be an extremely decentralised funding mechanism that would bypass state and large-city 
governments and directly appropriate funds towards any community or organised group of more 
than 5,000 people, meaning that it would enable community and civil rights organisations to 
develop childcare programmes without state interference (Morgan 2001, 229).  
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President Nixon, who at the time was being harangued by far-right columnists and organisations 
such as the Manhattan 12, and facing a primary challenge by conservative Republican 
Congressman John Ashbrook (R-OH),
89
 prepared to veto the bill. As Morgan explains, “the 
legislation seemed to Nixon and others in his administration to be more a product of civil rights 
and other social activists than an effort to address the material concerns of Middle America.” 
When his veto became definite, a battle broke out within the administration over how harsh a 
tone his veto should message should strike (Morgan 2013, 232-233).
90
 The conservatives won 
out and in his December 9, 1971 veto message, Nixon described the bill’s goals as being 
“overshadowed by the fiscal irresponsibility, administrative unworkability, and family-
weakening implications,” later adding: “There is a respectable school of opinion that this 
legislation would lead toward altering the family relationship. Before even a tentative step is 
made in this direction by their government, the American people should be fully consulted” 
(Woolley and Peters 2013). Apparently, however, the Republican administration did not view 
federal expenditure on childcare in and of itself to be so morally objectionable: the next day 
Nixon put in place a system of childcare tax deductions, which disproportionately benefited 
middle and high-income dual-earner families and formed the baseline policy – later converted 
into a tax credit
91
 -- through which most middle and upper-income American families receive 
federal childcare assistance today (Morgan 2001, Cohen 2001, Roth 1976). 
 
Whilst many in the House saw Nixon’s veto as an indication that he would be unwilling to pass 
any type of universal childcare programme, a bipartisan group in the Senate remained more 
optimistic: at the start of the 1972 Congressional session Sens. Gaylord Nelson (D-WI), Jacob 
Javits (R-NY), Robert Taft Jr. (R-OH) and Walter Mondale (D-MN) introduced the 
Comprehensive Headstart, Child Development, and Family Services Act (Karch 2013, 107). 
Though similar to the CDA, it included concessions with regard to prime sponsorship, increasing 
the figure to 25,000 and lowering the first year’s fiscal authorisation by 40%. The legislation did 
in fact pass the Senate (73-12), however, just as many on the left argued that the Democrats had 
conceded too much to the right, Karch notes, “these concessions [by the Democrats] were 
insufficient to generate any enthusiasm among conservatives” (Karch 2013, 108). And indeed 
there was little momentum behind the legislation in the House as the bill was never brought to a 
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 For several reasons: Nixon’s moderate if not left-leaning public policy proposals, such as a national health 
insurance programme, a guaranteed minimum income, his trip to China, etc.. 
90
 Morgan notes that: “Conservatives in the Nixon administration benefited from their relationships with the 
conservative newspaper Human Events and columnists like James Kilpatrick, especially because Buchanan 
controlled the news summary that Nixon read. After arranging to have someone write a conservative column on the 
CDA, they could slip it in the daily news summary to shape the President’s opinions on the legislation. Kilpatrick’s 
1971 editorial, “Child Development Act—to Sovietize Our Youth,” called the bill “the boldest and most far-
reaching scheme ever advanced for the Sovietization of American youth. . . .This bill contains the seeds for 
destruction of Middle America’” (Morgan 2001; 234). 
91
 The Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit. 
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vote: Karch notes that, “By the time the House took up the new bill, the looming election cast 
doubt on its prospects. Many southern Democrats hoped to avoid votes on social issues that 
might identify them with the [poorly performing] campaign of Senator George D. McGovern (D-
SD);they preferred to spend the rest of the term campaigning in their districts” (Karch 2013, 
109). 
 
It would not be until 1975 that a comprehensive childcare services bill akin to that of 1971 was 
debated the legislature. The Child and Family Services Act of 1975 again sought to address some 
of the concerns that stemmed from the vetoed 1971 legislation: it featured a more modest 
appropriations schedule and enhanced state responsibility,
92
 as indeed several childcare lobbies 
saw states as a more amenable venue
93
 (Karch 2013, 119).  The same childcare coalition that 
worked on the 1971 legislation delivered the bill to liberal New York Republican, Jacob Javits, 
in the Senate and Brademas in the House (Karch 2013, 177). However, the bill’s demise was 
eventually sealed by discord within the coalition itself: during the 1975 hearings an 
insurmountable divide occurred between the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), who 
wanted the public schools to become the sole provider of any new early years programme and 
the rest of the coalition, who wanted to maintain the original prime sponsorship, non-profit 
operating basis. The AFT threatened to block all labour support for the bill and indeed, without 
any AFL-CIO support to bolster the bill above the already poor context,
94
 it died in the water 
(Steiner 1976, 246-47).  
 
Democrats continued to subsequently introduce legislation, with key pieces in 1979
95
, 1983
96
 
and 1989
97
. However, each year the number of bills introduced became fewer and the bills that 
were introduced became more tightly means-tested.    
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 States who developed their own offices of childcare or grant plans did not look kindly on the prospect of the 
federal government reproducing or trampling over their efforts. Leaders hailing from these states – and there were 
thirty-seven of them at the time the 1975 legislation was introduced –testified that they would prefer federal support 
for their pre-existing state-level programmes (Karch 2013, 119 
93
 This strong role for states reflected the reality of childcare assistance at the time: the failure of the federal 
childcare bill in 1971 meant that most states picked up on the issue to some degree: by 1975, 37 states had either an 
office of child development, a plan for such an office, or an office operating in at least one part of the state (Karch 
2013, 119). 
94
 Contextual conditions included the rise of the ‘new right’ activist groups, an anti-childcare letter campaign, 
Republican President (Gerald Ford) in office, declining economic conditions, toxicity of childcare post 1971 veto 
(Morgan 2001, 234-235) 
95
 In 1979 Sen. Alan Cranston (D-CA) introduced a childcare bill that sought to avoid the pitfalls of a prime 
sponsorship debate, by designating states the power to choose where funding should be appropriated, including the 
possibility of not-for-profit groups. However, Cranston’s Child Care Act of 1979 was based upon need. Karch notes 
that “the coalition that had come together in 1971, splintered in 1975” and was “’hopelessly divided’ by 1979” 
(Karch 2013, 127). Moreover, Edward Zigler, director of the Office of Child Development during Nixon’s 
presidency, notes that the Carter administration was opposed to the bill, with one official testifying before Congress 
that the administration did not believe that all working families supported or needed centre-based childcare 
assistance and that they were happy with their current, often informal arrangements. Cranston withdrew the bill 
(Zigler 1991, 44). The failure of Cranston’s 1979 bill also signalled a strong decline in Congressional interest over 
the issue, which coupled with the arrival of conservative President (Ronald Reagan) in 1980 and the rise of ‘new 
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3.3  Democrats and childcare in context: wearing blue and white collars in the 1960s and 
1970s 
a.  Democrats’ shifting electoral coalition: childcare in the electoral context  
By the late 1960s, when the CDA was in its development, the fundamentals of New Deal-era 
partisan alignment were beginning to undergo a substantial shift (Petrocik 1987, Morgan 2001, 
Rae 1992). From roughly the 1930's to the late 1960's American political conflict had largely 
been structured according to a single dimension: economic class, where low and lower-middle 
income voters leaned Democratic and middle-high income voters Republican. According to Rae, 
this alignment came about during the Great Depression, when labour had actively mobilised. 
Seizing on economic strife and emerging weaknesses within the Progressive era pattern of voting 
alignment, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Democrats “refocus[ed] the debate on 
economic class issues” and poached disaffected working class and low-income voters from the 
Republicans, thereby adding the urban working class, organised labour, small-scale farmers and 
Northern blacks to the Democrats’ existing coalition of immigrants and Southern whites (Rae 
1992, 635). 
 
With time, Democratic efforts to broaden their coalition – such as President Truman’s embrace 
of selected civil rights issues and activists – alienated white southerners, who went on to form a 
group of “Dixiecrats,” conservative Southern Democrats that in Congress often aligned with 
Republicans against the national Democratic Party. By the late 1960s, virulent, cultural divisions 
such as those over Vietnam, civil rights, feminism, abortion, patriotism, domestic communism, 
etc., according to Rae, “tore fissures through the [Democratic] party.” While the liberal 
intellectual component of the party “abhorred” the pro-war attitude of Democratic labour 
champions, such as President Johnson and 1968 Democratic Presidential candidate Hubert 
Humphrey, blue-collar and labour Democrats found their Democratic counterparts that fell to the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
right’ activist groups against any childcare legislation represented, in Karch’s words, “a seemingly insurmountable 
obstacle to major [childcare] policy change” (Karch 2013, 136).  
96
 Rep. Geraldine Ferraro’s (D-NY) 1983 child care and welfare bill, HR 1603 predominantly benefited low-income 
families by supplementing Title XX funds to means-tested childcare programmes but also offered benefits to middle 
and upper-income families: it sought to increase the amount of childcare expenses that could be claimed back via 
the Dependent Care Tax Credit from 20% to 50%, and to grant tax exempt status to childcare providers whose 
caregiving allowed parents to remain in employment. Despite receiving 80 co-sponsors, the context for such 
measures was so that the bill never moved beyond committee. 
97
 In 1987 Sen. Chris Dodd (D-CT), along with 126 sponsors from the House and 22 from the Senate, introduced the 
Act for Better Childcare, which would have lowered costs for families earning up to 115% of their state’s median 
income.  The bill passed the Senate – via voice vote – on June 23, 1989, but its differences with House legislation 
were never resolved and instead, during the 1990 budget negotiations the Bush administration quickly agreed to a 
compromise: a targeted programme consisting of a block grant that catered to providers who cared for low-income 
children (the Child Care and Development Block Grant) which would support both quality improvement and 
operational costs. The bill also included an expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit, a supplemental tax credit 
for infants, made the Dependent Care Tax Credit refundable and introduced an “At-Risk child Care Program” – an 
entitlement for families at risk of going on welfare (Cohen 2001, 127-130). 
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left of the political spectrum on cultural issues to be “contemptuous toward middle- and working 
class people who did not happen to be black or Hispanic” (Rae 1992, 636-40).  
 
These accounts do tend to be supported by National Elections Studies data, as Hout, Manza and 
Brooks explain:  
 
“After 1964 professionals shifted rapidly towards the Democrats; routine white‐ collar 
workers followed at a slower pace. At about the same time, the self-employed and skilled 
blue-collar workers shifted in the Republican direction. The self-employed had split 
between Democrats and Republicans; they became strong Republicans. The skilled blue-
collar workers had been strong Democrats; they began to split their votes and were 
actually strong Republicans in 1988” (Hout, Manza and Brooks 1999, 88). 
 
These claims are reflected in Figures 1.16 and 1.17, the Alford and Thomsen indices, both of 
which display a decline in class voting in the US during the post-war era. Moreover, during the 
1972 election, women for the first time voted in greater proportion for the Democratic candidate 
than did men, at 38 to 37% respectively (Inglehart and Norris 2000, 445). There was a clear age-
dynamic to this trend, in that younger women were more likely to vote Democratic than their 
older counterparts. Reasons for this gender-based shift are numerous – and often debated – but 
much emphasis has been placed upon younger women’s increased access to higher education 
and their concomitant embrace of secularism (Inglehart and Norris 2000) and postmodern values 
(i.e. libertarianism, gender equality, self-expression) (Inglehart 1977), their increasingly large 
role in the labour force, and in particular, their specific place in the labour force (Inglehart and 
Norris 2000, 446).  
 
Trends in the American National Election Studies do seem to display a shift in the Democrats’ 
electoral coalition with regard to gender and education, highlighting an opportunity for the 
Democrats to make up for their losses with lesser-educated males by making strategic electoral 
appeals to women with higher levels of education. 
 
As outlined in Chapter One (and displayed in Figure 1.20), there has been an approximate linear 
reversal in the traditional gender identification gap in the US, wherein women were long 
associated with right over left party identification. For example, US women were less likely than 
US men to identify as Democrats in 1952 (a difference of -3%) and thus more likely to identify 
as Republican (a difference of +2.4%). These distinct gender-based party identification patterns 
began to converge in the mid 1960s, remain close during the 1970s and then quite dramatically 
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diverge from the 1980s, such that by 1996 the difference in females who identified as Democrats 
to males who identified as Democrats became positive - at over 13% and the difference in the 
percentage of females who identified as Republican to the percentage of males who identified as 
Republican became negative – at -12%.  
 
The following section attempts to present a more detailed illustration of electoral change by 
analysing party identification according to gender and education.
98
 The longitudinal trends 
presented here indicate a slight overall reversal in partisan identification amongst higher-
educated males and females between 1952 and 1996: during the 1950s and early 1960s, when the 
American National Election Study began, higher-educated women identified as Republican in 
greater proportion than they did Democrat (see Figure 3.1 below). However by the mid 1960s a 
degree of volatility commenced and no clear trend could be established until 1976, after which 
higher-educated women typically identified as Democratic in greater proportion than they did 
Republican (1988 and 1994 being exceptions), thereby reversing their original Republican bias.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 US party identification: female, some college - advanced degree (Source: American National Election Studies, 
1952-1996) 
Higher-educated men almost mirrored this trend: Figure 3.2 shows that whilst from the 
beginning of the election study, higher-educated men identified with both parties in roughly 
equal measure, by 1978 a clear trend began, wherein higher-educated men would increasingly 
identify as Republican in greater proportion than they would Democrat.  
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 The intention is not produced a sophisticated analysis examining the specific class and occupational based voting 
patterns as outlined by Oesch (2006) but rather to present electoral trends as the parties, then, may have seen them. 
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Figure 3.2 US party identification: male, some college - advanced degree (Source: American National Election Studies, 
1952-1996) 
 
Trends remained more stable amongst lesser-educated males and females, who consistently 
identified as Democrat more so than Republican: whereas between 1952 and 1996 there was a 
slight downward trend in the proportion of lesser-educated women who identified as Republican, 
no such trends emerge amongst lesser-educated men (see Figures 3.3 and 3.4).  
 
 
Figure 3.3 US party identification: female, grade school - high school (Source: American National Election Studies, 1952-
1996) 
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Figure 3.4 US party identification: male, grade school - high school (Source: American National Election Studies, 1952-
1996) 
 
The proportion of respondents identifying as independent did, however, increase amongst all 
demographics. For higher-educated males and females, this increase occurred largely during the 
late 1960s to mid 1970s, declining thereafter. It was lowest amongst higher-educated women 
(reaching a peak of 11.4% in 1974). The increase in independent identification, however, was 
more permanent amongst lesser-educated respondents of both genders, who from the 1970s 
continually identified as independent in greater proportion than their higher-educated 
counterparts. On average, 16% of both male and female lesser-educated respondents identified as 
independent between 1972 and 1996 (versus 11% of higher-educated men and eight per cent of 
higher-educated women). This suggests that Democrats, whom this group traditionally would 
have supported, needed to appeal to new voters so as to make up their loss of lesser-educated 
voters.  
 
Figure 3.5 views 1972 as a snapshot in time and shows that the decline in traditional partisan 
identification as displayed between 1952 and 1972 seems mirrored by the fact that all four 
groups increased their independent identification at rates varying from seven percentage points 
(females with higher education) to 12 percentage points females with lower-education levels. 
The only groups that increased their level of identification with a specific party were lesser-
educated males, who identified as slightly more Republican (which perhaps hints at Democrats’ 
future struggle for the demographic) and higher-educated females, who identified as slightly 
more Democratic (which perhaps hints at Democrats’ future opportunities). The direction of 
these (albeit small, two percentage points) changes mimicked broader claims emerging from 
literature on gender-based party realignment (i.e. Norris and Inglehart 2000) and/or a decline of 
traditional left-right materialist voting (Inglehart 1977, Inglehart and Rabier 1986).  
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Figure 3.5 Change in US party identification, 1952-1972 (Source: American National Election Studies, 1952-1972) 
But without the benefit of foresight, what sort of electoral coalitional change might the 
Democratic elite have been aware of during the early 1970s, when they were in the process of 
adopting childcare policy?  By applying the Pedersen index of electoral volatility
99
 to the 
identification patterns of each of the four demographics, we can measure between every two 
years from 1954 until 1972 the volatility of each group, and the average volatility they displayed 
in the run up to the Democrats’ childcare policy adoption. Figure 3.6, below, shows that whereas 
the average amount of volatility displayed between 1954
100
 and 1972 amongst all groups of 
respondents was 5.33. Women with both lower and higher-education levels displayed the most 
volatile partisan identification trends, with the average volatility rate of lesser educated women 
being 5.64 and higher-educated women, 7.18, therefore suggesting an opportunity for Democrats 
to bring these groups into their electoral coalitional fold.  
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 Typically employed to address volatility between parties in a multi-party system by calculating changes in each 
party’s election results from year to year, the figure is equal to the net percentage of respondents from a particular 
gender/education category that changed their identification (see for example Pedersen 1999). 
100
 1954 is used rather than the American National Election Survey’s starting point, 1952, because volatility must be 
calculated using two consecutive elections and starting at 1952 would not allow us to use 1972 at an endpoint, 
whereas starting at 1954 would.  
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Figure 3.6 Pedersen index of electoral coalitional volatility, US, 1954-1972 (Source: American National Election Studies) 
 
b.  Electoral and organisational responses to post-materialism: the party responds to 
class  and gender-based shifts  
 
i)  Reforming internal party organisation: gender-based and party-centralising 
 amendments  
The party’s shifting electoral base coincided with an array of internal organisational reforms, 
driven in part by the desire to make the Democratic Party more representative of its voters and 
members. The 1968 convention in Chicago, marked by the violent repression of anti-war, civil 
rights and various protestors on its surrounding streets, was also tarnished inside the 
International Amphitheatre by a presidential selection process that reflected the preferences of a 
handful of party insiders who favoured establishment candidate Hubert Humphrey over the 
majority of grassroots supporters and primary voters, who had chosen anti-war candidate Eugene 
McCarthy. Whereas McCarthy had won a plurality of votes in the primaries, Humphrey had 
declined to enter any, instead relying on his ability to win over the convention delegates whose 
votes weren’t locked in by a primary, most of whom reflected the old traditional Democratic 
party insider (i.e. older, white and often union-oriented males).  As 1972 Democratic presidential 
candidate George McGovern, explains, “[i]n no [primary] election did [Humphrey] win more 
than a tiny fraction of the votes. Yet he arrived at the Convention the clear favorite for the 
nomination, with perhaps 1,700 delegates out of a total of 2,500 pledged to him” (McGovern 
1970, 43).  
 
Indeed the mismatch between the convention delegates’ and party grassroots’ candidate 
preferences resulted from a variety of state party rules that made convention delegate selection 
processes inaccessible to rank-and-file Democrats by being unclear, expensive, or simply closed 
off. This had a particularly negative impact on the number of minority, female and middle class 
0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0
Male: Some college - advanced degree
Male: Grade school - high school
Total average volatility, all groups
Female: Grade school - high school
Female: Some college - advanced degree
Electoral coalitional volatility,  
using Pedersen index, 1954-1972 
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(e.g. new politics or post-materialist) delegates selected to attend the conference and by 
extension, set the party platform and choose the party’s presidential candidate. A subsequent 
investigation into what went wrong found, in McGovern’s words, “a widespread pattern of 
delegate selection by party bosses, small committees and rigged conventions.” In particular 
McGovern reported that in “many” states voters selected local party officers without any 
knowledge that those officers would go on to select convention delegates, let alone any 
knowledge of the delegates’ candidate preferences, adding that “Even in some primary states, it 
is unlawful for candidates for delegate to the National Convention to list their Presidential 
preference on the ballot.” Beyond that, ten states “had no codified rules available to Democrats 
who wished to participate in the delegate selection process,” an additional three had “no rules at 
all governing selection process” and that “in many more states, rules, if they existed were so 
inaccessible as to be useless to Democrats wishing to inform themselves of how to participate in 
party affairs”  (McGovern 1970, 43).  
 
The end result was a convention made up of delegates largely unrepresentative of the party’s 
emerging support base: in Chicago women made up just 13% of total delegates, with only one 
delegation featuring a women chairperson. 18 state delegations had no voting delegates under the 
age of 30 and 13 other delegations had just one under 30. McGovern found that in Chicago 
“blacks were not represented in proportion to their numbers in the population, and even less so in 
proportion to in proportion to their numbers in the Democratic Party (McGovern 1970, 43-45). 
The undemocratic selection of uncommitted (or at least publicly uncommitted) delegates was a 
boon to the labour movement, who quite differently from British and most Australian unions, 
purported non-partisanship. Whilst unions were well represented at the Democratic National 
Convention (the AFL-CIO for example, held in 1968 200 out of a total 3,084 delegates) unions 
as a whole rarely came out in support of a specific Democratic candidate. This guise of ‘non-
partisanship’ however, did not prohibit union leaders from involving themselves in the selection 
process but instead, simply protected union bosses’ individual political choices from any sort of 
need for internal union-wide voting:  
 
“A strong union president could endorse a candidate without undertaking any serious 
process of internal consultation and then could promote that candidate behind the scenes, 
protected by a façade of neutrality. This informal and unpublicized means of exercising 
influence almost never required the mobilization of the rank-and-file prior to the general 
election, nor did it draw significantly on union financial and organizational resources. The 
only exception was found in those few states where primaries were held; there, national 
unions might seek to mobilize their members to vote for the leadership’s favourite 
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candidate. In general, though, it was entirely possible for a labor leader to accomplish 
much for a candidate simply by bargaining with and persuading delegates and party elites 
prior to and at the convention itself” (Dark 2001, 79). 
 
In 1968 AFL-CIO president George Meany abandoned his non-partisan stance and supported the 
candidate he identified as pro-labour: Humphrey. Dark notes that whilst Meany’s AFL-CIO had 
approximately 200 delegates, it claimed to hold influence over roughly 600 as they were in 
Dark’s words “indebted to labor for campaign support.” The AFL-CIO deemed their influence in 
the convention and in particular, Humphrey’s nomination a success however Dark states that it 
was “precisely the nature of that success that would generate a counterattack from the very 
forces who had been vanquished at the Democratic National Convention” because “Humphrey’s 
nomination had been attained the ‘old-fashioned way’ -through the traditional methods of 
political brokerage” (Dark 2001, 82-83). 
 
And indeed the uproar and riots surrounding the Democrats’ 1968 convention directly inspired 
the appointment of a commission to analyse the organisational challenges facing the party. 
Humphrey, as acting leader of the Democratic Party immediately following his presidential 
election defeat in November of that year, agreed to a commission that by the next presidential 
election (1972), would implement reforms in the party’s nomination system. Following the 
tumult of 1968, Humphrey appointed liberal Senator Fred Harris (D-OK) to choose the 
commission members and also approved Harris’s selection of liberal Sen. George McGovern (D-
SD)
101
 to lead the commission, in what Arthur C. Paulson described as an attempt to “retrieve his 
liberal soul by approving reformers to lead the party and its reform process” (Paulson 2000, 
107).
102
 The key tenets of the McGovern-Fraser Commission’s103 recommendations surrounded 
increasing the party’s representativeness and democratising both its convention delegate and by 
extension, candidate selection procedures: of the 18 ‘guidelines’ issued to state Democratic 
parties, states would now be required “to encourage representation on the national convention 
delegations of minority groups, young people, and women in reasonable relationship to their 
presence in the population of the state” (DeClerico and Davis 2000, 86). The impact was clear: 
between the 1968 and 1972 conventions, the number of African-American delegates more than 
doubled, from seven to fifteen and the number of female delegates approximately tripled, from 
thirteen to forty (Marshall 1981, 46). However, women’s gains were not achieved without 
discord: any power within the convention that was apportioned to women and minority delegates 
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 McGovern was later replaced as commissioner by Donald Fraser when he decided to seek the 1972 Democratic 
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 Alternately, Cohen et. al describe Humphrey’s decision as “a concession he hoped would unify the party” (Cohen 
et al 2008, 158)
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 Formally known as the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection. 
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was perceived, in eyes of the AFL-CIO leadership, and in particular its leader George Meany, in 
Dark’s words “as little more than an effort by ‘white collar elites’ to take power away from 
unions and other working class constituencies” (Dark 2001, 85).  
 
The de-facto quotas set out in McGovern-Fraser were largely due to the efforts of emergent 
feminist organisations. In particular, the National Women’s Political Caucus, which at one point 
wrote the Democratic National Committee (DNC, Democratic Party executive) and threatened to 
send feminist lawyers to challenge state credentials were the Commission’s “reasonable 
representation” rule not interpreted to mean that that women should be represented in each state 
delegation in the same proportion as the state’s population (which would thus be a majority).104 
The NWPC had important supporters both within the Democratic Party (such as the Center for 
Political Reform and Americans for Democratic Action) and within the Commission: Donald 
Fraser, who took McGovern’s leading post once the latter ran for the Democratic Presidential 
nomination, was married to a leading NWPC activist and according to Young, “intervened 
forcefully with Democratic leaders to advocate an interpretation of the rules that would 
guarantee 50 percent representation for women” (Young 2000, 89). 
 
Year African-Americans 
(% of all delegates) 
Women 
(% of all delegates) 
Under 30     
(% of all delegates) 
1968 7 13 4 
1972 15 40 22 
1976 11 33 15 
1980 15 49 11 
Table 3.1: Democratic National Convention delegates, per cent (Source: Marshall 1981, 46)  
 
The commission is perhaps best known for its candidate selection reforms, which required that 
delegates to the convention be selected in a democratic manner (i.e. as opposed to being 
appointed/running without committing to a candidate) and that delegate selection procedures be 
open to all candidate members. Specific requirements included that those running to be a 
delegate expressly stated (and were bound to) their support for a particular Democratic 
candidate, so that “candidates would be awarded delegates in proportion to their share of support 
from Democratic voters, so long as they qualified by meeting a threshold of at least 15 percent of 
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 In actuality, Lisa Young states that the “leaders of the NWPC did not expect that the party would agree to 
anything close to 50 percent representation for women,” noting that the “nation-wide network of feminist lawyers” 
as an “empty threat,” given they had “almost no local state organization in place at the time” (Young 2000, 89). 
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the vote”105 (Paulson 2000, 108). Although these reforms did not mandate states to hold primary 
elections, as Paulson explains, “state parties and legislatures would find it easiest to comply with 
participation rules by passing primary laws” 106 (Paulson 2000, 108). 
 
As a result of the new primary system, Dark argues “labor leaders could no thus no longer 
sustain their traditional role as power brokers, bargaining with a discrete set of elite actors” 
(Dark 2001, 84). The requirement that all delegates must be first, democratically selected, and 
second, bound to a candidate prior to the convention helped removed labour leaders of their 
traditional brokering influence at the convention, and of their ability to endorse a particular 
candidate without any internal polling in their own organisation. George Meany’s feelings about 
the reforms can largely be summed up in his statement that he would not endorse the 1972 
Democratic Presidential candidate George McGovern in part because “The Democratic Party has 
been taken over by people named Jack, who look like Jills and smell like Johns” (Perlstein 2008, 
695). Meany and Alexander Barkan, director of the AFL-CIO’s lobbying arm, the Committee on 
Political Education (COPE) intended for the AFL’s non-endorsement in 1972 to bully the party 
into abolishing the McGovern-Fraser reforms. However, Meany and Barkan’s control over the 
AFL-CIO did not represent a unified viewpoint amongst the labor movement. Dark notes that 
“[d]espite the views of the AFL-CIO establishment, several important unions actually supported 
the reform efforts.” The UAW’s political director served on the McGovern-Fraser Commission 
and the UAW itself provided much-needed funding for the commission. Moreover, there were 
several other unions, which despite being affiliated with the AFL-CIO supported the reform: the 
Communication Workers of America (CWA), International Association of Machinists (IAM), 
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME). Dark claims “The 
UAW and its allies supported party reform in the hopes of forging lasting alliance with the 
activists who had surged into the party in the late 1960s” (Dark 2001, 85).  
 
Part of the division between Meany and many of the more progressive unions was rooted in 
union type and membership:  
 
“These leaders, mainly from unions composed of either industrial workers (CWA, IAM) 
or the growing ranks of service and public sector employees (AFSCME), were strongly 
committed to advancing policies at the national level that ranged from the protection of 
union organizing rights to the expansion of the welfare state. The more liberal 
Democratic Party that reform might bring about was likely to fulfil these national 
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policies. These liberal unions were also led by men who possessed a broader, sometime 
seven social democratic, conception of the purposes of the labor movement. Because of 
their ideological commitments, they supported a more programmatic, policy-oriented 
system—a goal that the liberal reformers also claimed as their own” (Dark 2001, 85).  
 
By contrast, Dark states that “Meany and his allies in the AFL-CIO hierarchy and the building 
trades” “sought to deepen an alliance with the city machines, traditional party leaders, and 
sometimes even southern conservatives on behalf of the procedural status quo and the existing 
distribution of power within the national party” (Dark 2001, 85). 
 
Whilst the McGovern-Fraser reforms’ impact on candidate selection, and in particular, the 
unintended institutionalisation of presidential primaries has been widely discussed,
107
 it also had 
an immediate and significant impact not just on presidential candidate selections but also on the 
make-up of the convention and as a corollary, the diversity of representation on the party’s 
platform committee (Shafer 1983, 439, 450). Wolbrecht (2002) links the increased proportion of 
women, minority and socially liberal delegates to changes in the Party Platform and specifically, 
its growing emphasis on women’s and work/family issues such as childcare. Perhaps more 
specifically, new rules surrounding the platform process allowed ten per cent of the platform 
committee’s 150 members the chance to bring up any additional proposals at the national 
conference for an up or down platform vote, which naturally diversified the types of platform 
proposals. More influential, however, was the manner in which the new conference delegation 
requirements fostered female participation on the committee: of the 150-member platform 
committee, 44% of its members were female, all four of the committee’s vice-chairs were female 
and seven of the 15 drafting committee members were women, including popular left-wing 
legislator, Rep. Bella Abzug (D-NY) (Herbers, 1972). A disgruntled male from the Florida 
delegation remarked on the initial platform committee meetings: “I have a heard a lot about 
health care, day care and a lot of other benefits. I haven’t heard one word about where the money 
is coming from” (NY Times, 1972).  
 
Whereas one would expect such transformational reforms to take several years or more, it took 
just two years from the appointment of a commission lead for the Democratic National 
Committee (DNC) to adopt the McGovern-Fraser reforms. The speed of reform correlates with 
several key institutional features of the Democratic Party and indeed the specific personal and 
political contexts operating at the time: institutionally, the Executive Committee of the 
Democratic National Party does not include (and thus allot votes) to trade union affiliates, as 
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occurs in the UK and Australia. In addition, DNC meetings occurred twice a year and thus 
limited the opportunities for further debate before the next election. In the run up to the DNC’s 
annual meeting in February 1971, Chairman Larry O’Brien, who was characterised as a 
“compromise” between a ‘reformer’ and ‘regular’ party member (Apple 1971), first introduced 
the proposed reforms to the Executive Committee and received their approval before moving on 
to the full committee. This way they would, in Schafer’s words, “arrive with the explicit 
endorsement of a range of recognized party figures” (Shafer 1983, 369). Apart from discord over 
the inter-state delegate apportionment formula, the meeting went smoothly, with proposed 
reforms passing seven yes to four no (Shafer 1983, 372). When the full committee met two days 
later, similar issues arose with respect to inter-state apportionment however the remaining 18 
recommendations were voted on as a bloc and approved by voice-vote over the course of a single 
afternoon (Shafer 1983, 379).  
 
The unions’ influence was also minimised because COPE, the political arm of the AFL-CIO, 
“didn’t track very tightly” on the specific guidelines and hence advise their allies on the 
committee. Shafer states: “It wasn’t so much that they didn’t like the product, as they didn’t like 
the whole operation, COPE was not actively concerned about the guidelines. A better tactic for 
COPE would have required intimate knowledge, and then finding problems. But they didn’t have 
anybody in the know who was tracking on it” (Shafer 1983, 388). As such the ease of reform 
seems to have been in fostered in part by personal loyalty as well as COPE’s own mishandling of 
the issue and in particular their lack of direct representation on the committee. Of importance 
were also the institutional arrangements of the McGovern-Fraser committee itself, the manner in 
which most power was vested in the chairman and the little opportunity that existed for state 
parties to challenge him. 
 
 ii) Targeting Female Voters  
The extent to which the Democratic Party developed a centralised, concerted effort to attract 
female voters ahead of either the 1968 or 1972 elections (and thus predating the CDA) is 
somewhat unclear. On the one hand, efforts to institutionalise female representation into 
Democratic Party decision making bodies had a direct impact on the make-up of policy 
committees, such as the platform committee, which in turn correlates with a perceived increase 
in attention towards female voters on the whole of the party. Young asserts that while the 
McGovern-Fraser reforms “had a limited impact on the DNC”108 the increase in women did bode 
well for the 1972 Democratic Party platform: 
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 106 
“The close ties between the NWPC leadership and the McGovern campaign, coupled 
with the perception of party strategists that feminist issues might win electoral support, 
meant that all but one of the key items on the movement’s agenda were included in the 
party’s 1972 platform document” Young 2001, 901). 
 
According to Young, “McGovern strategists believe that the political mobilization of women 
constituted an important new resource for their candidate” (Young 2000, 89). For example, 
Jeanne Kirkpatrick
109
 quotes Frederick Dutton, a lead McGovern strategist as saying that “the 
feminist factor ‘affects our campaign organization, the symbols that we signal, the issues that we 
choose and their personality and style of our candidate’” (Kirkpatrick 1976, 381). Kirkpatrick 
added:  
 
“Dutton and other McGovern strategists believed that the ‘Nylon Revolution,’ as one 
termed it in an off-guard moment, constituted an important new resource for a candidate 
like McGovern. The belief rested on the assumption widely held among some 
spokespersons and fellow travellers of the women’s movement, that new women entering 
politics in unprecedented numbers were more humanistic, liberal, and generous, than the 
men who had hitherto dominated politics” (Kirkpatrick 1976, 381-82) 
 
But as much as feminist groups such as the NWPC were able to convince McGovern of the 
growing importance of the ‘women’s vote,’ McGovern had limits; for example he refused 
feminists’ demands that a pro-abortion plank appear in the 1972 platform (Wolbrecht 2000, 37). 
Still, Nixon’s landslide victory over McGovern in 1972 led ‘regulars’ in the Democratic Party to 
believe that the reforms were “responsible for the nomination of a presidential candidate able to 
appeal to a broad enough portion of the electorate to win the presidency.”110 McGovern’s 
predecessor, Jimmy Carter, had less time for post-materialists: Young notes Carter’s opposition 
to their stances on both abortion and gay rights and states that “the commitments [in the 1976 
platform] were less extensive and less specific than in 1972”111 (Young 2000, 97).  
 
Despite the Carter campaign’s less enthusiastic stance towards new politics issues, the traditional 
gender vote gap did in fact reverse itself during the 1980 presidential election, with women 
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voting Democratic in greater proportion than men by approximately six to eight percentage 
points (Costain 1992, 2). The emergence of the new modern ‘gender gap’ in the 1980 election 
results armed feminists with a new tactic for pressuring the Democratic Party to advance their 
demands, with particular respect to the ERA and abortion. Whereas the “Nylon Revolution” 
garnered little attention beyond McGovern strategists in 1972, by the early 1980s feminists 
groups such as NWPC and NOW regularly released polling data that emphasised the political 
importance of the gap to both the media and to the Democratic Party. In fact, the term “gender 
gap” was invented by NOW leaders in a document that featured polling data presented to 
delegates at the DNC general meeting in 1981. The term’s popularity increased: the Washington 
Post began to use it by October of that year and, as Wolbrecht states, “the phenomenon began to 
attract intense press coverage” (Young 2000, 101; Wolbrecht 2000, 48-49) From May 1982 
NOW sent a monthly “Gender Gap Update” to the media, whereas by 1983, both Abzug and 
former NOW President Smeal each wrote books on the gap – the intention being “to convince 
politicians of the electoral consequences of opposing women’s rights” (Wolbrecht 2000, 49). 
The frequent use of the ‘gender gap strategy,’ both to convince the DNC to focus on women’s 
issues and to encourage Democratic legislators to take up key pieces of feminist legislation even 
in the context of a conservative Republican President, was such that Costain claims “Only the 
political presence of an electoral gender gap replaced the leverage that a more conservative 
Congress and White House had taken away” (Costain 1992, 104).  
 
Beyond the electoral incentives, which were not as clearly delineated until after the 1980 
election, Costain writes that the gradual churning of legislators and new breed of post-New Deal 
era politicians created a specific opportunity structure through which feminists could persuade 
policymakers on issues they held important. Though Mondale is not mentioned specifically, this 
idea is very much in keeping with his work on the CDA and his Presidential campaign 12 years 
after: “By the late 1960s, a less ideological group of politicians, holding ambitions for higher 
office began to view equal rights for women as an innovative issue with the potential to further 
their presidential aspirations” (Costain 1992, 133). In other words, although the party may not 
have employed gender-gap based research as means to develop an election strategy as early as 
the late 1960s, the idea that embracing progressive social policy and work/family issues of 
interest to women voters was grasped by the increasing ranks of post-materialist, new politics 
Democrats entering the party’s ranks.  
 
 
 
 
 108 
c.  Whose interest? Unions, the childcare ‘lobby’ and the Democratic elite  
This research is primarily concerned with the extent to which either trade unions, being a key 
ally of the Democratic Party, or electoral imperative drove legislators to address the childcare 
issue. However, it is worth briefly considering the role of other possible childcare policy 
demanders, such as pre-existing childcare advocacy organisations, feminist groups and civil 
rights organisations. The US childcare lobby of the 1970s was quite diverse and somewhat 
fragmented: it included labour unions, civil rights activists, childcare and early learning 
advocacy groups and, to a lesser extent, feminist organisations. Interestingly, during the 
development of the CDA, the Day Care and Child Development Council of America, arguably 
the largest childcare advocacy organising (it was an umbrella group) lobbied for increased 
legislative attention to the issue but as Cohen notes, “did not take a leadership role” (Cohen 
2001, 30). In fact, the leading role seemed to lay with both civil rights and labour organisations. 
Although the women’s movement identified childcare as a matter of concern (for example, 
NOW highlighted childcare as a policy priority as early as 1966), it was not at the forefront of 
their agenda: as Cohen notes, “most feminists in the 1960s and early 1970s were not involved 
with childcare legislation. This was mainly because there were other issues such as abortion and 
the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). By the 1970s, the ERA took precedence over every other 
item on the women’s agenda” (Cohen 2001, 29).    
 
By contrast to the somewhat muddled impact of childcare specific-advocacy groups and feminist 
organisations, Figure 1.15 shows a strong correlation, across all three countries in this study, 
between female labour mobilisation – the interaction of trade union density with female trade 
union membership – and childcare policy adoption. Whilst on the one hand it would seem 
intuitive that trade unions, in the midst of rising female membership, would lobby for a policy 
that enabled female employment, on the other hand there also appeared to be a tension between 
the prevailing tenor of large trade union leaders and policies that would facilitate women’s 
rights, and in particular equal female employment opportunities. This tension is best displayed in 
the battle for the Equal Rights Amendment, which the UAW opposed until 1970 and the AFL-
CIO until 1974. In fact, the UAW offered the National Organization for Women office space in 
1966 but ejected them in 1967 when they placed the ERA on their ‘bill of rights’ (Wolbrecht 
2000, 154). Moreover, there was conflict between the unions and emerging Democratic activist 
groups, such as feminists and black civil rights leaders as outlined in the McGovern-Fraser 
discussion above. 
 
However, despite broader concerns of a power struggle for influence within the Democratic 
Party, unions ceased lobbying against female equal employment policies in the wake of the 1964 
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Civil Rights Act and were themselves in the midst of becoming increasingly feminised. For 
example, Wolbrecht (2002) shows that during 1972 Democratic convention delegates identified 
as “labor activists’112 expressed on average a ‘cooler’ reception towards the women’s movement 
relative to all other Democratic delegates (a difference of 10 per cent), according to the 
Convention Delegate Study’s “women’s movement feeling thermometer,” but that the 
differences decreased by 1980 as labour activists warmed to women’s issues113 (Wolbrecht 2002, 
255-256). The AFL-CIO even promoted the 1969 Taft-Hartley reforms, which enabled trust 
funds for employee childcare centres (Cohen 2001, 28). They were also part of the ad hoc child 
care coalition that wrote, and lobbied for, the Child Development Act: though the coalition was 
led and to a certain extent dominated by Marian Wright Edelman, who had her roots with the 
civil rights movement, the US’s largest trade union confederation – the AFL-CIO – alongside its 
largest union, the National Education Association (the public school teachers union) and the 
American Federation of Teachers (AFT) were all powerful players in the coalition.  
 
The uniqueness of the ad hoc child care coalition is that it was able to bring together such a 
diverse array of organised interests; the group had 24 different associations represented, 
including the National Association for the Education of Young Children, the League of Women 
Voters, the National Organization for Women (NOW), the AFL-CIO, Day Care and Child 
Development Council of America, the National Council of Negro Women, the National League 
of Cities–U.S. Conference of Mayors, and the National Welfare Rights Organization (Morgan 
2001, 225).  This might suggest that during 1971 the ad hoc coalition had the representative 
diversity to secure the commitment of Democratic legislators who were both traditional social 
conservatives (and in particular linked to industrial unions) and those who were more socially 
progressive (aligned to civil rights, new left groups and perhaps more white collar/public sector 
unions). Such a diverse coalition is of course, open to the possibility of internal fracture and 
indeed, during this first attempt to legislate a landmark childcare bill a class-based divide did 
emerge, yet it was not between labour and feminists but instead was formed between the feminist 
and civil rights organisations. Morgan states: 
 
“In a tense negotiating meeting between staffers and the child-care lobby, Edelman 
accused the House legislators of caring only about the middle class. ‘Edelman did not 
care about middle class kids at all,’ said one staffer who was present at the meeting, 
‘[she] wanted to use the program as a political organizing base.’ Edelman herself recalls 
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fostered their average position change is unclear).  
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that in drafting sessions, ‘We fought fiercely over priorities. Welfare mothers almost 
came to blows with some of the middle class liberationists who thought they should have 
access to day care if they wanted time to go to an art gallery . . . But welfare mothers who 
have no choice but to work wanted their kids’ needs to come first’” (Morgan 2001, 226). 
 
Despite internal disagreement, the final Mondale-Brademas legislation of 1971 was endorsed by 
the wide array of groups within the childcare coalition, reflecting the possibility for shared goals 
amongst the Democrats’ newly diverse and perhaps unwieldy electoral coalition. Yet just as 
post-McGovern-Fraser, the Democrats would begin to lose certain elements of their traditional 
electoral coalition, by the time that the next major piece of childcare legislation (the 1975 Child 
and Family Services Act) was introduced into Congress, an even larger fracture occurred within 
the childcare coalition, thus dooming the possibility for a united Democratic push for childcare:  
during the 1975 hearings an insurmountable divide emerged between the American Federation of 
Teachers, who wanted the public schools to become the sole proprietor of any new early years 
programme and the rest of the coalition, who wanted to maintain the original prime sponsorship 
operating basis, wherein any non-profit organisation or municipality would be eligible to run an 
early years programme. 
 
On September 8, 1974 the President of the AFT, Albert Shanker, took out a full page in the New 
York Times that was headlined “Early Childhood Education Is a Job for the Public Schools.” As 
Karch notes, Shanker “argued that the Comprehensive Child Development Act and the Child and 
Family Services Act would lead to conflicting responsibilities, duplication and overlap, gaps and 
unevenness of access, and wide variation in service quality, because they allowed a broad range 
of sponsors” (Karch 2013, 120). The AFT threatened to block all labour support from the bill, 
suggesting, in Karch’s words that “organized labor writ large would take on the legislation, 
unless it were revised to mandate that public schools take responsibility for new ECEC 
programmes” (Karch 2013, 120). And indeed the legislative representative of the Amalgamated 
Clothing Workers, who did not have a direct interest in the AFT’s proposals “explained to her 
coalition colleagues that the public schools are not such a bad place and that a compromise with 
Shanker seems to represent the most likely path to legislative success.” The AFT’s position also 
received backing by the International Ladies’ Garment Association and the assistant director of 
the AFL-CIO’s legislation department (Steiner 1976, 246-47). 
 
This split seems to reflect the larger, more encompassing split amongst the Democratic Party to 
such an extent that Karch quotes a former staffer on the House Subcommittee on Select 
Education as saying, “[i]f we want blue-collar support we must assess the power of Al Shanker” 
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(Karch 2013, 120). Such statements help to illustrate how the struggle for childcare policy 
adoption was part and parcel of the emerging fault lines between the Democrats’ competing 
constituencies and illustrates the difficulties managing them.   
 
3.4 Driving the Democrats’ position change: union pressure or electoral imperative  
The sections above display a party that was a) adjusting to a shift in traditional party-voter 
linkages and reaching out to new constituencies as well as b) experiencing a significant reform 
process that undermined the power of union confederations whilst apportioning an increased 
amount of control to party leaders and post-materialists. This union movement seemed itself torn 
between two positions: on the one hand it engaged in efforts to develop the landmark Child 
Development Act. On the other hand, confederation leaders expressed distaste for the internal 
party reforms that empowered the new politics Democrats who took a lead role in pushing 
childcare policy. What was the relative influence of electoral imperative and union pressure upon 
the Democrats’ decision to adopt childcare policy as a legislative issue during the late 1960s and 
early 1970s? 
 
The following section employs quantitative analyses in order to determine whether the 
Democrats’ party position change was mechanised by legislator replacement and driven electoral 
imperative or whether it was mechanised by conversion and driven by trade union pressure. 
Whereas the former scenario reflect Karol’s (2009) model of coalition group incorporation114 the 
latter typifies coalition group maintenance.
115
 First, a series of descriptive statistics are provided 
in order to a) contextualise the composition of House Democrats from the late 1960s to the early 
1990s  and b) elaborate on the rate of turnover throughout the time period under examination. 
Next, Rapoport and Stone’s (1994) formula for disaggregating the components of political 
change is employed in order to determine the relative proportion of party position change (i.e. 
the increase in childcare bill co-sponsorship rates) that can be explained by replacement, 
conversion and mobilisation. Then, as a corroboration of Rapoport and Stone and a test of the 
relative importance of post-materialist and unionist characteristics on childcare policy adoption, 
a series of descriptive statistics on the co-sponsorship rates of different groups (e.g. men, 
women, university educated and non) are provided. A number of OLS regressions are also run. 
These regressions test for an association between co-sponsoring childcare legislation and having 
characteristics associated with either a unionist or a post-materialist orientation. In light of the 
                                                     
114
 Party elites responded to shifts in traditional party-voter linkages by making strategic appeals to a new set of 
voters. This change would be gradual on a party-wide scale, given that the party as a whole would need to replace its 
traditional, blue-collar and union oriented legislators and members with a new set of party elites who were not allied 
to traditional party-linked groups, such as unions. This new set of elites perhaps represented the types of voters that 
the party sought to attract (post-materialists of both genders and in particular, female voters) (Karol 2009, 19). 
115
 Congressional Democrats responded to their traditional party link interest group’s (i.e. the unions) newfound 
interest in childcare policy by adopting the issue. 
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emphasis on legislator replacement, this section will then examine whether legislator 
replacement did in fact produce a significant demographic shift amongst House Democrats in the 
lead-up to their adoption of childcare policy. 
 
a.  Co-sponsoring childcare and the mechanics of conversion or replacement: did 
legislators become converted to the childcare issue or was policy adoption driven by 
the entrance of post-materialist party modernisers?   
 
In order to provide context to the discussion about legislator conversion, replacement and soci-
demographic change, Table 3.2, below, introduces some descriptive statistics that illustrate how 
the composition of House Democrats changed between the 91st (1969-1971) and 101
st
 (1989-
1991) Congresses.
116
 This table focuses on the total number of House Democrats who served 
during each Congress; it includes their rate of turnover, the percentage of Democratic 
Representatives who were university educated, the percentage who were female and their 
median ADA and COPE scores throughout the period. An ADA score is an annual interest group 
rating computed  by the left-liberal interest group, Americans for Democratic Action.
 117
 It is 
based off of a legislators’s voting record on social and economic issues in a given year. A COPE 
score is an annual interest group rating issued by the AFL-CIO’s political arm. It is based off of 
a legislator’s voting record on labor issues  during a given year.118  
 
                                                     
116 Two separate Rapoport and Stone models are run, one in which T1 is the 90th Congress and one in which T1 is 
the 91st, in order to introduce the reader to the concept of Rapoport and Stone and illustrate the general mechanisms 
producing change between the 1960s and the early 1990s. However the second model (where T1 is the 91st) is 
preferable, given the low number of bills introduced during the 90th Congress and the few Representatives who 
stayed on between the 90th and 101st. For that reason, descriptive statistics as well the OLS regressions focus 
specifically on the 91st and 101st Congresses, leaving the 90th Congress aside. 
117
 ADA scores are a “liberal quotient” assigned to each Congressional representative published by Americans for 
Democratic Action, which according to the organisation covers “a gamut of judicial, social, economic, foreign, and 
military policy” issues. As Sharp (2000) explains, the selected votes “display sharp liberal/conservative divisions 
unblurred by extraneous matters.” COPE scores emanate from the Committee on Political Education of the AFL-
CIO and are published in “labor’s report card” on Congress. As Sharp explains, scores are tabulated according to 
whether a legislator “voted ‘right’ or ‘wrong,’ basing its decision on ‘the position the AFL-CIO took on the 
legislation’” (Sharp 2000, ix-xi).  
118 As will be discussed at the end of this chapter, time-adjusted ADA and COPE scores are preferable because of the 
way these scores are calculated: each year the ADA and AFL-CIO’s COPE compute their scores based off of a 
specific set of votes that reached the House floor in that particular year. Since the underlying base of measurement 
(i.e. the specific set of votes) changes each year it is difficult to compare scores over time. Time-adjusted ADA 
scores do exist, and are shown in Figure 3.8 but similarly adjusted COPE scores do not exist. For the sake of within 
year, between score comparison, non-adjusted ADA and COPE scores are listed here in Table 3.2 but these are less 
reliable when compared over time. 
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  91
st
 92
nd
 93
rd
 94
th
 95
th
 96
th
 97
th
 98
th
 99
th
 100
th
 101
st
 
Total Reps 250 266 264 307 305 302 267 284 273 285 283 
University, % 93 94 95 95 96 96 97 97 97 97 99 
Female, % 2 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 6 
Median ADA 50 56 61 67 54 70 67 78 73 80 77 
Median 
COPE 83 87 91 86 79 73 85 85 86 88 88 
Turnover: % 
first Congress 10 11 13 27 13 14 8 20 4 10 9 
Turnover: % 
last Congress 8 13 13 14 14 19 15 8 7 11 6 
Table 3.2 House Democratic composition, 91st –101st Congresses (Source: Sharp 2000, Anderson and Habel 2009) 
The makeup of House Democrats shifted little between the 91
st
 (1969-1971) and 101
st
 (1989-
1991) Congresses: the total number of House Democrats ranged from a low of 250 in the 91
st
 
Congress to a high of 307 in the 94
th 
(1974-1976); the proportion of female Democratic 
Representatives increased by just four percentage points, from two to six per cent in the 31 
years under examination. The proportion of university-educated Democrats began at 93% 
during the 91
st 
Congress and increased to 99% by the 101
st
. Turnover, as calculated by the 
proportion of newcomer House Democrats in a single Congress ranged from a low of four per 
cent (99
th
 Congress) to 27% in the 94
th 
Congress.
119
 Turnover, as calculated by the proportion 
of outgoing House Democrats in a single Congress ranged from six per cent in the 101
st
 to 18 
in the 96
th
 Congress.
120
 
 
39 ‘stayers’ remained in office between the 91st and 101st Congresses. In the 91st Congress 
these stayers comprised 16% of all House Democrats and in the 101
st
 they comprised 14%, 
meaning that by T2, 86% of House Democrats were ‘new.’ 26% of stayers co-sponsored a 
childcare-related bill during the 91
st
 Congress and 28% did so during the 101
st
. 
 
The section below will first analyse House Democrats’ childcare bill co-sponsorship rates with 
the Rapoport and Stone model, in order to find whether conversion or replacement was the 
dominant mechanism that produced their position change on the issue (i.e. the increase in the 
proportion of legislators who co-sponsored non means-tested childcare bills that occurred 
between T1 and T2). It will then provide descriptive statistics on co-sponsorship rates, 
comparing for example the percentage of men versus women who co-sponsored a childcare bill 
and indicating whether these differences were statistically significant. Next, it will apply OLS 
regressions that test for an association between the number of childcare bills a legislator co-
                                                     
119 An average of 11% with a standard deviation of six. 
120 An average of 13% with a standard deviation of four. 
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sponsored and a variety of characteristics (i.e. gender, education, interest group ratings and 
controls for sitting on the House Education and Labor Committee and representing a Southern 
state).  Both the second set of descriptive statistics and the regressions are useful because even if 
Rapoport and Stone find replacement to be the dominant driver, we would still not be sure that 
these new legislators were more post-materialist than their predecessors. And on the other hand, 
if Rapoport and Stone find that conversion was the dominant driver, it would still be unclear 
whether those who converted had strong links to trade unions.    
 
However as Section 3.2 shows, there were just two universal childcare bills introduced into 
Congress before the Child Development Act started gaining traction in 1970 and 1971 (Rep. 
Mink’s 1967 and 1969 Supplementary Pre-school Education bills). Whilst there were a small 
number of ‘workfare’-centred childcare bills introduced and even passed during the 1960s,121 
this type of legislation appealed to a more conservative coalition who were focused upon moving 
poor women from welfare to work, as opposed to the more socially liberal coalition of the early 
1970s, who aimed for a universal policy that would foster female employment and female equal 
opportunity in general (Morgan 2001). The non-existence of middle-class childcare legislation 
prior to 1967 would skew the analysis towards a conversion-heavy result if T1 was any earlier 
than 1967. As such, the analysis first designates the 90
th
 Congress (1967-1969) as T1 and also, 
due to the paucity of childcare bills in the 90
th (just one: Mink’s 1967 Pre-School Supplementary 
bill), it runs a second model using the 91
st
 Congress (1969-1971) as T1.  Given the increased 
number of childcare bills introduced during the 91
st
 Congress (six), and the fact that it 
immediately predated the McGovern-Fraser reforms, employing the 91
st
 as T1 is preferable to 
the 90th. Measurement is another concern: of the various universal childcare bills introduced 
from the late 1960s, only a handful ever reached the House or Senate floor for a full vote. 
Therefore in order to effectively track legislators’ positions over time, this analysis focuses on 
co-sponsorship, as opposed to roll call votes, thus further enlarging the amount of data. 
 
Since the analysis begins at a time period so close to the CDA’s passage (which occurred during 
the 92
nd
 Congress), it leaves little opportunity to examine the effect of conversion versus 
replacement immediately prior to the CDA. However, it continues until the 101
st 
Congress, 
which culminated in the 1990 passage of the Act for Better Childcare, the next landmark piece of 
childcare legislation to pass through the United States Congress (see footnote 97). It focuses 
specifically on the pieces of middle-income friendly childcare legislation discussed in 3.2, 
beginning with Mink’s 1967 bill in the 90th and ending with the Act for Better Childcare during 
                                                     
121
 The 1962 (limited reintroduction of means-tested funding) and 1967 (Amendments to the Social Security Act) 
bills noted in Section 3.1. 
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the 101
st122
. This longitudinal analysis, whilst not starting at the ideal time point, at least displays 
the trend that began in the late 1960s and indicates the extent to which the Democrats’ overall 
embrace of childcare policy – an issue that by the 1980s was firmly in their court rather than the 
Republicans’ – was driven by either trade union oriented Democrats or by younger, more 
progressive Democrats aligned with the new politics movement.  
 
Rapoport and Stone (1994) developed a model that identifies the extent to which conversion, 
replacement and mobilisation effects explain position/opinion shifts over time. The ‘conversion’ 
effect refers to the proportion of change between Time 1 and Time 2 that can be explained by 
respondents who remained in the panel over the entire time period under consideration 
(‘stayers’) and changed their position during that time. The ‘replacement’ effect is the proportion 
of total change between Time 1 and Time 2 that can be accounted for by the entry of newcomers 
whose views differed from their predecessors who had dropped out. Finally, ‘mobilisation’ refers 
to the proportion of change that can be explained by the entry of newcomers in excess of the 
number that had dropped out, in other words the proportion of change that goes beyond simple 
replacement (Rapoport and Stone, 1994). The value for co-sponsoring a bill is ‘1’ and for not co-
sponsoring is ‘0.’ 
 
The formula for disaggregating change is:  
 
T2-T1= (βα)(S2-S1) + β(1-α)(N2-D1) + (1-β)(N2-T1) 
 
Where: 
T1 and T2 are mean values of the variable under observation at the first and second time 
periods under observation 
S is the average value for ‘stayers,’ i.e. those present at both T1 and T2 
Β is the ratio of the size of the group at T1 relative to the size at T2 
α is the proportion of the group at T1 which is comprised, of ‘stayers’ 
D1 is the mean value for ‘dropouts,’ i.e. those who were present at T1 but not T2 
N2 is the mean value for ‘newcomers,’ i.e. those who were present at T2 but not T1 
 
The first part of the equation reflects the conversion effect, the second replacement and the third, 
mobilisation. 
 
                                                     
122
 Childcare bills that are focused entirely on means-tested assistance (e.g. welfare to work programmes) that do not 
include benefits for middle-income families, (for example an increase in the Child Care Development Block Grant 
or increases in the Dependent Care Tax Credit) are excluded. 
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i. 90
th
 to 101
st
 Congress 
This first analysis starts in the 90
th
 Congress (1967-1969) and completes in the 101
st
 Congress. 
At T1, 25 out of 252 (10%) House Democrats co-sponsored at least one childcare bill; that figure 
became 119 out of 271, or 44%, by T2, yielding a 34% increase in co-sponsorship rates. Of the 
32 House Democratic ‘stayers’ who remained in office throughout the time period, five (or 16%) 
co-sponsored in the 90
th
. That figure slightly more than doubled to 11 (34%) in the 101
st.
 The 
House Democrat co-sponsorship values are as follows: 
 
T1 = .099 
T2 = .439 
S1 = .156 
S2 = .344 
Β = .93 
α = .127 
D1 = .091 
N2 = .452  
 
Despite the doubling of stayers who co-sponsored in the 101
st
, when these values are applied to 
the Rapoport and Stone model, total party position change appears to be mechanised largely by 
replacement:  
 
Total change: Conversion Replacement Mobilisation 
.34 .022 .293 .024 
34% comprised of: 6.47% 86% 7.26% 
Table 3.3 Rapoport and Stone: US 90th Congress – 101st Congress (Source: Congressional Record, Thomas 2014) 
The large number of incoming Democrats who co-sponsored outweighs the effects of 
conversion. The newcomers co-sponsored at higher rate (45%) at T2 than did the stayers (34%) 
and even more so than the dropouts at T1 (9.1% of whom co-sponsored).  
 
ii. 91
st
 to 101
st
: 
As previously noted, a second analysis starting at the 91
st
 Congress is also employed in order to 
guard against the possibility that the relatively small number childcare bills introduced during 
the 90
th
 Congress skewed the results.
 123
 The 91
st
 Congress (1969-1971) is perhaps more useful 
                                                     
123
 In contrast to the 90
th
, where one childcare bill was introduced (Rep. Mink’s HR9720), there were six childcare 
related bills introduced during the 91
st
 Congress: HR 4190 and HR 4191, two versions of the Pre-school Centers 
Supplementary Education Act (1969); HR4314, which amended the Taft-Hartley Labor Management Relations Act 
so as to let employers and trade unions set up contribution funds for childcare centres (1969); and HR 13520 (1969), 
 117 
than the 90
th
 for several reasons: it was the first Congress during which any bill promoting 
universal access to affordable childcare was introduced into the Chamber
124
 and it was the last 
Congress before the impact of the McGovern-Fraser reforms would have been felt. As the 
commission ran from 1969-1972, we might expect that after the 91
st
, its reforms would have 
begun to make an impact on the social and political preferences, and socioeconomic 
backgrounds, of incoming legislators (Stricherz 2003).  
 
During the 91
st
 Congress, 19% of House Democrats co-sponsored at least one of the childcare 
bills introduced into the chamber; that figure was 44% during the 101
st
 Congress. To what extent 
was that 25% increase driven by conversion amongst stayers, replacement or mobilisation? Of 
the 39 House Democrats who stayed in office between T1 and T2, 10 (26%) co-sponsored a 
piece of universal childcare legislation during the 91st Congress. 11 (28%) co-sponsored 
childcare legislation during the 101
st
. Immediately, this suggests that the relative amount of 
change accorded to conversion would be quite low: only one additional stayer co-sponsored a 
universal childcare bill at T2 than had done so at T1.  
 
The House Democrat co-sponsorship values are as follows: 
T1 = .192 
T2 = .439 
S1 = .256 
S2 = .282 
Β = .992 
α = .156 
D1 = .18 
N2 = .47  
 
And as expected, applying these values to the Rapoport and Stone formula yields replacement-
heavy findings: of the 25% total change in House Democrat childcare co-sponsorship between 
the 91
st
 and 101
st
 Congresses, just 1.55% can be attributed to legislator conversion, 0.8% to 
legislator mobilisation and 98.3% to legislator replacement.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
HR19632 (1970), HR15766 (1970), all precursors to the Child Development Act, which eventually passed the 
House during the 92
nd
 Congress.   
124 Whereas Mink’s bills, first introduced during the 90th, would have provided capital funding to build centres, they 
were not as comprehensive as the CDA (and its precursors, three of which were introduced during the 91st), which 
included capital and operational funding as well as guidelines on eligibility and fees.  
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Total change: Conversion Replacement Mobilisation 
.247 = .004 .243 + .002 
24.7% comprised of: 1.55% 98.3% 0.8% 
Table 3.4 Rapoport and Stone: US 91st Congress – 101st Congress (Source: Congressional Record, Thomas 2014) 
This result is not entirely surprising: in contrast to the one stayer who converted, the newcomers 
to the House (i.e. those who arrived after the 91
st
 Congress) had higher co-sponsorship rates than 
their stayer counterparts at T2 (47% versus 28%) just as they had higher co-sponsorship rates at 
T2 than the House Democrat dropouts had at T1 (47% versus 18%, respectively).  
 
The Rapoport and Stone equations indicate that replacement was the dominant mechanism 
behind childcare policy adoption yet, as previously noted, it does necessarily confirm that the 
new Democrats who churned into the House of Representatives had backgrounds typically 
associated with post-materialist, left-liberal values, nor that those who co-sponsored – be they 
newcomers or stayers – had such backgrounds. Table 3.5, below, includes descriptive statistics 
that show the proportion of men, women, university and non-university educated House 
Democrats who co-sponsored at points T1 and T2. It also shows the proportion of Democratic 
Representatives with a COPE score higher than their ADA score who co-sponsored (and vice-
versa). T-tests are applied to indicate whether differences in the per cent of men/women, 
university educated/non and those with positive/negative COPE-ADA scores who co-sponsored 
are statistically significant.  
 
Co-sponsor characteristics 91st Congress 101st Congress 
Women, % 17 57 
Men, % 18 53 
University educated, % 17 53 
Non-university educated 18 50 
Positive COPE-ADA score
125
, % 19+ 60 
Negative COPE-ADA score, % 8 51 
Southern, % 3*** 34*** 
Non-Southern, % 27 62 
House Ed and Labor, % 86** 76** 
Non-House Ed and Labour, % 16 51 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1  
Table 3.5 Democratic Co-sponsor characteristics (Source: Sharp 2000, Anderson and Habel 2009) 
 
                                                     
125 Where the difference in scores is zero, it is counted as being a negative COPE-ADA score. 
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In the 91
st
 Congress there was no statistically significant difference between the proportions of 
men and women who co-sponsored childcare legislation, nor was there a statistically significant 
difference between the proportion of university and non-university educated House Democrats 
who co-sponsored. There was a statistically significant difference between the proportion of 
Representatives with positive and negative COPE-ADA scores who co-sponsored, however not 
in the direction hypothesised: a greater proportion of House Democrats with a COPE score that 
exceeded their ADA score co-sponsored, relative to House Democrats with an ADA score that 
was higher than their COPE score.
 126  
 
A control variable for a legislator representing a state in the Southern US is also included 
because as discussed in 3.3, they were associated with social conservatism and often allied with 
Republicans on social policy issues. Another control variable is added for Education and Labor 
Committee members, since one might expect them to be the first and most likely to introduce 
and/or co-sponsor bills that pass through their committee. Differences between these control 
variables – Southern/non-Southern and whether or not a Representative sat on the House 
Education and Labor Committee – are both statistically significant at the 99.9% and 99% 
confidence levels, respectively. Indeed, just three per cent of Southerners co-sponsored a 
childcare-related bill during the 91st, relative to 27% of non-Southerners.
127
 86% of those sitting 
on the House Education and Labour Committee did so, relative to just 16% of those not on the 
committee.
128
    
 
By the 101
st
 Congress, female Democrats co-sponsored in slightly greater proportion than did 
male Democrats, just as university educated Democrats co-sponsored at a somewhat higher rate 
than did their non-university educated counterparts, however neither of these differences is 
statistically significant. Representatives with lower COPE scores than ADA scores did co-
sponsor in greater proportion than their counterparts with the opposite pairing (a higher COPE to 
ADA) but the difference is not statistically significant. The control variables for being Southern 
and sitting on the House Education and Labor Committee again show up as significant: 34% of 
Southerners co-sponsored relative to 62% of non-Southerners, a difference that is statistically 
significant at the 99.9% confidence level.
129
 76% of House Education and Labor Committee 
                                                     
126 However, it should be noted that there were just ten House Democrats in the 91st who had an ADA score that was 
higher than their COPE, relative to 225 who had a higher COPE than ADA score (there are no available 91st 
Congress COPE and/or ADA scores for 15 remaining House Democrats).  
127 There were 91 House Democrats who hailed from the South during the 91st Congress.  
128 There were seven Democrats on the House Education and Labor Committee during the 91st Congress. 
129 There were 86 Southern House Democrats during the 101st Congress. 
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members co-sponsored relative to 51% of House Democrats who did not sit on that committee, a 
difference statistically significant at the 99% confidence level.
130
  
 
Both Rapoport and Stone and the descriptive statistics above treat House Democrats’ co-
sponsorship of childcare bills as a binary variable (i.e. a legislator did or did not co-sponsor) and 
as such, they do not indicate what might drive some legislators to co-sponsor more than once – 
which may prove to be a more informative measure of the extent to which legislators embraced 
the issue. In order to test whether the Rapoport and Stone-based findings hold when we consider 
co-sponsorship along a continuous scale (for example, from zero to five in the 91
st
 Congress) and 
to test whether or not that the ‘replacement’ effect implies an association between co-sponsoring 
and post-materialism, multiple linear (OLS) regressions are run. Without attempting to provide a 
comprehensive model of the all the factors that drove a legislator to co-sponsor a childcare bill, 
these models serve to test the relative partial effects of our main variables of interest: gender, 
education (university-educated or non) and, as a proxy for loyalty to socially-left causes and/or 
labour unions, two interest group ratings: Americans for Democratic Action and COPE.
131
 
Control variables for representing a Southern state and sitting on the House Education and Labor 
Committee are also included.  
 
Although the OLS regressions as shown in Tables 3.7 and 3.8 are intended to highlight 
associations between legislator characteristics and the strength of their commitment to childcare, 
(i.e. how many times they co-sponsored/debated the issue) there is not, across the three cases at 
hand, a normal distribution of childcare co-sponsorship and/or debate mentions. This is 
particularly concerning in the ALP and Labour Party cases, where debate mentions rather than 
bill co-sponsorship form the dependent variable: an individual MP’s number of debate mentions 
can range from zero to as high as 34 (as in the UK’s 52nd Parliament). Moreover, all three cases 
include a large quantity of zeros (i.e. legislators who did not co-sponsor/debate childcare).  
 
In order to guard against the weaknesses of the OLS model in handling such non-normal 
distributions, binary logistic regressions are also run. In these, the independent variables remain 
identical to those in the OLS models however the dependent variable is not the number of bills 
co-sponsored or the number of debate mentions but rather, it is whether or not a legislator co-
sponsored/debated. Because the differences between the two sets of results are not striking in 
any of the three cases (under the binary logistic regressions, nearly all of the independent 
                                                     
130 There were 21 Democrats on the House Education and Labor Committee during the 101st Congress.  
131
 Interest group ratings are employed instead of measures of career long voting records on different types of social 
and economic issues as for example captured in DW nominate scores (Caroll et. al. 2013) because this study is 
interested in legislators feeling beholden to a particular constituency (i.e. labour unions or the new left, etc.) and the 
extent to which that drives their proclivity to co-sponsor particular types of legislation.  
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variables have a similar direction and significance level as in the OLS), footnotes 133 and 134, 
attached to the discussion of the OLS findings, compare results between the two different types 
of regression analysis. The binary logistic tables themselves are included under Appendix D 
whereas the OLS results and corresponding discussion appear below. 
 
     Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
University .119 (.161) .122 (.156) .226
+
 (.135) .204 (.159) 
Female  .245 (.259) .246 (.258) .135 (.229) .205 (.262) 
ADA Score, 91st  .005* (.002) .005** (.002)   
COPE Score, 91st .000 (.002)    
ADA - COPE   .001(.002)  
COPE - ADA     -.003 (.002) 
Southern -.094 (.123) -.088 (.113) -.289*** (.071) -.335*** (.079) 
Ed and Labor Cmte       
2.19***(.221) 
2.189*** 
(.219) 
2.31*** (.211) 2.26*** (.221) 
(Constant) -.098 (.210) -.097 (.163) .101 (.135) .225 (.169) 
R
2 
N = 250 
.402 .394 .366 .385 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1  
Table 3.6 OLS regression results, US 91st Congress (Source: Congressional Record, Sharp 2000) 
 
Table 3.6, Model 1 for the 91
st
 Congress finds that whilst controlling for all other variables, 
education, gender and being southern yield no statistically significant effects on the number of 
bills a House Democrat co-sponsored; the partial association between ADA score and bills co-
sponsored is positive and significant at the 95% confidence level, albeit with a small coefficient 
(a one unit increase in ADA score, on average, yields a .005 increase in the number of bills a 
legislator co-sponsors). However, one concern is the strong correlation between the ADA and 
COPE ratings (Pearson’s correlation coefficient of .854 at the 99.9% confidence level). 
Removing the COPE score yields a positive and more significant relationship for the ADA score 
(as shown in Model 2) whilst removing the ADA score (not shown) yields a positive though not 
significant relationship between COPE score and co-sponsorship (b=.004, p=.06).   
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In order to address any possible complications from the correlation issue, Model 3 calculates the 
difference between ADA and COPE scores, wherein respondents with a higher ADA than COPE 
score have a positive numerical score and in Model 4 the reverse is done (ADA score subtracted 
from COPE score).
132
 Controlling for all other variables, a higher ADA-COPE score is 
associated with a greater number of bills co-sponsored, whilst as shown in Model 4, a higher 
COPE relative to ADA score has a negative association with co-sponsoring. However, neither 
coefficient is statistically significant at the 90%
 
confidence level. Finally, Model 4 shows that the 
control variable – Education and Labour Committee membership – is positively associated and 
significant at the 99.9% confidence level; indicating that controlling for all other variables, a 
Democratic member on the committee would, on average, co-sponsor 2.26 more childcare-
related bills than would a non-committee member. Controlling for all other variables, being 
Southern has a negative and significant association with co-sponsorship, indicating that, holding 
all else constant, Southern House Democrats co-sponsored, on average, 3.35 fewer bills than 
their non-Southern counterparts.
133
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 As they are based on different votes, the scales on which they are calculated are somewhat different. However 
COPE scores for House Democrats run on average higher than do ADA scores (in the 91
st
, the average COPE score 
was 73, ADA was 49; in the 101
st
 those figures were 81 and 71, respectively), suggesting that any association 
between having a positive ADA-COPE score and co-sponsorship has met a very conservative test, particularly in the 
91
st
 Congress. Given the large difference in averages one can be confident that a legislator who scores higher on the 
ADA score than the COPE score is most likely located in the left-liberal quadrant, as opposed to left-authoritarian 
quadrant, of party competition. 
133 The binary logistic regressions replicating the OLS models used in the 91st produce results quite similar to those 
shown in Table 3.6. Controlling for all other variables, both university education and gender remain insignificant 
across the models. Whilst still insignificant, the direction of association between being female and co-sponsoring is, 
in contrast to the OLS results, negative across all four models, holding all else constant. ADA and COPE scores also 
have a similar association with co-sponsorship in both types of regression, however the significance of ADA in 
Model 2 declined from 99% in the OLS regression to 95% in the logistic. In both regressions, ADA-COPE scores 
(Model 3) are positive and insignificant. The COPE-ADA score (Model 4) is negative and insignificant in the OLS 
but negative and significant at the 99% confidence level in the logistic, holding all else constant. This indicates a 
negative association between having being scored higher by a unionist than a socially liberal interest group and the 
log odds of co-sponsoring. The control variable for sitting on the Education and Labor Committee is, as with the 
OLS results, positive and significant in Model 3 (in the OLS results it is significant at the 99.9% confidence level 
and in the binary logistic it is significant at the 99% level), however it is no longer significant in the logistic Model 
4. The other control variable, Southern, remains negative and significant at the 99.9% confidence level, controlling 
for all other variables, in Models 3 and 4. For the full output see Appendix D. 
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     Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
University -.338 (.472) -.316 (.470) -.241 (.522) -.190 (.506) 
Female  -.115 (.136) .333 (.229) .247 (.238) .397 (.247) 
ADA Score, 101st .017***(.004) .018*** 
(.003) 
  
COPE Score, 101st .001 (.005)    
ADA - COPE   .006* (.003)  
COPE - ADA     -.011* (.004) 
Southern .344 (.230) -.098 (.133) -.555***(.117) -.566*** 
(.122) 
Ed and Labor Cmte       .269 (.188) .257 (.187) .412* (.201) .446* (.119) 
(Constant) -.080 (.526) -.080 (.513) 1.267* (.526) 1.294* (.509) 
R
2 
N = 283 
.274 .257 .120 .161 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1  
Table 3.7 OLS regression results, US 101st Congress (Source: Congressional Record, Sharp 2000) 
 
Twenty years later, in the 101
st
 Congress, gender and university education both remain 
insignificantly associated with co-sponsorship, holding all else constant. ADA and COPE scores 
remain heavily correlated with one and other (Pearson’s correlation coefficient of .814, at the 
99.9% confidence level), however as Model 3 indicates, House Democrats with ADA scores that 
are higher than their COPE scores are positively and significantly associated with co-sponsorship 
at the 95% confidence level. Similarly, Model 4 shows that controlling for all other variables, 
having a COPE score higher than an ADA score yields a negative association with co-sponsoring 
childcare bills. While both ADA-COPE and COPE-ADA variables are significant at the 95% 
confidence level, their coefficients are quite small (.006 and -.011, respectively). The control for 
representing a Southern state is now both negatively and significantly associated at the 99.9% 
confidence level: Model 4 shows that a Southerner is, on average, likely to co-sponsor .566 
fewer bills than a non-Southerner, holding all else constant. Controlling for all other variables, 
sitting on the Education and Labor Committee is again positive and significantly associated at 
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the 95% confidence level (a House Democrat on the committee would, on average, sponsor .446 
more childcare bills than non-committee members).
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These findings indicate that whilst on average both socially liberal and trade union-oriented 
backgrounds were significant in childcare co-sponsorship patterns during the 91
st
 and 101
st
 
Congresses, those who were rated higher by the ADA than they were the AFL-CIO’s COPE, 
were positively and significantly associated with co-sponsorship. Those who were rated higher 
by COPE than they were the ADA had in the 101
st
, a negative and significant association with 
co-sponsorship, indicating that by the early 1990s, post-materialism was relatively more 
important than unionism in fostering childcare policy adoption in the legislative sense. This new 
politics argument is further supported by the fact that during the 91
st
 and 101
st
 Congresses 
Southern Democrats, a group who on average eschewed new politics, also had a negative and 
significant association with bill co-sponsorship. This, in combination with the ADA-COPE 
findings, does seem to suggest that the Democrats’ embrace of childcare was pushed along by 
the arrival of new politics legislators. However, the coefficients for university education and 
being female – two factors associated with new politics – are statistically insignificant. This 
apparent contradiction could in fact reflect the difficulty of measuring new politics orientation: a 
large majority of Congress is university-educated; given that 93% of all House Democrats in the 
91
st
 Congress had been to university, there was not much room for variation based simply upon 
education.
135
 In addition, the proportion of female House Democrats remained quite low 
throughout the period of study (they ranged from just 2.3 to 5.3%). The act of co-sponsoring (as 
opposed to debating) may indeed require a level of networking and committee placement that is 
challenging for minority Representatives to take part in. 
 
The Rapoport and Stone findings, that legislator replacement mechanised the party’s embrace of 
childcare more so than legislator conversion, seem upheld. Characteristics associated with new 
                                                     
134 The binary logistic regression replicating the OLS models for the 101st displays largely similar results in terms 
of direction of association and significance to those that appear in Table 3.7. While the direction of association 
between university and gender varies across all four models, they remain consistently insignificant, controlling for 
all other variables, as in the OLS findings. ADA scores, in both Models 1 and 2, are positive and significant at the 
99.9% confidence level in both the OLS and logistic regressions. ADA-COPE scores (in Model 3) are, holding all 
else constant, positively and significantly associated with co-sponsorship in both regressions, however the 
confidence level is 95% in the OLS model and 99% in the logistic. COPE-ADA scores (Model 4) are, in both the 
OLS and logistic results, negatively associated however, unlike the OLS findings, the variable is no longer 
significant in the binary logistic model. The control for being Southern has the same negative and significant 
association (at the 99.9% confidence level) in Models 3 and 4 in both the OLS and logistic regressions. The control 
for sitting on the Education and Labor Committee is also largely similar between the two regression analyses: under 
the OLS it has a positive and significant association with co-sponsorship in Models 3 and 4, whereas in the logistic 
regression it remains positive but is only significant (at the 99% confidence level) in Model 4. For the full model see 
Appendix D. 
135
 During the 48
th
 UK Parliament (1979-83) 57% of Labour MPs were university educated; in Australia’s 28th 
Parliament (1972-74) 37% of ALP MPs were university educated. This compares to 93% of all House Democrats 
during the 91
st
 Congress (1969-71). 
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politics Democrats (mainly a higher ADA relative to COPE score) is significantly associated 
with higher rates of bill co-sponsorship just as being Southern Democrat or at T2, a high COPE-
ADA scorer, is negatively and significantly associated, controlling for all other variables.  
  
b.  What did legislator ‘replacement’ look like? 
While there has been large amount of explanatory power attributed to legislator replacement and 
the influence of legislators with characteristics more akin to new politics than unionism, to what 
extent did legislator replacement occur, and were the new legislators really very different from 
their predecessors?  
 
Figure 3.7 displays the percentage point terms difference in House Democrats’ characteristics 
between the 91
st
 and 101
st
 Congresses. The increase in average Democratic ADA score (23 
percentage points) relative to COPE score (eight percentage points) suggests that even 
accounting for shifts in standards in interest group ratings over time, the intake of House 
Democrats between 1969 and 1991 must have advanced more socially progressive pieces of 
legislation than did their predecessors. Time adjusted interest group ratings would be preferable 
in this case because the set of votes used to calculate these scores each year is not constant and 
thus the underlying scales can be different from year to year (Groseclose et al. 1999). However, 
the interest group scores here are not adjusted because there are no data for adjusted COPE 
scores over time. Figure 3.8 which displays over-time change does include adjusted ADA scores 
(Anderson and Habel 2009). The extent to which this new intake was more or less ‘pro-labour’ 
than their predecessors in absolute terms is unclear, however the strength of post-materialism (as 
measured by ADA scores) has increased relative to unionism, as the Rapoport and Stone and 
OLS findings would suggest. There were less significant, but positive, increases in university 
educated
136
 and female legislators and a decline in Southern Democrats.
137
  
                                                     
136
 As previously noted, the reason for the modest increase in university educated legislators is simply the higher 
starting point (relative to what will be shown in the Australian and British cases): in the 91
st
 Congress 93% of all 
House Democrats already had a university education – so there was not much scope for a large increase. 
137
 See Iversen and Rosenbluth (2010) for a discussion on the low level of female political representation in the US. 
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Figure 3.7 Percentage change in House Democrats’ characteristics, 1969-1991 (Source: Sharp 2000) 
 
Figure 3.8 House Democrats’ Characteristics, 1969-1991 with adjusted ADA scores (Source: Sharp 2000, Anderson and 
Habel 2009) 
 
c.  Approximating the forces and mechanics of change 
The Rapoport and Stone results indicate that replacement was by far the dominant mechanism 
behind the Democrats’ increased embrace of childcare and the OLS regressions largely 
confirmed a strong association between childcare co-sponsorship rate and legislators with 
characteristics that we would expect from ‘post-materialists’ (e.g. higher ADA score relative to 
COPE, non-Southern). Who did not co-sponsor? The typical House Democrat stayer who did not 
co-sponsor a single childcare bill between the 90
th
 and 101
st
 Congresses was Southern and 
socially conservative: more than half of the non-sponsoring stayers represented Southern states 
and their average ADA rating in 1990 was 56%, against a mean House Democrat rating of 71%. 
These findings are reflected by just glancing at the 1971 roll call vote on the CDA: 47 (90%) of 
the 52 House Democrats who voted against passing the Child Development Act conference 
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report (which cleared the measure for the President) were Southerners.
138
 However, what does 
this say about unions? The OLS regressions do indeed indicate that having a higher COPE 
relative to ADA score (which as previously noted is a conservative test) was, in the 91
st
 
Congress, negatively but not significantly associated with co-sponsorship; by the 101
st
 this 
association remained negative and was significant at the 95% confidence level. Whilst, overall, 
Southern Democrats provided an even greater hurdle to childcare policy adoption than did 
unionists, this research question is centred upon the relative importance of replacement versus 
trade union pressure in driving change. At least according to the quantitative results displayed 
here, replacement outweighed conversion and post-materialists outweighed unionists in driving 
childcare policy adoption. 
 
3.5 Conclusions: a new electoral agenda emboldened by reform 
 
This chapter’s qualitative analysis, which emphasises significant shifts in both Democrats’ and 
Republicans’ longstanding electoral coalitions, suggests that the Democrats’ childcare policy 
adoption, in both legislative and in electoral terms, was largely driven by electoral imperative 
and mechanised by the influx of more socially liberal and to a lesser extent, higher-educated and 
female legislators. However, it does not find that unions were absent from the childcare policy 
adoption process; despite disagreement over the ERA and the AFL-CIO’s opposition to 
modernising reforms in the Democratic Party, it has been shown that unions did play active roles 
in Congressional childcare policy development. Quantitative findings uphold the relative power 
of replacement and the rise of post-materialist legislators as the driver behind childcare policy 
adoption (i.e. party position change) but are more negative on the impact of unions. Conversion, 
for example, played little role in mechanising party position change whereas regressions showed 
negative and mostly non-significant associations between a legislator having a high COPE score 
(or higher COPE than ADA score) and their co-sponsoring childcare legislation.  
 
This is not to suggest that unions provided a significant hurdle to the party adopting childcare 
policy. In fact out of the quantitative variables analysed here, that title would surely go to one of 
the control variables, Representatives from Southern states.  Although social conservatives, such 
as AFL-CIO President George Meany, lambasted the power accrued by social liberals’ within 
the Democratic Party, this chapter also explains that union representatives sat alongside left-
liberals and civil rights activists on the original ad hoc childcare committee in the early 1970s 
and again in its 1975 reformation. Whilst the Rapoport and Stone model suggests little to no 
evidence of legislator conversion, the OLS findings indicate that ADA and COPE scores are 
                                                     
138
 The Southern Democrats were a part of the ‘conservative coalition’ of conservative Republicans and Southern 
Democrats (Congressional Quarterly, 1971). 
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correlated: one need to be either ‘pro-labour’ or ‘left-liberal’; indeed many of the legislators with 
high ADA scores also have high COPE scores. However, as it stands, the influence of unions at 
both T1 a and T2 on childcare policy adoption, in legislative terms, is weak relative to that of 
replacement and post-materialism, the variables this research associates with electoral 
imperative.  As unions became increasingly feminised and the overarching power of the Meany 
challenged, childcare could have indeed comprised a larger place on their agenda and perhaps 
they could have played a stronger role in pushing the Democrats on the issue. This, however, 
speaks to the importance of timing and party internal organisation: just as unions were becoming 
increasingly feminised, their power within the Democratic Party was already being reduced.  
 
Section 3.3 indicates that change in class and gender-based party-voter linkages predated 
strategic appeals to new middle class male and females voters: for example the influx of middle-
income childcare assistance bills and the amount of attention devoted to universal childcare in 
the Democratic Party Platform occurred late 1960s and early 1970s. However, class and gender 
declined from the early 1960s (see Figures 1.16-17 and 1.20). Whilst this gap in time between 
electoral change and childcare policy adoption does not appear as stark as those what will be 
discussed in the Australian and British chapters (and in Chapter Six), it does beg the question of 
whether internal party reforms mediated the speed in which parties were able to make strategic 
appeals to post-materialist voters, either in the legislature or during election campaigns, and 
hence promise specific work/family policies, either by writing legislation or placing them on the 
Party Platform.  
 
On the one hand, the Childcare Development Act was written and had received popular support 
at the same time the McGovern-Fraser reforms were being developed and implemented, 
therefore suggesting that party reform had no mediating impact on childcare policy adoption in 
the legislative sense. However, party reform could indeed have had a mediating impact on 
childcare policy adoption in the electoral sense: the direct impact of McGovern-Fraser included a 
27 percentage point increase in the number of female conference delegates between 1968 and 
1972 (from 13% to 40%) as well as the fact that the platform committee, in 1972, became 44% 
female with 46% its drafting subcommittee female and all of its four vice-chairs female (NY 
Times 1972). The resultant platform was the first to promise a specific programme of universal 
childcare just as it was the first to include a section focused exclusively on the ‘rights of 
women.’ Moreover, the quotas for youths and minorities alongside women, as well as the de-
facto mandate for primaries that occurred as a result of McGovern-Fraser, are argued to have 
allowed the rise of new left candidates and the influx of new left party members at the expense 
of union power brokers (see for example Rae 1994, 21-23). So whilst the internal organisational 
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reforms occurred too late to have directly spurred the development of childcare legislation in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, they did foster an increased proportion of women sitting on the 
committee that wrote what was then the most feminist party platform in Democratic Party 
history. Moreover, the reforms were representative of the left-liberal inertia within the party that 
ensured that both candidate selection procedures (and internal party decision making structures) 
would be increasingly won (and increasingly influenced by) the party’s rising ranks of left-
liberal, post-materialist members. These same members and legislators, who joined and were 
elected in the wake of McGovern-Fraser, would take the leading role in advancing childcare 
policy from the 1972 election up until this study’s endpoint, the 101st Congress. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 130 
Chapter Four: Two steps forward… The Australian Labor Party and universal childcare 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The following chapter analyses the Australian Labor Party‘s embrace of childcare as an electoral 
issue and as a legislative priority both in the run up to the 1983 and 1984 federal elections. It will 
first briefly trace childcare policy development in Australia before placing the issue in the 
context of two separate, albeit related, events: Australian parties’ shifting electoral coalitions and 
the ALP’s response to it, which included changes in both electoral strategy and party 
organisation. It will then qualitatively analyse the trade unions’ stance on childcare. Next, using 
data derived from Parliamentary debate and legislator demographics, it attempts to determine 
whether the ALP’s embrace of childcare was mechanised by legislator conversion and driven by 
trade union pressure or mechanised by legislator replacement and driven by electoral strategy. 
This analysis is conducted with two techniques: Rapoport and Stone’s (1994) model for 
disaggregating political change and OLS regressions that further test for an association between 
a legislator raising the issue in parliamentary debate and characteristics associated with either 
unionism or post-materialism. It will conclude on the relative strength of trade union pressure 
versus electoral imperative on driving party position change and also discuss the importance of 
party reform as a factor that mediated the speed in which electoral imperative was able to drive 
childcare policy adoption.   
 
4.2 This time, a real promise: childcare from World War II until the late 1980s 
Pre-war Australian childcare could be characterised as ‘philanthropic’; the few childcare centres 
that existed in the pre-war era were essentially centres for the study of ‘best practice’ on child 
health and care for children whose mothers were forced to work. Dubbed “Lady Gowrie 
Centres” after their founder, these facilities were not in fact services to provide full-day care in 
aid of female employment but rather charitable units staffed by middle class female volunteers. 
In fact, Suffragettes founded the organisation that ran the centres, the Kindergarten Union, in 
1895 (Brennan 1994, 40-41). The exigencies of the World War II effort saw married women’s 
employment rise from 11% in 1933 to 25% in 1943. However the Labour-led Commonwealth 
Government’s childcare response was somewhat muted: a conference on the issue of wartime 
childcare was held in Sydney during 1942 and minimal funds were appropriated for an 
experimental childcare programme. Whereas the UK and the US central/federal governments 
had developed specific administrative structures to provide wartime care, the Australian 
Commonwealth government simply offered additional funding to pre-existing voluntary pre-
school organisations, in the hopes they could expand services enough to meet rising demand. 
The results were limited: only 14 new centres across three states were developed. According to 
Brennan, the hesitancy to involve state structures was in part due to concerns about the party’s 
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key constituencies: they did not want to offend the Catholic Church, with its focus on the 
preservation of maternal care nor did they want to anger unions, who resisted policies that would 
compromise the male breadwinner model (Brennan 1994, 47-48).  
 
Despite a continual rise in women’s employment, the issue remained largely off the political 
agenda during the 1950s. Increased demand for pre-school education did not translate into a 
public debate over childcare. Brennan states that “there was some response from the market” in 
the form of child-minders but that “most women appear to have coped with the lack of childcare 
services by calling upon friends, neighbours and members of their extended family to provide 
help” (Brennan 1994, 53-55). Popularity for compensatory pre-school programmes, elicited by 
the influential “Plowden Report” in the UK and, in particular, the US’s Head Start programme 
increased from the 1960s, albeit public assistance was state rather than federal based and 
provision varied heavily from state to state, with Western Australia, Queensland and Tasmania 
integrating pre-school into their primary schools. Voluntary pre-school provision dominated in 
Victoria and New South Wales (NSW), with NSW influenced particularly by both Catholic 
church and trade union objections to interventions with the under-fives (Brennan 1994, 53-57). 
Moreover these services, varied as they were, focused on sessional pre-school education rather 
than the full-day programmes that would allow a second earner to take up full-time employment.  
 
In 1972 the Liberal-Country governing Coalition passed the Commonwealth Child Care Act 
(CCA), the first federal-level intervention into the Australian childcare market. The Act 
stipulated that the Commonwealth government would appropriate capital grants and operational 
subsidies directly to community groups and local-government sponsored bodies in order for 
them to develop early years and, in particular, long day childcare programmes. Emphasis – 
though no formal guidelines for monitoring – was placed upon directing funds towards children 
“in need.” The legislation stated that, over three years, the Commonwealth would appropriate 
$23 million to community-groups and local governments who completed funding submissions. 
Passed on 2 November 1972, the McMahon Liberal-Country Coalition was voted out of 
Government before appropriating any funds. Contextually, the timing seemed appropriate: GDP 
growth throughout the 1960s averaged 5.3% whilst unemployment remained under 4%. The 
country had also experienced a significant jump in women’s employment, particularly located in 
the lower-wage tiers of the economy: by 1968, married women comprised 17.2% of the 
workforce, leading Liberal ministers to fear that thousands of pre-school aged children were left 
in unsatisfactory caring conditions. With a labour shortage unfolding, employer organisations 
began calling for a government action to foster female labour force participation, complaining 
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that females “on the birth of their first child, would be lost to industry for at least five years” 
(Brennan 1998, 63). 
 
Opposition to the bill was largely fractured: debate surrounding women’s employment and 
childcare displayed a split between the traditionally conservative, Catholic members of the ALP, 
just as it did between male and female trade unionists. Whilst ALP Senator Arthur Gieztelt 
castigated the Coalition for not moving sooner – nor stronger – on childcare provision in aid of a 
woman’s freedom to choose between work and care, the ALP’s industrial relations spokesman, 
Clyde Cameron, argued that an increase in the family wage would negate the need for women to 
work in the first place (Brennan 1998, 64; Commonwealth Senate Hansard 30 October 1972). 
Although female trade unionists held meetings with then Australian Congress of Trade Unions 
(ACTU)
139
 President, and future Labor Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, in which they endorsed 
childcare, the ACTU officially prioritised the idea of a family wage – in lieu of childcare – until 
1977 (Brennan 1994, 141). 
 
Considering the pertinent context in which childcare policy entered the political arena (low 
unemployment, rising female labour force participation) and the fractured if not limited 
opposition to the policy, one might have expected childcare facilities to expand dramatically and 
for the policy in and of itself to take off as a vote winning issue. However, subsequent 
Governments – Labor under Gough Whitlam from 1972-1976 and the Liberal Coalition led by 
Malcolm Fraser from 1976-1983 – did not make substantive progress on the issue. In fact after 
two years of commissions and intra-party struggle, the ruling ALP could still not agree whether 
the policy was meant to be employed for educational (i.e. pre-school, half day) or daycare (full-
day care whilst parents work) purposes.  Under Whitman, the details of the submission-based 
model were finalised. The outcome of this however, was that organised, established pre-school 
associations were able to out-compete nascent and as yet non-existent childcare services for 
operational subsidies from the federal government. Although Fraser’s subsequent Coalition 
Government in 1976 attempted to limit pre-school funding – arguing that it fell under the remit 
of state-level education departments – and redirect subsidies towards child daycare centres, 
overall funding and the total growth in places remained quite stagnant (see Figures 4.1 and 
4.2)
140
. Moreover, the issue of childcare – and broader family policy issues – remained largely 
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 The ACTU is the predominant peak-level union in Australia. 
140
 The steep rise in federal outlays from 1991, as seen in Figure 4.1, was not the result of increased spending 
commitments but instead the unintended consequence of policy change wherein the government began to subsidise 
thousands of families already using private, for-profit childcare. This made the government liable for over AU $40m 
extra payments per year (Brennan 1994, 203). 
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off either party’s radar in subsequent federal elections, as indicated by Figures 1.7 and 1.8141 
(Brennan 1998, 101; 124, 176-77). 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Adjusted outlays on childcare, in 1990 $AU (millions), 1974-93 (Source: Brennan 1994, 203) 
 
Figure 4.2 Total childcare places, Australia, 1979-43 (Source: Brennan 1994, 203) 
 
The ALP had in the mid 1970s under Gough Whitlam begun to ‘modernise’ its image by 
campaigning on issues of interest to middle class families and in particular middle-income 
women: for example Brennan recalls Whitlam’s discussion of childcare during the 1974 
campaign: 
 
                                                     
141
 Australian Federal elections are held every at least every three years; the House serves a maximum of three year 
terms and the Senate typically serves a fixed six-year term except in the instance of a ‘double dissolution.’  
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“At the Lane Cove Town Hall, on Sydney’s North Shore, the heart of middle class 
suburbia, Whitlam promised a child care program, the key features of which were free 
pre-school education, subsidised child care with parents contributing according to their 
means, and the encouragement of the creation of child care centres and holiday programs 
by industry” (Brennan 1998, 89).  
 
Whitlam later stated that he had “no doubt that this commitment had much to do with our return 
to power” (Brennan 1998, 89). Though it was not until 1983 that, under the leadership of Bob 
Hawke, the ALP placed childcare within the key element of its election strategy: in the run up to 
the campaign the ALP signed a Prices and Incomes Accord with the ACTU which formalised an 
agreement for wage restraint in return for an increase in the “social wage” – childcare being 
denoted as key component of said wage – and the Accord being a central component of the 
ALP’s campaign (Brennan 1994, 165-66). During the 1984 election campaign the party 
prioritised the issue of childcare access and specific funding commitments. According to 
Deborah Brennan, childcare was “in expenditure terms, the biggest promise made by the 
government during the campaign” (Brennan 1998, 176). The Liberal-National Coalition engaged 
the issue but promised less: whilst the ALP offered to create an additional 20,000 new subsidised 
places available to children from families of all incomes, at a total cost of AU $100 million, the 
Liberal-National coalition campaigned on limited childcare tax rebates and floated the idea of 
providing fee assistance to families who registered their children in commercial childcare centres 
(Brennan 1998, 176-77). The ALP won in 1983 and were returned to power in 1984, and they 
did indeed follow through with their campaign promises: in addition to extending fee relief for 
families earning up to $30,000 (it had been $20,000 under the Coalition Government), the 
number of universally available Commonwealth-funded childcare places increased by over 60% 
in their first two years of rule (Brennan 1994, 174, 203).  
 
Once in office, Hawke’s emphasis on consensual policy-making within the Labor Party, dubbed 
“quasi-corporatism,” meant that pressures for reduced expenditure on childcare which stemmed 
from neoliberal elements of the Party (i.e. the Treasury and Finance Minister) were moderated 
by a system in which, for the most part, economic policy was the remit of the right and centre-
left factions, whilst social and welfare policy was handled by the leftist faction (Bray and 
Neilson 1996; Castles and Shirley 1996; Brennan 1998).
142
 Since the 1983 and 1984 elections, 
federal support for childcare has not only remained a feasible but also a popular and hotly 
                                                     
142
 Furthermore Treasury demands to cut childcare expenditure were often rebuffed by Ministers at the highest level, 
who argued that cuts to childcare expenditure would lose middle class and women’s votes, which would be a 
particularly stinging loss seeing as the ALP had only just closed the gender vote gap (which traditionally favoured 
the Liberals) in 1983 (Brennan 1998; Curtin 1997; Curtin and Sawer 1996).    
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contested political issue in Australian national politics. The necessity of maintaining federal 
support for childcare remains fairly uncontroversial in mainstream Australian politics, rather the 
debate continues about the level of and most appropriate mechanisms (supply-side versus 
demand-led) by which the government should deliver said assistance (Brennan 2007). During the 
early 1990s Labour Treasury ministers were successful in shifting funding mechanisms from a 
supply-side towards a decidedly demand-led approach. This resulted in rising parental costs as 
well as rising public expenditure (as will be discussed in Chapter Seven). However, childcare’s 
political popularity remained strong
143
.   
 
4.3 The ALP and childcare in context: balancing coalitions and interests 
 
a.  The ALP’s new electoral coalition: childcare in the electoral context 
 
i) Shifts in patterns of gender and education-based party identification 
The decline of manual labour as a result of deindustrialisation would, as class dealignment 
theory goes, suggest the Labor Party’s traditional male, working-class support would begin to 
decrease from the mid 1960s. This would require the party to shore up their electoral support by 
attracting a new group to their electoral coalition. Women, who had traditionally favoured the 
Liberal party regardless of class or income level, are said to have been Labor’s target: the ALP 
needed to reduce the traditional gender vote gap and, in particular, gain support in the growing 
outer-suburbs which were increasingly dominated by professional middle-income families (i.e. 
new middle class) (Sawer 1990). These trends are both displayed in Figures 1.16-1.17, which 
indicate a slow but steady decrease in class voting from the period 1945-1960 to 1981-1990 and 
a steady reversal of the traditional gender vote gap from 1967 to 1987. According to McAllister, 
another area of dislocation was strength of party identification: the percentage of “very strong” 
party identifiers dropped 13 percentage points, to twenty per cent, between 1967 and 1987 
(McAllister 2002, 387-388). 
 
This study’s analysis is based on Australia’s key political behaviour studies: the Australian 
National Political Attitudes Surveys of 1967, 1969, and 1979, as well as their successor, the 
Australian Election Study of 1987
144
. As with the Chapter Three, it examines trends in party 
identification according to gender and education level.
145
 Here, higher-educated males tend to 
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 See for example Woodley 2013.  
144
 The 1967 edition of the Australian National Political Attitudes (ANAP) survey was the first major voting 
behavior study in Australia; it was thereafter completed according to a somewhat erratic schedule: 1969, then 1979, 
with no surveys in between those ten years. The ANAP was discontinued and its replacement, the Australian 
Election Study, which is largely similar in many of its questions surrounding political orientation and demographic 
information, was first completed in 1987. 
145
 Educational categories are collapsed from four into two: post-secondary (technical or university education) and 
secondary (primary and secondary). This is done in order to avoid making judgments from categories with low 
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reflect Inglehart (1977) and Inglehart and Rabier’s (1986) theory on rising post-materialism: 
between 1969 and 1987 the proportion of highly educated men who identified as Labor began to 
outstrip those who identified as Liberals, yielding an increase of nine percentage points between 
1969 and 1987. There was little scope for reversal amongst lesser-educated men, who although 
they became slightly more likely to identify as independent, remained consistently more Labor 
then Liberal in terms of partisan identification between 1967 and 1987. This suggests that 
although total class voting may have been on the decline, at least among men, that process was 
not driven purely by blue-collar dealignment from the left.   
 
 
Figure 4.3 Australian party identification: male, tech – university 1967-1987 (Source ANAP 1967, 1969, 1979; AES 1987) 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Australian party identification: male, primary – secondary 1967-1987 (Source ANAP 1967, 1969, 1979; AES 
1987) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
bases – in particular this is relevant to university educated females, whose numbers were as low as 21 during the 
1960s. As such, the categories have been combined.  
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How did female respondents compare? From 1967, the proportion of higher-educated females 
who identified as Liberal and Labor reversed themselves: by 1987 higher-educated women 
identified as Labor 16 percentage points more than they did Liberal. Correlated with this trend is 
a smaller increase in independent/other identification between during the 1970s, although this 
steadies off as Labor’s popularity continued to rise during the 1980s.  
 
Figure 4.5 Australian party identification: female, tech-university (Source ANAP 1967, 1969, 1979; AES 1987) 
 
During the 1970s the Liberal-Labor party identification gap amongst lesser-educated women 
also narrowed to Labor’s advantage. However, Labor’s upward trajectory with this group 
appeared to stall from 1979 as, unlike their higher-educated counterparts, lesser-educated women 
identified in equal proportions Labor and Liberal during the 1980s. In fact, their identification 
with both groups dropped approximately three percentage points (42% to 39%) between 1979 
and 1987, whilst their independent identification increased by seven percentage points.  
 
Figure 4.6 Australian party identification: female, primary-secondary (Source ANAP 1967, 1969, 1979; AES 1987) 
 
Analysing the different groups’ identification with Labor overtime yields an interesting picture: 
women, as a whole, increased the proportion in which they identified with the Labor Party. 
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Figure 4.7 below, which displays the total change in party identification for all groups between 
1967 and 1987, could be accused of portraying a particular snapshot in time, wherein the 
mirrored effect of Liberal losses in all groups versus Labor gains in all groups indicates not a 
realignment on the part of the ‘post-materialists’ but instead the results of a popular political 
party that came to power in 1983 following almost ten years of Coalition rule. 
 
Figure 4.7 Change in party identification, Australia, 1967-1987 (Source ANAP 1967, 1969, 1979; AES 1987) 
Yet the gender vote gap as displayed in Figure 1.18 coupled with the high rates of electoral 
volatility on the part of both lesser and higher-educated women (as seen in Figure 4.8, below) 
suggests that from an ALP perspective, it would have been clear, at least from the late 1970s that 
the decline in Liberal identification on the part of women, and to a lesser extent, higher-educated 
men offered an opportunity to attract new types of voters, such as the new middle classes and in 
particular, new middle class women.  
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Figure 4.8 Pedersen index of electoral coalitional volatility, Australia, 1967-1987 (Source ANAP 1967, 1969, 1979; AES 
1987) 
 
ii) Shifts in Party Membership 
Disruptions in the party’s electoral base were paralleled by disruptions in their membership base: 
although ALP membership figures from this period are quite unreliable, due to the fact that all 
membership data was collected at the state level, Ian Ward notes National Secretary Bob 
McMullan’s claim that ‘everywhere’ in the 1980s has experienced an annual membership 
turnover of ‘about 20 to 30 per cent,’” leading Ward to claim that “Membership of the ALP now 
is extraordinarily fluid. Despite optimal political circumstances, the ALP has had difficulty 
attracting and retaining members” (Ward 1989, p.166).   
Ward explains this by suggesting that the fluidity or indeed turnover of members, at least in the 
Victorian branch of the ALP, is a result not simply due to declining membership but a sharp 
change in the type of members joining:  
“[B]y the early 1980s the party rank-and-file no longer chiefly comprised blue-collar, 
working class members drawn from Labor’s traditional constituency. Instead it had 
recruited a significant bloc of middle class members. By this I do not mean to suggest 
that Labor has attracted graziers, proprietors, professionals in private practice and others 
of the established (old) middle class who have long been stalwarts of the anti-labor 
parties. Rather it has attracted salaried, tertiary educated professionals, notably teachers, 
administrators and others of what King and Raynor (1981: 43) describe as the new 
established middle class. Their growing numbers have noticeably changed the ALP’s 
social character” (Ward 1989, 167). 
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Whereas Ward shows that “Professional, Technical and Related Workers”146made up just 8.4% 
of the ALP’s Victoria branch membership in 1961, they comprised 38.4% of its membership in 
1981 (Ward 1989, p.167). Indeed, the influx of these Australian ‘middle class’ members 
correlates with national-level strategies to make the party more electorally appealing to the new 
middle classes via an array of policies that catered to the modern middle-income family, despite 
irritation with the party’s newfound direction on the part of the rank-and-file, ‘blue-collar’ 
members (Ward 1989. 172). As the following sections will show, it was the tension between 
these groups that helped prompt the federal intervention in state parties, resulting in top-down 
reform. 
 
 
b.  Developing an electoral and organisational response 
i)  Targeting female voters 
The loosening of traditional class and gender-based party-voter linkages, as outlined both above 
and in Chapter One suggests that by the 1970s the ALP had an opportunity to garner support 
from female and higher-educated male voters, and that they needed to shore up declining 
membership numbers with female members who, in a rather circuitous fashion, would attract 
female votes. Responding to electoral failure, the party in 1978 set up a series of research 
exercises and discussion papers under the title, “Committee of Inquiry.” One of these discussion 
papers specifically addressed gender and ALP membership. It stated at the outset, “The fact that 
only about 25% of the membership of the ALP is made up of women indicates that the Party as a 
forum for meaningful political participation is less attractive to women than to men” (ALP 1978, 
2). The authors suggested that, in addition to broad representative numbers, the party’s female 
employment policies (or lack thereof) tended to discourage women from joining (or perhaps 
even voting for) the party:  
 
“Industrial policies necessary to improve the position of many women in the workforce 
have been ignored or actively opposed by the Party, particularly where they have been 
opposed by largely male controlled unions. Policies on part-time employment, job 
sharing, adult apprenticeship, child care, both at or near the workplace and in residential 
locations, job reclassifications to avoid equal pay provisions, recognition of maternity as 
a service to the nation and many other matters are only now being considered. In some 
significant areas, they are still being resisted” (ALP 1978, 4).  
 
Beyond industrial policies, the paper displayed frustration with the party’s social conservatism:  
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“The Party permits M.P.'s a conscience vote on abortion, an issue generally seen as 
having particular relevance to women. This is interpreted by many women as a refusal by 
the Party to accept political responsibility for an issue which does not directly affect the 
majority of members” (ALP 1978, 4).   
The paper also identified the party’s links with unions as a potential deterrent to female ALP 
candidates: “Women are unable to build up the necessary power connections and thus lack 
sponsorship. This is not unrelated to the overlapping of the power structures of the ALP and the 
ACTU and TLCs [Trades and Labour Councils]. Women are not commonly found in positions 
of influence in those 10% (approximately) of unions which are affiliated to the ALP” (ALP 
1978, 4).  In fact the paper also went on to propose several different affirmative action measures 
for amending the party’s gender imbalance, such as requiring each state-level party branch to 
send at least one female delegate to the National Conference, or instituting women-only 
shortlists in particular safe seats, and quotas on women’s representation on the Branch-level and 
National-level executive boards (ALP 1978, 7). These proposals would not be approved at the 
National Conference in 1978.  
However, electoral success required more than female party members’ increased representation; 
the party also needed an electoral strategy for reducing the vote gap. Marian Sawer points out 
that in the 1980 federal election, “the ALP became the first Australian political party to use the 
family theme extensively in a campaign” (Sawer 1990a, 49). Labour’s approach to the ‘family’ 
or indeed towards ‘women’ as an electoral issue appeared to have developed in fits and starts. 
Whilst Whitlam in the mid 1970s discussed and indeed developed childcare policy, albeit with 
limited attention and a funding mechanism that ultimately benefited part-time pre-school 
provision rather than full day care, Sawer notes that although “[e]arlier qualitative research had 
already shown that the family would be a popular campaign theme…Whitlam had refused to 
stoop to this in the 1977 federal election” (Sawer 1990a, 49). Yet according to Sawer the 
“increased targeting of the marginal outer suburban electorates which were the key to victory in 
four states and nationally” seems to have “partly influenced” “the stress on the family in ALP 
campaigns in the 1980s.” As Sawer states, “It is these outer suburban electorates which have the 
highest level of 'familialism' in Australia — meaning the degree to which people live in 
conventional husband/wife/dependent children households. And indeed, in the 1980 federal 
election, the ALP became the first Australian political party to employ the family theme 
extensively in a campaign.” Sawer quotes from a leading Australian National Opinion Poll 
(ANOP) pollster’s account of a dinner with then-Labor leader Bill Hayden, which without 
specifically citing childcare as an electoral issue, indicates a broader inclination to test the 
electoral benefits of campaigning on issues of interest to women and families: 
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“We had dinner one night and he said: 'Look, I've been wrestling with an idea. I want to 
turn the family into Labor Party territory. It really does belong to the Labor Party and 
we've been seen to be distant from it Go out and develop me a marketing program around 
that’” (Sawer 1990a, 49). 
Susan Ryan, the ALP’s first female Senator, spearheaded a great deal of the polling behind the 
ALP’s campaign for women voters and on work/family policies, urging her colleagues that a 
targeted effort would finally bring them back to power. According to Rebecca Huntley: 
 
“In order to persuade Party leaders that women voters were worth targeting, Labor 
feminists like Susan Ryan had to show that women could be convinced to vote Labor and 
that this in turn would give the Party a significant electoral advantage over its opponents. 
Ryan and many other Labor feminists have argued that generating numbers was the 
crucial first step towards breaking down some of the myths about women voters 
described above. New kinds of statistics, polling data and market research, interpreted by 
Labor feminists, would make women voters visible to the Party leadership, to the public 
and to the media. Numbers of this kind were, as Ryan puts it, ‘better than gold.’ With this 
‘new powerful tool,’ Ryan asserts that she ‘convinced the male leadership that with the 
right policies the gender gap could be closed’” (Huntley 2003, 151).  
 
At the first ever Labor Women’s Conference in 1981, Ryan pointed out, first that “[i]f the same 
percentage of women as men voted ALP at the 1977 election, the ALP would be in Government 
today”147 and second, that the gender vote gap between men and women voting Labour was 
“closing”: whilst in 1974 federal election the gap was eight per cent, in 1975 it was seven per 
cent, it was six per cent in the 1977 federal election and finally, 4.5% in 1980” (Ryan 1981, 5). 
She also made a clear electoral case for fielding women members and candidates: “Insofar as we 
have available detailed surveys on voters' attitudes to women candidates, the results are positive 
and suggest that other things being equal, as far as the gender of a candidate is relevant, women 
gain votes overall” (Ryan 1981, 4). 
This type of research suited Ryan’s aims (to persuade Labor to campaign for women’s votes by 
running work/family policies) and, at the 1982 National Conference, it seemed to pay off: for the 
first time the party included a section on women in their platform whilst Ryan was appointed to 
the party’s National Campaign Committee, from which she led a gender gap research project that 
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was quantitative (i.e. polling on women’s political behaviour) and  qualitative – small group 
discussions that better analysed political opinions, preferred policies, etc. (Huntley 2003, 153-
54).  And indeed Huntley notes that “The Labor Party’s attempt to close the gender gap in the 
1983 election was seen to be a success, with exit polls showing that ‘women and men at last 
voted Labor in similar proportions.’ Labor women were eager to claim that it was ‘partly through 
[their] efforts’ that the gender gap was closed”148 (Huntley 2003, 172). 
 
 
ii) Reforming internal party organisation 
Whilst the above paints the picture of a leadership dominated party attempting to modernise its 
public image and reformulate its electoral strategies, leaders such as Whitlam, Hayden and 
Hawke would have been unable to execute any of the aforementioned strategies only a decade 
earlier, before the party had begun its arduous process of modernisation and internal 
reorganisation. Upon becoming the ALP’s federal leader in 1967, Gough Whitlam found himself 
trying to steer a hugely decentralised, organisationally conservative and electorally disastrous 
party, which had not won an election since 1946. His chances of reforming the party were grim, 
considering that as federal party leader he was not even allowed to attend its national conference. 
That was because neither Whitlam, nor any of his fellow parliamentarians were delegates: from 
its inception in 1891, the ALP had been a fully federal political party, where state-level branches 
had their own rules for candidate selection, such as electing delegations to the national 
conference and choosing which trade unions to affiliate with
149
 (Jupp 1982, 105). The national 
conference was until Whitlam’s leadership, composed of 36 indirectly selected delegates from 
the states and territories (six from each), wherein each state was allowed to formulate their 
delegation’s ratio of union to party members, and in which unions had tremendous power – on 
average over 75% of total votes cast (McAllister 2002, 390). The federal leader was excluded 
from the conference whilst federal parliamentarians were rarely selected by their state 
delegations to attend – should they have wanted to attend they would have had to compete 
against both local union affiliates and rank-and-file members. This was entirely in keeping with 
party’s historical assertion that the parliamentary party was controlled by and responsible to the 
extra parliamentary party (Jupp 1982).  
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In 1963 Whitlam, at the time deputy leader, was photographed standing with then-ALP leader 
Arthur Calwell outside the Canberra hotel where the federal ALP conference was being held, the 
two leaders waiting for the delegates to emerge and instruct them on what political issues they 
would have to run their upcoming election campaign on. When a conservative journalist 
published the photo, noting that Labor was run by 36 “faceless men,” then-Liberal Prime 
Minister Robert Menzies leapt at the issue, sending out pamphlets with the photo and 
highlighting the fact that these faceless men “not elected to parliament nor responsible to the 
people were laying down policy and giving orders on critical conditions of defence and foreign 
relations which could affect every man and woman in this country” (McAllister 2002, 390; Jupp 
105). Labor lost the election to the Liberals, losing ten seats against the ten gained by the 
Liberal-Country Coalition (Coghlan and Denton 2012, 22).    
 
1966 saw the first ALP inquiry on organisational reform, written by former UK Labour advisor 
and ALP National Secretary, Cyril Wyndham in response to the party’s repeated election 
defeats.
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  Coghlan and Dalton state that the Wyndham inquiry was “about changing two 
specific perceptions about the ALP. The first was that Labor was too much of a trade union party 
and, because of that, failed to appeal to a broader constituency. The second was that the Labor 
Party was too slow adapting to a rapidly changing society.”   Wyndham, who was with Whitlam 
on the day of the infamous ‘faceless men’ photo, made 29 recommendations. A large theme was 
‘centralisation’: as Coghlan and Denton (2012) note, “Wyndham was the most senior Labor 
Party figure to call for genuine direct representation of Party members and the consolidation of a 
federal structure capable of unifying the dysfunctional state branches.” His recommendations 
“aimed to completely re-organise the Labor Party from top to bottom ensuring direct 
representation of party members at state and federal conferences.” For example, there was no 
centralised federal campaign mechanism – states took on federal campaigns as they saw fit; 
Wyndham wanted to overhaul federal control over elections, mandate media training for all 
candidates and encourage female candidates to run (Coghlan and Denton 2012, 21-22). 
 
On a more institutional level, Wyndham recommended that the federal leader and shadow 
cabinet attend the federal Labour conference and that state delegations to the conference include 
federal parliamentarians. Wyndham also cited the “importance of the women’s vote as a decisive 
factor” and called for delegate rights for the President and Secretary of the Federal Labor 
Women’s' Organising Committee. He additionally called for the federal executive to intervene in 
any state disputes (Coghlan and Denton 2012, 21). Whilst Coghlan and Denton assert that little 
actual change was ever made as a result of the recommendations they do note that Whitlam in 
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his 1967 campaign for the federal party leadership “used the issue of wholesale Party reform to 
challenge Arthur Calwell for the leadership” (Coghlan and Denton 2012, 21). Embarrassed by 
the ‘faceless men’ photograph, Whitlam understood the importance of a representative decision 
making body and upon taking national leadership of the party in 1967, insisted that in addition to 
the leader, at least two federal Senators and Representatives, along with each states’ 
parliamentary leader would be included as full voting delegates, which according to Jupp, made 
elected officials “a minimum of ten out of forty-nine entitled to attend” the conference (Jupp 
1982, 105).  
 
However, Whitlam was well aware that the all-powerful state executives in Victoria and 
Queensland would easily halt any substantive reorganisation of the party’s federal structure. 
Moreover, much of the party’s electoral failure stemmed not just from perceptions about the 
party conference’s legitimacy but also from the type of candidates being selected at the state and 
municipal branch levels: since the federal party could make no ruling on state or municipal 
selection procedures, these varied across the country. For example, in Victoria and Queensland, 
the union-dominated state executive selected candidates for local branch constituencies (i.e. 
municipalities) and quite often chose candidates who were widely opposed by/unrepresentative 
of their respective local branch, which often was increasingly composed of white-collar 
professionals. Thus Jupp states that in the case of Victoria, “the impact of migrant and 
professional movement into the inner suburbs was largely cancelled out by the preference shown 
by the [state’s] central executive, which was union-dominated for Australian-born, working-class 
candidates” (Jupp 1982, 98). 
 
Whitlam used the Wyndham review to justify interventions into state party executives, such as in 
Victoria and Queensland. Jupp notes that in both states “the party machine was dominated by 
trade union officials, with politicians reduced to secondary roles and local branches becoming 
increasingly frustrated and powerless” and that “[i]n both cases the organised opposition from 
within the state came from groups of professional middle class members who had little in 
common with the state officials either socially, intellectually or ideologically” (Jupp 1982, 94). 
Following a series of exogenous shocks that began to weaken the Victorian ALP leadership 
(1964 split in the Communist Party, election losses in 1966, split of the Melbourne Trades 
Council, which left many unionists in opposition to their counterparts on the Victorian Labor 
Party’s central executive) the organisation was in such a state disarray that by 1970 the federal 
leaders had won support from a sufficient number of ‘blocs’ within the Victorian ALP to justify 
intervention. They based their intervention on the grounds that, in Jupp’s words, “the branch 
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executive was chosen by an organised faction, the Trade Unionists Defence Committee” (Jupp 
1982, 96-97).  
 
And indeed at the 1970 federal conference the South Australia branch broke the deadlock 
amongst the Federal Executive and “moved against” the Victorian branch, which was duly 
suspended. Its executive was overthrown and it was rebuilt according to a new internal structure: 
ideologically based factions (e.g. Socialist Left, Centre Unity) were formalised, greater local 
branch participation was required, trade union dominance of conference delegations was 
lessened (delegates had to be 60% from the unions, 40% from local branches) and finally, its 
“newly elected officers were drawn largely from the Centre Unity faction.”151 A similar 60:40 
union/branches policy was adopted in New South Wales that same year (Jupp 1982, 96-97).  
Jupp states of post-reform Victoria: “The results were gratifying, including the winning of 
several suburban electorates for the ALP in 1972, an increase in branch membership and the first 
glimmerings of hope, so far unrealised, that Labor could win a state election” (Jupp 1982, 97). 
That said, they were not without controversy: a motion to expel Whitlam was brought to the 
federal conference, which Whitlam barely survived (a margin of 7-5) (Coghlan and Denton 
2012, 21). 
 
Subsequent federal interventions followed in the similarly problematic Queensland branch in 
1980; there too the 60:40 conference delegation rules were imposed. Whilst the New South 
Wales state executive was more moderate and electorally successful than the aforementioned 
state executives it was troubled by several Sydney branches, where allegations of corruption and 
violent resistance towards accepting increasingly professional/middle class party members came 
to a head in 1980 (Jupp 1982, 1977-1999). Jupp explains: 
 
“Following an organised beating by local party members on an ALP reformer, Peter 
Baldwin, who had sought to expose organised criminal behaviour, branch-stacking
152
 and 
refusal to accept new members in the select Sydney branches in July 1980, the NSW state 
branch intervened and the last major bastion of local working-class control was thus 
finally attacked because it had become corrupt and dysfunctional for the overall electoral 
image of the party. As in Melbourne, essentially working-class branches remained in 
newer western industrial suburbs. The old city machines no longer had much utility when 
most of their electorate were migrants, pensioners or professionals, whose notions of 
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what the ALP should be like were quite different from those which had shaped the party 
in the big cities for several generations” (Jupp 1982, 99). 
 
The overall impact of the three interventions was to change Labor’s image. Jupp states that the 
ALP “came to lose its unique character as a union-dominated and predominantly working-class 
party whose politicians mirrored the social composition of their electorate,” adding that “the 
professional and well-educated component of the party became more important in all states, 
regardless of the ideological context of state ALP politics” (Jupp 1982, 100).  
 
Still, the party’s Committee of Inquiry,153 which in 1978 released a report on “The Unions and 
the ALP” found two key electoral problems – both of which stemmed from the party’s trade 
union link: affiliated trade union members, let alone the non-affiliated, were not significantly 
more likely to vote for the ALP: only 50% of those affiliated did, as compare to Sweden where 
65% voted for the Social Democratic Party (ALP 1978, 8). Second, the voting public – including 
ALP members – felt that the unions had too much power: the Committee’s 1978 report found 
that in 1976, 69% of “all people,” 57% of union members and 48% of ALP voters felt that 
Australian trade unions had “too much power” (ALP 1978a, 6).   
 
Whilst on the one hand, the party sought to reduce the unions’ power by, in 1980, limiting the 
total amount of union votes cast at the national conference to 75% (later revised down to 60%), 
on the other hand, the Inquiry report stated that perceptions of trade union power were lower in 
South Australia, “where the Labor Premier and Government has for a long time enjoyed a very 
close working relationship with the unions in terms of consultation, participation of union 
members, and decision-asking.” This seemingly positive finding led them to state: “Although 
political style is an important factor, the poll referred to in fact indicates the need for more, 
rather than less, consultation with the trade union movement” [emphasis added]. According to 
the 1978 report, part of the problem lay with the highly decentralised nature of trade union 
affiliation in the ALP, where unlike UK Labour, unions only affiliated at the state, and not the 
national level (ALP 1978a, 8-10).   
As a result, the party called for increased consultation and a clearer channel of communications 
with the unions on the national level. The party leader, Bill Hayden’s154 1980 report on the ALP-
Union relationship called for “a National Conference involving representatives of Unions, 
Government and Employers to discuss in an open and honest way the economic and social 
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the ALP to victory in the 1983 federal election campaign. 
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problems of our society” whilst perhaps more importantly, during the 1979 conference the ALP 
promised that when elected they would implement an accord surrounding prices, wages, taxation 
and wealth distribution “supporting the maintenance of real wages by quarterly adjustment and 
the passing on of the of increases in productivity" (ALP 1978a, 2-3). 
In contrast to the similarly arduous modernisation process of UK Labour, where female activists 
in both the unions and the parties had, from the beginning of the process, been able to wedge 
themselves between the unions and party leadership so as to achieve gendered quotas on a 
variety of party bodies and in candidate selection processes, the ALP’s internal reform process 
did not from the early stages have an impact on, let alone consider the issues of gender or ethnic 
minority representation: indeed Jupp notes that whilst by 1980 the leaders in the party “were less 
likely to have a trade union background, more likely to have been university educated, less likely 
to have been manual workers and more likely to be professionals,” still the party “was white, 
Anglo-Irish and male, as it had been since its foundation nearly a century before” (Jupp 1982, 
113).The 1981 federal conference finally passed a motion requiring that women constitute at 
least 25%of all state delegations to future national conferences, that “all national policy 
committees should include at least one woman to be responsible for ensuring that ALP policy 
includes women's interest” (ALP 1981, 28).  
Interestingly, it was not until the 1994 conference that the ALP – at the federal level – instituted 
affirmative action rules that bore a resemblance to the gender quota motions which had passed 
Britain’s Labour Party conference almost a decade before – despite the fact that the ALP’s 
‘modernisation’ efforts pre-dated those of UK Labour by a decade. Whilst Broad and Kirner 
concede that the first of the gendered measures passed by the ALP national conference in 1994 
had in fact been adopted by most ALP state executives over nearly ten years prior (at least one-
third of all non-public official party positions which are up for election should be filled by 
women) the second two – that women should comprise a minimum one-third of trade union 
delegations to the state and national ALP conferences, provided women comprise at least one-
third of said trade union’s membership, and that by 2002 pre-selections for public office at the 
state and federal levels should be produce a minimum of 35% women – were largely novel to the 
party at both the state and federal levels (Broad and Kirner 1996, 80-81).   
The effect of the party’s organisational reform process, begun by Whitlam and instituted across a 
variety of arenas – such as the state level branches, trade union linkages and gender 
representation – was largely to centralise power in the hands of the federal leader and the 
parliamentary party. Whilst interventions into the Victoria and Queensland state branches are 
prime examples of this, as were gender quotas on states’ conference delegations, the party’s call 
for increased national-level consultation with the trade unions is not so much an indication that 
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the national party leaders were willing to submit themselves to greater union domination but that 
they intended to reduce the power that the states branches had with respect to union consultation 
and negotiations and come to more inclusive, national-level agreements such as the 1983 Accord 
without state-level intervention. In other words, their federal-level association with unions was 
yet another example of party centralising reform at the states’ expense. In stark contrast to 1963, 
when the parliamentary leaders waited outside of the conference whilst unelected insiders 
decided the party’s campaign platform, Manning notes that throughout the 1980s and 90s, “even 
Labor’s National Office has itself lost power to Hawke and Keating’s ‘Presidential’ style 
campaigning.” Indeed, in 1988, former ALP Prime Minister Paul Keating discussed the 
rebalancing of party power:  
 
“Whitlam wanted a bigger conference. There are now 99 delegates. He wanted Labor’s 
Parliamentary Leaders to be ex-officio delegates to it and to the national executive. That 
happened in 1967. He wanted the conference open to the news media and he wanted 
Labor to abandon the ‘archaic’ federal basis on which the conference was constituted. 
Those things have happened too. Just about every structural change Whitlam advocated 
is in place. The machine is under the thumb of the parliamentary party” (Oakes 2010, p. 
58-59). 
 
c. Unions, childcare and the ALP elite 
Whereas this research’s focus on interests is primarily centred upon that of trade unions, given 
that they were the ALP’s leading party-linked interest group, it is worth considering here the 
impact of other organised interests that one would expect to be linked to the childcare issue. 
Childcare interest organisations were from the aftermath of World War II somewhat fragmented: 
as previously noted, the Australian Pre-school Association (APA), was one of the most 
longstanding advocacy groups, with its roots in the Suffragette-formed Kindergarten Union. 
However, as late as the 1960s, it deemed childcare, in Brennan’s words, “a necessary evil” for 
the increased number of women who needed to enter the workforce (Brennan 1994, 60). Whilst 
the APA’s influence may have helped assuage conservatives’ concerns with the childcare issue, 
their influence on the childcare sector during the early to mid 1970s was somewhat detrimental 
in the sense that they had the experience necessary to win grants from the Commonwealth Child 
Care Act
155
 in order to provide pre-school services, outbidding the nascent and politically 
inexperienced non-profit, full-day childcare start-ups (Brennan 1994, 115-116).  
 
                                                     
155
 As it operated until 1976 on a submission based model. 
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The feminist influence was similarly mixed: the middle class oriented Women’s Electoral Lobby 
formed in Victoria during the early 1970s as a means of pressuring legislators into addressing 
issues of concern to women and women’s families but their middle class orientation (and indeed 
many of their Liberal Party sympathies) kept them at a distance from the Whitlam Government’s 
social policy debates during the early-mid 1970s (Brennan 1994, 74-76). Whereas, according to 
Brennan, several feminist organisations had demanded free, 24 hour childcare, the organised 
demand for such policies was weak and specificities of them largely unarticulated. By contrast, 
stronger pressure for a response to childcare issues of the 1970s emanated from feminists in the 
Labor Party bureaucracy (Brennan 1994, 79-83) as well as those within the white-collar unions 
such as the Australian Council of Salaried and Professional Associations and finally, those who 
throughout the 1970s battled (and eventually succeeded) in convincing the Australian Council of 
Trade Unions (ACTU) to drop their family wage ideal and become more proactive on childcare 
issues (Brennan 1994, 143).     
 
The cooperative link between women and the trade unions as displayed in the 1983 Accord 
represented a break in what had been an uneasy, or at least inconsistent, association. On the one 
hand, during the mid 1970s individual unions and union federations had made claims for 
childcare assistance on behalf of the workers, for example the Victoria Builders Association and 
the Clothing Trades, Food Preservers, Metal Workers and Vehicle Builders, in addition to a 
white-collar peak association, the Australian Council of Salaried and Professional Organisations 
(Brennan 1998, 142-143). On the other hand, the union movement at large maintained policies 
aimed at discouraging women from the workforce: it was not until 1977 that the ACTU 
abolished support for a ‘family wage,’ which in Deborah Brennan’s words, “sought to 
discourage the necessity for families to have two incomes.” Brennan explains: “In keeping with 
this, the ACTU’s child care policy called for services to support the needs of ‘women who under 
present economic circumstances have to work’” (Brennan 1998, 141), rather than promoting the 
concept of universal childcare so that women could work.  
 
A group of female trade union activists, the Women’s Action Committee, picketed the ACTU’s 
General Conference in 1970, “demanding support for equal pay, child care, abortion, 
contraception and maternity leave”; at the Alternative Trade Union’s Congress in 1973 they 
requested ACTU to draw up a charter for women. The reply seemed somewhat antagonistic: 
Brennan notes: “The ACTU responded with a document which omitted a number of the 
women’s claims and demanded an allowance for mothers to stay at home!” (Brennan 1998, 142). 
When sensing the need to modernise in 1973, a subcommittee at the ALP national conference 
“recommended that other elements within the party, such as women’s and youth groups…have 
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greater representation.” However, the unions soundly defeated the proposal (McAllister 2002, 
390). In fact, it was not until 1977 when the ACTU finally dropped the family wage and set up a 
‘Working Women’s Charter’ that included calls for “acceptable child care facilities and for 
support by government and local government bodies” stating that “trade unions should 
participate in the establishment of such centres which should be at low cost to the parent” 
(Brennan 1998, 143). Seven years later ACTU and the ALP agreed on the Accord (Brennan 
1994, 165-166). 
  
The ACTU, itself allied to state-level branches of the ALP, had until the 1970s been largely 
dominated by blue-collar unions. However, in a move towards centralisation and cross-class 
coalition building, the white-collar, private-sector employee dominated Australian Council of 
Salaried and Professional Associations (ACSPA) dissolved itself in 1979 and most of affiliates 
joined the ACTU. Two years later the leading public sector union, Council of Australian 
Government Employee Associations (CAGEO) followed suit and in 1985 a more decentralised 
state-based federation of white collar public sector employees, the Australian Public Service 
Federation (APSF) also joined ACTU. Interestingly, the ACTU President who coordinated the 
first two mergers was the same ALP Prime Minister who in just a few years would negotiate the 
ACTU-Labor Accord and run a campaign focusing on issues of interest to middle income 
families, such as childcare: Bob Hawke (Griffin 2009, 15). White-collar union federations such 
as the ACSPA were indeed interested and perhaps were stronger advocates of progressive and 
progressive work-family policies than ACTU had traditionally been. For example, in 1975 the 
ACSPA helped set up a ‘Working Women’s Centre,’ a policy and information resource for 
issues related to female employment. From 1977 it solicited federal government funds to set up 
union-sponsored childcare centres (Brennan 1994, 142, 147) and from 1978 took on the issue of 
12 months maternity and paternity leave, antidiscrimination efforts for gay unionists and related 
progressive issues (Marlow1978, 1).  
 
4.4 Driving ALP position change: union pressure or electoral imperative 
The following section analyses both parliamentary debate on childcare and legislator 
characteristics in order to determine the extent to which the ALP’s adoption of childcare as a 
legislative issue was mechanised by conversion and spurred by trade union pressure versus the 
extent to which it was mechanised by replacement and driven by electoral imperative. The 
former would reflect Karol’s (2009) model of coalition group maintenance: where Labor MPs 
embraced the issue of childcare in order to appease their longstanding party-linked interest 
group, trade unions. The latter would reflect Karol’s coalition group incorporation, wherein 
autonomous party elites responded to changing electoral conditions by making strategic appeals 
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to a new set of voters. First, it will provide a series of descriptive statistics illustrating the the rate 
of turnover amongst and the sociodemographic background of ALP MPs between the 28
th
 and 
34
th
 Parliaments. Next, Rapoport and Stone’s 1994 model for disaggregating political change 
will be applied; this will indicate the extent to which the party’s position change on childcare 
was mechanised by legislator replacement, conversion or mobilisation. Another set of 
descriptive statistics will identify associations between our key independent variables (education, 
gender and unionism) and debating childcare, specifically pointing out for example, whether 
men or women debated childcare in greater proportion and whether these differences are 
statistically significant. Then OLS regressions are run: these will test for an association between 
the number of times a legislator debated childcare and their having characteristics associated 
with either a union or post-materialist orientation. The last section will analyse the demographic 
change underlying legislator replacement, noting whether the new crop of legislators emerging 
ahead of the ALP’s childcare policy adoption were in fact more post-materialist than their 
predecessors.  
 
a.  Mechanising and driving policy adoption: conversion or replacement 
In order to contextualise the analysis of legislator conversion versus replacement, Table 4.1, 
below, provides descriptive statistics that illustrate the scale of change amongst ALP MPs 
between T1, the 28
th
 Parliament (1972-1974), and T2, the 34
th 
(1984-1987). Specifically, it looks 
at the composition of ALP MPs in each parliament: their absolute number, the percentage of 
whom were female, university educated and had a unionist background, as well the scale of their 
turnover (measured here as the percentage of MPs who were either in their first or last 
parliament).  
  28th 29th 30th 31st 32nd 33rd 34th 
Total ALP MPs 68 66 37 40 52 77 83 
University educated, % 37 41 35 40 48 57 58 
Female, % 0 2 0 0 6 8 8 
Trade union, % 31 29 41 35 25 16 1% 
Turnover: % first parliament 25 8 5 20 31 38 17 
Turnover: % last parliament 9 37 16 18 13 9 7 
Table 4.1 Composition of ALP MPs, 28th to 34th Parliaments (Source: Commonwealth of Australia Hansard) 
 
The total number of ALP MPs who served in a given parliament ranged between a low of 40 (in 
the 31
st
) and a high of 83 in the 34
th
 (T2). ALP MPs had lower rates of university education than 
their US counterparts, though they did experience a 21 percentage point increase – from 37% to 
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58% between T1 and T2. There were zero women in Parliament at T1 and seven (eight per cent) 
at T2. Mirroring the rise in university educated ALP MPs was a decline in those with a unionist 
background: the figure nearly halved, from 31% in the 28
th
 Parliament to 16% in the 34
th
.  
 
Turnover, as measured by incoming MPs, ranged from as low as five per cent in the 30
th
 to as 
high as 38% in the 33
rd
, after the ALP won their first federal election in a decade.
156
 Turnover 
when measured by the proportion of MPs in their last parliament ranged from a high of 37% in 
the 29
th
 to a low of seven per cent in the 34
th
.
157
 There were 17 ALP ‘stayers’ who remained in 
the House of Representatives between the 28
th
 and 34
th
 Parliaments. These stayers comprised 
25% of ALP MPs in the 28
th
 and 20% in the 34
th
, meaning that by T2 80% of ALP MPs were 
‘new.’ Whereas 18% of stayers debated childcare at T1, 35% of them did so at T2. 
 
The next part of this section’s analysis employs Rapoport and Stone’s (1994) model for 
disaggregating the different components of political change. Here, party position change is 
measured as the proportion of ALP members in the Federal House of Representatives who 
discussed childcare in the 34
th 
Parliament (1984-1987), less the proportion of ALP MPs who did 
so in the 28
th 
Parliament (1972-1974).
158
 The 28
th
 is chosen at the starting point because it 
preceded the broader onset of internal organisational reforms and the 34
th
 is designated T2 
because it was the Parliament that followed Bob Hawke and the ALP’s 1984 electoral victory, 
during which childcare received increased attention as a legislative and a campaign issue.
159
 The 
analysis counts any instance in which a legislator discusses or asks a question related to 
childcare. It does not, however count instances in which a legislator, usually a minister, is 
providing a perfunctory answer to a parliamentary question on childcare (e.g. if they are a 
minister and when asked about a the number of places/level of spending they provide a simple 
answer). Negative statements on childcare are not counted
160
 nor are mentions of childcare in 
                                                     
156 An average of 21% with a standard deviation of 12.  
157 An average of 16% with a standard deviation of 10. 
158
 The figures are derived from an examination of of the Australian Federal Parliament’s Hansard system which 
compiled every instance that an ALP MP discussed childcare in the House of Representatives between  the 28
th
 and 
the 34
th 
Parliaments (1972-74 to 1983-87). References limited to part-time sessional pre-school are excluded as the 
focus is on full-day childcare that fosters female employment. Search terms include “childcare,” “child care,” “child 
day care,” “day care,” “daycare” and “nursery.”  
159
 Ideally, the starting point would have predated even the 1970 federal intervention into the Queensland branch but 
the ALP’s unpopularity during the 1960s and early 1970s meant that there were comparatively few ALP MPs in the 
House of Representatives. As such, if the analysis began before the 28
th 
Parliament there would be very few 
‘stayers’ left in the 34th Parliament. Stayers are crucial to the Rapoport and Stone model as their position change 
indicates whether or not large proportions of the party ‘converted’ to a particular issue. 
160
 This is largely due to the difficulty in assessing why a particular statement is negative: a legislator/party may 
indeed be supportive of state support for childcare costs but, for example, may not agree with a particular 
programme or a particular funding mechanism. For the sake of consistency, only positive mentions of childcare are 
counted.  
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which the context refers specifically to a tightly means-tested or lone parents only programme.
161
 
Whereas 20% of ALP MPs mentioned childcare during the 28
th 
, 62% did so during the 34
th
 – 
yielding a measure of party position change equal to 42%. 
 
As with the US case, Rapoport and Stone’s (1994) formula is used to determine the amounts of 
change attributed to conversion, replacement and mobilisation. The formula is as follows:  
 
T2-T1= (βα)(S2-S1) + β(1-α)(N2-D1) + (1-β)(N2-T1) 
Where: 
T1 and T2 are mean values of the variable under observation at the first and second time periods 
under observation 
S is the average value for ‘stayers,’ i.e. those present at both T1 and T2 
Β is the ratio of the size of the group at T1 relative to the size at T2 
α is the proportion of the group at T1 which is comprised of ‘stayers’ 
D1 is the mean value for ‘dropouts,’ i.e. those who were present at T1 but not T2 
N2 is the mean value for ‘newcomers,’ i.e. those who were present at T2 but not T1 
 
The first part of the equation reflects conversion, the second replacement and the third, 
mobilisation. 
T1 = .197 
T2 = .621 
S1 = .176 
S2 = .353  
Β = .805 
Α = .258 
D1 = .204 
N2 = .692 
 
Total change: Conversion Replacement Mobilisation 
.424 = .037 .291 .097 
42.4% comprised of: 9% 68% 23% 
Table 4.2 Rapoport and Stone, 28th – 34th Australian Parliament (Source: Commonwealth of Australia Hansard 2013) 
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 This also excludes references to programmes exclusively for aboriginal communities or questions that relate to 
the development of a childcare centre in a specific community, as it is less telling of the legislators’ interest in the 
issue as a national public policy concern. 
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The equation yields a largely replacement and mobilisation-heavy effect: whilst nine per cent of 
the 42% increase in ALP MP’s attention to childcare between 1972 and 1987 is attributed to 
conversion, we can see that the dominant force (91%) lies with the entry of new members, via 
both replacement and mobilisation.
162
 As such, the Rapoport and Stone equation suggests the 
mechanism behind policy change was not pressure on legislators that forced individuals to 
change their position on the issue but rather the replacement of older legislators with new ones. 
 
However, Rapoport and Stone focus solely on legislators’ entry status, i.e. whether they were 
stayers, newcomers or dropouts. It tells us little about whether legislators’ backgrounds, as they 
relate to gender, education or unionism, are associated with debating childcare. Table 4.3, below, 
provides some descriptive statistics that show the proportions of MPs under each category that 
debated the issue. T-tests are applied to indicate whether group-based differences in debating 
childcare (e.g. between women and men) are statistically significant.  
 
  28th Parliament 34th Parliament 
University educated, % 40** 63 
Non-university educated, % 7 46 
Women, % -- 85.7+ 
Men, % 19 53 
Non-trade union, % 23 59 
Trade Union, % 10 38 
Minister
163
, % 50 0 
Non-minister, % 17 62 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1  
Table 4.3 Characteristics of ALP MPs who debated (Source: Commonwealth of Australia Hansard 2013) 
During the 28
th
 Parliament, university educated ALP MPs debated the issue in greater proportion 
than their non-university educated respondents, a margin of 40% to seven per cent, the difference 
being statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. It is impossible to compare the 
proportions of women and men who debated, given that there were no female ALP MPs sitting 
in the 28
th
 Parliament. A greater percentage of MPs with a non-union background debated the 
issue than their unionist counterparts (23% to 10%), though this difference is not statistically 
                                                     
162 As previously noted, mobilisation is the increase in total MP numbers above and beyond the proportion of those 
MPs that dropped out, this new group being, on average, more attuned to the issue than their predecessors. 
163 During the 28th, two out of four relevant ministers debated the issue; during the 52nd all apart from one of the 
relevant ministers were located in the Senate. The single minister in the House did not debate childcare. 
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significant. A control variable, relevant ministerial/shadow ministerial posting, is included but it 
has no significant association with debating childcare at either T1 or T2.
 164
  
 
During the 34
th
 Parliament, university educated Labour MPs continued to debate the issue in 
greater proportion than their non-university educated counterparts but the difference was no 
longer statistically significant.  Women, who by the 34
th
 comprised eight per cent of Labour 
MPs, debated the issue in greater proportion than men: 86% of women debated the issue as 
compared to 53% of men, a difference statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. 59% 
of MPs who did not have a union background debated the issue as compared to 38% of those 
with a union background, however the difference is not statistically significant.     
  
In order to test whether a) these ‘replacing’ legislators who debated childcare were associated 
with post-materialism and b) the Rapoport and Stone-based findings hold when we treat debating 
childcare as a continuous, rather than a binary variable,
165
 a series of multiple linear (OLS) 
regressions are run for the number of times individual ALP MPs debated childcare during the 
28
th
 and 34
th 
Parliaments. The aim is not to provide an overarching explanation for all of the 
drivers behind a legislators’ decision to raise the issue of childcare, but rather the regressions are 
employed in order to examine the relative strengths of the variables of interest and note whether 
they shifted throughout the course of electoral change and internal party reform that occurred 
between the late 1960s and early-mid 1980s. (The results for the binary logistic regressions, 
under which the dependent variable is whether or not a legislator debated childcare, appear in 
footnotes 167 and 168.) 
  
The main variables of interest are gender, university education and having worked for a trade 
union
166
 whilst the control variable is relevant ministerial/shadow ministerial position, operating 
under the assumption that MPs with a women’s, childcare, or education-based post would be 
more likely to discuss the issue regardless of demographic/education characteristics. A strong, 
positive partial effect of trade union background could lend some credence to the hypothesis that 
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 For the 28
th 
Parliament relevant ministerial posts are: Shadow Minister for Social Security, Shadow Minister for 
Labour, Shadow Minister for Education and Shadow Minister for Health. For the 34
th 
Parliament relevant posts are: 
Minister for Employment, Education and Training, Minister for Social Security, Minister for Community Services 
and Health, Minister assisting the Prime Minister for the Status of Women, Minister for Employment Services and 
Youth Affairs. However, just one of these positions, Minister for Employment, Education and Training, was 
allocated to an MP during the 34th (the rest were taken up by Senators). For a particular parliament, any MP who 
held one of these ministerial posts is denoted as having a relevant ministerial position, even if they did not hold the 
post throughout the entirety of the parliament. 
165
 For example, 55% of all ALP MPs discussed childcare during the 34
th 
Parliament, though the number of times 
MPs spoke ranges from zero to four. 
166
 There are no interest group ratings akin to that of the ADA or COPE in Australia. As such, having worked for a 
trade union is employed as a proxy for being close to the movement, as one would expect that current and/or 
previous trade union staff would score highly in a union legislative ratings scheme. 
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the unions drove MPs to increasingly discuss the issue whilst the same effect for female and/or 
university educated MPs could suggest that MPs who raised the issue were of a more new 
politics/post-materialist orientation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1  
Table 4.4 OLS regression results 28th Parliament, Australia, (Source: Commonwealth of Australia Hansard) 
 
The model for the 28
th 
Parliament excludes the partial effect of women, given that there were no 
female ALP members in the House of Representatives during that parliament. Controlling for all 
other variables, the association between university education and debating childcare is positive 
and significant at the 95% confidence level: legislators with a university degree on average 
discussed childcare .299 times more than those without. The other independent variable, trade 
union background, has a negative relationship with debating, although not a significant one. 
Finally, the control variable, ministerial post, is significantly and positively associated at the 
99% confidence level: those with a relevant post, on average, discussed childcare .74 more times 
than those without a similar post, controlling for all other variables. This indicates that holding 
all else constant, during the early-mid 1970s, legislators who were either highly educated and/or 
held a post that required them to address the issue adopted childcare policy more so than their 
unionist counterparts (who were negatively but not significantly associated with childcare 
debate).
167
 
                                                     
167 In the binary logistic regression replicating the OLS results shown in Table 4.4 (the 28th Parliament), university 
remains positive and significantly associated with debating childcare at the 95% confidence level, holding all else 
constant. Trade union background remains negative but not significant whereas ministerial post remains positive but 
loses the significance accorded to it in the OLS output: the OLS regression found it to be significant at the 99% 
confidence level however it is not significant in the logistic results, controlling for all other variables. This is likely 
explained by the fact that out of the four ministers, just two debated childcare during the 28
th. The variable’s 
increased significance under the OLS model is likely driven by the fact that these two ministers who debated the 
     Model 1 
University .299* (.124) 
Female  -- 
Trade Union -.099 (.130) 
CC/Women’s Ministerial Post .737** 
(.247) 
Female*University -- 
(Constant) .113 (.086) 
R
2 
N = 68 
  .229 
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     Model 1 Model 2 
University .473
+ 
(.268) .454 (.282) 
Female  1.418** (.478) 1.324* (.643) 
Trade Union .055 (.886) .051 (.382) 
CC/Women’s Ministerial Post -1.192 (1.253) -1.182 (1.262) 
Female*University   -- .212 (.960) 
(Constant) .665** (.221) .676** (.228) 
R
2 
N = 84 
  .131 .132 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1  
Table 4.5 OLS regression results 34th Parliament, Australia (Source: Commonwealth of Australia Hansard) 
 
These underlying fundamentals changed – but were not reversed – by the 34th Parliament: in 
Model 1, the partial effect of having a university education on the number of times a Labor MP 
raised childcare is still positive, though only significant at the 90% confidence level. Controlling 
for all other variables, a university educated MP is associated with raising the issue .473 times 
more than a non-university educated MP. Whilst the partial effect of union background, 
controlling for all other variables, is still insignificant, its coefficient is no longer negative. The 
third variable of interest, being female, is positively and significantly associated with raising the 
issue of childcare during parliamentary debates: controlling for all other variables, being a 
female MP increases the average number of times an MP debated by 1.4, which is significant at 
the 99% confidence level. The control variable, ministerial post, is no longer significantly 
associated with debating childcare and is indeed negatively related; this is unsurprising given 
that during the 34
th 
Parliament all, bar one, of the relevant ministerial postings were held by ALP 
Senators, rather than MPs. And indeed the only ALP MP with a relevant ministerial post did not 
debate the issue. 
 
Model 2 for the 34
th
 Parliament includes the same independent variables as Model 1 but adds an 
interaction variable, female x university, in order to examine whether university educated 
                                                                                                                                                                           
issue each did so twice versus an average of .23 mentions for the all ALP MPs during that Parliament. See Appendix 
D for the full output. 
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women were more likely than women on average to raise the issue of childcare, suggesting a 
degree of class-based interest in the issue. The partial effect, however, is insignificant.
168
  
 
These findings indicate that controlling for all other variables, whilst university educated MPs - 
all of whom were male - were associated with the limited discussion of childcare during the early 
to mid 1970s (in contrast to trade unionists, who were negatively but not significantly associated 
with it), by the mid-to-late 1980s, females – regardless of university education – were positively 
and significantly associated with speaking on childcare, controlling for all other variables. Union 
background, whilst negative and insignificant in the 28
th 
Parliament is positive and insignificant 
in both 34
th
 Parliament models. These combined findings tend to suggest that, of the variables 
we are concerned with, the impetus behind the ALP’s increased discussion of childcare in 
parliament was driven largely by MPs associated with the new politics movement, in particular 
female and university educated MPs. Relative to these groups, unionists appear to have had very 
little association with childcare policy adoption.
169
 This is in keeping with the Rapoport and 
Stone results, which indicated that the increase in ALP MPs’ discussion of the issue was largely 
driven by new entrants to the party as opposed to the conversion of MPs.  
 
b.  Legislator replacement: the ALP’s new brand  
The previous section found that replacement – and not conversion – was the mechanism that 
produced party position change and that MPs who were female and/or higher-educated had a 
stronger association with debating childcare than did those without a university education and/or 
those who had previously worked for a trade union. So whilst there has been a great deal of 
explanatory power attributed to legislator replacement and the implied influence of legislators 
with characteristics suggesting a new politics approach to policy development, to what extent did 
legislator replacement occur, and were the new legislators very different from their 
predecessors? Figure 4.9 shows a near reversal in the proportion of Federal ALP MPs who had a 
university education and those who had previously worked for a trade union: whilst in 1966 45% 
of all ALP MPs had previously worked for a union, that figure was 15% by 1987. In 1966 just 
20% had a university education whereas by 1987, 59% did. The increase in women MPs is less 
                                                     
168 Under the binary logistic regression that replicates Model 1 of the 34th Parliament, university education remains 
positive and significant at the 90%
 
confidence level, holding all other variables constant. Being female remains 
positively associated with debating childcare but while the association was significant at the 99.9% confidence level 
under the OLS regression it is just beyond significance at the 90% confidence here (p = .117). Having previously 
worked for a union remains negatively but not significantly associated with debate. Finally, ministerial post 
becomes negatively associated and features a large standard error. This variable appears problematic as there was 
only one ALP MP with a ministerial post during the 34
th
 Parliament, and this MP did not debate childcare. (Unlike 
during the 28
th, the four other relevant child and women’s ministers were all in the Senate.) The logistic models 
appear in Appendix D. 
169
 Of course the intent is not to construct an overarching model for childcare policy adoption but rather to test the 
strength of the theoretically relevant independent variables: gender, education and trade unionism. 
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dramatic and it reflects the overall low level of females represented in the ALP House: whereas 
there were no female ALP MPs between 1966-72, by 1987 they comprised eight per cent of all 
ALP MPs. 
 
 
Figure 4.9 Percentage change in ALP MP demographics, 1966-1987  (Source: Commonwealth of Australia Hansard) 
 
4.5 Conclusions: a new electoral agenda but first, reform 
 
When coupled with OLS regression results, the Rapoport and Stone findings would suggest that 
the Australian Labor Party adopted childcare because it sought to make strategic appeals to new 
middle class male and female voters. This driving force, according to the results, is stronger than 
that of union pressure. However, as set out both in this chapter and in Chapter One, traditional 
class and gender-based party-voter linkages had been on the decline in the Australian party 
system throughout the 1970s – well before the 1983 election and its focus on expanding 
childcare places. Moreover, the traditional pattern in which a greater proportion of Labor MPs 
had a trade union background than a university background had eroded from as early as 1971; 
indeed the dominance of the two characteristics would be in flux until 1977 when university 
educated Labour MPs began to eclipse those with a trade union background, ultimately by a 
difference of nearly 45% during the mid 1980s.  
 
So, given the shifts both within the electorate and even within Labor’s own ranks, why did it 
take them until 1983 to make a cohesive attempt at appealing to the votes of middle-income 
families and in particular, women? On the one hand, Figures 1.6 – 1.8 show that attention to the 
issue did increase during the 1970s, when measured either in terms of words in a party manifesto 
or parliamentary debate mentions. On the other hand, it is worth noting that the number of debate 
mentions more than doubled between the 32
nd
 and 33
rd
 parliaments (1977-80 versus 1980-83), so 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1966 1969 1972 1974 1975 1977 1980 1983 1984 1987
Change in ALP MP demographics, per cent, 1966-1987 
University Trade Union Female
 161 
too did the number of childcare commitments in leader’s speeches. The number of words related 
to childcare in ALP manifestos nearly doubled over the same period of time. Indeed, there is 
something that allowed the attention to childcare to increase so steeply in the three years to 1983. 
The decentralised nature of the ALP and, as a consequence, the manner in which that inhibited 
party centralising and gender-based reforms may have played a role in mediating the speed at 
which the ALP’s electoral imperative allowed for strategic appeals on work/family policies such 
as childcare. 
 
Whereas Whitlam demanded federal parliamentary representation at the national ALP 
conference as early as 1967 (Jupp 1982, 105), conference votes and candidate selection were 
largely union dominated until the 1970 intervention into the Victorian branch and rule change in 
NSW, and ten years later, the 1980 interventions into Queensland and Sydney branches 
(Coghlan and Denton 2012, 21-22). Federal intervention into the Victorian Branch during 1970 
imposed reforms that rebalanced state delegations to a 60:40 union-rank-and-file ratio improved 
the state party’s electoral results and gradually won over middle class voters at the state level 
(Jupp 1982, 96-97). Indeed, the 1980 federal conference saw through yet another reduction in 
union voting power whilst, perhaps in response to the Committee of Inquiry findings and Sen. 
Susan Ryan’s research on the imperative of winning over female votes, the 1981 conference 
finally instituted gender-based reforms, requiring that women make up at least 25% of state 
delegations to the federal conference and that all national policy committees include at least one 
woman “responsible for ensuring that ALP policy includes women's interest” (ALP 1981, 28). 
The extent to which these reforms generated the party’s enhanced interest in women’s votes and 
hence work/family issues cannot be quantitatively measured but it does seem possible that an 
increase in female representation on policy-making boards is associated with an increase in 
attention to work/family issues in political campaigns and particularly on the national platform. 
Specifically, it seems plausible that party leaders would not have had the resources to appeal to 
new voters and campaign on such issues were it not for their ability to a) centralise decision 
making and public relations from the states and into the federal executive and b) develop 
structures that enhance the diversity of voices on party policy so as foster policy proposals more 
appealing to the new middle class and advertise to voters that ALP policy was no longer written 
by ‘36 faceless men.’ 
 
This is not to suggest, however, that unions were opposed to the ALP’s stance on childcare and 
work/family policies during the early 1980s; if anything it was the ACTU along with Labor who 
included childcare in the 1983 Accord as a part of the national social wage and as pointed out, 
the ACTU had by the late 1970s dropped their call for a family wage and by 1981 integrated 
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white collar unions such as those previously affiliated with CAGEO and ACSPA, both of which 
had made demands for public childcare assistance and the latter, improved maternity rights 
(Marlowe 1978).  However, this era of union ‘modernisation’ also occurred during the same time 
that the ALP was attempting to ‘modernise itself,’ in part by limiting trade union influence at the 
state and federal levels. Therefore, the assertion that the ALP acted purely as a tool of the unions 
on childcare is doubtful. Had the ACTU been able to modernise themselves and take seriously 
demands stemming from its growing ranks of female members before the onset of ALP reform 
process then we may indeed have seen greater evidence of ‘legislator conversion,’ driven by 
trade union pressure. Since, however, that did not occur ahead of the ALP’s internal party reform 
it appears that the childcare policy adoption here was more a consequence of electoral imperative 
than traditional interest group pressure. 
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Chapter Five: Better late than never. New Labour and childcare policy adoption 
 
5.1  Introduction 
The following chapter will outline the UK Labour Party’s adoption of childcare policy as both a 
legislative and an electoral issue in the run up to the mid 1990s, when it became a centrepiece of 
the party’s 1997 general election campaign and a subsequent legislative priority. It will first 
provide a brief outline of the history and key interests surrounding British childcare policy, 
before going on to analyse the extent and shape of electoral change surrounding the Labour 
Party’s adoption of childcare. It will then qualitatively examine two strands of the Labour 
Party’s response to said change: targeting female voters and undergoing internal organisational 
reforms. It will qualitatively assess the link between unions, childcare and the Labour Party and 
then, in order to quantitatively test for the relative strength of union pressure versus electoral 
imperative in driving reform, it will employ Rapoport and Stone’s 1994 model of political 
change to disaggregate the proportions of party position change that were mechanised by 
conversion and replacement. Next it will run OLS regressions that test for an association 
between legislators debating childcare and having characteristics associated with either unionism 
or post-materialism. This will indicate, quantitatively, whether childcare policy adoption in the 
legislative sense was mechanised by conversion and driven by union pressure or mechanised by 
replacement and driven by electoral imperative, or perhaps another combination of the two. It 
will conclude by discussing the link between electoral imperative, legislator replacement and 
childcare policy adoption with a focus on the extent to which the party’s arduous organisational 
reform process mediated the speed in which it could adopt childcare policy, even more so in the 
electoral than in the legislative sense. 
 
5.2  From zero to sixty: an outline of childcare policy in the UK 
For much of the twentieth century, childcare remained off the British political agenda. World 
War II of course served as the key exception: like the United States, the UK government 
oversaw a rapid increase in provision as part of its ‘war effort’ as both industry and Trades 
Union Congress (TUC), in need of female employees, lobbied an accommodating government 
on the need for public childcare provision. By 1944 the state had developed 1,450 publicly 
funded “war nurseries” serving children aged 2-5 on both part and full-time bases (Randall 2000, 
37-38). The nurseries were shut after the war’s end, despite the London Women’s Parliament’s 
formation of a “National Nursery Campaign.” Although there was a Parliamentary debate on 
their closure in 1945 that featured delegates from the National Council of Maternity and Child 
Welfare, child welfare organisations and nursery training challenges, etc., Randall notes that “it 
was only an adjournment debate and its timing on a Friday afternoon meant that very few 
members were present” (Randall 2000, 59). Westminster’s lack of attention to the prospect of 
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1,450 nurseries shutting reflected the little deliberation that would occur on the subject for the 
next forty years.  
 
Indeed nearly dormant until New Labour’s ascension to power in 1997, British childcare policy 
– from the end of World War II until the 1990s – was means-tested, heavily decentralised, poorly 
regulated and quite minimally funded (Randall 2000). By the early 1990s, childcare provision in 
both the public and private sector was scant: 94% of mothers requiring childcare relied on their 
family for help (Hakim et al, 2008, 14) as there was only one childcare place per nine children
170
 
(Waldfogel and Garnham 2008, 7). Despite a continual rise in maternal employment and 
repeated calls for a comprehensive policy on childcare from trade unions, employer 
organisations and early year’s pressure groups, consecutive Conservative Governments were 
unmoved
171
 (Randall 1996). In fact, during 1984 – when the Australian government ramped up 
childcare expenditure to record levels and the US Congress oversaw a rise in childcare tax 
credits – Margaret Thatcher’s Government landed parents who utilised workplace childcare 
centres with a tax bill, classifying it as a ‘perk’ (Policy Studies Institute 1989, 57; Randall 1996, 
183). 
 
In 1988 the Department of Employment warned of a “demographic time bomb,” predicting a 
labor shortage that mothers of young children would be needed to fill. Business interests, such as 
the typically Conservative Party-favouring Confederation of Business Interests (CBI) began to 
demand action on the issue: in 1993, the CBI, along with several major corporations such as 
Shell, TSB, Kingfisher and British Gas went so far as to form an association, “Employers for 
Childcare,” which released reports calling on the government to take action to increase childcare 
accessibility and affordability (Randall 2000, 89). According to Fleckenstein, the (Conservative) 
Major Government “cautiously acknowledged that work/family conﬂicts existed,” but rather 
than address the issue as a need for cross-class active labour market policy, it took a leaf out of 
the book of their conservative colleagues in the US and “considered a solution to the perceived 
welfare dependency of low-income families and lone mothers.” As such they added a minimal 
childcare component to the heavily means-tested “Family Credit” benefit and appropriated 
“limited” start-up funds for after-school care (Fleckenstein 2010, 799). Finally in 1997, the 
Labour Party, long considered a bastion male trade unionism, developed an election strategy that 
targeted middle-income women, concentrating on issues the strategists deemed key: parental 
leave, childcare, health and education (Mattinson 2010). Their manifesto touted a “National 
Childcare Strategy” which would “plan provision to match the requirements of the modern labor 
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171 Apart from 1990 when John Major, acting as Chancellor, repealed the Thatcher-Government instituted 
workplace nursery tax.   
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market and help parents, especially women, to balance family and working life” (Labour Party 
1997).  
 
And indeed, once in office the party pushed through its five-year plan: a large, if slightly 
jumbled series of initiatives with an aim to ensure “good quality, affordable childcare for 
children aged 0 to 14 in every neighbourhood” (DFEE 1998, 7). Specifics included childcare tax 
credits for low-income working families, an increase in the universal child benefit, start-up funds 
for public-private childcare centres, integrated health, nursery and educational centres available 
to all but built in low-income neighbourhoods, 12.5 hours per week of free pre-school for all 
three and four year olds, and public-private partnerships that provided capital grants to new 
childcare centres, etc. (Lewis and Campbell 2007; Lloyd 2008; Seely 2011). Between 1997-1998 
and 2007-2008, New Labour tripled spending on early years education and care, from £2 billion 
to over £7 billion making it “probably the fastest-growing major area of public spending” 
(Sefton 2009, 3). 
 
5.3 Labour and childcare in context: electoral coalitions and policy demanders  
a.  Shifting voters, unclear coalitions  
 
i) Shifts in patterns of gender and class party identification 
Like its fellow centre-left parties in Australia and the United States, Labour had since the 1960s 
experienced a shift in the socio-economic profile of its electoral coalition, whereby according to 
Perrigo its “traditional working class membership” was slowly joined and partly replaced by 
better educated professionals employed in the public sector, often referred to as the “new middle 
class” or “new urban left” (Perrigo 1996, 119-120). Indeed Britain’s Alford index, at just above 
40 in 1966, dropped steeply to under 30 by 1977 and whilst it increased slightly in the 1979 
election, it never again rose above 30 (Clarke et. al. 2004, 43-44). Moreover, the traditional 
gender identification gap – which had favoured the Conservatives – began a gradual decline 
from the 1970 general election, although it was not completely eclipsed until 1997, as seen in 
Figure 1.19.   
 
Classifying gender according education level provides a finer view of electoral coalitional 
change between the mid 1970s and the 1997 election, where Labour’s childcare appeals came to 
a head. It appears that from 1992 to 2001, the proportion of higher-educated female voters who 
identified as Conservative declined by 26 percentage points, as shown in Figure 5.1. This was a 
rather sharp drop that did not occur at any other point during the 1974-2001 timeline. This was in 
concert with a gradual increase in the proportion of higher-educated female voters who identified 
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as Liberal-SDP/Liberal Democrat (between 1987 and 1997, six percentage points) and an 
increase in Labour identification that occurred between 1987 and 2001 (26 percentage points), 
suggesting a somewhat gradual, increase in Labour identification on the part of higher-educated 
women, but one that was partially offset by the Liberals. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 UK party identification: female, post secondary – university (Source: British Election Study, 1974-2001) 
 
Shifts in party identification among women with lower levels of education were smaller than 
those of higher-educated women (see Figure 5.2: a nine percentage point increase in Labour 
Party identification between 1987 and 2001 versus a 17 percentage point decrease in 
Conservative Party identification between 1992 and 2001). Moreover, the shift seems less 
historically significant: whereas since 1974, higher-educated women identified as Conservative 
in greater proportion than they did Labour, there was greater degree of variance amongst lesser-
educated women, who identified as either more Labour or more Tory from election to election.  
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Figure 5.2 UK party identification: female, primary – secondary (Source: British Election Study, 1974-2001) 
There was an 18 percentage point increase in the proportion of higher-educated men (Figure 5.3) 
who identified as Labour between 1992 and 1997, concurrent with an eight percentage point 
decrease in Conservative and a two percentage point increase in Liberal/Liberal Democrat 
identification. Apart from the quite noticeable increase in Labour identification between 1992 
and 1997, two trends become apparent: first, the increase in higher-educated male Labour 
identification was greater than that of lesser-educated women but second, the trend was much 
less predictable: Conservative identification had been steadily increasing since 1983 whilst 
Labour identification was decreasing: from 1979 this was coupled with a more gradual increase 
in the proportion of higher-educated men identifying as Liberal/Liberal Democrat (seven 
percentage point between 1987 and 1997). Again, this suggests that Labour did not reap the full 
rewards of middle class Conservative dealignment. 
 
 
Figure 5.3 UK party identification: male, post secondary – university (Source: British Election Study, 1974-2001) 
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Figure 5.4 UK party identification: male, primary – secondary (Source: British Election Study, 1974-2001) 
Lesser-educated men (Figure 5.4) also displayed an increase in Labour Party identification 
between 1992 and 1997 of 13 percentage points, and of 16 percentage points between 1992 and 
2001. However since at least 1974
172
 this group has traditionally identified as Labour in 
somewhat higher proportion (between two and five percentage points) than Conservative, so 
there was no stark reversal in identification trends as seen with both higher-educated men and 
women. The increase in Liberal identification as outlined above was minimal.  
 
Figure 5.5 Change in party identification, UK, 1974-2001 (Source: British Election Study, 1974-2001) 
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 1979 being the exception. 
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Figure 5.5 notes the total overall change in partisanship levels between 1974 and 2001: Labour 
are clearly a winner whilst the Conservatives, and to a much lesser extent, the Liberals lost out. 
This is indeed a snapshot in time and not indicative of long-term electoral trends, though it is 
interesting to note that Labour identification increased most among both highly-educated men 
and women, the two groups it had, during the 1970s, struggled the most to make inroads with. 
Though of course the presence of the Social Democratic-Liberal Alliance/Liberal Democrats 
meant that Labour were not operating in a zero-sum game with the Tories and hence, would not 
reap all the rewards from middle class Conservative dealignment. The figures above suggest that 
lesser-educated men did not necessarily abandon the Labour Party from the late 1970s
173
 but that 
Labour’s purported advantage with them became very small until their popularity increased 
across all groups in 1997. The increase in support from higher-educated men does not appear to 
have been a gradual response to Labour’s slow evolution on social issues and party 
modernisation, as it appeared largely out of nowhere in 1997. There are, however, hints at some 
form of dealignment in this group, when one considers the rise in Liberal/Liberal Democrat 
identification which rose steadily from 1987
174
, which perhaps suggests that higher-educated 
men were becoming increasingly attracted to the type of ‘left-liberal’ appeals that ‘New Labour’ 
under Tony Blair would begin to make.  
 
While female voters of both educational groups increased their identification with Labour, 
higher-educated females seemed the group who changed the most, given their higher overall rate 
of identification change between 1987 and 2001 (15 percentage points) and the gradual manner 
in which this change occurred (i.e. the speed in which their rate of Conservative identification 
declined and their Labour identification increased), which suggests that their increasing 
preference for Labour was perhaps based on either a longer-term response to the party’s 
modernising electoral appeals (or on the other hand, their disaffection from the Conservatives), 
rather than the impact of a single election, as seen with higher-educated men. Their much higher 
than average electoral volatility score (see Figure 5.6 below) provides further evidence that the 
erosion of the traditional gender identification gap offered the Labour Party opportunities to 
forge a new electoral coalition, if only they would be able to institute reforms that would help 
modernise the party’s image and allow work-family policy proposals to be included in the 
strategic appeal process. 
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 Although there does indeed appear to be a drop in Labour identification on their behalf between 1974 and 1979. 
174
 Albeit starting from a lower base (from 11% in 1987 to 18% in 1997). 
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Figure 5.6 Pedersen index of electoral coalitional volatility, UK, 1974-2001 (Source: British Election Study, 1974-2001) 
 
b.  The party’s responds: new targets and organisational reform 
 
i)  Targeting female voters 
Elected Labour Party Leader in 1983, Neil Kinnock found a party that was internally divided and 
poorly received by women of all backgrounds and the middle classes in general. What is worse, 
its traditional party-voter link with blue-collar males was also giving way. Kinnock aspired to 
modernise the party through two related strands: a communications overhaul and a series of 
reforms to the party’s internal organisational structure. The first strand will be discussed in this 
section and the second discussed in the next. In response to the party’s poor public reception (to 
be discussed below), Kinnock recruited a media friendly press secretary (future Labour Minister 
Patricia Hewitt) and communications director (Peter Mandelson) along with a team of pro-bono 
advertising professionals, dubbed the “Shadow Communications Agency” (SCA), all of which 
caused detractors to argue that “policy was increasingly subordinated to strategic considerations” 
(Bashevkin 2000, 410-411).  Reviewing the factors behind Labour’s 1987 loss, the SCA 
indicated that the party’s old-fashioned male image remained an electoral obstacle. Moreover, a 
1989 strategy document written by Patricia Hewitt and Deborah Mattison, the latter a co-founder 
of the SCA, which was entitled, “Women’s Votes: the Key to Winning” emphasised Labour’s 
need to campaign on work-family issues such as childcare. The strategy document also noted 
that in the 1987 general election Labour improved its overall standing amongst women by nine 
percentage points - a factor their polling attributed to women’s increasing concern over social 
policy issues - but that Labour’s newfound advantage amongst women was limited to a 
demographic with the lowest voter turnout: 18-24 year old women labelled as ‘working class.’ In 
short, Labour needed to widen its appeal. 
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Citing  the Australian Labor Party’s success with closing the gender gap in 1983 as “the most 
important factor” in their electoral victory, Hewitt and Mattinson emphasised the ALP’s success 
in targeting middle-income voters, not strictly aligned to the feminist agenda but rather family 
concerns: “[b]ased on that research, the ALP in 1979 and 1980 campaigned as ‘the Party of the 
family,’ building up support amongst ‘middle Australia’ which served them well in the 1983 
election itself.” Extrapolating from the ALP’s success with ‘middle-Australia’ the authors 
underlined the importance of attracting younger, middle-income women operating on a post-
materialist vision of politics, as opposed to the traditional left-right distributive divide. Claiming, 
“the 25-50 age group must be Labour’s first priority,” they went on to argue: “A key target 
audience for Labour is women in their 30s and 40s, the ‘post-war baby boom’ teenagers of the 
1960s. For them, combining employment and family is an urgent priority, which Labour’s 
policies must address” (Hewitt and Mattinson 1989).  
 
But Kinnock’s Shadow Cabinet, let alone rank-and-file party members, were not easily 
convinced: Deborah Mattinson notes that when presenting the Shadow Cabinet with the findings 
from “Women’s Votes” at an away day in 1989: 
 
“Patricia [Hewitt] and I had struggled to convey this [the fact that to women, 
Labour’s image ‘as male, old fashioned, and somewhat aggressive was profoundly 
off-putting’] to our male colleagues. Once again it was an all-male audience, with 
the exception of Jo Richardson, the women’s minister. The men were not noisy but 
some read papers as we spoke. We had expected this and decided that an appeal to 
self-interest was the only thing that would work. We had to persuade politicians that 
their own futures depended on persuading women voters” (Mattinson 2010).  
 
Labour Party feminists continued to advocate for publicly funded childcare policy. The first 
report introduced by the progressive think tank loosely affiliated with Labor, the Institute for 
Public Policy Research (IPPR), in 1990 was “The Family Way,” which focused heavily on 
work/family balance. Its authors were Hewitt, Labour MP Harriet Harman and social policy 
analyst and advocate, Anna Coote (Randall 1996, 491; Coote et. al, 1990). Whilst Labour’s 1992 
campaign did eventually increase its focus on policies that would appeal to middle-income 
women,
175
 the traditional gender-vote gap that had begun to close in 1987 re-opened slightly in 
the 1992 election. The political imperative for gender equality issues was, according to 
Fleckenstein, “reinforced” as “[s]ubsequently, childcare remained on the agenda of the Labour 
Party” (Fleckenstein 2010, 802). This was bolstered by the fact that the Shadow 
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 For example the 1992 manifesto committed £50m towards creating new childcare places (Randall 1996, 491). 
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Communications Agency data revealed Labour would have won the 1992 General election had 
women voted Labour in the same proportion as men (Perrigo 1996, 126).   
 
Taking over as Labour leader following the death of John Smith in 1994, Tony Blair continued 
with his predecessors’ strategies on both the organisational and image fronts (Bashevkin 2000, 
413).  Hayes and McAllister note that under Blair, the party closely monitored the policy 
preferences of “Worcester woman” a straw woman invented by polling firms to represent a 
typical working woman from Middle England. Moreover, Mattinson notes that seven years after 
she and Patricia Hewitt received a cool response to ‘Women’s Votes’ at a Kinnock Shadow 
Cabinet away day in 1989, the response to their presentation on ‘Winning Words’ for women’s’ 
votes at a Blair Shadow Cabinet away day in 1996 was quite different: “The reaction to our 
presentation this time was much warmer, and we came away feeling that they really had ‘got it’” 
(Mattinson 2010).  
 
Indeed, Labour’s 1997 platform was heavily reliant on social issues like health and education, 
with childcare playing a fairly significant role. Whilst the Conservative’s manifesto was absent 
of any childcare-related policies bar a proposal to “assist [lone parents] with childcare in work” 
(Conservative Party Manifesto, 1997), Labour announced a national childcare strategy that “will 
plan provision to match the requirements of the modern labor market and help parents, especially 
women, to balance family and working life” (Labour Party Manifesto, 1997).  The increase in 
female support that Labour received in the 1997 general election was regarded as critical to their 
“landslide victory” (Peake 1997), and not only did Labour come close to eclipsing the traditional 
gender identification gap (see Figure 1.19), but also, for the first time Labour added higher-
educated women to their electoral coalition (see Figure 5.1).  
 
ii)  Reforming internal party organisation: gender-based and party-centralising changes 
The Labour Party of the early 1980s would likely be unrecognisable to those only familiar with 
the orderly conferences and centrist, largely leadership-derived policy positions that defined 
Tony Blair’s New Labour. But in fact, when Kinnock was elected leader in the wake of Labour’s 
poor 1983 election performance, he found a party largely at war with itself, fissured between the 
hard-left, the unionist right and the often more centrist parliamentary party. The party’s internal 
chaos was in part the result of changing social-structural conditions within the country at large: 
on the one hand deindustrialisation since the 1960s had by the mid 1970s helped foster, in 
Perrigo’s words, “a marked decline in the traditional working-class [Labour Party] membership” 
which corresponded with, pace Inglehart and the rise of post-materialism, an “increase in 
members who were better educated, predominantly professionals employed in the public sector, 
often referred to as the 'new middle class' or the 'new urban left'” as well as the rise of unions 
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with a predominantly female membership (Perrigo 1996, 119-120).  
But while this educated, middle class ‘new left’ included centrist, would-be modernisers such as 
future leaders Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, and future Deputy Leader and women’s minister, 
Harriet Harman,
176
 the new politics entrants also formed into ‘hard-left’ factions, such as the 
Campaign for Labour Party Democracy (CLPD),
177
 associated with veteran MP and socialist, 
Tony Benn, just as they also filtered into an ‘ultra-left’ faction which, dominated by Trotskyist 
radicals, was collectively referred to as “Militant” (Shaw 1988, 218-220; Russell 2005, 18). The 
party experienced discord amongst its left-of-centre members but there was also a faction on the 
right, dominated by traditionalists who sought to restore relations with trade unions. And then of 
course there were the trade unions themselves, whose relationship with Labour declined along 
with the economy and which became particularly fragile during the 1979 ‘winter of discontent.’ 
According to Russell, the series of strikes “severely damaged perceptions of Labour’s ability to 
govern, ultimately contributing to its fall from power” (Russell 2005, 21-26). Moreover, the 
Labour leadership’s relationship with the CLPD was further inflamed in 1979, when then-Prime 
Minister James Callaghan refused to include on the 1979 manifesto a policy which passed 
through the National Executive Committee (NEC) (the party’s executive decision making body), 
calling for the abolishment of the House of Lords (Russell 2005, 169).     
Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party trounced Labour in the 1979 elections, an event which 
threw the party into further internal disarray. Both the CLPD, whose sole reason of being was to 
exert extra-parliamentary party power over the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) and the unions 
were able to combine and secure mutually beneficial, decentralising internal party reforms by 
1981. The first, mandatory re-selection of all MPs opened up moderate seats to challenges from 
both the hard-left and the right. The second reform benefited unionists: the conference voted to 
replace the PLP’s sole decision making authority over leadership selection with an electoral 
college that appropriated 40% of votes to the party’s union affiliates.178 This was a somewhat 
unsurprising outcome given that the union bloc totalled 90% of all votes at the party conference. 
The outcome stirred moderate, right and in particular PLP members, and even went so far as to 
further push left-liberal party members into forming the breakaway Social Democratic Party 
(Russell 2005, 40). The hard-left who had continued to gain seats on the NEC and were thus able 
to exert control over the party’s manifesto, such that by the 1983 election it called for 
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 Harman being associated with the then-called ‘soft-left’ Labour Coordinating Committee (LCC). 
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 The CLPD was founded in protest to then-Prime Minister Howard Wilson’s refusal in 1974 to endorse an NEC 
policy statement calling for the nationalisation of 25 large national firms. Wilsons stated that he would refuse to 
endorse the reforms even if they were agreed to by the party conference. Thus the CLPD was formed as an 
organisational challenge to the party leadership – its aim was to gain power on the NEC and exert extra-
parliamentary party dominance over the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) (Russell 2005, 16).  
178
 The introduction of the electoral college is cited as a key reason for the breakaway Social Democratic Party 
(SDP) (Russell 2005, 288). 
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widespread nationalisation and unilateral nuclear disarmament (Russell 2000, 130-13), Labour 
MP Gerald Kaufman famously dubbed the manifesto “the longest suicide note in history” 179 
(Kaufman 2009). And indeed, despite the Thatcher Government’s unpopularity, Labour 
performed disastrously; they polled three million less votes than they had in 1979, making it the 
party’s worst performance since 1918. (Perrigo 1996, 116-17). 
From 1983 onwards, centrist Labour Party officers began to attribute the repeated losses at the 
polls to their image as one embattled between the old-fashioned, blue-collar, male dominated 
party and a new left-wing “militant” factions, in addition to the public’s perception of Labour 
priorities as being centred upon unilateral nuclear disarmament and wide-scale nationalisation  
(Gould 1998, 66). Labour’s chief pollster, Bob Worcester described the party in the late 
1970’s/early1980s as “organisational madness,” noting, “[i]n my experience I have had 
conflicting instructions from the head of press and publicity, the Prime Minister [Jim Callaghan] 
and the General Secretary, all of whom told me to do something different. There are no clear 
lines of authority and responsibility” (Gould 1998, 45). Kinnock responded to the organisational 
dysfunction by attempting to rebrand the party’s image (as discussed above) and internally 
reorganise the party, for example by exerting power over disobedient factions through tactics 
such as containment and sidelining (disavowing militant factions, i.e. those the tabloids labelled 
“the loony left”), as well as by attempting to reduce the power of the unions’ bloc vote, which 
will be discussed further below (Perrigo 1996, Lovenduski  and Randall 1993, Bashevkin 2000).  
The transition on both the public relations and internal organisational fronts, although here 
discussed separately, were not mutually exclusive. Labour strategist Philip Gould recalled a not 
so veiled threat from the assistant to the party’s then General Secretary, Larry Whitty: if Larry 
was ‘against’ Kinnock’s proposal for a new communications wing, it was going to be “extremely 
hard” for Kinnock to make any progress on it (Gould 1998, 49). Kinnock’s other major 
battlegrounds included shares of union versus constituency party influence in both candidate and 
party leadership selection procedures, in conference voting rights and on policy-making boards. 
This was in addition to a separate – but frequently entangled – movement on the part of Labour 
feminists who sought greater representation on decision making bodies such as the National 
Executive Committee, greater representation at the party’s annual conference and on trade 
unions’ delegations to said conference, as well as gender-based quotas in candidate selection 
procedures, such as having at least one woman on a shortlist (OWOS) or indeed all-women 
shortlists (AWS) (Lovecy 2007, Russell 2005, Alderman and Carter 1994). These gender-based 
and party centralising reforms, in reference to candidate and leadership elections as well as 
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 Kaufman later recalled of his statement: “ I was drawing attention to the party’s apparently irreversible meltdown 
as an electoral force… the strategy, if there was one, seemed to be to lose as many votes as possible” (Kaufman 
2009)  
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quotas on decision making bodies were attempted throughout the 1980s. Even if supported by 
similar moderates (such as those on the LCC), they were often entangled with one and other. For 
example, some factions supported gender-based reforms as means of side-lining other factions 
(which will be discussed below). 
In 1982 the first OWOS motion (wherein each constituency candidate selection procedure was to 
include at least one woman) reached the conference floor but was opposed by the NEC – its 
representative on the issue being Gladys Dunwoody, a female NEC member supported by the 
trade unions. The motion itself only received 20% of the votes. As Russell argues, the vote was 
an issue of women’s representation on its surface but was co-opted by factional interests in 
pursuit of their own gains, unrelated to gender-based representation.
180
 The following year, the 
NEC approved OWOS in principle but the measure was rejected by the full conference, only to 
be approved in 1986 and put into place – in constituencies where there was no sitting Labour MP 
– by 1987 (Russell 2005, 288).  
 
In 1984 Kinnock attempted to reform local candidate selection procedures by removing the trade 
unions’ bloc-vote and introducing a one member-one vote (OMOV) system - though this was 
narrowly defeated in the conference vote. Finally, after another lost election in 1987, Kinnock 
managed to push through what Philip Gould termed an “unsatisfactory hybrid,” wherein unions 
held up to 40% of the local constituency vote, contingent upon the number of branches affiliated 
to the local constituency party (Gould 1998, 189; Alderman and Carter 1994, 325). The issue of 
women’s representation was bolstered at the 1989 conference when, after initially failing in 
1986, the female-dominated union GMB APEX, working in concert with Labour Party feminists, 
was able to push through resolutions that called for increased representation of women on all 
Labour Party bodies, including the NEC, and demanded that trade unions send enough female 
delegates to Labour Party conferences so as to represent the proportion of their membership that 
is female. The rule change mandated that by 1990, four out of the trade unions’ 12 NEC seats 
were to held by women and that by 2001 50% of the Parliamentary Labour Party (i.e. 50% of 
Labour MPs) would be female (Russell 2005, 102-108).  
The 1991 conference provided another success for women’s representation, as it approved a 
phase-in of NEC and constituency-level changes to be enacted by 1995: four out of 12 trade 
union seats on the NEC and three out of seven constituency seats on the NEC were required to 
be held by women; in local parties two out of four elected officers and three out of seven 
constituency officers were required to be women; 50% of constituency delegations were also to 
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 The CLPD saw the proposal as a mechanism to “help protect the opportunity to deselect right-wing MPs” before 
each general election (Russell 2005, 100).   
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be reserved for females, and trade union delegations to the annual Labour Party conference were 
required to include women in “at least the proportions in which they were represented in the 
trade unions’ membership. The outcomes were reasonably stark: whilst only five out of 29 NEC 
members were women in 1991, 18 out of 32 executives were female by 1998. Russell argues 
“this was rapid change for a body where by 1990 there had still never been as single women 
elected in the trade union section, and only four women had ever been elected in the 
constituency section” (Russell 2005, 108). By the 1992 conference, the same group of women 
from the trade unions who had worked with female Labour Party leadership on internal party 
quotas now sat on the reformed NEC women's committee; in turn, the same group of women 
worked alongside Labour Women's officer Vicky Phillips and committee chair Clare Short to 
develop a compromise proposal on all-women shortlists (Russell 2005, 112). The timing was 
fortuitous in the sense that recently elected Labour Leader John Smith was more amenable to the 
concept than his predecessor, Neil Kinnock. In June 1993 the NEC agreed - in principle - that 
women shortlists were to be required in a) 50 per cent of the seats where a Labour MP retired 
and b) 50 per cent of seats that Labour expected to win, with room to take account of local 
conditions, such as popular male MPs – although this needed conference approval (Russell 2005, 
113).  
 
Yet the positive gains for women’s representation in 1992 and 1993 were counterbalanced by 
uncertainty on the party centralisation front: the 1992 conference was also the venue for the 
party’s next leadership election, a process singled out for ridicule by then-Conservative leader 
Michael Howard, who proclaimed that “the new Labour leadership would be 'tainted at source' 
by the manner of its election,” given the unions’ 40% stake in the electoral college (Alderman 
and Carter 323). According to Alderman and Carter, the unions were on the back foot over 
Kinnock’s moves to impart OMOV on constituencies’ candidate selection processes and were 
alarmed “at what was seen as 'a race to sever links with the unions.’” In what the authors deem 
“a haphazard and piecemeal manner” the NEC established a Review Group to examine the 
whole gamut of party-union links,” which “effectively precluded any change in the leadership 
selection procedures during the 1993 conference.” A large majority of the 15-member Trade 
Union Links Review Group were either unionists or thought to be supportive of the current 
arrangements (Alderman and Carter 1994, 324).
181
 In fear of another public spectacle, a 
compromise was reached where the unions retained their separate status in the electoral college, 
albeit with their share of the votes reduced from 40% to 33%, putting them on equal footing with 
the PLP and the Constituency Labour Parties (CLP) (Alderman and Carter 324-25).  
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 Indeed, although battles were framed as a move towards party “democratisation,” they have often been 
characterised as party-elite led moves towards “emasculation” of union/blue-collar influence and/or party 
centralisation (see for example Hopkin 2001, Russell 2005). 
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Finally, at the 1993 conference, significant headway was made on the feminists’ and party 
centralisers’ two long term-goals: OMOV at constituency-level candidate selection and all-
women shortlists. As Russell explains, the conference had an increased feminist tilt - largely 
because of the 1991 rule change on internal quotas. According to Russell, "all the major trade 
unions expressed ‘formal support’ for all-women shortlists, due to female trade unionists' efforts 
within their own organisations. (Russell 2005,113).  The all-women's shortlist motion was tied to 
one mandating one member one vote (OMOV) in constituency-level and Labour leadership 
elections (thus depleting the trade union bloc vote). Whilst the constituencies favoured OMOV 
(since it put individual constituency level party members and activists a fairer level with the 
unions), they opposed all-women shortlists, since they viewed it as central party interference in 
local party affairs (Russell 2005, 113). The unions, by contrast opposed OMOV and, due to their 
female trade union officers, favoured all-women shortlists. Both measures, tied to the same 
resolution, narrowly passed through the conference vote: 47.5% to 44.4%, a fact that Alderman 
and Carter partially attribute to a last-minute position change by the Manufacturing, Science and 
Finance (MSF) union as well as a “a rousing closing speech by [then-Shadow Cabinet member 
John] Prescott” (Alderman and Carter 1994, 327). 
 
But what about centralising reforms that would directly impact party policy? Policy such as 
manifesto commitments had traditionally been the remit of the NEC, who produced policy 
proposals that would then be submitted to the full conference. Prior to the era of discord the 
party leader would pass reforms through the NEC and as Russell states, “when the trade union 
majority in the conference and NEC was amenable, the leadership could thus comfortable secure 
its policy positions” (Russell 2005, 129). However, as outlined above, the rise of factions and 
increased tension between the unions and PLP resulted in a breakdown of consensus, to the 
extent that leaders such as Wilson and Callaghan would wilfully disavow policy that had passed 
through the party’s various internal decision making structures which resulted in the sort of left-
wing backlash displayed by the 1983 manifesto. The NEC had two policy committees, 
international and home, the latter having been controlled by the CLPD’s Tony Benn since 1974. 
As Russell notes, the “political control of the NEC and its committees resulted in many decisions 
that were unwelcome by the party’s leaders” (Russell 2005, 131). Yet the party’s right gained 
enough seats during the 1981 NEC election that they ousted Benn by 1982. Benn’s removal and 
the entrance of the right allowed Kinnock an opportunity to pressure the NEC into reforming its 
policy-making process: instead of a single NEC-only domestic policy committee, Kinnock 
united the PLP and the extra parliamentary party by forming a joint Policy Coordinating 
Committee comprised of seven policy review groups, in which PLP and NEC members were to 
be represented in equal numbers. But despite being advertised as a ‘joint’ venture, the reforms 
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essentially subverted power from the extra parliamentary party to the PLP: the fact that there had 
been an increase in MPs on the NEC meant that MPs were a minority in only two out of the 
seven groups (Russell 2005, 131). 
Although the policy output was more in keeping with the PLP’s objectives, Russell notes party-
wide complaints about the exclusivity of the process and the conference’s inability to amend 
(they could only vote up or down) proposals (Russell 2005, 132-133). After the party’s loss in 
the 1987 election
182, the joint Policy Coordinating Committee was formalised into the “Policy 
Review”183: like its predecessor the review groups were comprised of PLP and NEC members 
but were also “topped up” with trade unionists which, according to Shaw was a “format designed 
to lock in co-operation from the three main institutional units constituting the party.” The 
addition of unionists, however, does not appear to have detracted much power from the 
leadership in the sense that the entire review was overseen by the Campaign Management Team, 
which was comprised of senior politicians and party executives (Shaw 1993, 113). Moreover, the 
operation was increasingly focused on public perceptions: it consulted Institute for Public Policy 
Research just as each of the groups were regularly provided with quantitative public opinion data 
from the party’s Political Intelligence Officer and also, briefed by the Shadow Communications 
Agency (Shaw 1993, 112-114). Perhaps most relevant, however, was the concern with how the 
Review’s policy output would be received by women. Shaw states:  
“For a mixture of internal party and electoral reasons, Labour was keen 'to ensure that the 
women's perspective (was) fully covered.' A Women's Monitoring Group (containing all 
the women members of the PRGs [Policy Review Groups]) was established (and later 
upgraded after opinion research in 1989 indicated that Labour was failing to attract women 
supporters) and was authorised to check that women's needs were taken fully into account 
by all PRGs” (Shaw 1993, 113). 
 Shaw’s assessment reflects the impact not just of the party’s newfound media strategy to win 
over female voters but also points to the increased representation of women on these decision 
making bodies, the result of the gender-based organisational reforms outlined above. In fact, 
Russell notes that Harriet Harman’s own election to the NEC in 1993, which helped bring 
work/family issues to the party executive’s attention, was made possible in the first place 
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 Whilst the 1987 manifesto was introduced to the public without receiving such damning condemnation by 
centrists, the party only received 30% of all votes, as compared to the Tories’ more comfortable 42%.   
183
 Policy-making became more streamlined with an Interim National Policy Forum, proposed in 1990 which finally 
met in 1993 that “contained representatives of MPs, MEPs, local councillors, women's organisations, black 
members and youth organisations.” As Alderman and Carter point out, union representation was lessened as “Union 
representatives constituted about one-quarter of its membership” (Alderman and Carter 1994, 328-329). 
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because of rule change that required OMOV on constituencies’ NEC elections.184 These OMOV-
induced results clearly favoured the ‘modernisers’: in 1992 left-winger Dennis Skinner lost his 
position whilst Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were elected in, with Harman the following year. 
Through a series of arduous battles over selection, representation and policy it was clear that the 
party modernisers finally gained the upper-hand over both the hard-left and the unions, and as 
the Policy Review and discussion over Labour’s 1997 manifesto suggests, this did have an 
impact on party policy and specifically, its newfound attention to work/family issues such as 
childcare. 
 
c.  Who wants childcare? Unions, Labour and policy adoption 
i)  Broader (non-union) childcare interests: fragmented and often divided advocacy 
Beyond unions and Labour Party activists, who comprised the UK’s ‘childcare lobby’? Randall 
argues that from the 1960s and 1970s an “embryonic” under-fives lobby was formed which was 
“diverse, organizationally fragmented and lacking in political clout” (Randall 2000, 67-68). In 
fact, Randall argues that the group was not even in agreement on the “question of working 
mothers” (Randall 2000, 74).  Organisations included broad under-fives welfare groups, charities 
such as the Salvation Army, a branch of the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children (NSPCC) and pre-school only (i.e. non-full day) groups like the National Campaign for 
Nursery Education. Feminist organisations did not immediately rush to the issue: the first 
feminist oriented childcare organisation, the National Childcare Campaign (NCC) only arrived 
on the scene in 1989 (Randall 2000, 69) and according to Randall, it originally “campaigned 
from an uncompromisingly socialist feminist position: women had the right to full-time, free and 
collective childcare” (Randall 2000, 84). 
 
Public expenditure cuts in the 1970s and 1980s stifled the nascent movement, and indeed there 
was a split within the NCC with half its membership forming the Daycare Trust in 1986. It 
seemed most of the attention was derived through individual efforts of particular unions as well 
as the ‘municipal feminism’ so popular in the leftist-run Greater London Council and its local 
Labour Party at the time (Randall 2000, 84). The gap, aggravated by public expenditure cuts 
fostered a private childcare market. The growth of private-sector nurseries had an impact on 
industry coordination: by the mid 1990s, two private oriented groups, the Childcare Association 
and the National Private Day Nurseries Association, arose. These groups were also in 
competition with the Playgroups Association, who although they could not provide full day care, 
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 This was the result of a previously agreed to motion that required all local constituencies to individually ballot 
(OMOV) their constituencies on NEC elections, rather than allow local heads to directly select members. 
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had existed in the 1960s. With attendance rates stagnating by the 1990s the Playgroups 
Association felt increasingly threatened by the Major Government’s flirtation with pre-school 
services and in particular their proposal for a nursery school voucher scheme (Randall 2000, 
104-105). By the mid 1990s even the NCC stepped away from its demand for free, publicly 
funded services and recognised that, in Randall’s words, “it may be necessary to have fees” 
(Randall 2000, 104). In a sense the non-union, non-Labour childcare interests were largely 
divided: at first by normative issues (e.g. childcare as a necessary evil versus childcare as a 
public good) and later by class and economic issues (e.g. public childcare as a right for all versus 
private childcare for middle class families). The union movement, as will be shown below, 
featured similarly diverse if not divided stances on the issue. 
 
ii)  Peak-level trade unions and the response to work/family policies 
Even the Labour Party’s name bares tribute to the historical ties between itself and the trade 
unions: the party was founded, largely financed, and according to David Marquand, “controlled 
by a highly decentralised trade union movement” which “in a sense is not true of its social 
democratic counterparts on mainland Europe” (Gould 1998, 25). Apart from the fact that during 
the 1980s fees from affiliated trade union members accounted for 90% of total Labour Party 
income
185
 (Terry 2001), affiliated unions also historically had bloc votes in constituency 
candidate selections, for the Labour Party leaders and, crucially, had reserved more than half the 
seats on the Party’s chief administrative body, the National Executive Committee, which until 
Blair’s tenure had a decisive role in policy-making, acting as a “counterweight to the power of 
the parliamentary party” (Garner and Kelly 1998, 134). Coalition maintenance theory would 
predict that, had the affiliated unions put forth a strong call for action on childcare policy, the 
PLP would have quickly heeded their demands both during election campaigns and in 
Parliament. 
 
Whether the unions put forth such a claim is unclear: from 1963 the Trade Unions Congress 
(TUC) had adopted the position that the government should provide childcare for working 
mothers; in 1978 it issued a “Charter for Under 5’s,” calling for flexible working hours and 
comprehensive childcare, and in 1979, a “Charter for Equality,” calling for mandatory female 
presence on key decision making boards, in addition to full-time childcare (Randall 2000, 70-71; 
Gelb 1989, 40-41, 76). Small pieces of anecdotal evidence taken from Hansard suggest that trade 
unions were linked to the advocacy of childcare since the 1980s. For example, during debate on 
Day Care Review legislation in 1989, Labour MP Jeremy Corbyn, noted:  
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“I am sponsored in the House by the National Union of Public Employees. We have a 
particular interest in the debate as our members provide a large proportion of the pre-
school facilities in this country. 
[…] 
We are also debating the range of child care facilities that should be on offer. The Labour 
party strongly believes that there should be statutory provision of pre-school facilities for 
parents who want to use them” (Hansard Millbank, 2013).   
Moreover, Conservative MP Teresa Gorman, who wrote a clause to allow tax-exempt childcare 
vouchers (which did not pass), stated on the Commons floor:  
“Labour Members knew from my discussions with them that my ten-minute Bill attracted 
enormous attention, not least from trade unions, which wrote to congratulate me on the 
forward-looking views of the Conservative party in making such a point to the House” 
(Hansard Millbank 2013). 
However, British labor unions had a lengthy history of promoting the concept of a ‘family 
wage’186 and were more than hesitant to embrace the idea of female trade union leadership or 
even key feminist issues such as maternity/parental leave until the late 1980s and, in some cases, 
the 1990s (Gelb 1989).  Measures of feminist agency within labor unions remain unclear: Kirton 
and Healy (2010), note that female trade union leadership was quite low up until the late 1990s 
and that even still, women are under-represented in trade union leadership positions.
187
 Deborah 
Mattinson notes that when making a presentation to the Trade Union Congress (TUC) General 
Council in 1988 that used demographic data, polling and focus group work in order to highlight 
“how crucial women would be to the movement in the future”: 
 
“The council members at the meeting, all men bar one, sat back in their chairs in the oak-
panelled board room and guffawed noisily at each other’s jokes as I ran through the data. 
At the end, the TUC President moved the agenda on, dismissing me with a wave of his 
hand. There was no discussion about what I had presented at all, no action points, no 
follow-up” (Mattinson 2010).  
 
iii)  Trade unions at the micro-level: coordination between female union and Labour Party 
officials 
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 The concept of which was antithetical to married women working as it implied the male breadwinner should earn 
enough money for his entire family. 
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 For example, women comprised 79% of COHSE membership but just 39% of its national executive; in the GMB 
women were 34% of membership, 29% of its executive; in NUPE: 75% membership, 46% executive (Brookes, 
Eagle and Short, 1989). 
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The behaviour of peak-level trade union officers and even the information gleaned from female 
union leadership statistics may, to a certain extent, mask wide variance amongst unions in terms 
of both their demographics and their inclination to lobby for work/family policies such as 
childcare; it also may downplay the impact of micro-level coordination between female trade 
union officers and female Labour Party officials. This coordination between female trade union 
officers and senior female Labour Party officers – what Russell calls a “progressive 
bureaucracy” (Russell 2005, 124) – pushed forward the previously discussed internal Labour 
party quotas, which sought to ensure that women were better represented on constituency 
General Committees, in the Shadow Cabinet, amongst conference delegates and on the NEC 
(Russell 2005, 104-05).  
 
The party’s factional disputes created an opportunity structure for the progressive bureaucracy to 
play one group against and other, in order to shore up both union and party support for their 
measures.
188
 Meg Russell writes that the progressive bureaucracy “at times acted covertly to 
avoid opposition from senior men” and would then go to persuade unions and the party 
leadership at a broader level by framing their demands in the electoral context: ‘winning 
women’s votes’ and attracting new union members. The proposals, Russell concludes, were 
“radical in their effects” (Russell 2005, 124). The ‘progressive bureaucracy’s’ specific policy 
successes included OWOS and eventually, all women shortlists, which took hold before the 1997 
election. They were aided by female-dominated unions: at the 1986 and 1989 GMB APEX 
sponsored resolutions that called for increased representation of women on all Labour Party 
bodies, including the NEC, and demanded that trade unions send enough female delegates to 
Labour Party conferences so as to represent the proportion of their membership that is female, 
that by 1990 four out of the trade unions’ twelve NEC seats were held by women and that by 
2001 50% of the Parliamentary Labour Party (i.e. 50% of Labour MPs) were female (Russell 
2005, 102-108).  
 
Indeed both Russell (2005) and Lovecy (2007) suggest that the ‘progressive bureaucracy’ was 
able to make inroads with both the Labour Party and the unions by framing their demands in an 
electoral context: ‘winning women’s votes.’ However Lovecy notes that it would be inaccurate 
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 For example at the 1993 conference, the motion on all-women's shortlists was tied to another motion that 
mandated one member one vote (OMOV) in constituency-level and in Labour leadership elections (thus invalidating 
the trade union bloc vote). Whilst the constituencies favoured this (since it put individual constituency level party 
members and activists a fairer level with the unions), they opposed all-women shortlists, since they viewed it as an 
incidence of central party interference in local party affairs. The unions, by contrast naturally opposed OMOV and, 
due to the persuasion of female members (in addition to a number of heavily unions that were predominantly 
female) and perhaps more so their battle with the constituency leaders, favoured all-women shortlists. Both 
measures, tied to the same resolution, narrowly passed (Russell 2005, 112-115). 
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to suggest that the Labour and union leadership would have progressed on said issues were it not 
for prodding by the network of female party and union leaders:  
 
“If the internal quotas proposals were thus strategically framed to appeal to the party 
leadership, and the case for them often presented as part of an electoral-driven strategy, it 
is nevertheless true that the issue was not developed nor initially taken forward by 
Kinnock or the NEC, but rather as Russell argues, the NEC, union leaders and Kinnock 
were essentially left in a reactive role, ‘bounced’ into supporting change by an active, 
feminist network in the unions supported by key party head office staff. The longer-term 
outcome would be a radically changed gender composition for executive bodies, for the 
Annual Conference and for the NEC were the number of women expanded from five out 
of 29 in 1991 to 18 out of 32 in 1988…This resulted in Clare Short’s assessment, in ‘an 
important and unremarked change in the ethos and the balance of power of the party’” 
(Lovecy, 2007, 81). 
 
It appears that the level of close coordination between the trade unions and the Labour Party 
resulted in an increasingly feminised Party leadership and indeed, many of the senior Labour 
Party politicians went on to take up seats on the NEC, one in particular, Angela Eagle, became a 
leading Labour MP  (Russell 2005, 127).
189
  
 
5.4 New votes or old interests: the drivers of policy adoption 
The following section attempts to explain whether the Labour Party’s relatively slow190 embrace 
of childcare policy as a legislative issue was a response to the changing interests of trade unions 
and mechanised by legislators ‘converting’ to the issue, and the extent to which it was driven by 
electoral imperative and mechanised by the replacement of blue-collar, union-oriented MPs with 
post-materialist, new politics MPs. Whereas the former cause would reflect Karol’s (2009) 
‘coalition group maintenance’ theory, the latter reflects his ‘coalition group incorporation’ 
theory.  
 
First, it will provide a series of descriptive statistics in order to illustrate the composition of and 
rate of turnover amongst Labour MPs between T1 (the 48
th
 Parliament, 1979-1983) and T2 (the 
52
nd
 Parliament, 1997-2001). It wil then run the Rapoport and Stone (1994) model for 
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    Among the female trade union officers working within their parties - and alongside Labour - for quotas were 
Angela Eagle (COHSE), Maureen Rooney (AEEU), Bernadette Hillon (USDAW), Maureen O'Mara (NUPE), Anne 
Gibson (MSF) and Margaret Prosser (TGWU). These women went on to achieve increasingly powerful positions in 
the Labour Party: as Russell explains, "when the NEC women's committee was reformed in 1989 to include six 
trade union women elected at the women's conference, these women took up the seats" (Russell 2005, 127). 
190
 As compared to the US Democrats and Australian Labor Party. 
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disaggregating political change, which as previously noted, identifies the proportion of party 
position change (i.e. the increase in the percentage of Labour MPs who debated childcare 
between T1 and T2) that is attributed to replacement, conversion or mobilisation. Next, it will 
provide another series of descriptive statistics, here listing the percentage of MPs who, according 
to gender, education and union background, debated chilcdare, noting whether the differences 
between said groups (e.g. men versus women) are statistically significant. A series of of OLS 
regressions then test for a relationship between the number of times an MP debated childcare and 
characteristics associated with post-materialism or characteristics associated with trade 
unionism. The last section will examine the amount of replacement that took place in each party 
from T1 to T2 and specifically, identify the characteristics of those replacing and those replaced: 
were the newcomers the type of post-materialist oriented legislators hypothesised here? 
 
a.  The mechanics and forces of party position change: conversion or replacement, 
 unionists or post-materialists? 
 
In order to illustrate the scale of legislator turnover as well as the general composition of Labour 
MPs between T1 and T2, Table 5.1 provides a series of descriptive statistics. It focuses on the 
delegation of Labour MPs in each Parliament: what proportion of them were female, university 
educated and had a union background? It also identifies the proportion of MPs who, in each 
Parliament, were either in the first of last terms.  
 
  48
th
 49
th
 50
th
 51
st
 52
nd
 
Total Labour MPs 283 219 240 282 419 
University educated, % 57 60 69 74 79 
Female, % 5 6 10 14 23 
Trade union, % 42 45 37 34 29 
Turnover: % first Parliament 15 17 30 28 45 
Turnover: % last Parliament 34 27 17 17 14 
Table 5.1 Labour MP characteristics, 1970-2001 (Source: Hansard Milbank) 
 
The composition of Labour Party MPs shifted considerably between T1 and T2, the 48
th
 and 52
nd 
Parliaments (1979-2001). Table 5.1, above, shows that there was an increase of 136 Labour MPs 
during that time period.  Whereas university educated MPs comprised just over half the Labour 
Party delegation during the 48
th
 Parliament, this would rise to nearly 80% by the 52
nd
. Similarly, 
the percentage of women Labour MPs more than quadrupled, from five to 23%. The percentage 
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of former unionist MPs declined by 13 percentage points, from 42% to 29%. Turnover, as 
calculated by the proportion of newcomer Labour MPs in a single parliament ranged from 15% 
in the 48
th
 to as high as 45%, following Labour’s 1997 election victory191. Turnover, when 
calculated as the proportion of outgoing Labour MPs in a single parliament ranged from a high 
of 34%, in the 48
th
 Parliament, to a low of 14%, during the 52
nd
.
192
 
 
63 ‘stayers’ remained in Parliament between 1979 and 2001. They comprised 22% of all Labour 
Party MPs during the 48
th
 Parliament and 15% during the 52
nd
, meaning that by T2 85% of 
Labour MPs were ‘new’. 11% of stayers debated childcare during T1 and 27% of them did so at 
T2. 
 
This research employs Hansard’s Millbank system of parliamentary debates in order to capture 
the proportion of Labour MPs who debated childcare at T1 and T2. For each Parliament between 
1979 and 2001, it notes every instance in which a Labour MP mentioned
193
 the issue of 
childcare
194
 either in the form of a parliamentary question or during a debate.
195
 Rapoport and 
Stone’s (1994) model for disaggregating the components of party change is applied.196  
 
The 48
th 
Parliament (1979-1983) is T1 because that was the point during which the party was 
mired by internal chaos and it was, arguably, the last parliament before the battle for internal 
Labour Party reform and modernisation commenced. The 52
nd
 Parliament (1997-2001) is 
                                                     
191 An average of 27 with a standard deviation of 12. 
192 An average of 22 with a standard deviation of eight. 
193
 Word search for the words “childcare,” “child care,” “day care,” “daycare,” “nurseries” and “early years” in 
Commons sittings between 1970 and 2001. 
194
 It does not count instances in which the mention of childcare refers exclusively to narrowly means-tested or lone-
parents only programmes as they do not illustrate a general interest in childcare assistance for middle-income 
families, what this research is interested in.  
195
 It does count instances in which a legislator discussed childcare as part of a debate and also note each time a 
written question was submitted to the Government on childcare. It does not count each written response the 
Government in power gives, since the minister involved is required to answer such queries and is not choosing raise 
the issue on their own accord. If, however, a question is asked to a minister in a Commons sitting and the minister 
responds with a party-positional statement then that response is counted. However, it does not count negative 
responses or negative statements on childcare. While they are few and far between it is too ‘fuzzy’ to try and 
measure the extent to which a negative response is driven by for example financial reasons, by the fact that the 
speaker is endorsing another form of childcare assistance or indeed opposes the concept of non-maternal care for 
children at a cultural level. As such only positive debate mentions (i.e. discussing its importance, advocating an 
increase in spending and/or places) and/or parliamentary questions related to Government plans for childcare, the 
number of available childcare places and levels of childcare funding are counted.  
196
 As discussed in Chapter One, this method is less straightforward than that used by Karol (who uses roll-call data 
to draw a distinction between the two processes) because the traditional prevalence of party discipline in 
parliamentary systems (relative to that of presidential systems) masks legislators’ true intentions. Thus the 
traditional party line vote in the UK parliament yields little information as to whether a party changed its overall 
stance on an issue because legislators were convinced by longstanding interest group allies to do so (and thus 
reversed/converted their previous positions), or because legislators within that party were ousted and eventually 
retired, allowing new legislators with different alliances to come to the floor. Moreover, because, as this chapter 
shows, childcare was a relatively dormant issue during this timeframe (apart from the Thatcher Government’s 
removal of workplace nursery tax exemptions in 1984) votes on the issue are too few and far between to glean 
definitive insight. 
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designated T2 because it follows the 1997 election, where childcare received an increased 
amount of attention and it was the Parliament during which the party’s  first set of non-means 
tested childcare policies were devised and (to some extent) implemented. T1 saw just nine per 
cent of Labour MPs raise the issue of childcare in the Commons. By contrast, during T2, 42% of 
Labour MPs raised the issue.   
 
Rapoport and Stone will find the proportion of overall party position change that can be 
accounted for by change amongst the stayers or indeed replacement of dropouts with 
newcomers. The model is as follows: 
 
T2-T1= (βα)(S2-S1) + β(1-α)(N2-D1) + (1-β)(N2-T1) 
 
Where: 
T1 and T2 are mean values of the variable under observation at the first and second time periods 
under observation 
S is the average value for ‘stayers,’ i.e. those present at both T1 and T2 
Β is the ratio of the size of the group at T1 relative to the size at T2 
α is the proportion of the group at T1 which is comprised, of ‘stayers’ 
D1 is the mean value for ‘dropouts,’ i.e. those who were present at T1 but not T2 
N2 is the mean value for ‘newcomers,’ i.e. those who were present at T2 but not T1 
 
 
T1 = .085 
T2 = .424 
S1= .111  
S2 = .270 
D1 = .078 
N2: = .451 
Β = .671 
α = .223 
 
Applying these values to the Rapoport and Stone formula yields a result that is dominated by 
replacement and mobilisation: of the 34 percentage point increase in the number of Labour MPs 
who raised the childcare issue during Commons debates between the 48
th
 and the 52nd 
Parliaments, just seven per cent is attributed to legislator conversion, as opposed to 57% and 
36% to legislator replacement and mobilisation, respectively. This suggests that Labour MPs 
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‘converting’ to the issue only account for seven per cent of change, whilst legislator replacement 
and mobilisation (the entry of newcomers in excess of the number that have dropped out) 
together account for 93% of the total increase in MPs debating childcare. 
 
Total change: Conversion Replacement Mobilisation 
.339 .024 .194 .120 
34% comprised of: 7% 57% 36% 
Table 5.2 Rapoport and Stone: 48th to 52nd UK Parliament (Source: Hansard Milbank, 2013) 
 
The Rapoport and Stone equation finds that party position change amongst Labour MPs was 
indeed mechanised by replacement and mobilisation, rather than existing MPs changing their 
position. However, since the model only disaggregates between legislators according to when 
they entered office, it provides less insight into whether there is an association between debating 
and independent variables such as gender, education and unionism. Before testing these variables 
in a full OLS regression, Table 5.3, below, shows the proportion of Labour MPs at T1 and T2 
that debated childcare who were female, university educated and had previously worked for a 
trade union. It also includes a control variable for relevant ministerial/shadow ministerial 
posting.
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  T-tests are applied to indicate whether group-based differences in debating childcare 
(i.e. between women and men, etc.) are statistically significant.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
197
 For the 48
th 
Parliament this is: Shadow Secretary of State for Social Services, Shadow Secretary of State for 
Employment and Shadow Secretary of State for Education and Science. For the 52
nd
 Parliament this is: Children’s 
Minister, any ministerial post in Department of Education and Employment (i.e. both junior minister and Minister of 
State), Secretary of State for Social Security and Minister for Women. 
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  48th Parliament 52nd Parliament 
University educated, % 9 45+ 
Non-university educated, % 7 34 
Women, % 38* 71*** 
Men, % 7 34 
Non-trade union, % 12* 46** 
Trade Union, % 4 33 
Minister, %
198
 0 83+ 
Non-minister, % 8.5 41 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1  
Table 5.3 Characteristics of Labour MPs who debated (Source: Hansard Milbank, 2013) 
 
In the 48
th
 Parliament, university and non-university educated Labour MPs debated childcare in 
roughly similar proportions, nine and seven per cent, respectively. However, women debated in 
greater proportion than men: whereas seven per cent of male Labour MPs debated childcare 
during the 48
th
, 38% of female Labour MPs did so, a difference that is statistically significant at 
the 95% confidence level. MPs without a union background also debated in greater proportion 
than their counterparts with a union background, 12% to four per cent, respectively, a difference 
that is significant at the 95% confidence level. None of the three relevant shadow ministerial 
posts debated childcare during the 48
th
. 
 
During the 52
nd
 Parliament, university educated Labour MPs debated childcare in greater 
proportion than their non-university educated counterparts by a margin of 45% to 34%, a 
difference significant at the 90% confidence level. As with the 48
th
 Parliament, a larger 
proportion of women than men debated, though the difference is now greater: 71% of female 
Labour MPs debated the issue as compared to 34% of men, a difference that is statistically 
significant at the 99.9% confidence level. Finally, non-trade unionists continued to debate the 
issue in greater proportion than their unionist counterparts, 46% to 33%, a difference that is 
significant at the 99% confidence level. 83% (five out six) relevant ministers debated childcare 
during the 52
nd
; the difference between relevant ministers and non is significant at the 90% 
confidence level. 
  
As with the US and Australian cases, both the descriptive statistics set out in this chapter and 
Rapoport and Stone’s model treat speaking about childcare in Commons debates as binary 
                                                     
198 There were only three relevant minsters during the 48th Parliament, none of whom spoke on childcare. There 
were six ministers during the 52nd, five of whom spoke at least once on childcare. 
 189 
variable (i.e. a legislator did or did not do so) which in a sense does not explain why some MPs 
who debated childcare were more or less committed than others, given for example, that in the 
52
nd
 Parliament the number of times an MP spoke on the issue ranged from zero to 34, with 42% 
of all MP speaking on it. Therefore OLS regressions are again used to both assess the driving 
factors behind the number of times an MP discussed the issue and test whether the Rapoport and 
Stone-based findings (that Labour’s embrace of childcare was predominantly mechanised by 
legislator turnover as opposed to conversion) holds when we treat speaking about childcare as 
continuous rather than categorical variable. The results for the binary logistic regressions, under 
which the dependent variable is whether or not a legislator debated childcare, appear in footnotes 
201 and 202. 
     Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
University -.031 (.090) -.024 (.089) -.032 (.092) 
Female 1.067*** 
(.194) 
1.34*** 
(.210) 
1.161** 
(.072) 
Trade Union -.160
+
 (.091) -.123 (.091) -.126 (.092) 
CC/Women’s Ministerial Post .136 (.142) .134 (.388) .134 (.339) 
Female*Union  -1.337* (.523) -1.298* 
(.533) 
Female*University   .167 (.421) 
(Constant) .209* (.087) .189* (.087) .195 (.088) 
R
2 
N = 283 
  .117 .138 .139 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1  
Table 5.4 OLS regression results 48
th
 Parliament, UK (Source: Hansard Milbank) 
 
Like the Australian case, the main variables of interest are university education, gender and 
having previously worked at a trade union
199
, whilst the control variable is relevant ministerial 
post. Regressions are run for the 48
th 
Parliament, which preceded the Labour Party’s decade of 
internal strife and reorganisation, and for the 52
nd
 parliament, which was the result of Blair’s 
1997 electoral victory, during which campaign childcare was embraced as an electoral issue. The 
National Childcare Strategy was also first devised during the 52
nd
.  Model 1 for the 48
th
 explains 
just 12% of the total variation in the number of times MPs spoke on the issue, however, it points 
to a strong and significant partial association between being female and speaking on the issue: 
controlling for education, trade union background and ministerial post, female MPs spoke on the 
                                                     
199
 In Britain there are no interest group ratings similar to the US’s COPE or ADA scores, so having previously 
worked for a trade union is employed as a proxy. The assumption is that union staff, even after they entered 
Parliament would remain loyal to the demands of the labour movement. 
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issue 1.1 more times than their male counterparts, which is significant at the 99.9% confidence 
level.
 200
  Controlling for all other variables, having a university education is negatively but not 
significantly associated with the number of times an MP spoke on the issue. The association 
between trade unionism and the number of times an MP spoke on childcare is negative and 
significant at the 90% confidence level. The control variable, relevant ministerial post, is not 
significant, therefore suggesting that childcare was of limited interest even to those whose 
portfolios may have included it, an indication of how far off the radar childcare was at the time.  
 
Model 2 includes the interaction variable female x union, in order to assess whether female MPs 
with a union background were more likely to discuss the issue than their male-union 
counterparts. Interestingly, the result is negative, suggesting women with a union background 
were associated with 1.46 fewer childcare mentions than their male union background members, 
an association significant at the 95% confidence level. However, this seems driven by the fact 
that of the 11 female MPs, only one – who did not debate childcare – had previously worked at a 
union. Model 3 includes all of the aforementioned variables but adds another interaction, for 
female MPs with a university education: controlling for all other variables: the effect is positive 
but insignificant.
201
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
200 This is in spite of Joan Lestor’s disproportionate number of childcare mentions (five): being female continues to 
be positively and significantly associated with debating childcare, at the 99% confidence level, in the binary logistic 
models shown in Appendix D. 
201 The direction and significance of relationships in the OLS regressions and the binary logistic regressions that 
appear in Appendix D are similar. Under the binary logistic counterpart to OLS Model 1, Table 5.4 (48
th
 
Parliament), university and ministerial posts remain insignificant, holding all other variables constant. Trade union 
remains negative and significant at the 90% confidence level, controlling for all other variables. Gender remains 
positive and significant, though whereas the OLS regressions found it significant at the 99.9% level, the binary 
logistic model finds it significant at the 99% level, holding all other variables constant. The direction and 
significance of association between debating and all independent variables are the same across Models 2 and 3 in 
the OLS and the binary logistic models. The only exception is the interaction female x union variable: holding all 
else constant, it is negative and significant at the 95%
 
confidence level in the OLS results but is not significant in the 
logistic results. 
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     Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
University .351 (.336) .271 (.339) .079 (.365) 
Female 1.400*** 
(.316) 
1.149** 
(.355) 
-.039 (.922) 
Trade Union -.004 (.301) -.233 (.335) -.287 (.337) 
CC/Women’s Ministerial Post 6.493*** 
(1.111) 
6.565*** 
(1.11) 
6.512*** 
(1.109) 
Female*Union  1.185 (.767) 1.164 (.766) 
Female*University   1.354 (.969) 
(Constant) .457 (.328) .589+ (.339) .752* (.358) 
R
2 
N = 419 
  .123 .126 .128 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1  
Table 5.5 OLS regression results 52nd Parliament, UK (Source: Hansard Milbank) 
 
As Table 5.5, Model 1 shows, by the 52
nd
 Parliament, having a university education becomes 
positively – but still not significantly – associated with the number of times an MP spoke on 
childcare, controlling for all other variables. Being female remains positively and significantly – 
at the 99.9% confidence level – associated with the number of times an MP spoke on the issue: 
controlling for all other variables, the partial effect of being female is to increase the average 
number of times an MP spoke on the issue by 1.4. The final independent variable, trade union 
background, remains negative but not significant, whilst the control variable, ministerial post, is 
perhaps unsurprisingly positive and significant (being a minister is associated with speaking 6.5 
more times on the issue than not being a minister), given that during this Parliament ministers 
developed and partially implemented the National Childcare Strategy (Lewis 2011, 76). Models 
2 and 3 add interaction variables: Model 2 shows that the addition of a female x trade union 
background yields a positive but not significant association, and Model 3 finds the same for a 
female x university background.
202
 
                                                     
202 The binary logistic models shown in Appendix D produce largely similar results to those of the OLS regressions 
shown in Table 5.5 (52
nd
 Parliament): with specific regard to OLS Model 1, under the binary logistic regression 
university remains insignificant as does trade unionism. Gender, the strongest result obtained in Model 1 of the OLS 
regressions for the 52
nd
 Parliament, did remain positive and significant at the 99.9% confidence level under the 
binary logistic regression.  Whereas the OLS regression found that being female was associated with 1.4 more 
childcare mentions than being male, the binary logistic model found that by being female, the odds of a Labour MP 
debating childcare increased by 60% relative to the odds of a male Labour MP debating childcare. Whereas the OLS 
regression found ministerial positions to be positive and significant at the 99.9% confidence level, the binary logistic 
model finds the variable insignificant; this reduction in significance is likely due to the fact that three out of the six 
ministers (David Blunkett, Margaret Hodge and Harriet Harman) raised the issue between 13-14 times each, against 
a Labour MP average of 1.2 mentions, thus skewing the OLS model. In Models 2 and 3, the partial effect of the 
interaction variables (female x union and female x university) on debating remain positive but insignificant.   
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These models illustrate that during the 48
th
 Parliament, neither university nor trade unionism had 
positive partial effects, controlling for all other variables, on the number of times an MP spoke 
on childcare. Being a female is indeed positively and significantly associated, even when the 
same models are run employing a binary dependent variable according to whether they did or do 
not debate childcare (see Tables A.D.7 and A.D.8). By the 52
nd
 Parliament, it becomes clear that 
female MPs were indeed a driving force behind the issue; university educated MPs, also a key 
contingent of the new politics group were not significantly, but now at least positively associated 
with speaking, whilst those with a union background remained negatively, though not 
significantly associated. These results, although found in models with quite low R
2’s, do at least 
seem to indicate that of the variables we are interested in, the driving force behind MPs’ 
adoption of the childcare issue seems to lie more within the new politics movement (i.e. 
feminism and to a lesser extent, the entry of university educated Labor MPs), than it does with 
trade unionists coming to embrace the issue as a united movement.  This finding gels with the 
Rapoport and Stone results that suggest the party’s increased attention to the issue was 
mechanised by replacement and the addition of more childcare friendly MPs than it was by the 
conversion of pre-existing parliamentarians.    
  
b.  Replacing whom? What was the extent of legislator ‘replacement’? 
The debate analyses above suggest that Karol’s (2009) coalition group incorporation theory 
better explains the Labour Party’s embrace of childcare than does his coalition group 
maintenance theory (where legislators are converted by party-linked interest groups, i.e. trade 
unions). This is indicated by both the Rapoport and Stone results (which attribute 93% of 
position change to both replacement and mobilisation) and by the fact that OLS regressions 
indicate that union background has a negative and insignificant association with childcare 
debate, whilst having a university education and being female are both positively associated, 
with the latter also being significantly associated. The coalition group incorporation thesis is 
built on two premises: first that a party will have an electoral incentive to adopt a particular 
position and second that the process will be commenced by enterprising, autonomous elites and 
mechanised by the replacement of older legislators and party elites with ties to old interests 
groups, with new legislators and MPs who may resemble the voters they are trying to attract 
more so than their predecessors did.  
 
What other components of coalition group incorporation does the British case display? As 
section 5.3 noted, the Labour Party adopted childcare policy in the wake of significant electoral 
coalitional change, and in the face of opportunities to gain votes with both higher-educated men 
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and women. Moreover, section 5.4 just noted the strong evidence pointing to legislator 
replacement and mobilisation as the driving mechanisms behind party position change. But who 
were these new legislators: were they in fact dominated by post-materialist modernisers? If so, 
we would expect to see socially conservative, influential men in Labour leadership positions 
replaced with progressive, educated and middle-income men and women. Comparing NEC 
election ballots (in which candidates write a short manifesto) with NEC election outcomes would 
be an excellent measure of replacement. Unfortunately, NEC ballots prior 1994 are not publicly 
available and 1994 is too late to be able to track processes of party elite replacement. 
 
A proxy for this (social characteristics and social policy leanings of Labour officials) might be to 
compare the characteristics of Shadow Cabinet members over time, since these members have 
been, from 1981 to 2011, elected by the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP). Key variables 
include a member’s gender and their level of education (i.e. whether or not they attended 
university). Figure 5.7 summarises the change in characteristics between each Shadow Cabinet, 
displaying quite an apparent shift by the time John Smith became Labour Leader in 1992: 
 
Figure 5.7 Demographic change in Shadow Cabinet/Cabinet, UK, 1974-2005 (Source: Hansard Milbank) 
For the sake of comparison, Wilson and Callaghan’s Cabinet have been included, as well as 
Blair’s two Cabinets, which are largely similar to his Shadow Cabinet.203  
 
Although the average age of entry into the Cabinet was largely stable (minimum of 50, 
maximum 53), gender and education reverse themselves: under Wilson (1974-1976) there were 
just two (eight per cent) females in the Shadow Cabinet; that figure jumped to seven (23%) in 
                                                     
203
 In contrast to the Shadow Cabinet, Cabinet positions are not up for election in the PLP, one might assume that 
the party as a whole would not be opposed to the Cabinet choices of a Leader that they voted for. 
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Smith’s Shadow Cabinet and finally to nine (29%) in Blair’s second Government. In fact there 
has been an almost inversely proportional shift between female and non-university educated 
members: Kinnock’s Shadow Cabinets included just  two (five per cent) female member and 15 
(38%) non-university educated members.
204
 Yet the proportion of non-university educated males 
continued to decline, just as the proportion of female members continued to rise: the proportions 
were equal in Smith’s Shadow Cabinet but by the time of Blair’s first Government there were 
seven (21%) female members and just two (six per cent) non-university educated members. By 
2001 there were over four times as many female members as there were non-university educated 
members. The proportion of former trade union employees exhibits a decline as well: from 32% 
in 1974 to 15% by the time of Blair’s shadow cabinet in 1994. Whilst there was an increase 
during Blair’s cabinet it’s worth noting that two of his five cabinet members with a trade union 
background were women.
205
 Moreover, the changes in Shadow Cabinet and Cabinet 
demographics are mirrored across the entire Parliamentary Labour Party (see Figure 5.8), with a 
rise of both university educated and female MPs occurring in near concert with a decline of MPs 
who had previously worked for a trade union. This group, operating with a much larger base 
number than the Shadow Cabinet/Cabinet members, displays a clear shift in party demographics 
commencing in 1983, the year in which the battles for both centralising and gender-based intra-
party reforms commenced.  
 
 
Figure 5.8 Change in Labour MP demographics, UK, 1970-2001 (Source: Hansard Milbank) 
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 It may seem curious that Neil Kinnock, the apparent ‘moderniser’ of New Labour presided over a series of 
shadow Cabinets that was less well educated and less feminine than Harold Wilson’s Cabinet almost twenty years 
earlier. One point worth noting is that Kinnock’s tenure was so long that he had 39 members in and out of his 
Shadow Cabinet, moreover, many of those Shadow Cabinet members were elected during the early years of his 
tenure as leader and thus were chosen in an era of factional battles, when Kinnock had not yet passed through a 
series of institutional reforms that would have restrained ‘militant’ and the trade union influence in favour of a more 
middle class, feminine and university-educated cohort. And indeed from 1980, the shadow cabinet was no longer 
elected by the PLP but by the party conference, from which point there occurs an increase in female members and 
decline in non-univeristy educated members. 
205
 Margaret Beckett and Mo Mowlam. 
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5.5 Conclusion: Reform now, votes later 
The findings here suggest that electoral imperative was the force driving Labour’s adoption of 
childcare policy, whilst legislator replacement was the mechanism through which it occurred. 
This does not suggest however, that there is a linear, causal relationship between electoral 
change, shift in MP/Cabinet characteristics and policy adoption: for example, shifts in British 
class voting and in the UK’s gender vote gap (as seen in Figures 1.16-1.17) commenced as early 
as 1970 and 1966 respectively, whereas the shift in background and demographics amongst MPs 
and Shadow Cabinet members lagged behind, by approximately 13 years (see Figures 5.7 and 
5.8). The intake of female, university educated MPs does increase in tandem with the number of 
childcare mentions during Parliamentary debate (compare Figures 5.7 with 1.11), however both 
of these factors are not clearly correlated with manifesto promises (a far more jagged trend) and 
in particular, spending commitments on childcare, which did not increase until the mid 1990s 
(see Figure 1.9 and 1.10).    
 
This suggests that internal party reforms played an important role in the process: Labour MPs 
could frequently advance the issue in Parliamentary debate, however the increase in debate 
mentions moved in tandem with the speed in which both higher-educated and female MPs were 
first selected by local constituency parties and then elected into Parliament. These same selection 
procedures were a key battleground between Labour Party modernisers, right-wing unionists and 
left-wing ‘Militant’ party members throughout the 1980s. It was not until 1987 that Kinnock was 
first able to reduce the power of the union bloc vote in local constituency party selections and 
1993 when OMOV was passed, putting local constituency members’ votes on a more even level 
with union votes. Moreover, the principle of one woman on a shortlist (OWOS) was not put in 
place until 1987, and only in seats where there was not a sitting Labour MP. Additional battles 
over reform included the selection of a leader willing to advance the issue, influence over 
election campaigns which can promote the issue and in particular, control over the party 
manifesto and over the spending commitments made in Leaders’ speeches. Yet these reforms 
took, in some cases, over a decade to achieve: it was not until 1992 that the union share in the 
electoral college for leadership selection was reduced from 40 to 33%; Kinnock’s Shadow 
Communications Agency was introduced in 1987 and continually battled for influence over 
everything from campaign slogans to party symbols
206
; reforms mandating women be 
represented on the NEC in proportion to their share in local constituency parties and in trade 
unions were not passed until 1991 and finally, the National Policy Forum, which replaced the 
conference’s role in voting on policy and instead is comprised of “representatives of MPs, 
                                                     
206
 See for example Gould (1988), p. 85-86. 
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MEPs, local councillors, women's organisations, black members and youth organisations” was 
not set up until 1992 and did not meet until 1993 (Alderman and Carter 1994, 328-329). 
 
This suggests that while electoral imperative may have been the driving force behind childcare 
policy adoption, the actual speed in which said adoption happened (measured both in terms of 
discussion in parliamentary debate and in campaign commitments) was mediated by the speed of 
internal party organisational reforms.  Labour – arguably once an 'activist-dominated party' in 
the terms used by Schumacher et. al. (2013) – became a more leadership-dominated party in part 
by the work of both male and female modernisers. Interestingly, Schumacher et. al. (2013) 
would code Labour as an activist-dominated party because their data (Laver and Hunt surveys), 
comes from 1992 - the point at which Labour was only beginning to emerge from a period of 
stark transition, and seemingly moving from a mass party to an electoral professional one (Katz 
and Mair, 1995; Panebianco, 1988).  
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Chapter Six: Comparing the cases: policy adoption as a function of electoral imperative 
and party reform  
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter will compare both the variables analysed and the conclusions gleaned from the US, 
Australian and UK cases. Section 6.2 will provide a brief comparison of the childcare policy 
background in each country, noting the broader history of childcare provision, the strength of 
and cooperation between childcare advocates when the issue first entered the legislative arena, 
initial legislative attempts to address the issue and the outcome in each country. Section 6.3 
compares the role of trade unions in addressing childcare policy across each country whilst 
Section 6.4, noting the broad correlation between childcare policy adoption and electoral change, 
compares shifting party-voter linkages in each country. Section 6.5 compares the quantitative 
results laid out in each chapter, assessing the extent to which replacement versus conversion 
effects mechanised, and union versus new politics characteristics drove, party position change 
within the three legislatures. It concludes that across the three countries, replacement did in fact 
mechanise change while the influence of post-materialist legislators
207
 drove said change. 
Finally, Section 6.6 highlights the fact that the gap in time between electoral change and policy 
adoption varies from country to country; it argues that these different gaps in time may be 
attributable to the different processes of organisational reform that were ongoing in each of the 
three parties near to the time they adopted childcare policy. It compares the content of 
organisational reforms which occurred in each party and highlights differences in the speed in 
which these were enacted. It finds that whilst party position change is driven by the rise of 
middle class, post-materialist members and legislators (and their attempt to attract like-minded 
voters to the party’s new electoral coalition), the time at which that policy adoption took place 
(in both the legislative and in electoral terms) was mediated by the speed in which party 
reformers were able to enact significant internal organisational change. 
 
6.2 Childcare policy history: comparing the US, Australia and the UK 
Although each country adopted emergency measures to provide childcare as part of the broader 
‘war effort’ during World War II,208 Chapters Three, Four and Five note that these were 
temporary structures, largely retrenched at the commencement of the post-war, male-
breadwinner era (Karch 2013, Brennan 1994, Randall 2000). Despite similar rates of female 
employment, legislative and electoral attention to the childcare issue arose amongst the 
Democratic Party in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Australian Labor Party during the early 
1980s and the British Labour Party in the mid-to-late 1990s. The Democrats’ attempt to 
                                                     
207 Relative to those with union backgrounds. 
208 Although the Australian response was less robust in comparison to that of the UK and the US (Brennan 1994, 
48). 
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implement a universal, federally funded childcare programme was stymied in the early 1970s by 
a Republican president and the complications of multiple veto points. Childcare policy 
subsequent to that had been split between means-tested, welfare-to-work type assistance and 
largely regressive childcare-related tax expenditure on middle-income families (Karch 2013, 
Cohen 2001). By contrast, in 1980s Australia the ALP were able to increase operational funding 
for non-profit childcare centres, wherein fees were paid on an income-sliding scale. In fact, by 
the mid 1980s the Australian policy reflected the Child Development Act as passed in 1971 by 
the Democratic-led Congress (Brennan 1994). British Labour, by contrast, placed childcare on 
its agenda during the mid-to-late 1990s and once in Government enacted a mixed system of 
supply and demand-led childcare policy proposals: Sure Start centres that provided care and 
parental training, tax-free employer childcare vouchers and, eventually, 12.5 weekly hours of 
free early education and care for 3 and 4 year olds (Lewis and Campbell 2007; Lloyd 2008; 
Seely 2011). 
 
But outside of political parties, what sort of coalitions lobbied for childcare?  In the run up to 
policy adoption, childcare lobby groups in each country were largely fragmented: in no country 
was feminist attention to the issue paramount, since their concerns were often centred upon equal 
pay, equal rights and reproductive issues (Brennan 1994, Cohen 2001). Moreover, there were 
divides between pre-school and long day childcare advocates (UK and Australia) (Brennan 
1994), socialist calls for free 24 hour childcare versus middle class oriented demands for 
increased childcare places, with an acceptance of fees (UK and to a limited extent Australia) 
(Randall 2000, Brennan 1994), divisions between unions and childcare advocacy groups over 
who would provide publicly funded services (US) (Karch 2013) and class-based arguments over 
what ultimate ends childcare should service (US) (Morgan 2001). Interestingly, in each country 
neither feminists nor childcare-specific advocacy groups have been identified as the key 
lobbyists (see for example Karch 2013 and Cohen 2001, Brennan 1994 and Randall 2000). 
Instead, the active interests – outside of political parties – include in the US, civil rights activists 
and female-dominated unions (Cohen 2001, Karch 2013), whereas in Australia, Brennan (1994) 
noted white-collar unions and increasingly feminised-blue collar unions, and in the UK, Randall 
(2000) pointed to female union activists and, to a limited extent, business interests such as the 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI) (Randall 2000, 89).  
 
6.3 Trade unions and childcare policy: addressing work/family balance in the US, Australia 
and the UK 
Is there evidence of a relationship between unions’ stance on childcare and broader work/family 
balance policies, and parties’ childcare policy adoption? This research has noted a quite neat 
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correlation between the peak of organised female labour mobilisation (the interaction effect 
between trade union density and female trade union membership) and each party’s adoption of 
childcare as an electoral issue (see Figure 1.15). Given the fact that much of the gendered 
Varieties of Capitalism literature suggests trade unions, at least in CMEs, would be resistant 
towards policies that facilitate female employment
209
 (Estevez-Abe 2009), is there any 
qualitative evidence to corroborate the correlation between organised female labour mobilisation 
and childcare policy adoption? 
 
Chapters Four and Five observed that the largest trade union confederations in Australia and the 
UK had a history of promoting the family wage,
210
 a policy antithetical to those that advocate 
female employment, with the ACTU only dropping this as official policy in 1977 (Brennan 
1998, 143) and the TUC during 1978 (Gelb 1989, 74). Both the ACTU but particularly the TUC 
opposed gender-based party reforms (Russell 2005, Coghlan and Denton 2012). The AFL-CIO 
opposed the ERA until as late as 1974 (Wolbrecht 2000, 154), whilst AFL-CIO executives such 
as president George Meany and COPE director Alex Barkan opposed reforms to the Democratic 
Party including those that would improve women’s representation (Dark 2001, 85).  
 
On the other hand, unions in the US and Australia were directly involved with efforts that 
promoted childcare: as discussed at length in Chapter Three, although they were not in the lead 
of the ad hoc child care coalition, representatives from the AFL-CIO, the National Education 
Association and American Federation of Teachers were all active, participating members (Cohen 
2001). Moreover, the ACTU negotiated the 1983 Accord with the ALP, which specifically 
designated childcare part of the national social wage.  The ALP then went on to give childcare its 
most dominant place in a federal election campaign yet; once in office, the ALP more than 
doubled the number of available childcare places within their first two years in office (Brennan 
1994, 165-66, 1974). The UK’s TUC, when it dropped its advocacy of the family wage in 1978, 
also issued “Charter for the Under 5’s” that called for flexible working hours and comprehensive 
childcare,” though it is unclear how strongly it was lobbied (Gelb 1989, 74).  
 
Part of the incongruity surrounding this qualitative evidence
211
 might speak to the differences 
between trade unions, specifically regarding demographics: some unions had a higher proportion 
of female members and indeed were more progressive on issues ranging from gender-based 
                                                     
209
 For fear that career breaks and part-time employment could depress wages. 
210
 See for example Charles 1983. 
211
 That trade unions have on the one hand issued statements, or as in the US, have been part of a coalition behind 
childcare whilst, on the other hand, have also supported anti-feminist policies such as the family wage or opposed 
measures promoting greater female representation within their own ranks. 
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quotas in political parties to work/family balance policies.
212
 These distinctions may not have 
been reflected by broader trade union confederation stances, as seen for example in differences 
between US unions over the McGovern-Fraser reforms.
213
 Similarly, Australian white-collar 
union confederations, such as the APSCA,
214
 promoted work/family issues including maternity 
leave and childcare during the mid 1970s - prior to ACTU even dropping their demands for a 
family wage (Brennan 1994, 143). Before the TUC endorsed gender-based quotas within the 
Labour Party, specific unions such as GMB APEX had endorsed them (Russell 2005, 102-108). 
The question remains, even in light of said cross-union variation: to what extent did the unions 
have influence over party policymakers in terms of childcare? And specifically, might union 
influence have been as strong as, or indeed stronger than electoral imperative?  
 
6.4 Electoral trends: shifting voter-party linkages in the US, Australia and the UK 
Chapter One showed that each party adopted the issue within the broader context of a loosening 
gender identification gap
215
 (i.e. where women/men as a singular category identify in greater 
proportion for one party of does the other gender) and within the context of a reduction in 
traditional class voting, as measured by both the Alford and Thomsen indices (see again Figures 
1.16 and 1.17). Such trends represented both challenges and opportunities for centre-left parties: 
dealignment from traditional allies such as blue-collar males threatened their electoral viability. 
However, they had a chance to shore up votes from the drop in centre-right identification 
amongst female and higher-educated males.  
 
The several charts in Chapters Three to Five that tracked party identification according to both 
gender and education found that between the 1960s and the late 1980s to early 2000s there was a 
drop off in centre-right support amongst female voters, and in particular the higher-educated 
female voters whom Kriesi identifies as being drawn towards left-liberal political value 
orientations (Kriesi 1999, 403). Whilst for the most part, the centre-right’s loss was the centre-
left’s gain, as Chapter Five pointed out, the British Labour Party was not able to fully capitalise 
on higher-educated women’s declining Conservative identity during the late 1980s and early 
1980s, since this group increased their Liberal-SDP/Liberal Democrat identity in tandem with 
                                                     
212
 See for example Russell on the “progressive bureaucracy” between female-dominated unions and Labour Party 
women (Russell 2005, 124) and and Dark on the fallout between progressive and female dominated unions and the 
AFL-CIO surrounding McGovern-Fraser (Dark 2001, 85). 
213 As discussed in Chapter Three, the AFL-CIO leadership opposed McGovern-Fraser whereas many of its 
affiliates, including the UAW, AFSCME and CWA supported them (Dark 2001, 85). 
214 As noted in Chapter Four, the white-collar unions of the APSCA affiliated with ACTU after the APSCA dissolved 
in 1979 (Griffin 2009, 15). 
215 In the US the gender gap began to loosen during the mid 1960s, immediately prior to the number of pieces of 
childcare legislation put forth by Democratic legislators and the appearance of universal childcare on Democratic 
Party Platforms. Unlike the UK and Australia, however, the gender identification gap did not just loosen over time 
but instead, from the 1980s it entirely reversed, wherein women now favour the Democratic Party in greater 
proportion than do men. 
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that of Labour until 2001. Lesser-educated females also increased their centre-left identification 
but while this was a (positive) reversal of fortunes’ for the centre-left in the UK and Australia, it 
did not buck any pre-existing trends in the US.  
 
Figure 6.1 collates each country’s Pedersen index of electoral volatility and finds that higher-
educated women displayed the highest average volatility rate in the roughly twenty years leading 
up to each parties’ adoption of the childcare issue216,: whereas the average rate of volatility for 
all groups ranged from five (US) to seven per cent (UK), that of higher-educated females ranged 
from seven (US) to 11% (UK). The next highest rate of volatility was amongst lesser-educated 
females, ranging from five (US) to seven per cent (UK). Both higher and less-educated males 
displayed lower than average rates of volatility in each country. Average volatility, for all 
groups, was lowest in the US (5.3), followed closely by Australia (5.7) and lastly the UK was 
most volatile (7.2). 
 
Figure 6.1 Electoral coalitional volatility, Pedersen index, US, UK, Australia (Sources: AES 1987, ANAP 1969, 1979, 
American Election Studies 1966-1992, British Election Studies, 1966-2001) 
 
Given females’ higher than average volatility, what cross-country trends underlie the gender 
identification gap? Chapter One displayed a reversal of the traditional gender identification gap 
across all three countries between the 1960s and the 1980s-1990s, though the extent of this 
varied across the three countries. Figure 6.2 below displays the amount of change in the 
traditional (conservative favouring) and modern (left favouring) identification gap between the 
approximate onset of each country’s gender-based dealignment and the time at which its centre-
left party adopted childcare as an electoral issue. To what extent were parties able to capitalise 
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 Start and end points are US (1954-1972); Australia (1967-1987); UK (1974-2001). 
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Electoral coalitional volatility, Pedersen index, US, UK, 
Australia 
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on the decline of the traditional gender identification gap by the time they adopted childcare as 
either an electoral or a legislative issue? Both the Democrats and the ALP were able to take 
advantage of shifting voter-party linkages to such an extent that their modern gender 
identification gaps increased more than their countries’ traditional gaps declined. By contrast in 
the UK, women as of 1997 identified as Conservative in lower proportion than men but Labour 
still were not able to fully capitalise on this: the modern gender identification gap lagged behind 
the decline in the traditional gap; indeed the traditional gap had to decline further than it had in 
the other two countries before Labour embraced childcare. Where the mismatch between the 
gaps suggests that some disaffected centre-right identifiers gravitated to smaller 
parties/independent identification as opposed to Labour, the timing issue suggests an inability to 
respond to changing electoral conditions, or what Kitschelt (1994) would call a lack of “strategic 
flexibility.”  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Change in gender identification gap at time of policy adoption (Sources: AES 1987, ANAP 1969, 1979, 
American Election Studies 1966-1992, British Election Studies, 1966-2001) 
 
The cross-country Alford and Thomsen indices (Figures 1.16 and 1.17)  which detail trends in 
class dealignment between 1945 and 1990 suggest that the initial post-war declines in class-party 
alignment occurred first in the US and Australia, with the UK lagging behind the two by 
approximately 10 years. Whilst this broadly fits the order in which each country’s centre-left 
party adopted the issue of childcare policy, the drop in the UK between 1970 and 1980 was far 
steeper than that which occurred in either the US or Australia, suggesting that by 1980 UK 
Labour would have had as much incentive to develop strategic new policies like childcare as did 
the Democrats and ALP at that same point in time. Figure 6.3 displays the amount of change in 
class voting that occurred before Labour’s childcare policy adoption: it indicates that, as with 
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Change in gender identification at policy adoption 
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gender-based electoral change, before adopting the issue Labour experienced more than twice as 
much class-based electoral change than had the other parties.  
 
 
Figure 6.3 Decrease in Thomsen index at time of childcare policy adoption (Source: Nieuwbeerta 2001, 125, 128) 
 
The combined effect of shifts in class and gender party identification does seem to indicate that 
the parties’ electoral bases were in a state of flux throughout the years leading up to childcare 
policy adoption and, as a corollary, suggests that these shifts would cause parties to respond to 
such electoral change by reassessing the contents of their electoral constituencies and/or 
undertaking a process of party modernisation/internal reorganisation (Kitschelt 1994). Their 
greatest opportunities seemed to lie with female and in particular, higher-educated female voters. 
This factor, considered alongside the steady increase in female employment that has occurred in 
each of these three countries over the past forty years (see Figure 1.12) would indicate that 
parties not only had functional reasons to advance childcare policy (e.g. a response to increased 
rates of female employment) but that they also had an electoral incentive to do so: the class and 
gender-based electoral dealignment that has occurred over the previous 30-40 years offered an 
opportunity for parties to develop new policies that would appeal to increasingly adrift voters.  
Although the shifts in each country’s traditional gender and class-party alignments surrounded 
centre-left parties’ decision to adopt childcare policy as both an electoral and a legislative issue, 
the cross-country, temporal variation in which these shifts occurred does not correlate as neatly 
with each party’s policy adoption as one might have expected, if electoral change was indeed the 
sole variable behind party policy adoption. This mismatch raises two questions: 1) to what extent 
might policy adoption be explained by the other hypothesised independent variable, trade union 
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influence and 2) to what extent was the impact of electoral change mediated by the hypothesised 
intervening variable, internal party reform? 
 
6.5 Quantifying the mechanisms and forces that fostered childcare policy adoption 
This research positions the issue of childcare policy adoption into the context of two shifting 
political relationships: on the one hand, policy adoption occurred during a time when trade 
unions, the centre-left’s traditional ally, saw an increase of female membership in its ranks and, 
as a consequence, began to consider the promotion of policies that foster work/family balance, 
such as flexible working and childcare (Cohen 2001, Karch 2013, Gelb 1989, Brennan 1994). On 
the other hand, the centre-left parties considered in this research adopted the issue (in both 
legislative and in electoral terms) during the broader context of shifting electoral conditions and 
an erosion of traditional party-voter linkages, which saw higher-educated male voters and female 
votes increasingly dealigned from their longstanding party family, the centre-right (Kitschelt 
1994, Häusermann 2010, 14).  
 
This research employed Rapoport and Stone’s model of party change in order to determine 
whether a party’s policy adoption (here measured in the legislative sense, meaning the 
proportion of Labour/ALP MPs who debated childcare/ the proportion of House Democrats who 
co-sponsored childcare bills) was mechanised by legislator conversion or legislator replacement. 
Conversion indicates that change in the party’s position on childcare was mechanised by 
legislators who shifted their position, and thus change may be have been driven by pressure on 
legislators to reverse previous stances/move from ambivalence to decisiveness on the issue. 
Replacement indicates that change was mechanised by new legislators coming into the party and 
replacing old legislators who had different positions on the issue and, presumably different 
background characteristics. An influx of new legislators may suggest a broader strategy to 
change the face of the party and as a consequence, the types of voters it appeals to.  
 
Once the mechanism, conversion or replacement, is found OLS regressions are then run in order 
to test whether a) an association exists between legislators debating/co-sponsoring childcare and 
having a particular background (e.g. blue-collar, union-oriented versus higher-educated, post-
materialist) and b) that the association runs in the same direction that the Rapoport and Stone 
results would lead us to expect. For example, if the Rapoport and Stone model found that 
childcare policy adoption was predominantly mechanised by conversion, we may assume that an 
outside force lobbied/pressured legislators into making that change. However, we would not 
know who exactly lobbied them. If the OLS regression then found a positive and significant 
association between having a union background and speaking on childcare/co-sponsoring 
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childcare legislation, then we may interpret that the two findings, in combination, suggest union 
pressure (more so than legislator replacement and electoral imperative) was a driving force in the 
parties’ adoption of childcare policy.217 If, on the other hand, the Rapoport and Stone model 
found replacement to dominate the process of party position change, the OLS regressions will 
tell us whether those new legislators supporting childcare did indeed have a background 
associated with post-materialism and new politics orientation. These two findings, in 
combination, would then suggest that party modernisation and perhaps, parties’ strategies to 
attract higher-educated, middle-income voters were the driving forces behind party position 
change. 
 
a. Change mechanised by legislator replacement or conversion: comparing 
Rapoport and Stone results 
Table 6.1 indicates that replacement effects far outweighed conversion as the force mechanising 
party position change in each of three parties under examination.  
 
 
Change, 
% 
Conversion, 
% 
Replacement, 
% 
Mobilisation, 
% 
House 
Democrats, 1969-
1990
218
 
24 1 98 1 
House ALP, 
1972-1987 
 
42 9 68 23 
Labour, 1979-
2001 
 
34 7 57 36 
Table 6.1 Rapoport and Stone comparison (Sources: Congressional Record 1965-74, Thomas 2014; Commonwealth of 
Australia Hansard 2013; House of Commons Hansard, 2013) 
The size of party position change, in the legislative sense, is measured as the change in the 
proportion of legislators who either co-sponsored childcare legislation or debated it on the 
legislature floor between points T1 and T2. As Table 6.1 shows, the largest amount of change 
                                                     
217 This does not suggest that there were no other factors driving position change, however, the purpose of these 
analyses is to test the relevant importance of a particular set of factors. 
218 Two Rapoport and Stone models were run for the US Democrats: the first model identified T1 at the 90 th 
Congress (T2 remained the same). Here change was 34% and conversion higher, at seven per cent. However, the 
90th Congress featured fiver fewer bills than did the 91st, so to avoid the risk of the model being skewed (this is 
particularly a concern for the OLS regressions), T1 in this comparison chart, as well as with the OLS regression 
models refers to the 91st Congress. As explained in Chapter Three, T1 occurs far later into the adoption process in 
the US than in Australia or the UK, because there was no concerted effort to develop childcare legislation before 
1967 and thus nothing to measure. 
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occurred amongst the ALP, followed by Labour and finally the Democrats: between T1 and T2 
co-sponsorship rates increased by 24% amongst the US Democrats whereas the proportion of 
MPs who debated childcare increased 34% amongst UK Labour and by 42% amongst the ALP.  
 
Conversion accounted for less than 10% of change in all parties; although it is the highest 
amongst the ALP where perhaps it should be recalled, the main trade union confederation, 
ACTU, jointly with the ALP, formulated the 1983 ‘Accord,’ which designated childcare costs 
“part of the national social wage” (Brennan 1994, 165-66). Replacement and mobilisation by 
contrast, accounted for 91-99% of change within all parties. The mobilisation effect is similar to 
replacement in that it indicates the proportion of change mechanised by newcomers but accounts 
for the fact that in each party, there were more newcomers at T2 than there were dropouts at T1. 
Each of the three parties had more seats at T2 than T1, though Labour experienced the greatest 
increase: the mobilisation effect was lower amongst the Democrats (1%) than either the ALP 
(23%) or Labour (36%).  
 
b.  Change associated with union background or new politics characteristics: 
comparing  OLS regressions 
 
Whereas the Rapoport and Stone equations helped identify the mechanism behind party position 
change, regression analyses tested for associations between co-sponsoring/debating childcare 
and several socio-demographic characteristics, in attempt to determine the relative importance of 
the two hypothesised drivers behind policy adoption, union pressure and electoral imperative.  
    
 Democrats T1 
(1969-71) 
ALP T1 
(1972-1974) 
Labour T1 
(1979-1983) 
Female .205 (.262) N/A 1.067***(.194) 
University .204 (.159) .299*(.124) -.031 (.089) 
Union/COPE-
ADA 
-.003 (.002) -.099 (.130) -.160
+
(.091) 
Ministerial/Cmte 2.26***(.221) .737**(.247) .136 (.142) 
Southern -.335***(.079) N/A N/A 
(Constant) .225 (.169) .113(.086) .209 (.087) 
R
2
 .385 .229 .117 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1  
Table 6.2 OLS regressions, T1 comparison (Sources: Congressional Record, Sharp 2000; Commonwealth of Australia 
Hansard; Hansard Milbank) 
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 Democrats T2 
(1989-91) 
ALP T2 
(1984-1987) 
Labour T2 
(1997-2001) 
Female .397 (.247) 1.418**(.478) 1.400***(.316) 
University -.190 (.506) .473
+
(.268) .351 (.336) 
Union/COPE-
ADA 
-.011* (.004) .055 (.886) -.004 (.301) 
Ministerial/Cmte .446*(.119) -1.192 (1.25) 6.493***(1.11) 
Southern -.566***(.122) N/A N/A 
(Constant) 1.294*(.509) .665**(.221) .457 (.328) 
R
2
 .161 .131 .123 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1  
Table 6.3 OLS regressions, T2 comparison (Sources: Congressional Record, Sharp 2000; Commonwealth of Australia 
Hansard; Hansard Milbank) 
 
As Tables 6.2 and 6.3 indicate, gender has a mixed but, in the case of Labour and the ALP, a 
very positive, association with childcare policy debate/co-sponsorship at both T1 and T2: for 
example, the relationship is positive but not significant in the US at both points in time, whereas 
controlling for all other variables, it is positive and significant at the 99.9% confidence level 
amongst Labour MPs at both T1 and T2 and ALP MPs at T2.
219
 The reasons for the lack of a 
significant association in the US are multi-causal and perhaps beyond the scope of this research. 
However, one avenue for inspection would be numbers in Congress: at T1 women made up just 
2.5% of House Democrats and at T2, 5.3%. Moreover the difference could be attributable to the 
different dependent variables, co-sponsorship versus debating. Co-sponsorship, in the US, may 
require a greater degree of networking and particular committee placements, than would simply 
debating the issue in either the UK or Australian parliaments. 
 
University education poses similarly mixed results: controlling for all other variables at T1 
(when childcare was not yet adopted in either the Labour Party or the ALP), university education 
was positively and significantly associated (at the 95
% 
confidence level in Australia) but not 
significant amongst the Democrats or British Labour. The pattern prevails at T2, with university 
still being positively and significantly associated with debate amongst ALP MPs (but not 
amongst Democrats or British Labour), controlling for all other variables. Part of the reason for 
university education’s null association with co-sponsorship in the US could relate to the 
                                                     
219 There were no female ALP MPs during T1. 
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proportion of House Democrats who already by T1 had a university education: 93%. University 
education was the norm amongst House Democrats to such an extent that it would be unlikely to 
differentiate a post-materialist-oriented from a traditionalist-oriented legislator. In fact, 
legislators without university education were not associated with higher COPE scores.
220
  
 
What is negatively associated with childcare debate/co-sponsorship? The evidence broadly 
suggests variables related to blue-collar and/or socially conservative backgrounds. For example, 
controlling for all other variables at T1, there is a negative association with having a union 
background
221
 and debating/co-sponsoring childcare in all three parties; though the association is 
only significant in the UK. By T2, the relationship remains negative and is indeed significant in 
the US, remains negative but not significant in the UK and finally, positive but insignificant in 
Australia. A further control for the Democrats, which tests for the effects of representing a 
Southern state is negative and significant at the 99.9% confidence level at both T1 and T2, 
suggesting further the negative association between traditional, socially conservative party 
stalwarts and childcare policy co-sponsorship.  
 
Possible (though by no means concrete) characteristics associated post-materialism, such as 
gender and higher-education are, for the most part, associated with childcare debate amongst 
ALP and Labour MPs at both T1 and T2. Controlling for all other variables, these associations 
are not significant in the US at either T1 or T2, however this could be related to the number of 
female House Democrats, as discussed above. By contrast, other proxies for post-materialist 
orientation in the US context include a legislator’s ADA score and, as shown immediately above, 
their COPE score relative to ADA score. Tables 3.4 and 3.5 indicate that a legislator’s ADA 
score at both T1 and T2 is indeed positively and significantly associated with co-sponsorship
222
, 
and here we see that COPE-ADA scores have a negative relationship with co-sponsorship, 
controlling for all other variables, at both T1 and T2 and that this association is significant at T2. 
This implies that legislators whose COPE score (union orientation) is higher than their ADA 
(left-liberal orientation) are negatively associated with co-sponsorship. The hypothesised 
association between unionism and childcare is further weakened when one considers the 
negative association is significant in the UK at T1 but insignificant in both the UK and Australia 
at T2. Overall, it seems that, across all three parties, the relative influence of new politics, post 
materialist characteristics are stronger and more positive than are traditional blue-collar unionist 
characteristics. Similar summary tables for both T1 and T2 with the results from the binary 
                                                     
220 For T1: Pearson’s correlation coefficient of .125 with p value of .057; for T2: .082 and .196, respectively. 
221 For the ALP and Labour, ‘union background’ denotes having previously worked for a trade union. For the 
Democrats it implies having a higher COPE score relative to ADA score.  
222 At the 95% confidence level at T1 and the 99.9% confidence level at T2. 
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logistic regressions appear in Appendix D. With small variation, they are in accordance with the 
results presented above.  
 
c.  Characteristics of legislator replacement within the Democrats, ALP and Labour 
The Rapoport and Stone model indicated that party change was mechanised by replacement and 
the OLS regressions suggested that those legislators who co-sponsored/debated were associated 
more with a post-materialistic background/new politics orientation than trade-unionist/blue 
collar history. But to what extent did legislator replacement actually occur? And was there in fact 
an increase in legislators with post-materialistic characteristics coupled with a decrease in those 
with traditional blue-collar union-oriented characteristics?  
 
As indicated by Figures 3.9, 4.9 and 5.8 the largest increases in female and university-educated 
legislators occurred in Australia and the UK, where for example between T1 and T2 there was an 
eight percentage point increase in the number of female ALP MPs and a 30 percentage point 
increase in the number of university educated MPs; between T1 and T2 there was a 17 
percentage point increase in the number of female Labour Party MPs and a 21 percentage point 
increase in the number of university educated MPs. Legislators with a trade union background 
dropped 30 percentage points in the ALP and 13 percentage points in Labour. Whereas the shifts 
in university educated MPs in the US were noticeably smaller (three percentage points), the 
average nominal ADA score rose by 23 percentage points relative to COPE increase of eight 
percentage points, suggesting an influx of more new politics oriented MPs, albeit on just one of 
the dimensions analysed here.
223
  
 
d.  Childcare policy adoption: the post-materialists’ natural policy response or a 
 demonstration of strategic electoral appeals? 
 The three previous sections found that a) each party’s policy adoption was mechanised by 
legislator replacement, b) driven by legislators with characteristics normally associated with a 
post-materialist background and that c) the process of legislator replacement that occurred in 
each of the three parties was for the most part dominated by the entrance of higher-educated, 
more female and more socially liberal legislators. They replaced a large proportion of the male, 
lesser-educated and somewhat unionist old-guard. But to what extent can one argue that these 
parties adopted childcare due to electoral imperative, in other words to attract fellow higher-
educated, middle-income men and women to the party’s fold? Or can one convincingly argue 
that childcare policy adoption was simply new legislators exerting their own personal policy 
                                                     
223 However, as noted in Chapter Three, the lack of time-adjusted COPE scores makes over time COPE score 
comparison difficult. 
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desires onto their party’s policy agenda? Or that they were not attempting to attract a new 
constituency but rather catering to a group of voters they had already won over? 
 
On the one hand it seems unrealistic to suggest that parties are controlled by a handful of inter-
generational puppet masters who from the early 1960s noticed gradual shifts in their country’s 
traditional party-voter linkages and set into place a long-term strategy to attract post-materialist 
legislators who would adopt similarly post-materialist strategic appeals and, within the course of 
up to thirty-plus years, decidedly win over higher-educated, middle-income (i.e. post-materialist) 
voters. On the other hand, it seems naïve to expect that these post-materialist legislators, be they 
Blair’s New Labour or “Watergate babies,” were purely motivated by their own personal policy 
goals and had no electoral foresight when they pushed childcare onto their legislative agendas or, 
in the case of party members, awarded the issue a dominant space on their party’s manifestos. 
The natural response thesis, which argues that childcare policy adoption was not a product of 
electoral imperative, would implicitly suggest that party members and legislators needed to a 
reach a critical mass of ‘post-materialism’ before the party as a whole could in fact adopt the 
issue.
224
 Moreover, if childcare policy were not an electoral appeal we might expect its adoption 
to have occurred well into the process of class dealignment, and in particular, after the traditional 
gender identification/vote gap had been eclipsed: this would suggest parties viewed the policy as 
an ideal that catered to their large, post-materialist electoral constituency, rather than one that 
would attract an as yet unproven electoral bloc. 
 
Yet this does not appear to be the case in the US. Here, in both legislative and in electoral (i.e. 
party platform) terms, the Democrats’ adopted childcare policy after the traditional gender 
identification gap had begun to decline but before the modern gender identification gap took 
shape: the modern gap was 4.3 in 1972, just smaller than it had been in 1968 and much smaller 
than it would eventually become (it would reach 14 by 1996). Moreover, the Child Development 
bill, although drawn up by two ‘left-liberals’ (Mondale and Brademas), passed the Democratic-
led Congress before the party experienced a significant shift in the background of its 
Representatives: at the time of passage the proportion of female and university educated House 
Democrats as well as their average adjusted ADA score were all below their mean and median 
figures for the period of the 90
th
 to 101
st
 Congresses (see Figure 3.9).  
 
                                                     
224 If they did not have the requisite power within the party to do so, they would need to provide their fellow party 
members, such as legislative committee heads and national executives, with a convincing reason for adopting the 
policy. Arguably, their convincing reason would be couched in electoral terms and, as such, policy adoption would 
be an electoral appeal and not a natural response to the entry of new politics oriented legislators. 
 211 
In Australia, the shift in legislator characteristics seemed to move in tandem with shifts in 
electoral behavior: Figure 4.9 shows that after 1975 there was a precipitous decrease in the trade 
unionist MPs (concurrent with a proportionate increase in university-educated MPs). It was 
during the 1970s
225
 that class voting dropped 30% however by 1983-1984, when childcare was 
placed so prominently within the ALP manifestos as well as the 32
nd
 Parliament (1980-83), when 
ALP members produced such a stark uptick in their discussion of the issue,
226
 the traditional 
gender vote gap had yet to be eclipsed. Moreover, as Chapter Four discussed, the ALP undertook 
a series of polls in market research on the issue, with Sen. Susan Ryan stating in 1981 that “[i]f 
the same percentage of women as men voted ALP at the 1977 election, the ALP would be in 
Government today”227 (ALP 1981, 5). 
 
Amongst UK Labour, post-materialists, as measured by the proportion of university, female and 
non-trade union MPs in Parliament appeared to gain a foothold between 1983 and 1987.
228
 
However, unlike their ALP counterparts, shifts in legislator characteristics did not move in 
tandem with electoral behaviour: although the traditional gender vote gap had been in a process 
of decline, Figure 1.19 shows that the decreased traditional gender vote gap was not mirrored by 
an increase in the modern gender vote gap until the 1990s. In other words Labour was not 
necessarily rewarded for the Conservatives’ loss, in part due to the rising popularity of left-
liberal parties such as the Liberal-Social Democratic Alliance relative to Labour (see for 
example Figures 5.1 and 5.3).
229
 In fact, Labour did not begin to make steady gains with higher-
educated women until after the 1987 election and with lower-educated women until after the 
1992 election.  
 
Whereas Figure 1.11 displays a steady increase in the number of UK Labour’s childcare-related 
debate mentions from 1983 and in particular 1987, which progressed steadily until 2001 (the end 
of the time period under examination), the number of manifesto words and Leader’s speech 
commitments to the issue did not take off until the 1992 and 1997 campaigns. Chapter Five 
discussed how party strategists sold the issue of work-family policies to the Labour party elite as 
female vote winning issues.
230
 As discussed in Chapter Five and shown in the increase of 
                                                     
225 As explained in Chapter Four there was only one Australian Election Survey during the 1970s. 
226 By 56% since the prior parliament.  
227 This argument was nearly identical to the one British Labour’s Patricia Hewitt and Shadow Communication 
Agency representative Deborah Mattinson would employ in “Women’s Votes: The Key to Winning” (1989). In fact, 
Hewitt and Mattinson cited the ALP’s success with middle-income women in their directive to the Labour Party on 
making strategic appeals to female voters.   
228 This is when their median figure for the period of 1970-2001 was eclipsed. 
229 The Liberals’ gender identification gap was positive (i.e. more females than males identification with them) 
throughout the BES time series under examination (from six per cent in 1964 to 27 per cent in 2001).  
230 It also pointed to party strategy documents from the late 1980s which emphasised the importance of developing 
work-family policies as a strategic appeal and even pointed to the Democrats’ and the ALP’s success with closing 
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manifesto and leadership speech attention, they were ultimately successful by the 1992 and 1997 
elections, despite a long journey to that point. That disjuncture between legislators’ emphasis on 
the issue, which increased starkly from 1983, and that of the party manifesto’s commitment to 
the issue may point to the importance of internal organisational reform and in particular, the 
balance of leadership/parliamentary party power versus rank-and-file power in setting party 
policy and managing electoral campaigns. 
 
6.6 Mediating policy change: the importance of parties’ internal organisational reforms 
a.  The speed and content of reforms 
This research suggests that childcare policy is one measure of a centre-left party’s willingness to 
respond to electoral change, in the sense that adopting childcare policy, in either legislative or 
campaign terms is a means of reaching out to new electoral constituencies. However, there was 
stark variation in the speed in which these three parties adopted childcare policy that may be due 
to differences between each party’s internal organisations. More specifically, the different gaps 
in time between the onset of class and gender-based electoral change and a party’s adoption of 
childcare policy may be explained by differences in the speed and depth of each party’s 
organisational reform process. 
 
As discussed in Chapters Three, Four and Five, the Democrats, ALP and Labour all underwent 
significant internal party reforms that sought to 1) increase the representation of females and 
minorities within internal party decision making bodies (and in the UK, parliamentary 
candidates), 2) reduce the internal party power of extreme factions and affiliated interest groups, 
predominantly trade unions, and relatedly, 3) centralise a greater degree of power around the 
party leadership and parliamentary party. For clarity, the concept of ‘party modernisation’ or 
‘party reform’ is here broken down into two separate categories: modernisation via media and 
public relations strategy (e.g. sophisticated polling, use of media strategists, such as Labour’s 
Shadow Communications Agency) and modernisation via internal organisational reforms of 
decision making structures (e.g. quotas on conference delegations, changes to candidate and 
leadership selection rules, changes to the process of party policy development).
231
 ALP and 
Labour Party leaders approved a shift in media strategies (targeting middle-income families and 
work-life balance issues) from the late 1970s
232
 and the mid 1980s
233
, respectively. This was 
                                                                                                                                                                           
the gender vote gap by addressing such issues (Mattinson 2010, Hewitt and Mattinson 1989 and see also Harman 
and Coote 1992). 
231 This is not to argue that the two are mutually exclusive; for example, Chapter Five notes that Neil Kinnock and 
his Shadow Communications Agency faced pushback from the Labour Party bureaucracy, but for purposes of clarity 
the two types of party reform are treated here as distinct. 
232 For example Chapter Four discussed Whitlam campaigning on childcare in middle class, Sydney suburbs as well 
as Hayden’s decision to go further in campaigning on family issues than Whitlam was willing to do. 
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approximately 10 years after traditional gender identification gaps began to erode in Australia 
and 20 years after they began to erode in the UK. Assessing a specific shift in the Democrats’ 
media strategy is somewhat more difficult given the fragmentation of campaigns for the 
presidency, different chambers of Congress
234
 and state and local-level campaigns.  
 
The gender-based and party centralising reforms, which comprise the second category of party 
modernisation outlined above, occurred fastest in the already more leadership-oriented structure 
of the US Democrats,
235
 next in the ALP, where the federal party was able to intervene in state-
level parties under a series of extreme, exogenous circumstances,
236
 and finally occurred last in 
UK Labour, where any reforms had to make their way through 1) a battling contingent of 
factions within the party and 2) a decision making structure with multiple veto points, wherein 
any rule changes needed to pass through at least two forums
237
 before making it to the 
conference floor, where voting was largely dominated by trade unions.
238
 These distinctions are 
set out in Table 6.4 below.   
 
As Table 6.4 shows, if one were to assess the amount of time elapsed between the first decline in 
the Alford Index (identified at 1965 in the US and Australia, 1975 in the UK)
239
 and the first 
attempt at securing a substantive party-centralising organisational change (i.e. in candidate 
selection procedures, conference voting) we would see a timeframe of just six years in the US, as 
opposed to five to nine years in Australia and nine years in the UK. If, on the other hand, we 
were to measure the amount of time between the first decline in the Alford index and the first 
successful centralising reform, then we would see time elapse six years in the US, five to nine 
years in Australia and twelve to fifteen years in the UK. When analysing organisational reform 
within the context of shifts in the traditional gender identification gap and gender-based reforms, 
this ordered pattern remains: the amount of time elapsed between the first decline in the 
traditional gender identification gap (identified at 1966 in both the US and the UK, 1969 in 
Australia) and the first attempt at securing gender-based organisational reforms (e.g. quotas on 
decision making bodies, institutions that promote female candidate selection) was five years in 
                                                                                                                                                                           
233 Kinnock brought in advertising executives Peter Mandelson, Deborah Mattinson and Philip Gould to run the 
Shadow Communications Agency in 1986 (Mattinson 2010). 
234 For example the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC) has different offices, staff and leadership 
from the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC).  
235 As outlined in Chapter Three, the head of McGovern-Fraser commission controlled the processes’ entire agenda 
and prevented state-level or union-based complaints from reaching the floor. 
236 Such as Whitlam’s 1970 intervention into the Victoria state-ALP as well as subsequent (1980) interventions into 
Queensland and Sydney local branches. 
237 Any proposal would have to be drawn up a particular Labour Party Committee, put before the NEC (which 
during the 1980s was union-dominated and had few female representatives) and upon passage by the NEC would 
have to be agreed to by a full conference vote (Russell 2005, 105-107). 
238 Unions held 90% of conference votes before the conference voting reform of 1990 (Russell 2005, 40). 
239 Specifically when the Alford index became lower than the median for the entire time period examined in Figure 
1.15 (1945-90). 
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the US, nine to twelve years in Australia and sixteen years in the UK. The amount of time 
between that first decline in the traditional gender identification gap and the first successful 
attempt at securing gender-based reforms would again, see five years elapse in the US, twelve in 
Australia and twenty in the UK.  
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US Australia UK 
Decline in class 
voting until 
party 
centralising 
reforms 
proposed 
6 (McGovern-
Fraser in 1971 – 
baseline 1965240) 
5 (federal intervention 
into state party 
delegations’ 
composition in 1970) 
to 9 (Committee of 
Inquiry and its union 
findings in 1978) 
(baseline 1965) 
9 (OMOV proposals 
rejected in 1984) 
(baseline 1975)241 
Decline in class 
voting until 
party 
centralising 
reforms enacted 
6 (McGovern-
Fraser in 1971 – 
baseline 1965) 
5 (federal intervention 
into state party 
delegations’ 
composition in 1970) 
to 9 (Committee of 
Inquiry and its union 
findings in 1978) 
(baseline 1965) 
12 (electoral college 
compromise in 
1987) to 15 
(conference voting 
reform in 1990) 
(baseline 1975) 
Decline in 
traditional 
gender vote gap 
until gender 
based reforms 
proposed 
5 (McGovern-
Fraser in 1971) 
(baseline 1966) 
12 (25% female 
representation in 
conference 
delegations/on policy 
committees in 1981) 
(baseline 1969) 
16 (OWOS rejected 
in 1982) (baseline 
1966) 
Decline in 
traditional 
gender vote gap 
until gender 
based reforms 
enacted 
5 (McGovern-
Fraser in 1971) 
(baseline 1966) 
12 (25% female 
representation in 
conference 
delegations/on policy 
committees in 1981) 
(baseline 1969) 
20 (limited OWOS 
approved in 1986) 
to 23 (quotas on 
female 
representation in 
delegations on party 
decision making 
bodies in 1989) 
(baseline 1966) 
Table 6.4 Impact of party reform: space between electoral change and childcare policy adoption 
                                                     
240
 A baseline of 1965 is applied to the US and Australia because the Alford and Thomsen index data only measure 
class voting in ten-year intervals; it is clear that the decline commenced during 1960-1970 interval, so its mid-point 
is employed.  
241
 A baseline of 1975 is applied the UK because the Alford and Thomsen index data only measure class voting in 
ten year intervals; it is clear that the decline commenced during 1970-1980 interval, so its mid-point is employed. 
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b.  Explaining variation in time elapsed 
Why did these reforms take so much longer for Labour than for the Democrats? Why were the 
ALP in the middle? Labour’s delayed response may be partly attributable to factional battles 
within the party and quite simply, the refusal of traditional hard-liners on both the right and the 
left to come to terms with the party’s electoral failures and negative public image. When hard-
leftists such as the CLPD took key positions within the decision making bodies such as in local 
constituency parties, but in particular on the NEC during the mid-to-late 1970s, it was difficult 
for moderates (such as the LCC) and Kinnock to take back control and centralise power into the 
hands of the leadership. Moreover, the then-dominant power of the trade unions that permeated 
through local constituency parties up to the NEC meant that for the most part, any attempt to 
centralise power in the leadership’s hands or apportion a fixed level of decision making power to 
women was met with fierce resistance at every level. In other words, the multiple veto points that 
were inherent in the Labour Party’s structure reinforced a struggle between union dominance and 
leftist power that came at the expense of centrists. 
 
At the start of the ALP’s modernisation process federal leader Gough Whitlam was perhaps at 
even more of a disadvantage than his UK Labour counterparts: as set out in Chapter Four, extra-
parliamentary dominance over the parliamentary party was so great that the federal 
parliamentary leader was, in 1966, barred from attending the national conference. The extremely 
decentralised nature of the party precluded national standards over conference delegation, 
candidate selection and campaign management. But it was also this decentralised, disorganised 
structure, in combination with electoral imperative and exogenous factors that allowed Whitlam 
an opportunity for overhaul: when in 1970 the Victoria branch’s increasingly dominant middle 
class membership deemed the state party’s leadership illegitimate and accused it of being co-
opted by a left-wing union organisation, Whitlam was keen to draw on the Wyndham 
recommendations and intervene. When at the 1970 federal conference the more moderate South 
Australia branch co-opted the Victorian executive by siding with Whitlam, the federal branch 
was able to suspend the Victoria branch, place moderates into its leadership, mandate that 
conference delegations feature a 60:40 union-constituency ratio and encourage more local 
branch participation in policy-making. By 1972 the Victoria ALP had turned around its electoral 
fortunes and won several middle class suburban seats (Jupp 1982, 94-97). This set a precedent 
for similar interventions into the electorally unsuccessful Queensland state branch and local 
Sydney branch in 1980. Moreover, the enforced replacement of hard-line unionists and left-
wingers with the party’s increasingly moderate, higher-educated membership arguably paved the 
way for an easier adoption of the gender-based reforms which passed the national conference in 
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1981.   
 
The Democrats’ McGovern-Fraser reforms sped along the quickest in part because of fewer veto 
points: for example, rule changes such as those related to McGovern-Fraser did not need to be 
put up for a conference vote. Furthermore, AFL-CIO executives could have tried to pressure 
DNC members to vote against the reforms but trade unions (unlike in the UK and Australia) are 
not able to officially affiliate to the Democrats at either the state or national level, and as such 
they had no direct representatives on the Democratic National Committee to veto the reforms. 
The absence of those two significant veto points were bolstered by personal and procedural 
factors related to the reform process: the Chairman, Larry O’Brien, was received as a 
compromise candidate between the traditional base and new politics members whilst O’Brien’s 
direct control over the reform processes’ agenda enabled him to separate the DNC executive 
from the full committee and earn the executives’ approval before presenting the reforms to the 
full committee. Both committees also felt pressure to reform given the fact they met twice a year 
(and Congressional elections are held more frequently, for example, than UK general elections). 
 
However, the depth of the reforms did vary from country to country, with the Democrats 
arguably undertaking the narrowest gender-based reforms (loosely-defined gender-based quotas 
to conference delegations as set out in McGovern-Fraser
242
), followed by the ALP (gender-based 
quotas in conference delegations and on decision making bodies in the 1980s. Quotas on trade 
union delegations were not set until 1994 and pre-selections until 2002) and lastly UK Labour, 
where, after a slow start, the party ensured female representation on intra-party decision making 
bodies, in constituency and trade union delegations to the national conference, secured OWOS in 
non-Labour incumbent seats and finally, in 1993, secured all-women shortlists.  
 
From the lens of party centralisation, a comparison of depth is not as simple: whereas in the US, 
35 states’ candidate selections occur through open primaries and are thus less accountable to the 
smoke-filled room of party insiders that would have controlled nominations pre-McGovern-
Fraser, it is now argued that a candidate’s ability to win a nomination is conditioned by party-
linked interest groups and activists (see for example Masket 2011, Bawn et. al. 2012, Cohen et al 
2008). Candidate selection procedures in both Australia and the UK have become increasingly 
less beholden to trade unions and in particular trade union bloc votes – thus ostensibly promoting 
a vision of party ‘democracy,’ though here elements of centralisation are more apparent: for 
example the Labour Party leadership have intervened in candidate selection procedures and 
                                                     
242 McGovern-Fraser also fostered the development of primaries, which helped remove broker power status from the 
unions. However this did not directly engender a higher level of female political representation. 
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vetoed particular candidates (see for example Hopkin 2001).
243
  
 
c.  Party transformation 
Chapter Two noted Katz and Mair’s (1995) and Panebianco’s (1988) arguments on party change, 
and the extent to which they state traditional mass-based, bottom-up party organisations have 
transformed into either ‘catch-all’ or ‘electoral-professional’ parties, largely characterised by 
“de-ideologisation, weak electoral links, and centralisation of power around the party leadership” 
(Hopkin and Paolucci 1999, 308). To what extent did the Democrats, ALP and Labour meet this 
requirement, before and after their reform processes? Although the leadership of the pre-
McGovern-Fraser era Democrats was more empowered than for example, their Labour Party 
counterparts,
244
 Chapter Three does outline a party which before 1972 was influenced by labour 
unions disproportionate to their size in the overall apparatus, and especially considering their 
lack of official affiliation with the party. Frustrations over Humphrey’s ability to swing the 1968 
nomination despite his not fighting a single primary allowed the commencement of reform: 
whereas the primary elections that resulted out of McGovern-Fraser were characterised as 
‘democratising’ they, in effect, removed power from traditional unionist brokers and placed it 
into the hands of an increasingly post-materialist party base. 
 
 The Australian Labor Party, electorally unsuccessfully and perceived as a male, union 
dominated ‘black box’ (see Chapter Four on the ‘faceless men’) at both the state and federal 
levels had a large membership base. However it is not clear this base was still the homogenous 
group who fostered bottom-up policy-making by the 1960s. In fact, the party was becoming an 
increasingly heterogeneous group of members who were nonetheless overpowered by hard-line 
factions that had managed to secure leadership positions. Whitlam’s interventions into the state-
level parties centralised power into the hands of the federal leadership by mandating particular 
delegation and selection processes, as well as requiring that power be distributed to a more 
heterogeneous political base (Jupp 1982). Subsequent leaders turned to targeted polling (Huntley 
2003) and employed more strategic media campaigns (Sawer 1990) and indeed a greater degree 
of control over election campaigns (Keating 2010). 
 
Like Australia, Labour had historically maintained a large, direct and homogenous membership 
base typical of the post-war mass-member party structure. However by the time Kinnock came 
to power, there had already been a decline in traditional members concurrent with an influx of 
                                                     
243 The differentiating depth of reforms is not posited to be the explanatory variable behind each country’s different 
childcare policy trajectories, but rather make the simple point that although Labour started behind its counterparts in 
terms of both campaigning for and indeed promoting women within its own organisation, it eventually eclipsed both 
the ALP and the Democrats on the promotion aspect. 
244 As indicated by the relative ease in which the transformational reforms of McGovern-Fraser were passed. 
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middle class, hard-leftists who were able to take over several local constituency parties and make 
significant gains into internal party decision making bodies. Superficially the party have 
appeared to be a ‘bottom-up’ organisation but in fact it was becoming one where the bottom was 
increasingly fractured and at odds with one and other. Reforms starting with the Kinnock-era 
allowed the hard-left to be pushed out of key positions and also, dampened the unions’ power 
over internal decision making on issues ranging from leadership selection to policy-making. The 
party’s Shadow Communications Agency brought forth an era of targeting polling, focus groups 
and media training whilst its new policy-making structures reasserted PLP control over 
campaign issues (Perrigo 1996, Russell 2005, Shaw 1993), all of which led to traditionalists’ 
complaints that “policy was increasingly subordinated to strategic considerations” (Bashevkin 
2000, 410-411). 
 
d.  Linking organisational change to policy adoption 
Whilst this chapter has outlined the imperative behind each party’s organisational change and in 
this section, discussed variance in both the speed and depth of reforms that passed through each 
party, and the extent to which parties have ‘changed,’ the question remains: what is the explicit 
link between a party’s organisational change and their adoption of childcare policy? This 
depends on how the dependent variable – childcare policy adoption – is measured.  
 
In the US attention to childcare in the legislative arena increased from the late 1960s to early 
1970s, starting with Mink’s 1967 legislation and followed by the series of universal childcare 
bills proposed in the run up to 1971’s Child Development Act. To what extent did the 
McGovern-Fraser reforms promote this? The evidence at first seems less than clear when 
childcare policy adoption is measured by legislative attention: Patsy Mink was already in office 
prior to the reforms as were the chief architects of the CDA, John Brademas and Walter 
Mondale. On the other hand, the reforms sparked off greater representation of post-materialists 
(including post-materialist women) in the party, and in the long run fostered the entry of 
legislators who would in the future develop significant pieces of childcare legislation, such as 
Rep. Geraldine Ferraro (D-NY), and become the legislatures’ leading early years advocates, such 
as Rep. George Miller (D-CA) or Sen. Chris Dodd (D-CT).  
 
Concurrent with the uptick in childcare legislation was an increase in attention to the issue in 
terms of election campaigns, or more specifically, on the party’s platforms: whilst the 1968 
Democratic Party Platform committed the party to means-tested programmes such as Head Start 
and offered “expanded” access to early education and childcare, the 1972 campaign promised a 
federally-funded universal childcare programme (similar to that of the CDA) and dedicated an 
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entire section to the rights of women. When measured as the number of words dedicated to the 
issue, Figure 1.4 displays the first major spate of attention to the issue occurring in 1972, with 
the number of sentences dedicated to the issue more than tripling from the 1968 platform. Did 
party reforms promote this? Chapter Three noted that women comprised just 14% of all 
delegates in the 1968 convention. By 1972, McGovern-Fraser reforms had transformed 
delegations to such an extent that women made up 40% of delegates. The 1972 platform – the 
first to propose universal federally funded childcare as well as the first to dedicate a section to 
the rights of women – was drawn up by a 150-member committee of which 44% of its members 
were female. Moreover, all four of the committee’s vice-chairs were female and seven of the 15 
drafting committee members were women, including Rep. Bella Abzug (D-NY) (Herbers, 1972). 
Newspaper reports at the time mentioned disgruntled delegates complaining about the attention 
given to health and childcare issues without a parallel discussion of funding (NY Times 1972).  
 
Figure 1.8 displays a peak in the ALP’s legislative attention to childcare during the late 1970s 
and in particular early 1980s. To what extent was this measure of policy adoption linked to party 
reform? The reorganisation of state-level parties and the empowerment of their increasingly 
middle class and female membership base may have directly impacted the type of ALP MPs 
elected to the House of Representatives: the interventions occurred through the 1970s – early 
1980s and in that same time period the proportion of unionist MPs dropped roughly 15 
percentage points, against the proportion of female and university educated MPs, both of which 
rose eight percentage points (see Figure 4.9). The change in legislator characteristics is 
associated with the party’s increased parliamentary attention childcare: controlling for all other 
variables, the OLS regressions for 1984-1987 found a positive and significant association (albeit 
at the 90% confidence level) between university education and childcare debate, a positive and 
significant association (at the 99.9% confidence level) between being female and debating 
childcare and finally, an insignificant association between having a union background and 
debating childcare (see Table 4.5). 
 
What of the link between party reform and the electoral (i.e. platform) measure of childcare 
policy adoption? Figure 1.7 shows that a sharp increase in manifesto attention towards the issue 
occurred within the 1983 platform (58 percentage point difference from the 1979 manifesto in 
terms of the number of words devoted to childcare). Moreover, as Chapter Four sets out, that 
manifesto was the first of the ALP’s to include a specific section on the rights of women. This 
correlates with the 1981 federal rule requiring 25% female representation on both party policy 
committees (which would have influence over the manifesto) and on conference delegations 
(which would vote on the manifesto), as set out above. In fact, at conferences, during the early 
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1980s women members such as Sen. Susan Ryan spearheaded efforts to use sophisticated polling 
in order to track female political preferences (Ryan 1981). At the 1982 conference Ryan was 
appointed to the party’s National Campaign Committee, from which she led a gender gap 
research project. Efforts by Labor women sought to ensure that the 1983 campaign was, in 
Sawer’s words, “aimed specifically at women” (Huntley 2003, 154, 176). 
 
When childcare in the UK Labour Party is measured in legislative terms (i.e. the proportion of 
Labour MPs who debated on the issue) one sees a steady, but steep, increase from 1987. For 
example, Figure 1.11 shows that the number of childcare debate mentions on behalf of Labour 
MPs nearly quadrupled between 49
th
 and 50
th 
Parliament (1983-1987; 1987-1992) and that figure 
doubling again between the 50
th 
and the 52
nd 
(1997-2001) parliaments, such that it reached over 
500 mentions between 1997 and 2001. The increase in debate mentions commenced whilst the 
party reforms outlined above were moving ahead: for example in 1987 Labour feminists had 
secured limited approval of one-woman on a shortlist (OWOS)
245
 just as Kinnock at the same 
conference was able to reduce the size of the union bloc vote (but not implement OMOV) in 
constituency candidate selection procedures. However they had not reached their full potential 
(one woman on a shortlist or all-women shortlists) by the time the increase in childcare debate 
mentions had commenced.  
 
Figures 1.9 and 1.10 shows the dependent variable, childcare policy adoption measured in 
electoral (i.e. manifesto) terms. Here, the number of words dedicated to childcare in UK Labour 
manifestos more than doubled between 1987 and the 1997 manifesto. The increased manifesto 
attention correlates with the reforms on female representation that commenced from 1987, which 
had an influence on conference delegations (from both local constituency parties and trade 
unions) as well as places on decision making bodies such as policy review committees and the 
NEC. For example, in 1991 just five out of 29 NEC seats were held by women, by 1998 this 
figure was 18 out of 32 (Russell 2005, 108). The steady gains made by women into party 
decision making bodies as well as into the PLP ensured that women would be well represented in 
the Policy Review process which, after the party’s loss in 1987, sought to develop an innovative 
manifesto in which output was subject to the approval of a women’s monitoring group in order 
to check that, in Shaw’s words, “women's needs were taken fully into account by all [policy 
review groups]” (Shaw 1993, 113). Moreover, 1991 reforms ensured women were 
proportionately represented on what would in 1992 become the National Policy Forum, the body 
that finalises the set of policy proposals to be placed before the party conference and, eventually, 
on the manifesto (Alderman and Carter 1994, 328-329).  
                                                     
245 OWOS would only be required in constituencies where there was no sitting Labour MP. 
 222 
If one were to conceptualise a timeline commencing with electoral change, which produced MP 
change and following on from that, the onset of childcare policy adoption as measured in both 
legislative and electoral terms, it might resemble Table 6.5 below. Here it becomes apparent that 
in the US, electoral change predated (very subtle) changes in legislator characteristics (measured 
here by an increase in ADA scored that commenced from the 93
rd
 Congress). This shift in 
legislator characteristics was concurrent with policy adoption in both electoral and legislative 
terms. In Australia, it took roughly three years longer for the impact of electoral change to 
manifest itself into a shift in MP demographics (measured here in education/unionism and 
gender terms). However, once the shift in MPs commenced, it took two years until there was at 
least a 25% increase in childcare debate mentions and four to eight years before there was an 
increase in attention to the issue on the party platform.  
The different lags between MP change and policy adoption in the legislative versus electoral 
senses repeats itself in the UK case. Here, there were eight-18 years between electoral change 
(measured in both education and gender terms) and a shift in MP demographics (measured in 
education and gender-based terms). Following the shift of MP demographics, it was only four 
years until Labour MPs displayed an increase of at least 25% in legislative attention to the issue. 
Yet electoral (i.e. manifesto) attention lagged further behind:  it would not be until 1992 that the 
number childcare-related words in the manifesto would increase by at least 25% and indeed 1997 
until a strong universal commitment to childcare was included in the manifesto. 
The different gaps between MP change and childcare policy adoption in the legislative versus 
electoral senses suggest that whilst MPs were, once in office, able to draw attention to the issue, 
their power was limited in terms of electoral campaigns and party manifestos. Here, the 
complexities of internal party politics in the ALP and Labour, both of which were still battling 
over leadership centralising reforms, prevented childcare from becoming holding a more 
dominant place on the manifesto, further illustrating the impact of party reform on strategic 
flexibility. 
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 Length of time 
between 
US Australia UK 
 Electoral 
change246 and 
change in MP 
characteristics247 
7-8 years248 10-11 years249 8-18 years250 
 MP change and 
adoption of 
childcare in 
legislative 
terms251 
0-1 years252 2 years253 4 years254 
 MP change and 
adoption of 
childcare in 
electoral terms 
255 
0-1 years256 
4 – 0 years/8-3 
years257 
9-12 years258 
Table 6.5 Party reform and the space between the two measures of childcare policy adoption 
 
6.7 Conclusion: electoral imperative, party reform and the importance of timing 
This chapter provided a comparative analysis of the three case studies already outlined: it found 
variation with regard to specific factors such as the opportunity for centre-left parties to gain 
votes amongst higher-educated male (higher in the ALP and Labour than Democrats) or the 
increase in female legislators between T1 and T2 (15 percentage points in Labour as opposed to 
                                                     
246
 Onset of class (Alford/Thomsen) and gender-based electoral change. 
247
 MP change according to gender, university, union background: minimum baseline for change is 10% (in a 
sustained direction) for any of the aforementioned characteristics. 
248
 Baseline electoral change years are class: 1965 and gender 1966 against legislator change (of which there was 
little) according to increase in ADA scores which commenced in the 93
rd
 Congress (from 1973). 
249
 Baseline electoral change years are class: 1965 and gender 1969 against changes in MP characteristics based 
upon class: 1975 and gender 1980. 
250
 Baseline electoral change years are class: 1975 and gender: 1966 against MP change (in terms of 
university/union and gender) of 1983. 
251
  Measured by increase in childcare debate/co-sponsorship. Minimum baseline for change is a 25% increase (in a 
sustained direction). 
252
 Predated/concurrent with 1973 legislator change. 
253
 Using 1977 as year of legislative increase yields a result of 2 years according to MP’s class/educated based 
change. 0 years when MP change is based upon gender.  
254
 One parliament. 
255
 Measured by rise in platform mentions, policy commitments. Minimum baseline for change is a 25% increase (in 
a sustained direction). 
256
 Predated/concurrent with MP change. 
257
 Increase in manifesto words apparent in 1979, four years after class-based change in MPs, one year before gender 
based change in MPs. If using a more qualitative measure (i.e. strength of manifesto commitments) then 1983 (with 
the Accord) is a more appropriate and the gaps of time are 8 years (class) and 3 years (gender). 
258
 Nine years in terms of number of words in speeches and manifesto, 12 when qualitatively assessing policy 
commitments (i.e. 1997 election promised childcare for all). 
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just eight in the ALP and four amongst the Democrats). However, it broadly concluded that 
parties had an opportunity to take advantage of the decline in class voting by making appeals to 
female voters. But whilst the qualitative evidence on the potential for positive trade union 
influence upon parties’ childcare policy adoption was mixed, the quantitative evidence presented 
in section 6.5 largely quashed the possibility, across all three cases, that union influence relative 
to electoral imperative drove the timing of parties’ childcare policy adoption in either the 
legislative or the electoral senses. The Rapoport and Stone results found replacement – rather 
than conversion – to be the dominant mechanism producing party position change in each party 
and the OLS regressions found that, for the most part, characteristics associated with post-
materialism/new politics orientation were more strongly and significantly associated with a 
legislators debating/co-sponsoring childcare than were having a trade union background (which 
on some occasions was found to have a negative association). The combined quantitative 
analyses therefore suggest that since party change (measured in the legislative sense) was 
mechanised by replacement and driven
259
 by largely post-materialist legislators, that childcare 
policy adoption was, for all three parties, part of a broader electoral strategy to attract new and 
often, middle-income, higher-educated voters to their electoral constituencies.  
 
However, the quantitative findings compared in this Chapter do not entirely dismiss the 
possibility that unions had a role in pushing for childcare policy: the US and Australian chapters 
noted that unions were involved in drafting childcare legislation and setting party policy. They 
rather indicate that unions’ relative influence in producing position change was far smaller than 
that of replacement and post-materialist orientations. Nor do these findings dismiss the 
possibility that unions have not in fact become increasingly concerned with the issue over time. 
Just as replacement effects shifted the make-up of Democratic, ALP and Labour legislators and, 
arguably, led to more progressive policy stances, the increased number of female members could 
have changed the organisations’ aggregate stance on the issue. However, even if unions are by 
now the leading childcare policy lobbyists in each country, their power within the three centre-
left parties under examination has been significantly reduced through the series of internal 
reforms outlined in 6.6.  
 
Both factional and traditional blue-collar unionist power was seen at T1 to be an impediment to 
politicians’ strategic flexibility to appeal to new voters, in this case middle-income and female 
voters. The ease (and attendant speed) in which party elites were able to restructure their internal 
organisation by apportioning more decision making control to women and moderates as well as 
centralising power into the leaderships’ hands helped determine when the party would adopt 
                                                     
259 At least according to the variables tested here. 
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childcare policy, adoption here being measured in both legislative and in electoral terms. 
Therefore the Democratic Party structure, which had the fewest veto points and no direct trade 
union representation on the executive was able to increase female and minority representation as 
well as reduce de-facto union power quicker than were the ALP, where extreme extra-
parliamentary control over the parliamentary party and union domination of the federal 
conference held ‘modernising’ politicians back. Still, a combination of party decentralisation and 
exogenous factors from 1970 allowed ALP parliamentary leaders to step in, suspend and re-
organise state branches from the top-down state, thus changing the demographics of the federal 
party conference. These options were not available to Labour Leaders, who found themselves in 
a centralised structure with multiple veto points, warring factions and entrenched union power. 
The implementation of rules on gender-based representation and reforms that apportioned power 
back to the PLP would take well over a decade. 
 
The length of time taken to implement both these gender-based and centralising reforms explains 
why the Democrats were able to respond to large-scale changes in class and gender-based 
electoral behaviour earlier than were the ALP who in turn, surpassed British Labour. Once 
implemented these reforms helped spur party policy adoption on both electoral and legislative 
terms due to increased representation on party decision making bodies and, in particular on party 
policy and platform committees, just as they fostered the intake of more post-materialist, higher-
educated (and in the case of UK Labour, female) legislators, relative to unionist, lower-educated 
legislators. In other words, the hypothesis as set out in Table 1.1 has been affirmed. Party reform 
centralised power into the hands of post-materialists, who adopted childcare policy as a strategic 
appeal to new middle class voters. It was these post-materialists, rather than unionists, who 
brought childcare policy onto the party’s agenda even if, as the next chapter will discuss, their 
long-term commitment to the issue would vary from party to party.     
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Chapter Seven: Discussion and Further Research 
 
7.1 Where is party policy now? 
Chapter Six concluded that all three parties’ childcare adoption processes were driven by 
electoral imperative rather than union pressure, however it did not address how stable those 
commitments to childcare remained. Did the three parties continue to advocate the issue and if 
so, did the policy shape that they promoted remain similar over time? The answer is somewhat 
mixed: since the mid 1980s the ALP has continuously advocated childcare and kept it as a 
centrepiece on their party platform in nearly every election.
260
 Labour, who adopted the issue 
during the late 1990s, continues to publicly advocate for affordable childcare and has given the 
issue increased attention in their party manifestos
261
 as well as in Government. The Democrats’ 
commitment to childcare has remained strong relative to the Republicans, who dropped childcare 
from their party platform during the 1970s. Yet universal policy proposals and specific spending 
commitments from the Democrats have been thin on the ground
262
 (Woolley and Peters 2013).  
 
If parties have remained, at least in their campaign promises, committed to childcare, how strong 
are the policies they promote? In other words, have they continued to advocate policies similar to 
their original proposals, such as the ALP and Democrats’ 1970s and 80s commitments to 
universal, supply-side childcare funding? In the US and Australia, and to a certain extent, Britain 
the answer seems to be no, centre-left parties do not or have not been able to make such strong 
commitments to non means-tested childcare. Without attempting to provide a comprehensive 
explanation for the various paths each party’s childcare policy has taken, it does appear that the 
different times at which each party adopted the issue gave rise to different challenges to their 
original model of provision, at times quite drastically changing each party’s policy shape. For 
example, the 1980s onset of neoliberal ideas placed pressure on both the ALP and the 
Democrats’ universal, supply-side childcare policies and as such, neither party continues to 
promote this form of childcare assistance. UK Labour, arriving at the issue later than its 
American and Australian counterparts, has shifted slightly with regard to entitlements but it has 
not experienced an ideological change as large as moving from supply-side to demand-led policy 
shape, given that its original policies were designed for a mixed economy of childcare provision 
(Lloyd and Penn 2012).  
                                                     
260
 For example the ALP’s 2013 platform heavily emphasised the fact that they increased the childcare rebate to 
cover up to 50% of ‘out of pocket’ child care costs (ALP 2013, 117).  
261
 For example, Labour’s 2010 manifesto committed to increased spending on Sure Start centres, promised an 
expansion of the free entitlement to all 2 year-olds as well as an expansion of hours for threes and fours and 
promising to retain childcare vouchers (Labour Party 2013, 3.3) 
262
 The Democrats’ 2008 platform committed to expanding pre-kindergarten early education but their specific 
promise on childcare was vague (“We will help pay for child care”); the 2012 platform committed to reform and 
expansion of Head Start but did not mention childcare (Wooley and Peters 2013). 
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Chapter Three noted that Democratic momentum behind universal childcare stalled after the 
early 1970s: subsequent policies may have included elements that benefited middle-income 
families, such as increased generosity of the Dependent Care Tax Credit, but since the mid 
1970s, Democratic childcare bills have mostly centred upon means-tested benefits.
263
 Democrats 
were discouraged from actively addressing the issue after Nixon’s veto in 1971; the childcare 
coalition’s crumbling in 1975 did little to reinvigorate them. Nor have Democratic Presidents 
actively sought to revive the issue: President Carter, who lacked the post-materialist credentials 
of a George McGovern or Walter Mondale
264
, discouraged universal childcare programmes, 
particularly in the context of a weakening economy
265
; Bill Clinton, in the context of a growing 
economy, hinged his largest childcare policy proposal not upon helping middle-income families 
with rising costs and poor quality care but instead as part of a broader ‘welfare-to-work’ agenda 
(Levy and Michel 2002, 246). The Obama administration’s main policy proposal for the under-
fives is focused upon universal pre-school, an unmet and important need in and of itself, but not 
one that would assist working families with the cost of full-day care
266
 (Gable 2014, 5).  
 
More so than in the US, childcare remains a conventional Australian election issue that even the 
centre-right Liberals purport to champion
267
 (Liberal Party 2013). However, the shape of 
childcare funding has been transformed from supply-side to demand-led, with significant cost 
implications for both parents and the Treasury. The Labor Party, in office from 1983 to 1996, 
continued to advance childcare throughout the 1980s and 1990s, although they eventually 
submitted to a shift in policy, where funding went from being supply-side, quality rewarding and 
universal in the 1980s and early 1990s to demand-led, quality neutral and increasingly means-
tested by the mid to late 1990s.
268
 These latter policies, whilst couched in the neoliberal canons 
                                                     
263
 See for example Geraldine Ferraro’s HR 1603 and the Act for Better Childcare as discussed in Chapter Three, 
footnotes 96 and 97. 
264
 Who succeeded and preceded Carter as Democratic Presidential candidates. Mondale, of the Child Development 
Act was the Democratic Presidential candidate in 1984 where McGovern, as noted, was the left-liberal candidate in 
1972. 
265
 For example Carter Administration official Arabella Martinez from the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare testified before Congress during the deliberations over Sen. Alan Cranston’s Child Care Act of 1979, telling 
legislators that the administration did not believe all families needed or supported the idea of centre-based childcare 
assistance, stating that most were happy with informal arrangements. Cranston withdrew the bill (Zigler and Lang 
1991, 44). See also footnote 95 in Chapter Three. 
266
 The Obama administration did implement stricter regulations on childcare providers (Cohn 2013)  
267
 For example the Liberal Party, ahead of the 2013 federal election, released a ten page document on their 
childcare strategy, which promised to prioritise “flexible, affordable and accessible” childcare for all (Coalition 
2013, 2). 
268
By the 1980s, Australian childcare policy was based off operational subsidies for non-profit, income-sliding scale 
fees for parents and a top-up fee relief (paid directly to non-profit providers) for low-income families. However, in 
1987 neoliberal oriented Treasury minister Sen. Pete Walsh and Minister of Social Security, Don Grimes, floated 
the possibility of a complete shift towards a market-based, demand-led policy: a means-tested voucher system which 
would remove the government from direct involvement in childcare, including all operational and capital grant 
subsidies. However, Bob Hawke and Deputy Prime Minister Paul Keating rebuked the ministers citing internal 
polling that showed tampering with the childcare system would lose the ALP women’s votes. 
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of efficiency and choice, replaced operational subsidies with tax credits and cash payments to 
for-profit providers without mandating a fee cap. Although Labor’s then-Treasury Minister 
expected the shift to reduce government outlays, the demand-led policies in fact prompted fee 
inflation, and the government were locked into footing 50 per cent of the bill. Net costs to 
parents rose by over 100% between 1996 and 2007 (compared to 27% general inflation) and 
pushed public expenditure up from AU$ 500 million in 1996 to 3.3 billion in 2008
269
 (Ben-
Galim 2014, 14).  
 
Public childcare spending predominantly benefited large, for-profit childcare chains, such as 
Australian-based ABC Learning, who with over 1,100 centres in Australia and 2,000 across the 
UK, New Zealand and US, received more than AU$ 1 million a day in subsidies via Australian 
fee relief programmes. The company, which at one point was valued at more than AU$ 3.5 
billion, collapsed in 2008 as a result of financial mismanagement (Hoy 2008). This forced the 
Australian federal government to commit at least AU$ 475 million in order to temporarily 
support the 120,000 children using its facilities and the 16,000 staff members who would be 
displaced (Brennan and Oloman 2009, 117-118). In power at the time, the ALP under Julia 
Gillard attempted to reign in regulations and quality controls on private centres but were unable 
to make headway on reshaping the overall demand-led funding mechanism and/or reducing 
either government expenditure or parental costs by implementing a fee cap. In 2011 total federal 
government childcare subsidies were estimated to reach AU$4 billion, despite continually rising 
parental net costs (Kruger 2011). 
 
In the UK, Labour continued to implement its National Childcare Strategy throughout the 52
nd
 to 
54th Parliaments (1997-2010). As described in Chapter Five, this included a generous but 
somewhat awkward mix of supply and demand-led policies that ranged from universal Sure Start 
Centres (universal but primarily located in low-income neighbourhoods), Children’s Centres 
(which had a similar remit), introduced 12.5 weekly hours of free early education and care for all 
three and four year-olds (with 4’s being able to use their entitlement at primary school reception 
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 In 1991, under pressure to prompt an increase places, the ALP (under Prime Minister Paul Keating) expanded the 
generously means-tested fee relief programme so that parents could use it at private, for-profit institutions.  The 
Government expected that the move would yield an increase of 28,000 places in the first year, yet places in the 
commercial childcare sector – which was unencumbered by the planning principles non-profit centres had to abide 
by in order to receive operational subsidies – grew by 89,600 between 1991 and 1997, versus 4,300 for the non-
profit sector. The increased costs, according to Brennan, “exceeded the Treasury’s worst fears” as they were forced 
to double their spending on Child Care Assistance between 1991 and 1996. Indeed, reports suggested that 70-75% 
of private operators’ income stemmed from government fee relief, which is accorded to centres before parents paid 
their fees (Brennan 1998, 200-04). In 1996, the newly elected Coalition Government under Liberal PM John 
Howard finally removed operational subsidies from non-profit centres, and in former Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s 
words, “let the market rip,” Howard’s Coalition Government completed the path towards a commercially led, 
demand-side childcare policy that was largely initiated by the ALP’s 1991 decision to allow childcare assistance 
funding for commercial centres. 
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classes), working tax credits for low-income families that at one point would cover up to 85% of 
parents’ childcare fees, tax-free, employer-provided childcare vouchers, and a ramp up of the 
universal cash payment, Child Benefit. Total spending on under 5’s tripled under New Labour 
(Sefton 2009, 3).  
 
The 12.5 free hours was eventually increased to 15 and the current Coalition Government has 
followed through with Labour plans to expand the free early education and care entitlement to 
disadvantaged two year-olds (currently the lowest-income 40% are entitled), just as Labour have 
announced plans that they would consider universalising the 2 year old free entitlement if elected 
in 2015 (Grice 2014). Of course, Labour’s childcare policy proposals have not been a portrait of 
continual generosity: Gordon Brown in 2009 threatened to do away with tax-free childcare 
vouchers. Whilst public debate on UK childcare currently centres upon the untenable nature of 
net costs to parents (estimated at 28% of family net income in 2011), Labour leader Ed Miliband 
launching a report at the IPPR think tank in June of 2014 cautiously dismissed programmatic 
policy expansion such as the report’s proposal to increase the number of free hours provided to 3 
and 4 year-olds, or provide a smaller entitlement for 1 year-olds. Instead, Miliband emphasised 
overall a party set on reducing public expenditure and specifically, cutting benefits
270
 (Wintour 
2014). 
 
7.2 Why are they here? 
So although parties’ public commitments to the concept of affordable childcare have remained 
broadly stable, the strength of policies that they either proposed or passed in aim of that goal 
seems to have weakened. An explanation for why that happened would naturally be beyond the 
scope of this research, however it is worth asking how the story of childcare policy adoption and 
its eventual outcome fits into the broader discussion of party politics and the welfare state. The 
following section will focus on the tension between the two theoretical approaches that underlie 
the study’s guiding question (power resources and party competition) and consider the 
implications of this research for both these approaches, highlighting the importance of social 
democratic party transformation and organisational reform. In light of parties’ decreased ability 
or perhaps, decreased inclination, to propose childcare policies that are as strong and inclusive as 
their original ideas, the third section suggests avenues for future research. 
 
The question guiding this research specifically implies a test on the relevance of the power 
resources versus party competition approach – do the findings presented in this study suggest 
                                                     
270
 For example a key element of Miliband’s speech revolved around removing Jobseeker’s allowance for all under 
25s without a Level 3 qualification. They may receive it if they enter training but it will be means-tested according 
to parental income. 
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that the power resources theory was irrelevant? It depends, partly, on how the ‘power resources’ 
are measured. Left-party power is somewhat irrelevant to the question at hand, whilst union 
density cannot explain temporal variation. Indeed, as repeatedly noted, union influence was 
weak relative to electoral imperative in driving policy adoption. But if one considers briefly 
again the argument of this thesis – that a party’s proclivity to adopt childcare policy was driven 
by electoral imperative and mediated by party organisational changes that instituted gender-
based and centralising reforms – they will notice the suggestion that the number of women in 
parliament or in the party elite matter. This type of ‘critical mass’ theory is essentially a 
gendered measure of resource mobilisation and would suggest that without women in either the 
legislature or in the party elite, childcare policy adoption would not have happened in either the 
legislative or in the electoral senses.  
 
In reality, the relationship is probably more complex: women comprised between two and three 
per cent of House Democrats in the immediate years before and after McGovern-Fraser, and in 
fact there were few women in Congress, apart from Patsy Mink, who played a role in the 
development of childcare policy during the 1960s and 1970s. Similarly, there were no women 
ALP MPs during the late 1970s, as the party’s attention to childcare (in legislative terms) began 
to noticeably increase.
271
 Yet, women ALP MPs were positively and significant associated, for 
controlling all other variables, with childcare debate at T2.  Women were also positively and 
significantly associated with debating childcare in the UK at both T1 and T2, controlling for all 
other variables. In fact, the Labour Party’s gender-based candidate selection reforms brought an 
increased number of women into parliament, which did coincide with a steady increase in 
childcare debate in the run up to T2. On the one hand, this suggests that critical mass thesis can 
at least some of the time explain increased attention to childcare in the legislature (specifically in 
the Australian and UK cases). On the other hand, Fleckenstein notes that under New Labour, 
women MPs had the agency to influence the agenda and pressure the Blair government but they 
lacked the agency to actually exercise power in terms of childcare policy
272
 (Fleckenstein 2010, 
801). When policy adoption is measured in electoral terms we do see evidence from all three 
countries that where party platforms and policy committees experienced an increase in female 
representation the resultant platforms/manifestos include a greater level of attention to 
work/family issues like childcare. Once again, however, this highlights the need to draw a 
distinction between discussing and debating (or indeed campaigning on) an issue versus having 
the political and (perhaps) financial capital to implement policy goals as formidable as universal 
childcare.  
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 The 1980 election saw five female ALP MPs into the House of Representatives.  
272
 Given the lack of a women’s minister during Blair’s first Government and the cut of lone parent benefit 
(Fleckenstein 2010, 801). 
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The distinction between discussing and campaigning versus successfully legislating points to 
different gradations in the strength of the party competition approach: can parties afford to 
implement costly policies that cater to one constituency (for example middle-income families) at 
the expense of others (for example low-income families on benefits or indeed elite financial 
interests)? In other words, is party competition an independent variable that drives party position 
change or is it an intervening variable that structures policymakers’ choices? This research has 
argued that the aim of acquiring new voters ultimately drove parties to adopt childcare policy. 
However, this is not to argue that parties were free to do so without strategic constraints: 
Rosenbluth, et. al. 2006 asserted that “both social democratic and liberal parties are somewhat 
constrained by their core constituencies from issuing pure policy-based appeals to working 
women” (Rosenbluth et al., 2006, 167). Ultimately, the three parties at hand did not entirely 
abandon their traditional social constituencies during their hunt for middle class voters: the ALP, 
Democrats and Labour all promoted select labour and low-income issues: the Obama 
administration is currently pressing for an increase in the federal minimum wage
273
; if elected in 
2015, Labour’s Ed Miliband has promised to do the same,274 just as current Federal ALP leader 
Bill Shorten has pushed back against business demands to defer statutory minimum wage 
increases.
275
 However, the strength in which they continued to pursue left-materialist policies 
was, in light of their broader acceptance of neoliberal ideology, weak: for example President 
Clinton, in addition to implementing welfare-to-work policies, signed into law the repeal of the 
Glass-Steagall regulations, which among other rules, separated commercial from investment 
banking (Sanati 2009); New Labour engaged in ‘light touch’ financial sector regulation and 
implemented reforms such as de-indexing the public pension system from inflation (Hopkin and 
Blyth 2012, 22); the ALP underwent a series of neoliberal-oriented financial sector reforms 
during the 1980s and 1990s that by extension impacted wage distribution, such as floating the 
dollar, allowing the entrance of international banks and selling the Commonwealth bank (Martin 
1999). 
 
In this regard, the inconsistencies between social democratic ideals and neoliberal policy tend to 
resemble the strong public but wavering financial and political commitment to universal 
childcare outlined above. Picot’s 2009 framework, in a ‘purer’ gradation of the party competition 
                                                     
273
 The Obama administration wants to increase the federal minimum from its current $7.25 an hour to a ‘living 
wage’ of $10.10 per hour. In January 2014, President Obama signed an executive order mandating federal 
government contractors to be paid $10.10 per hour by 2015 (Goldfarb 2014). 
274
 As part of Miliband’s focus on ‘pre-distribution,’ he promised to set a statutory minimum wage linked to national 
average earnings (BBC 2014). 
275
 In Australia, the independent Fair Work Commission implements minimum wage increases. Following the 
panel’s decision to increase wages to AU$15.80 in June 2013, industry leaders called for the implementation to be 
delayed. Shorten pushed back, stating, “Labor does not support a working poor as we see in the United States” 
(Australian, 2014). 
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approach would suggest that researchers focus their analysis on 1) public demand for policy 
change and 2) the spatial pattern of party competition: where all three of the parties here were 
motivated by electoral gains and aware of public opinion in favour of the issue, they had an 
incentive to employ policies like childcare so as to mobilise new middle class voters on non-
materialist issues. However, neither the ALP nor the Democrats have a viable party to the left of 
them on the liberal-authoritarian axis of competition that could challenge them into committing 
to stronger childcare policy, wherein ‘strength’ here implies large-scale financial and/or 
administrative commitment (such as reorienting the funding model from demand to supply-side 
and/or ramping up expenditure). Though the Liberal Democrats are located to Labour’s ‘liberal-
left’ (and indeed ahead of the 2015 election committed to a wider expansion of the childcare 
entitlement than Labour have, at the time of writing) the party’s current popularity and the 
overall mobilising capacity of childcare in general may not be powerful enough to motivate 
Labour to make a stronger commitment on the issue.
276
 This raises the possibility that whilst 
these parties have not entirely abandoned their traditional working class and low-income 
constituencies, they have also not pursued middle class childcare policies as strong as one might 
have expected them to because of the absence of a viable left-liberal competitor, as Picot (2009) 
would predict.   
 
However, this research has argued that there is more to the story of childcare policy adoption 
than structured electoral imperative: just as inter-party politics condition the extent to which 
parties can make strong policy commitments and remain electorally viable, parties also have 
their own internal political and organisational constraints on the type of strategic electoral 
appeals they are able to put forth (Kitschelt 1994). Where, for example, the Democrats were 
hesitant to adopt the ERA during the 1960s, Wolbrecht suggest this was due to unions’ then-
powerful influence in the party (Wolbrecht 2002, 254-273). It seems likely that had female 
Labour Party members fought to include a large manifesto plank that committed the party to 
universal, state-funded childcare during the early 1980s they would have received pushback 
from the union representation at both the policy committee, NEC and conference level. Whilst 
this explains previous constraints that were largely removed during the parties’ organisational 
reform processes, how then does the idea of internal organisational structure link up to the ALP, 
Democrats’ and Labour’s current stance on childcare?  
 
By reducing the power of party affiliates, specifically unions, parties are now less anchored to a 
core constituency and more impervious to the types of policies that organised labour were once 
able to push through party forums, conferences and ultimately, onto their legislative agendas. In 
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 This includes universalising the 2-year old offer of 15 free hours early education and care per week, as well as 
offering 1 year-olds 10 hours per week (Brewer et. al, 2014, 185).  
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the immediate post-war era this would have resulted in policies such as wage arbitration, 
generous pensions, healthcare and survivors’ benefits. Had the internal party power of unions 
been replaced with the internal party power of a well-organised constituency on work-family 
issues then the parties may have continued to issue (and act upon) strong childcare policy 
commitments. Of course, that is not what happened: unlike in the electorate, the reduction of 
union power within parties’ internal organisations was not replaced by the growing internal 
power of another organised, new middle class group interest group. Instead, the reduction of 
unions’ internal party power was a consequence of centralising reforms that handed increased 
autonomy to the party leadership.  
 
When parties adopted childcare as both an electoral and legislative issue they directed a strategic 
appeal to this new middle class and, to some extent, became electorally beholden to them. But 
because this new middle class is not an organised entity it would have had a more difficult time 
than did the organised union movement in for example, brokering candidate selection deals or 
issuing an organised response to potentially disappointing policy commitments. As such, the 
three parties at hand have not been anchored to the new middle classes in such a way that they 
prioritise long-term policy seeking goals on behalf of this constituency over the shorter-term 
benefits of office.  
 
It thus seems expedient to lay the missed opportunity for universal childcare entirely at parties’ 
feet. Though, to what extent are parties’ strategic, office-seeking and sometimes empty appeals 
an indication of their rapacity for political power? And to what extent are they merely 
responding to the social and economic consequences of deindustrialisation which, arguably, has 
fostered demobilisation of working and middle class political interests and pushed parties into an 
arena where shifting, short-term valence issues determine votes? Whereas this study has argued 
that the power resources approach, relative to the party competition approach, cannot explain 
why parties adopted the issue of childcare in both legislative and electoral terms, it is here that 
the importance of power resources becomes apparent: perhaps it is the lack of an organised, 
middle class interest group affiliated to political parties that can explain why the childcare 
policies these three parties have taken on have not been able to produce a system of affordable, 
quality, universal childcare. 
 
If, perhaps, this discussion includes an optimistic conclusion it might be that parties, free from 
powerful, internal affiliates are now less beholden to outside interests or, to use Bawn et. al’s 
term, “policy demanders” (Bawn et. al 2012). Whereas Bawn et. al. develop a convincing albeit 
disconcerting group-centric of theory of parties, in which their policy output is determined by the 
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preferences of party-linked interests/activists (and indeed the authors argue that both US parties 
are of this type), this research has found that childcare policy adoption was driven by parties’ 
electoral aims and that the party elite were able, post-reform, to do so autonomously from their 
traditional party-linked interest groups. Any nascent optimism, however, should be tempered: the 
findings here also speak to the ease in which parties can compete for votes on policies that have 
a diffuse array of interests without having to make a credible commitment or indeed 
transforming said policy once in office. Had this research examined party position change on a 
policy with a better-organised constituency, such as financial sector reform or perhaps in the US, 
gun control, we may indeed have seen greater influence of both legislator conversion and 
continued, strong policy commitments to the issue.  
 
7.3 What way forward? 
In light of the discussion on organisational power, research related to parties’ childcare policies 
would benefit from an examination into the way both organised and diffuse interests filter their 
policy preferences through today’s centre-left parties: have the organisational reforms that 
sought to ‘democratise’ candidate selection supplanted particularistic working class interests 
with particularistic elite interests? To what extent can ‘new middle class’ party members 
pressure parties to act on middle-income social policy needs, given the constraints of both 
autonomous party elites and the seemingly inelastic presence of neoliberal ideology? Until those 
issues are addressed the question remains: how might significant expansion and reform of 
childcare policy in each of these three countries take place? Short of a full-blown crisis in costs 
or provision, the answer seems to lie with the unnavigable task of organising and mobilising the 
new middle class: until that occurs, Schattschneider’s (1964) much discussed bias will prevail. 
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Appendix A: ALP MPs’ childcare debate mentions, by parliament 
Debates extracted from Parliament of Australia Hansard. Full transcripts available upon 
request. 
 
Parliament MP 
Number of times 
mentioned 
27
th
  
(1969-
1972) 
  
 
Barry Cohen 1 
 
Clyde Cameron 1 
 
David Kennedy 1 
 
Dick Klugman 1 
 
Doug Everingham 1 
 
Frank Kirwan 1 
 
Frank Stewart 1 
 
Gil Duthie 1 
 
Harry Jenkins 1 
 
Harry Web 1 
 
Joe Berinson 1 
 
Martin Nicholls 1 
 
Rex Connor 1 
 
Kep Enderby 2 
 
Kim Beazley Snr 2 
 
Len Reynolds 2 
 
Les Johnson 2 
 
Gough Whitlam 3 
 
Adrian Bennett 7 
28
th
 
(1972-
1974) 
  
 
Frank Crean 1 
 
John Coates 1 
 
John Kerin 1 
 
Kep Enderby 1 
 
Laurie Wallis  1 
 
Len Reynolds 1 
 
Lionel Bowen 1 
 
Race Matthews 1 
 
Ray Sherry 1 
 
Tony Lamb 1 
 
Bill Hayden 2 
 
John Armitage 2 
 
Kim Beazley Snr 2 
29
th
 
(1974-
1975) 
  
 
Adrian Bennett 1 
 
Allan Mulder 1 
 
Bob Whan 1 
 
David McKenzie 1 
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Garetg Clayton 1 
 
Joe Berinson 1 
 
Ken Fry 1 
 
Kim Beazley Snr 1 
 
Laurie Wallis  1 
 
Paul Keating 1 
 
Race Matthews 1 
 
Frank Crean 2 
 
Gough Whitlam 2 
 
John Armitage 2 
 
Lionel Bowen 2 
 
Max Oldmeadow 2 
 
Peter Morris 3 
 
Mick Young 4 
30
th
 
(1975-
1977) 
  
 
Barry Cohen 1 
 
Charles Jones 1 
 
Dick Klugman 1 
 
Frank Crean 1 
 
Horrie Garrick 1 
 
Jim Cairns 1 
 
Ken Fry 1 
 
Vince Martin 1 
 
Bill Hayden  2 
 
Frank Stewart 2 
 
John Armitage 2 
 
Laurie Wallis  2 
 
Paul Keating 2 
 
Ralph Jacobi 2 
 
Gough Whitlam 3 
 
Lionel Bowen 3 
 
Ted Innes 3 
 
Tony Whitlam 3 
 
Leslie McMahon 5 
31st 
  (1977-
1980) Chris Hurford 1 
 
Clyde Holding 1 
 
Dick Klugman 1 
 
Gough Whitlam 1 
 
Harry Jenkins 1 
 
John Dawkins 1 
 
Leo McLeay 1 
 
Leslie McMahon 1 
 
Lionel Bowen 1 
 
Morton Cass 1 
 
Peter Morris 1 
 
Ralph Jacobi 1 
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Ted Innes 1 
 
Tom Uren 1 
 
Bill Hayden  2 
 
Charles Jones 2 
 
John Brown 2 
 
Les Johnson 2 
 
Ralph Willis  2 
 
Stewart West 2 
 
Barry Jones 3 
 
Ken Fry 3 
 
John Armitage 4 
32
nd
 
(1980-
1983) 
  
 
Barry Cunningham 1 
 
Bob Hawke 1 
 
Brian Howe 1 
 
Charles Jones 1 
 
Chris Hurford 1 
 
Dick Klugman 1 
 
Joan Child 1 
 
John Kerin 1 
 
Mick Young 1 
 
Elaine Darling 2 
 
Graeme Campbell 2 
 
John Mountford 2 
 
Michael Maher 2 
 
Paul Keating 2 
 
Peter Morris 2 
 
Ted Innes 2 
 
Ben Humphreys 3 
 
Ken Fry 3 
 
Lionel Bowen 3 
 
Mr Howe 3 
 
Neal Blewett 3 
 
Peter Milton 3 
 
John Armitage 4 
 
John Dawkins 4 
 
Ros Kelly 4 
 
Stewart West 4 
 
Leslie McMahon 8 
 
Kim Beazley Jr 9 
 
Les Johnson 10 
33
rd
 
(1983-
1984) 
  
 
Allen Blanchard 1 
 
Bob Hawke 1 
 
Elaine Darling 1 
 
George Gear 1 
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Ralph Willis  1 
 
Stewart West 1 
 
Michael Maher 2 
 
Wendy Fatin 2 
34
th
 
(1984-
1987) 
  
 
Allen Blanchard 1 
 
Bill Hayden 1 
 
Bob Hawke 1 
 
Brian Howe 1 
 
Clyde Holding 1 
 
David Bedall 1 
 
David Simmons 1 
 
Dick Klugman 1 
 
Elaine Darling 1 
 
George Gear 1 
 
John Button 1 
 
John Langmore 1 
 
Keith Wright 1 
 
Kim Beazley Jr 1 
 
Leo McLeay 1 
 
Lewis Kent 1 
 
Lionel Bowen 1 
 
Manfred Cross 1 
 
Michael Duffy 1 
 
Michael Maher 1 
 
Michael Maher 1 
 
Neal Blewett 1 
 
Neil O'Keefe 1 
 
Nick Bolkus 1 
 
Peter Baldwin 1 
 
Peter Cleeland 1 
 
Peter Staples 1 
 
Ralph Jacobi 1 
 
Ric Charlesworth 1 
 
Ron Elstob 1 
 
Ronald Edwards 1 
 
Stephen Martin 1 
 
Stewart West 1 
 
Ted Lindsay 1 
 
Ben Humphreys 2 
 
Gordon Bliney 2 
 
Jeanette McHugh 2 
 
Jim Snow 2 
 
John Dawkins 2 
 
John Scott 2 
 
Robert Tickner 2 
 
Ros Kelly 2 
 
Carolyn Jakobsen 3 
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Gerry Hand 3 
 
Lloyd O'Neil 3 
 
Ross Free 3 
 
Tony Lamb 3 
 
Colin Hollis 4 
 
Helen Mayer 4 
 
Paul Keating 4 
 
Peter Duncan 4 
 
Wendy Fatin 4 
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Appendix B 
British Labour MPs debating childcare in parliament, by parliament 
Debates extracted from the House of Commons Hansard Millbank systems. Full transcript 
available upon request. 
 
 
 
48
th
 
(1979-
1983) 
 
 
 
Allan Roberts 1 
 
Arthur Davidson 1 
 
Brynmor John 1 
 
Chris Price 1 
 
Edward Lyons 1 
 
Frank White 1 
 
Gavin Strang 1 
 
George Foulkes 1 
 
Gwyneth Dunwoody 1 
 
Jack Ashley 1 
 
Jock Stollard 1 
 
Tom McNally 1 
 
Alf Dubs 2 
 
Harriet Harman 2 
 
Jack Straw 2 
 
Reg Race 2 
 
Reginald Freeson 2 
 
Alf Morris 3 
 
Hudson Davies 3 
 
Jeff Rooker 3 
 
Jo Richardson 3 
 
Renee Short 3 
 
Ernie Ross 5 
 
Joan Lestor 7 
 
 
 
49th 
(1983-
1987) 
 
 
 
Ann Clwyd 1 
 
Bill Michie 1 
 
Brian Sedgemore 1 
 
Clare Short 1 
 
Dave Nellist 1 
 
Derek Fatchett 1 
 
Ernie Ross 1 
 
Frank Dobson 1 
 
Guy Barnett 1 
 
Harry Cohen 1 
 
Jack Ashley 1 
 
Jack Straw 1 
 
Jeremy Corbyn 1 
 
Kevin Barron 1 
 
Margaret Beckett 1 
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Mark Fisher 1 
 
Peter Pike 1 
 
Renee Short 1 
 
Richard Caborn 1 
 
Robert McTaggart 1 
 
Robert Sheldon 1 
 
Robert Wareing 1 
 
Stuart Randall 1 
 
Tony Lloyd 1 
 
Tony Banks 1 
 
Jack Cunningham 2 
 
Terence Davis 2 
 
Barry Jones 3 
 
Roland Boyes 3 
 
Gordon Bagier 4 
 
Andrew Bennett 5 
 
Jo Richardson 9 
 
Harriet Harman 14 
 
 
50th 
(1987-
1992) 
 
 
 
Austin Mitchell 1 
 
Barry Jones 1 
 
Bill Michie 1 
 
David Blunkett 1 
 
David Hinchliffe 1 
 
Derek Fatchett 1 
 
Elliot Morley 1 
 
Frank Field 1 
 
Gerald Bermingham 1 
 
Gerry Steinberg 1 
 
Granville Janner 1 
 
Jim Marshall 1 
 
Joan Ruddock 1 
 
John Fraser 1 
 
John Home Robertson 1 
 
John McFall 1 
 
John Reid 1 
 
Kate Hoey 1 
 
Keith Bradley 1 
 
Keith Vaz 1 
 
Kevin Barron 1 
 
Kevin McNamara 1 
 
Llin Golding 1 
 
Mark Fisher 1 
 
Martin Flannery 1 
 
Michael Welsh 1 
 
Mildred Gordon 1 
 
Nicholas Brown 1 
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Norman Godman 1 
 
Paul Flynn 1 
 
Paul Murphy 1 
 
Peter Hardy 1 
 
Peter Snape 1 
 
Robin Corbett 1 
 
Roland Boyes 1 
 
Tom Cox 1 
 
Tony Worthington 1 
 
Alun Michael 2 
 
Andrew Bennett 2 
 
Andrew Smith 2 
 
Audrey Wise 2 
 
Bill O'Brien 2 
 
Bob Cryer 2 
 
Chris Smith 2 
 
Ernie Ross 2 
 
Jack Straw 2 
 
Jim Cousins 2 
 
Joyce Quin 2 
 
Robert McTaggart 2 
 
Tony Blair 2 
 
Tony Lloyd 2 
 
Allen McKay 3 
 
Brian Wilson 3 
 
Gwyneth Dunwoody 3 
 
Harry Cohen 3 
 
Henry McLeish 3 
 
Ian McCartney 3 
 
James Wray 3 
 
Joan Walley 3 
 
Martin Redmond 3 
 
Mo Mowlam 3 
 
Tom Clarke 3 
 
Win Griffiths 3 
 
Diane Abbott 4 
 
Harriet Harman 4 
 
Max Madden 4 
 
Paul Boateng 4 
 
Ann Clwyd 5 
 
Jeremy Corbyn 5 
 
Joan Lestor 5 
 
Graham Allen 6 
 
Alice Mahon 7 
 
Clare Short 8 
 
Michael Meacher 8 
 
Maria Fyfe 9 
 
John Marek 12 
 
Ron Leighton 15 
 
Hilary Armstrong 21 
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Jo Richardson 34 
 
 
 
51st 
(1992-
1997) 
 
 
 
Ann Taylor 1 
 
Tony Benn 1 
 
Tam Dalyell 1 
 
John Fraser 1 
 
Roy Hughes 1 
 
Ted Rowlands 1 
 
Neil Kinnock 1 
 
Bob Cryer 1 
 
James Callaghan (Middleton and 
Prestwich) 
1 
 
Barry Sheerman 1 
 
Ernie Ross 1 
 
Jack Straw 1 
 
Bill Michie 1 
 
Gordon Brown 1 
 
Harry Cohen 1 
 
Martin Redmond 1 
 
Norman Godman 1 
 
Roland Boyes 1 
 
Tony Lloyd 1 
 
Alistair Darling 1 
 
Andrew Smith 1 
 
Ian McCartney 1 
 
Joan Walley 1 
 
Ken Livingstone 1 
 
Mo Mowlan 1 
 
Gordon McMaster 1 
 
Alan Keen 1 
 
Alan Milburn 1 
 
Andrew Miller 1 
 
Bridget Prentice 1 
 
David Hanson 1 
 
Estelle Morris 1 
 
Jane Kennedy 1 
 
Jim Dowd 1 
 
Llew Smith 1 
 
Mike Gapes 1 
 
Piara Khabra 1 
 
Robert Ainsworth 1 
 
Stephen Byers 1 
 
Dennis McShane 1 
 
Ian Pearson 1 
 
Judith Church 1 
 
Nigel Spearing 2 
 
Audrey Wise 2 
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Clive Soley 2 
 
Ron Leighton 2 
 
Bill O'Brien 2 
 
Chris Smith 2 
 
Peter Pike 2 
 
Ann Clwyd 2 
 
Diane Abbott 2 
 
Elliot Morley 2 
 
Eric Martlew 2 
 
John McAllion 2 
 
Kate Hoey 2 
 
Helen Jackson 2 
 
John Austin-Walker 2 
 
Mike O'Brien 2 
 
Donald Dewar 3 
 
Gwyneth Dunwoody 3 
 
Frank Field 3 
 
Gerry Steinberg 3 
 
Mildred Gordon 3 
 
Rhodri Morgan 3 
 
Tony Worthington 3 
 
George Mudie 3 
 
George Stevenson 3 
 
Janet Anderson 3 
 
Llin Golding 4 
 
David Hinchliffe 4 
 
Martyn Jones 4 
 
Ann Coffey 4 
 
Jean Corston 4 
 
Jim Cunningham 4 
 
Clare Short 5 
 
Dawn Primarolo 5 
 
Henry McLeish 5 
 
Win Griffiths 5 
 
Lynne Jones 5 
 
Malcolm Wicks 5 
 
Angela Eagle 6 
 
Joan Lestor 7 
 
Keith Bradley 8 
 
Jeremy Corbyn 10 
 
Maria Fyfe 10 
 
Margaret Hodge 10 
 
Harry Barnes 11 
 
Graham Allen 12 
 
Kevin McNamara 14 
 
Anne Campbell 14 
 
Malcolm Chisholm 15 
 
Alan Howarth 19 
 
Hilary Armstrong 21 
 
Harriet Harman 27 
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Tessa Jowell 29 
 
Barbara Roche 32 
 
 
 
52nd 
(1997-
2001) 
 
 
 
Alan W Williams 1 
 
Gwyneth Dunwoody 1 
 
John Prescott 1 
 
Michael Meacher 1 
 
Tom Cox 1 
 
Jeff Rooker 1 
 
Margaret Beckett 1 
 
Peter Snape 1 
 
Clive Soley 1 
 
Ernie Ross 1 
 
Frank Dobson 1 
 
Harry Cohen 1 
 
Mark Fisher 1 
 
Norman Godman 1 
 
Stuart Bell 1 
 
Llin Golding 1 
 
David Hinchliffe 1 
 
Hilary Armstrong 1 
 
Ian McCartney 1 
 
James Wray 1 
 
John McAllion 1 
 
Keith Vaz 1 
 
Paul Boateng 1 
 
Paul Murphy 1 
 
Sam Galbraith 1 
 
Tony Worthington 1 
 
Win Griffiths 1 
 
Ashok Kumar 1 
 
Huw Edwards 1 
 
Alan Milburn 1 
 
Ann Coffey 1 
 
Bridget Prentice 1 
 
Glenda Jackson 1 
 
Gordon Prentice 1 
 
Hugh Bayley 1 
 
Jean Corston 1 
 
John Heppell 1 
 
Michael Connarty 1 
 
Mike Gapes 1 
 
Mike O'Brien 1 
 
Paddy Tipping 1 
 
Piara Khabra 1 
 
Tessa Jowell 1 
 
Gerry Sutcliffe 1 
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Andrew Dismore 1 
 
Andy King 1 
 
Ann Keen 1 
 
Barbara Follett 1 
 
Barry Gardiner 1 
 
Candy Atherton 1 
 
Charles Clarke 1 
 
Christine Russell 1 
 
Christopher Leslie 1 
 
Claire Ward 1 
 
Colin Burgon 1 
 
David Drew 1 
 
David Lepper 1 
 
David Stewart 1 
 
David Taylor 1 
 
Derek Twigg 1 
 
Douglas Alexander 1 
 
Fraser Kemp 1 
 
Geraldine Smith 1 
 
Hazel Blears 1 
 
Hilton Dawson 1 
 
Jackie Lawrence 1 
 
Jane Griffiths 1 
 
Janet Dean 1 
 
Jim Murphy 1 
 
Joan Humble 1 
 
Julia Drown 1 
 
Kali Mountford 1 
 
Laura Moffatt 1 
 
Lindsay Hoyle 1 
 
Lynda Clark 1 
 
Mark Todd 1 
 
Oona King 1 
 
Paul Stinchcombe 1 
 
Paul Truswell 1 
 
Phil Hope 1 
 
Roger Casale 1 
 
Rosemary McKenna 1 
 
Rosie Winterton 1 
 
Sandra Osborne 1 
 
Stephen Hepburn 1 
 
Stephen Pound 1 
 
Steve McCabe 1 
 
Tom Levitt 1 
 
Vernon Coaker 1 
 
Hilary Benn 1 
 
Derek Foster 2 
 
Alice Mahon 2 
 
Brian Wilson 2 
 
Diane Abbott 2 
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John McFall 2 
 
Rhodri Morgan 2 
 
Sylvia Heal 2 
 
Andrew Miller 2 
 
Helen Jackson 2 
 
Lynne Jones 2 
 
Stephen Byers 2 
 
Anne Begg 2 
 
Charlotte Atkins 2 
 
David Kidney 2 
 
Desmond Browne 2 
 
Gareth Thomas 2 
 
Gisela Stuart 2 
 
Ian Gibson 2 
 
Ivan Lewis 2 
 
Jacqui Smith 2 
 
James Plaskitt 2 
 
Joan Ryan 2 
 
John Healey 2 
 
Martin Linton 2 
 
Martin Salter 2 
 
Michael Wills 2 
 
Patricia Hewitt 2 
 
Paul Marsden 2 
 
Peter Bradley 2 
 
Phyllis Starkey 2 
 
Russell Brown 2 
 
Shona McIsaac 2 
 
Syd Rapson 2 
 
Tony Clarke 2 
 
Valerie Davey 2 
 
Angela Smith 2 
 
Robert Sheldon 3 
 
Audrey Wise 3 
 
Andrew Smith 3 
 
Maria Fyfe 3 
 
Angela Eagle 3 
 
Barbara Roche 3 
 
Estelle Morris 3 
 
John Denham 3 
 
John Hutton 3 
 
Malcolm Wicks 3 
 
Ann Cryer 3 
 
Beverly Hughes 3 
 
Brian Iddon 3 
 
Chris Pond 3 
 
Debra Shipley 3 
 
Jim Fitzpatrick 3 
 
Jeremy Corbyn 4 
 
Jim Cousins 4 
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Malcolm Chisholm 4 
 
Fiona Mactaggart 4 
 
Lorna Fitzsimmons 4 
 
Louise Ellman 4 
 
Paul Goggins 4 
 
Tony Colman 4 
 
Yvette Cooper 4 
 
Frank Field 5 
 
Chris Smith 5 
 
Helen Jones 5 
 
Judy Mallaber 5 
 
Barry Jones 6 
 
Joan Ruddock 6 
 
Anne Campbell 6 
 
Ruth Kelly 6 
 
Alistair Darling 7 
 
Keith Bradley 7 
 
Sally Keeble 10 
 
Dawn Primarolo 11 
 
Karen Buck 11 
 
Jim Cunningham 12 
 
David Blunkett 13 
 
Margaret Hodge 13 
 
Harriet Harman 14 
 
Tony Blair 14 
 
Julie Morgan 14 
 
Gordon Brown 15 
 
Harry Barnes 18 
 
Steve Webb 21 
 
Caroline Flint 34 
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Appendix C 
1) Childcare legislation co-sponsors, 90th – 101st Congresses 
 (Pre-1973 co-sponsorship data from Congressional Record 90
th
 -93
rd
  Congresses, 
Sessions 1 and 2. Post-1973 data from the Library of  Congresses’ Thomas bill search. 
Full details available on request.) 
    
    
 
  
    
Congress Representative 
90
th
 
(1967-1969) 
  
  Anderson, Glenn 
  Benitez, Jamie 
  Brown, George 
  Cohelan, Jeffery 
  Daniels, Dominick 
  Dent, John 
  Ford, William 
  Gilbert, Jacob 
  Hanley, James 
  Hansen, Julia 
  Hicks, Floyd 
  Leggett, Robert 
  Matsunaga, Spark 
  Mink, Patsy 
  Moorhead, William 
  Moss, John 
  O'Hara, James 
  O'Neill, Tip 
  Perkins, Carl 
  Riegle, Donald 
  Ryan, William 
  Scheuer, James 
  Tunney, John 
  Wilson, Charles H. 
  Zablocki, Clement 
    
91
st
 
(1969-1971) 
  
  Adams, Brock 
  Boland, Edward 
  Brademas, John 
  Burke, James 
  Burton, Phil 
  Carey, Hugh 
  Corman, James 
  Daniels, Dominick 
  Dent, John 
  Dingell, John 
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  Edwards, Don 
  Farbstein, Leonard 
  Feighan, Michael 
  Ford, William 
  Fraser, Donald 
  Friedel, Samuel 
  Gilbert, Jacob 
  Hanley, James 
  Hathaway, William 
  Hawkins, Gus 
  Howard, James 
  Johnson, Harold 
  Koch, Edward 
  Leggett, Robert 
  Matsunaga, Spark 
  Meeds, Lloyd 
  Mikva, Abner 
  Miller, George Paul 
  Mink, Patsy 
  Moorhead, William 
  Moss, John 
  O'Neill, Tip 
  Perkins, Carl 
  Powell, Adam 
  Pucinski, Roman 
  Rooney, Frederick 
  Ryan, William 
  Scheuer, James 
  Thompson, Frank 
  Wilson, Charles H. 
  Wolff, Lester 
  Zablocki, Clement 
    
92
nd
 
(1971-1973) 
Brademas, John 
  Burton, Phil 
  Clay, Bill 
  Dent, John 
  Dulski, Thaddeus 
  Edwards, Don 
  Eilberg, Joshua 
  Ford, William 
  Gibbons, Sam 
  Kastenmeier, Robert 
  Koch, Edward 
  Leggett, Robert 
  Matsunaga, Spark 
  Meeds, Lloyd 
  Mikva, Abner 
  Mink, Patsy 
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  Moss, John 
  Nix, Robert 
  Pepper, Claude 
  Podell, Bertram 
  Powell, Adam 
  
Rostenkowski, 
Daniel 
  Roybal, Edward 
  Scheuer, James 
  
St. Germain, 
Fernand 
  Stokes, Louis 
  Wilson, Charles H. 
  Wolff, Lester 
94
th
 
(1975-1977) 
  
  Abzug, Bella 
  Addabbo, Joseph 
  Anderson, Glenn 
  AuCoin, Les 
  Badillo, Herman 
  Beard, Edward 
  Benitez, Jamie 
  Biaggi, Mario 
  Bingham, Jonathan 
  Boggs, Lindy 
  Boland, Edward 
  Bonker, Don 
  Brademas, John 
  Brown, George 
  Burke, Yvonne 
  Carney, Charles 
  Carr, Bob 
  Clay, Bill 
  Collins, Cardiss 
  Conyers, John 
  Corman, James 
  Cornell, Robert 
  Daniels, Dominick 
  Dellums, Ronald 
  Dent, John 
  Drinan, Robert 
  Edwards, Don 
  Eilberg, Joshua 
  Fascell, Dante 
  Flood, Daniel 
  Florio, James 
  Ford, Harold 
  Fraser, Donald 
  Gibbons, Sam 
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  González, Henry 
  Green, William 
  Hannaford, Mark 
  Harrington, Michael 
  Hawkins, Gus 
  Hayes, Philip 
  Hechler, Kenneth 
  Holtzman, Elizabeth 
  Jordan, Barbara 
  Kastenmeier, Robert 
  Keys, Martha 
  Koch, Edward 
  Lehman, William 
  Matsunaga, Spark 
  Meeds, Lloyd 
  Metcalfe, Ralph 
  Mikva, Abner 
  Miller, George  
  Mineta, Norman 
  Mink, Patsy 
  Mitchell, Parren 
  Moakley, John 
  Moorhead, William 
  Nix, Robert 
  Oberstar, James 
  Ottinger, Richard 
  Pepper, Claude 
  Perkins, Carl 
  Rangel, Charles 
  Rees, Thomas 
  
Richmond, 
Frederick 
  Riegle, Donald 
  Rodino, Peter 
  Roe, Robert 
  
Rosenthal, 
Benjamin 
  Roybal, Edward 
  Sarbanes, Paul 
  Scheuer, James 
  Schroeder, Patricia 
  Seiberling, John 
  Solarz, Stephen 
  Spellman, Gladys 
  Stokes, Louis 
  Thompson, Frank 
  Waxman, Henry 
  Wilson, Charles H. 
  Won, Pat 
  Young, Andrew 
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96
th
 
(1979-1981) 
  
  Bingham, Jonathan 
  Dixon, Julian 
  Ferraro, Geraldine 
  Flood, Daniel 
  Garcia, Robert 
  Guarini, Frank 
  Hawkins, Gus 
  Lehman, William 
  Mikulski, Barbara 
  Ottinger, Richard 
  Roybal, Edward 
  Solarz, Stephen 
  Stark, Pete 
  Stokes, Louis 
98
th
 
(1983-1985) 
  
  Ackerman, Gary 
  Albosta, Donald 
  Barnes, Michael 
  Berman, Howard 
  Boner, William 
  Bonior, David 
  Boxer, Barbara 
  Brooks, Jack 
  Carr, Bob 
  Coelho, Anthony 
  Conyers, John 
  Crockett, George 
  Dixon, Julian 
  Donnelly, Brian 
  Dwyer, Bernard 
  Edgar, Robert 
  Fazio, Victor 
  Ferraro, Geraldine 
  Ford, Harold 
  Frank, Barney 
  Gejdenson, Sam 
  Gray, William 
  Guarini, Frank 
  Hawkins, Gus 
  Howard, James 
  Kaptur, Marcy 
  Kastenmeier, Robert 
  Kennelly, Barbara 
  Kildee, Dale 
  LaFalce, John 
  Lantos, Tom 
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  Lehman, Richard 
  Lehman, William 
  Leland, George 
  Levine, Meldon 
  Long, Clarence 
  Matsui, Robert 
  Mikulski, Barbara 
  Mineta, Norman 
  Moody, Jim 
  Morrison, Bruce 
  Neal, Stephen 
  Nowak, Henry 
  Oakar, Mary 
  Oberstar, James 
  Ottinger, Richard 
  Richardson, William 
  Rose, Charles 
  Sabo, Martin 
  Schroeder, Patricia 
  Schumer, Charles 
  Shannon, James 
  Smith, Lawrence 
  Solarz, Stephen 
  Stark, Pete 
  Stokes, Louis 
  Studds, Gerry 
  Torricelli, Robert 
  Weiss, Theodore 
  Wheat, Alan 
  Wolpe, Howard 
  Yates, Sidney 
    
101
st
  
(1989-1990) 
  
  Akaka, Daniel 
  Atkins, Chester 
  Bates, Jim 
  Berman, Howard 
  Boggs, Lindy 
  Bonior, David 
  Borski, Robert 
  Bosco, Douglas 
  Boxer, Barbara 
  Brennan, Joseph 
  Bryant, John 
  Bustamante, Albert 
  Campbell, Ben 
  Cardin, Benjamin 
  Carper, Thomas 
  Clay, Bill 
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  Coleman, Ronald 
  Collins, Cardiss 
  Conyers, John 
  Crockett, George 
  Dixon, Julian 
  Dwyer, Bernard 
  Dymally, Mervyn 
  Edwards, Don 
  Engel, Eliot 
  Espy, Albert 
  Evans, Lane 
  Fascell, Dante 
  Fazio, Victor 
  Flake, Floyd 
  Florio, James 
  Foglietta, Thomas 
  Ford, William 
  Frank, Barney 
  Garcia, Robert 
  Gejdenson, Sam 
  González, Henry 
  Guarini, Frank 
  Hawkins, Gus 
  Hayes, Philip 
  Hoagland, Peter 
  Johnston, Harry 
  Jontz, James 
  Kennedy, Joseph 
  Kennelly, Barbara 
  Kildee, Dale 
  Lantos, Tom 
  Laughlin, Gregory 
  Lehman, Richard 
  Lehman, William 
  Leland, George 
  Levine, Meldon 
  Lewis, John 
  Lowey, Nita 
  Manton, Thomas 
  Markey, Ed 
  Martínez, Matthew 
  Mavroules, Nicholas 
  McCloskey, Francis 
  McDermott, Jim 
  McHugh, Matthew 
  McNulty, Michael 
  Mfume, Kweisi 
  Mineta, Norman 
  Moakley, John 
  Moody, Jim 
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  Morrison, Bruce 
  Mrazek, Robert 
  Murphy, Austin 
  Neal, Richard 
  Neal, Stephen 
  Oakar, Mary 
  Owens, Douglas 
  Owens, Major 
  Pallone, Frank 
  Payne, Donald 
  Pelosi, Nancy 
  Pepper, Claude 
  Poshard, Glenn 
  Rahall, Nick 
  Richardson, William 
  Savage, Gus 
  Sawyer, Thomas 
  Scheuer, James 
  Schroeder, Patricia 
  Schumer, Charles 
  Sikorski, Gerald 
  Skaggs, David 
  Solarz, Stephen 
  Staggers, Harley 
  Stark, Pete 
  Stokes, Louis 
  Studds, Gerry 
  Swift, Allan 
  Torres, Esteban 
  Towns, Ed 
  Traxler, Jerome 
  Udall, Morris 
  Unsoeld, Jolene 
  Vento, Bruce 
  Visclosky, Peter 
  Walgren, Douglas 
  Weiss, Theodore 
  Wheat, Alan 
  Wolpe, Howard 
  Yates, Sidney 
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2) US childcare bills with middle-income benefits, 90
th
 Congress – 101st Congress (Pre-1973 
bills listed in Congressional Record 90
th
 -93
rd
 Congresses, Sessions 1 and 2. Post-1973 bill 
retrieved from the Library of Congresses’ Thomas bill search. Full details available on request.) 
 
90
th
 (1967-1969) 
-HR 9720: Pre-school Supplementary Education Act 
 
91
st
 (1969-1971) 
-HR 4190: Pre-school Supplementary Education Act 
-HR 4191: Pre-school Supplementary Education Act 
-HR4314: To amend the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 
-HR 13520: To provide comprehensive pre-school education programs in the --- 
-Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
-HR19362: Compressive child development program in the Department HEW 
-HR 15776:  Compressive child development program in the Department HEW 
 
92
nd
 (1971-1973) 
-HR 6719: Comprehensive child development program in the Department of HEW 
-HR 6748: comprehensive child development program in the Department of HEW 
-HR 7333: Comprehensive child development program in the Department of HEW 
-HR: 7750: Comprehensive child development program in the HEW:  
-HR 10952: Comprehensive child development program in the Department of HEW 
-HR 7397 
-HR 7349: Compressive child development program in the Department HEW 
-HR 7353: Compressive child development program in the Department HEW: 
-HR: 7336: Compressive child development program in the Department HEW 
-HR7355: Compressive child development program in the Department HEW 
 
93
rd
 (1973-1975) 
-H.R.2967: Child and Family Services Act  
-H.R. 2970: Child and Family Services Act 
-H.R. 2966: Child and Family Services Act 
-H.R. 2968: Child and Family Services Act 
-H.R. 2969: Child and Family Services Act 
-H.R.3624: Child and Family Services Act 
-H.R.8179: Child and Family Services Act 
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94
th
 (1975-1977) 
- H.R.1121: Child Care Act of 1979 
 
98
th
 (1983-1985) 
- H.R.1603: A bill to provide an effective and cost-effective program for children in the areas 
of child welfare, child care, health care, education…Amends the Internal Revenue Code to 
increase the income tax credit for household and dependent care expenses from 20 percent to 
a maximum of 50 percent of such expenses. Reduces such percentage by one percent for each 
full $1,000 by which the taxpayer's adjusted gross income exceeds $10,000. 
 
101
st
 (1989-1991) 
H.R.3: Act for Better Child Care Services of 1990 
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Appendix D: Binary Logistic Regression Tables 
1) US Democrats, 91st and 101st Congresses 
 
     Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
University .751 (1.001) .721 (.971) 1.300 
(.946) 
-.850 
(1.350) 
Female  -1.779 
(1.695) 
-1.854 
(1.747) 
-1.909 
(1.652) 
-1.29 
(.558) 
ADA Score, 91st .000 (.012) .020* (.009)   
COPE Score, 91st     .064* 
(.026) 
   
ADA - COPE   .002 (.009)  
COPE - ADA     -.029** 
(.009) 
Southern -1.312 (.929) -1.648* 
(.768) 
-2.541*** 
(.663) 
-1.110*** 
(.291) 
Ed and Labor Cmte 3.579** 
(1.259) 
3.175** 
(1.263) 
4.019** 
(1.271) 
.808 (.549) 
(Constant) -7.795*** 
(2.330) 
-3.103 
(1.011)** 
-2.272 
(.960)* 
1.554 
(1.360) 
Pseudo R
2 
 N= 250 
.372 .297 .269 .169 
   
***p<0.001, **p<0.01,  *p<0.05, +p<0.1 
Table A.D.1, Binary logistic regression, 91st Congress, US Democrats (Source: Congressional Record, Sharp 2000) 
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     Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
University -1.534 (1.514) -1.533 
(1.533) 
-8.50 
(1.350) 
1.294 
(.947) 
Female  .265 (.652) .223 
(.651) 
-.129 
(.558) 
-1.900 
(1.649) 
ADA Score, 101st .046 (.012)*** .045*** 
(.009) 
  
COPE Score, 101st -.004 (.013)    
ADA - COPE   .029** 
(.009) 
 
COPE - ADA     -.002 
(.009) 
Southern -1.75 (.378) -.081 
(.370) 
-1.110*** 
(.291) 
-2.533*** 
(.663) 
Ed and Labor Cmte .615 (.611) .554 
(.608) 
.808 
(.549) 
4.020** 
(1.269) 
(Constant) -1.327 (1.641) -1.569 
(1.625) 
1.554 
(1.360) 
-2.285 
(.960)* 
Pseudo R
2 
N = 275 
.274 .273 .169 .267 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1      
Table A.D.2, Binary logistic regression, 101st Congress, US Democrats (Source: Congressional Record, Sharp 2000) 
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2) Australian Labor Party, 28th and 34th Parliaments  
     Model 1 
University 1.905* 
(.747) 
Female (0)  
Trade Union -1.379 
(1.132) 
CC/Women’s Ministerial Post 1.855 
(1.453) 
Female*University -- 
(Constant) -2.289*** 
(.628) 
Pseudo R
2 
N = 68 
  .290 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1  
Table A.D.3, Binary logistic regression, 28th Parliament, Australian Labor Party (Source: Commonwealth of Australia 
Hansard) 
 
     Model 1 Model 2 
University .809+ (.475) .717 (.514) 
Female  1.772 (1.129)  1.744 (1.128) 
(+.122) 
Trade Union -.414 (.655) -.701 (.929) 
CC/Women’s Ministerial Post -21.3 (4.1) -21.6 (4.19) 
Female*University    .605 (1.341) 
(Constant) -.271 (.387) -.215 (.405) 
Pseudo R
2 
N = 83 
  .129 .132 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1  
Table A.D.4, Binary logistic regression, 34th Parliament, Australian Labor Party (Source: Commonwealth of Australia 
Hansard) 
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3) British Labour Party, 48th and 52nd Parliaments  
 
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
University 
-.112 (.492) -.093 (.497) .016 (.537) 
Female 
1.961** (.631) 2.514** 
(.670) 
2.541* 
(1.106) 
Trade Union 
-.985+ (.566) -.850 (.578) -.954+ (.570) 
CC/Women’s Ministerial Post 
1.858 (1.278) 1.863 (1.273) 1.891 (1.281) 
Female*Union 
 -20.1 (28.4)  
Female*University 
  -.852 (.527) 
(Constant) 
-2.221 
(.451)*** 
-2.268*** 
(.461) 
-2.309*** 
(.483) 
Pseudo R
2 
N = 282 
.117 .125 .120 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1  
Table A.D.5, Binary logistic regression, 48th Parliament, British Labour Party (Source: Commonwealth of Australia 
Hansard) 
 
 
 
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
University 
.137 (.267) .099 (.270) .069 (.292) 
Female 
1.300*** 
(.250) 
1.176*** 
(.280) 
1.001 (.707) 
Trade Union 
-.325 (.240)  -.445 (.274) -.453 (.276)+ 
CC/Women’s Ministerial Post 
1.658 (1.131) 1.670 (1.127) 1.667 (1.128)  
Female*Union 
 .582 (.617) .578 (.617) 
Female*University   .201 (.748) 
(Constant) 
-.697** (.259) -.634 (.266)+ -.608* (.282) 
R
2 
N = 419 
  .119 .121 .122 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1  
Table A.D.6, Binary logistic regression, 52ndth Parliament, British Labour Party (Source: Commonwealth of Australia 
Hansard) 
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4) Cross-national comparison 
 Democrats T1 
(1969-71) 
ALP T1 
(1972-1974) 
Labour T1 
(1979-1983) 
Female -1.29 (.558) -- 1.961** (.631) 
University -.850 (1.350) 1.905* (.747) -.112 (.492) 
Union/COPE-
ADA 
-.029** (.009) -1.379 (1.132) -.985+ (.566) 
Ministerial/Cmte .808 (.549) 1.855 (1.453) 1.858 (1.278) 
Southern -1.110*** (.291 -- -- 
(Constant) 1.554 (1.360) -2.289*** (.628 -2.221 (.451)*** 
Pseudo R2 .169 .290 .117 
N 250 68 282 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1  
Table A.D.7, Binary logistic regressions, T1 comparison  
 
 Democrats T2 
(1989-91) 
ALP T2 
(1984-1987) 
Labour T2 
(1997-2001) 
Female -1.900 (1.649) 1.772 (1.129) 1.300*** (.250) 
University 1.294 (.947) .809+ (.475) .137 (.267) 
Union/COPE-
ADA 
-.002 (.009) -.414 (.655) -.325 (.240) 
Ministerial/Cmte 4.020** (1.269) -21.3 (4.1) 1.658 (1.131) 
Southern -2.533*** (.663) -- -- 
(Constant) -2.285 (.960)* -.271 (.387) -.697** (.259) 
R
2
 .267 .129 .119 
N 275 83 419 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1  
Table A.D.8, Binary logistic regressions, T2 comparison  
 
